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1 Conceptualizing Gender, Religion and Islam 
Women’s movements in Islamic countries have had a long and arduous journey 
in their quest for the realization of what is called human rights and gender equal­
ity. In some of these countries, there has not been much progress beyond rudi­
mentary issues (see Abu Zaid 1999: 106–109). Some of the problems that the 
women’s movement in Iran still struggles with have been challenges for over a 
century, and which have not yet been overcome. An example is the right to guard­
ianship of children, which grants the privilege of managing and supervising the 
affairs of children below the age of eighteen to their father or paternal grandfa­
ther, leaving the mother with no legal say in the matter. Furthermore, men in 
most Muslim countries (including Iran) are granted the right to polygamy, which 
allows a man to marry up to four wives. 
One reason of not being able to change such laws is that these laws have been 
supported by religion. The experience of many western and non­western coun­
tries shows that discriminatory laws have existed all around the world through­
out history. However, the question arises here of how in some countries discrim­
inatory laws get abrogated through proving that they are unjust and inhuman 
with respect to women, but in many countries whose laws are based on Islamic 
law, it takes a long time to achieve even a tiny amendment of discriminatory laws. 
Since the source of law in Islamic countries like Iran is claimed to be Islam­
ic law, this raises the question of whether discriminatory laws against women 
do in fact originate from Islam and ultimately, if Islam is at all compatible with 
gender equality. To deal with this topic it is important to note that Islam is not a 
monolithic and homogenous religious tradition. There have been different inter­
pretations of Islam, each having diverse views on the legitimacy and applicabil­
ity of all Islamic law in modern times, and consequently having various perspec­
tives on gender equality. 
The main common feature throughout all different interpretations of Islam is 
that of emphasizing the fulfilment of justice in society as a central aim of reli­
gion in general and Islam in particular. Fulfilment of justice is mentioned in both 
the Quran and Muhammad’s traditions (sunna); however, there was no given 
definition of justice in either the Quran or the sunna. 
Accordingly, various interpretations of Islam offer different definitions of jus­
tice in which women’s rights and gender equality inhabit different places. A look 
at the current situation of women in Iran as an Islamic country shows that wom­
en are still deprived of economic, political, and cultural rights. A woman, re­
gardless of having reached the age of majority or her social position, requires 
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the permission of her father or her paternal grandfather to get married. A wom­
an still needs her husband’s permission to travel outside the country; her testi­
mony is not acceptable in a court of law in many types of crimes and when it is 
accepted her testimony is not equal with a man’s; and her life is less worthy than 
a man’s by making her blood money1 half that of a man’s. Women do not have 
the right to choose their clothing; they are banned from being solo singers; and 
they are barred from entering stadiums to watch matches attended by men, 
among other prohibitions. 
The question that arises from these circumstances is whether it is possible to 
claim to have a just society in which women are deprived of some of their fun­
damental human rights. Furthermore, is it justifiable to deprive women of these 
rights in some societies to defend the cultural and religious lifeworld2? Are con­
cepts such as justice, human dignity, human rights and gender equality relative 
concepts which have different definitions in various locales of the world? Or are 
these concepts universal and should they be enforced with international support, 
regardless of particular cultural and religious conditions? The international de­
bate within the United Nations has resulted in establishing universal human and 
women’s rights, as in the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Dis­
crimination against Women (CEDAW3). In other word, these rights now are glob­
al consensus and not a Western privilege. Are they compatible with Islam and 
how do its most important currents relate to this?
The issues of gender justice and Islam have been debated in the social sci­
ences and in society in general, enough to fill up whole libraries. Most authors 
followed a path of analyzing the provisions of the Quran on women and gender. 
1  Blood Money (diya/diyyah) in Islamic law is the financial compensation one must pay to the in­
jured person when he or she intentionally or unintentionally causes bodily harm or property 
damage to another. It can be paid to heirs of a victim in the cases of murder, in lieu of execu­
tion (Maurer & Mireshghi 2013: 90)
2  The concept of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) was introduced by Edmund Husserl in his book The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology:
    “In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe 
of existing objects, we, each “I­the­man” and all of us together, belong to the world as living 
with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as exist­
ing precisely through this ‘living together.’ We, as living in wakeful world­consciousness, are 
constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world... Obviously this is true not 
only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre­given in this 
together, belong, the world as world for all, pre­given with this ontic meaning... The we­subjec­
tivity... [is] constantly functioning” (Husserl 1936: pp. 108–109).
3  The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted 
on December 18, 1979. It was enforced on September 3, 1981, after being ratified by twenty 
member states. Currently, 189 states are parties to the convention and only six UN member states 
have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention. These states include Iran, Somalia, Sudan, 
Tonga, Palau (signed on September 20, 2011) and the United States of America (signed on 17 
July 1980). Signing the convention differs from ratification. The signature does not establish the 
consent to be bound, while ratification indicates a state’s consent to be bound to the Conven­
tion.
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They have been looking at their origins, their historic contexts and their poten­
tial adaptability to modern societies. Often the interpretations remain locked into 
a repetition of one’s own position and a polarization with other positions.
I want to propose a new perspective on this old problem. We should look not 
at parts and sentences of sacred texts, but rather at gender in the context of Is­
lam as a long term tradition and living religion.
Therefore, I analyze the different interpretations of women’s and human rights 
by reconstructing the interpretations of three core issues. The first is the issue 
of religion, Islamic law and the Quran. The second refers to the view of human 
reason – and the potential endowment of men and women with it – as well as 
gendered rights, especially women’s rights. The third issue is the view of human 
rights considering Islamic teachings and the universal norms of justice. These 
points provide an interrelated set of issues for a comparative analysis. They are 
seen in their interrelationship and referred to each other in the discussion. 
The different currents in Islam have developed diverse combinations between 
reason, revelation and modernity, as shall be argued, and the concepts of gender 
inequality/equality should be considered in light of these relationships. Differ­
ent interpretations of Islam are demonstrated in the main streams of Islamic 
thought including fundamentalist, reformist, and secular streams, in a sociocul­
tural context. According to fundamentalists, since religion is aimed at manag­
ing human society and educating the human being, it is necessary to have rules 
and regulations in accordance with the requirements of society as well as hu­
man nature. These regulations and laws have inevitably remained the same 
throughout human history. This is because human nature is unchangeable. 
Changes can only be made in the manners and habits of human beings in the 
material world. Hence, the only one capable of legislation is one who knows the 
characteristics and the essence of human existence. In other words, only God 
has the right to legislate laws for human beings. As a result, the human being 
requires religion and revelation to manage his individual as well as social af­
fairs, in order to reach salvation and felicity in social and individual life (Amo­
li 2010). Accordingly, fundamentalists reject the idea of the flexibility of law ac­
cording to time and circumstance. Human beings need to rely on eternal and 
absolute values, as well as on a set of laws and practices that are beyond time 
and the wishes of fallible people. Such eternal law, according to fundamental­
ists, can be found in Islamic law aimed at the salvation of human beings in this 
world and in the afterlife (Mesbah Yazdi 1999).
Reformists aim to present an interpretation of Islam in which Islamic laws 
are compatible with modern concepts, such as human and women’s rights. They 
apply different internal religious methods to address such modern concepts in 
sunna and the Quran. In this way, they offer an interpretation of Islam based on 
an egalitarian notion of justice, which is not only compatible with human rights 
and gender equality in general, but also acknowledge such concepts as essential 
for Muslim society. 
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Secular Muslims have emerged from the reformist view. It seems that reform­
ists are gradually leaning towards more recognition of human reason and indi­
vidual agency. According to this view, all people living in the modern era have 
different ideas and worldviews from people in traditional societies (Malekian 
1381/2002). They do not aim at finding the modern concepts in sunna and Is­
lamic law, but rather they believe that modern life needs modern means, which 
do not necessarily originate from sunna or the Quran. Such concepts are out­
comes of human reason and are required to achieve justice in the modern era. 
They reject the text­based definition of being Muslim and emphasize the role of 
faith, spirituality and religious experience (Mojtahed Shabestari 1389/2010); 
therefore, I would call this school of thought secular Muslim. 
The categorization of various interpretations of Islam is of crucial importance, 
for it provides a better understanding and knowledge of Islam, both in the Is­
lamic and non­Islamic world. Globalization and the advancement of global com­
munication no longer restrict Muslims and their issues to the Islamic world. On 
the one hand, the categorizing of different interpretations of Islam widens the 
space for discussion about Islam in the public sphere in the non­Islamic world, 
rather than to be silent on the topic out of fear of condemnation and being la­
beled an Islamophobe. On the other hand, it challenges the orientalist perspec­
tive that reduces Islam to an alien and aggressive religion, incompatible with 
modern views and concepts, such as human rights and gender equality, and gen­
eralizes all Muslims as retrogressive, fanatical and bigoted. This orientalist per­
spective, however, is also sometimes based on one of the most visible and prev­
alent interpretations of Islam, which legitimatizes its violence and opposition to 
human rights and gender equality through referring to some verses mentioned 
in the Quran, some parts of the prophet’s tradition (sunna) and Islamic jurispru­
dence (fiqh). 
This book aims to investigate the different interpretations of Islam to find out 
which interpretations are compatible with the global norms of justice and hu­
man dignity, and hence in accordance with women’s rights and gender equali­
ty. It also reflects, according to those interpretations, that a belief in the concept 
of gender equality is not against religious faith and being Muslim.
Accordingly, Chapter Two presents different definitions of religion in sociol­
ogy and introduces the debate on the secularization thesis. Then I proceed with 
an explanation of fundamentalism as a reaction to secularization. After a brief 
historical overview of the most important concepts, the chapter discusses the 
theories of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann about religion, in order to in­
vestigate the dialectical relationship between society and human beings and ac­
cordingly, the dialectical relationship between individual agents and religion. It 
also examines how this dialectical relationship can be disrupted, which causes 
a crisis of meaning, in that religion is unable to offer a value and meaning sys­
tem to satisfy the human needs of meaning and spirituality. The dialectic rela­
tionship between individual agent and religion, and their roles in building iden­
tity in modern society, is further investigated through the Structuration Theory 
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of Anthony Giddens. It is followed by a discussion of the theory of recognition 
and its contemporary advocats, including Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser, which 
allows for the discussion of the of concept justice and its relation to the concept 
of self­realization. The proceeding section deals with the question of how a prac­
tical aspect of recognition theory as a concept of cosmopolitan norms of justice 
incorporates in international conventions such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Dis­
crimination Against Women (CEDAW), as discussed by Seyla Benhabib.
I propose a theoretical model through synthesizing these theories, which aims 
to support a theoretical analysis of main streams of Islamic thought as well as 
provide an outline for expert interviews with representatives of each group of 
Islamic thought, which took place during the empirical research phase. Accord­
ing to this theoretical model, this study aimed to investigate the main currents 
of Islamic thought in three subjects. The first group deals with the concept of 
the individual and human reason, and aims to present the perspectives of each 
stream of Islamic thought on the equality of men and women. The second con­
cept is that of religion as structure. The definition of religion and the approach 
to the Quran and sunna as the source of revelation and Islamic law shall be de­
bated here. The third concept is perspectives on the UDHR and CEDAW and 
their acceptability in different interpretations of Islam. These points provide a 
theoretical model for a comparative analysis in second part of the book. 
The methods applied in this research project, including comparative and doc­
umentary methods as well as the qualitative method of expert interviews, are in­
troduced in Chapter Three. The methods of sampling the representatives of the 
main currents of Islamic thought, the designing of the guidelines of the interviews 
as well as the methods of analyzing the interviews are explained in this chapter.
Chapter Four offers a brief history of the rise and fall of women’s rights with­
in Iran’s legal system since the beginning of the constitutional revolution in Iran 
between 1905 and 1911, when women were deprived of socio­political rights, 
through to the era of Reza Shah, who tried to modernize the country by banning 
Muslim women from wearing the veil. It is preceded by a brief summary of the 
struggles of women for their suffrage and the establishment of the Family Pro­
tection Law (FPL) in the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, and the regression of 
some women’s rights in both public and private realms after the revolution of 
1979, claimed as being based on Islamic jurisprudence. The historical overview 
of changes in women’s rights ends with a synopsis of the situation of women in 
different eras of presidency in Iran after the revolution, until the first era of pres­
idency of Hasan Rouhani (August 2013–2017).
The second part of the fourth chapter presents a historical overview of the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), as well as an investigation of the current state of women’s rights 
within the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This shall be done 
through a comparison of Islamic law vis­à­vis the provisions in CEDAW, in or­
der to gain a schema of the current legal situation of women in Iran.
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Chapter Five introduces fundamentalist, reformist, and secular perspectives 
on the position of women, presented through research in various Islamic coun­
tries. It also offers some aspects of the historical development of the main 
streams of Islamic thought. Despite significant regional and political differenc­
es among such various Islamic perspectives, they have certain similar features 
which are explained in this chapter. In this way, this chapter provides an intro­
ductory explanation of current research on women in different interpretations of 
Islam, so that I can present the foundation and substructure of the main currents 
of Islamic thought through a sociological perspective. This chapter also offers 
a brief historical review of the most important schools of theology in Islam – 
Mu’tazili and Ash’ari from the second century AH (after hijra, approximately 
the eighth century AD), which is essential to gaining a better understanding of 
the arguments of the main streams of Islam in the modern era. 
The second part of the book, consisting of Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, 
provides a comparative analysis of the groundwork and fundamental arguments 
of the main currents of Islam – fundamentalist, reformist, and secular – apply­
ing the theoretical model presented in Chapter Two to the three core issues. To 
recap, these issues are religion (Islamic law, the Quran and sunna), individual 
agency (human reason), and global norms of justice and human dignity (CE­
DAW, UDHR). The book concludes with Chapter Nine, presenting the outcomes 
of this study of changing gender norms in Islam – between reason and revela­
tion.
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2  Towards a Theoretical Model for Changing Gender Norms 
in the Main Streams of Islamic Thought
The overarching goal of this research aims to study women’s rights in four cat­
egories – family, economic, political and cultural – from the perspectives of the 
three main Islamic schools of thought (fundamentalist, reformist and secularist) 
in Iran since the 1979 Revolution. To this aim, I propose a theoretical model by 
synthesizing theories of the sociology of religion (Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann), sociological action theory (Anthony Giddens’ structural theory) and 
struggles related to universal norms of justice (Nancy Fraser, Axel Honneth, Sey­
la Benhabib). This theoretical model shall support a theoretical analysis of the 
main streams of Islamic thought, as well as provide an outline for expert inter­
views with representatives of each group in the empirical section of the research. 
2 1 Religion in Sociology
To discuss theories of the sociology of religion, a definition of religion is re­
quired. Over the centuries, different scholars have commented on what religion 
is; nevertheless, there is no consensus about which definition fully encompass­
es this complicated concept. Some definitions have been very narrow and have 
tended to exclude some forms of beliefs and practices which seem to be reli­
gious for other scholars, while other definitions have been as vague and gener­
al as to include other areas of human sciences like law, psychology, philosophy, 
etc.
Substantive and functional definitions of religion
The various definitions of religion are categorized in two groups. First, sub-
stantive, which refers to the essence and nature of religion, while the second 
focuses on the functional elements of religion – what religion does. Roberts 
and Yaman (2012) elaborate the features of these two types of definitions. The 
substantive definition, as they explain, emphasizes a specific belief in a super­
natural realm. The substantive definition was used in 1873 by Edward B. Taylor 
MARZIYEH.indd   17 21.06.18   14:28
18
(1958: 8 cited in Roberts & Yamane 2016: 3). He defined religion as “belief in 
spiritual beings.” He regarded the term spiritual beings to be more inclusive than 
belief in gods (ibid.). 
Durkheim also provides a substantive definition of religion in his book The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) as “a unified system of beliefs and 
practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – 
beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral community called a church, 
all those who adhere to them” (Durkheim 1992 (1912): 62). The substantive defi­
nition also distinguishes sacred from profane realms of experience and focuses 
on what the sacred is. That is the special feature of religion for Durkheim, which 
helps in the recognition of religion in different cultures since people’s attitude 
towards religious rituals differs from their everyday experiences: “the religious 
life and the profane life cannot coexist in the same unit of time: it is necessary 
to assign determined days or periods to the first, from which all profane occu­
pations are excluded. […] there is no religion, and, consequently, no society 
which has not known and practiced this division of time into two distinct parts” 
(Durkheim 1912 (1995): 347, in: Roberts and Yamane 2016: 4). In this way, 
Durkheim also recognizes the sacred attitude as a group experience; therefore, 
religion is a common activity (Roberts and Yamane 2012: 4–5). Accordingly, 
Durkheim was most concerned with the relationship between religion and soci­
ety; hence, he moved beyond an individualistic depiction of religion. Substan­
tive definitions are more focused on traditional forms of religion, and are there­
fore unable to explain the new ways of religiosity in complex and changing 
societies (ibid.: 18). 
An alternative to substantive definitions of religion are functional definitions. 
Milton Yinger suggests that we focus on what religion does rather than what re­
ligion essentially is: “it is not the nature of belief, but the nature of believing 
that requires our study” (Yinger 1970: 11 in: Roberts and Yamane 2012: 7). Wil­
liam James (1979) offers a functional definition of religion through an under­
standing of the subjective experience of individuals involved in religious prac­
tice. In his point of view, religion pertains to “feelings, acts and experiences of 
individual men [sic] in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to 
stand in relation to whatever they consider the divine” (1979: 50, quoted in Hafez 
2011: 31).
The functional definition, as Roberts and Yaman explain, considers religion 
as a provider of “a sense of ultimate meaning, a system of macro symbols, and 
a set of core value systems”(Roberts and Yamane 2012: 18). Paul Tillich (1957) 
offers a functional definition of religion: “Religion, in the largest and most ba­
sic sense of the word, is ultimate concern” (Tillich 1959: 7–8) and “our ultimate 
concern is that which determines our being and non­being. [… ] Nothing can be 
of ultimate concern for us which does not have the power of threating and sav­
ing our being” (Tillich 1973: 14). This concept of ‘ultimate concern’ was devel­
oped by Milton Yinger (1970) as underlining the importance of meaning sys­
tems to “understand the purpose of life and the meaning of death, suffering, evil, 
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and injustice”, which provide human beings with a strategy to overcome the ma­
jor concerns of human life, including futility and despair (Roberts and Yamane 
2012: 7).
In this definition, religion can be considered as a resource to provide a mean­
ing system with different dimensions, such as a shared world view, as well as 
the Ritualistic dimension (religious practice); the Experiential (religious expe­
rience and emotions); the Intellectual (religious knowledge); the Social (insti­
tutional organization of the religious community); the Ethical (formal and mor­
al laws); and a set of routinized social expectations and patterns (Reich 2011: 
283; Roberts and Yamane 2012: 12).
The considerable point here is how meaning systems are created throughout 
human life. Here ‘time’ plays a relevant role in the equation. As Droogers (2011) 
says, “disciplines and theories change in the course of time, therefore, every era 
will produce its particular definition of religion.” Hence, it would be a mistake 
to ignore the era’s conditions, such as modernism and its consequences, or the 
process of the secularization thesis. Talal Asad also emphasizes that the “terms 
‘religious’ and ‘secular’ can be understood only in relation and opposition to 
each other. Thus, any redefinition of the secular necessarily involves a redefini­
tion of the religious, and vice versa” (in Van Antwerpen 2012: 7). 
Therefore, the debate on the secularization thesis has crucial significance for 
the definition of religion in the sociology of religion, even though it may influ­
ence that definition (Droogers 2011: 269). In what follows, the concept of sec­
ularization shall be elaborated in order to gain a broader perspective of the con­
cept of religion in the modern era. 
The definition of secularization
The term ‘secularization’ was first used by George Jacob Holyoake in 1846 to 
explain a social order separated from religion.4 The term secularization was not 
used directly in classical Sociology. However, it can be traced in the works of 
the fathers of sociology – Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Max Weber, Emile 
Durkheim and Karl Marx. They were all convinced that the consequences of the 
Enlightenment and industrialization would lead to the decline of the religious. 
For example, Comte recognizes three stages of human society, from the theo­
logical stage to the metaphysical stage, and finally to the fully scientific stage. 
Eventually, science (and especially sociology) would replace religion. Similar­
ly Weber, with the concept of rationality, Durkheim with the concept of differ-
entiation, and Tönnies with the concept of ‘Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft’ provid­
ed a basis for further developing the term ‘secularization’ by later generations 
of sociologists like Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, and Bryan Wilson (Stolz 
4  Catholic Encyclopedia.Secularism. Available at: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13676a.htm
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and Könemann 2016: 11–12; Dobbelaere 2011: 599) in the second half of the 
twentieth century.
The definition of secularization has changed throughout history, especially 
insofar as some speak of neo-secularization. The initial point of secularization 
refers to a societal level – when subsystems in modern societies differentiated 
from each other because of their particular function, such as economy, polity 
and science. Every subsystem has its own autonomy, values and norms, reject­
ing religious autonomy and value systems. Therefore, secularization refers to 
the decline of religious authority over other subsystems, an outcome of modern­
ization, and it leads to the development of “functional rationality” (Dobbelaere 
2011: 600). For example, ‘charismatic’ authority barely has a place in a ratio­
nalized political system, and a cost­efficiency basis ousts religious ethos in the 
economy. The development of science also induces a scientific approach to the 
world rather than religious explanations which impact people’s everyday life 
and individual minds. This ultimately means the decline of religious beliefs and 
practices in individual life. Therefore secularization can be considered as a pro­
cess that started in a macro, societal level and continued into to micro, individ­
ual levels of analysis (Dobbelaere 2011: 600–601). However, in reality religion 
continues to be powerful at the individual level and also at a societal level. As 
Berger (1999) argues, “the world today, is as furiously religious as it ever was, 
and in some places more so than ever” (Berger 1999: 2). 
Berger has revised his opinion on promoting the secularization theory and 
emphasizes the continuity and upsurge of religion in the modern world. In his 
point of view, there is no inevitable link between secularization on the societal 
level and secularization on the level of individual minds. Perhaps some religious 
institutions lost their influence as a result of modernity, but both old and new re­
ligious beliefs and sometimes institutions continue to have social and political 
significance. Therefore the relation between religion and modernity is not as 
simple as the secularization theory of the 50s and 60s would have it, when it was 
assumed that modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in 
society and in the individual consciousness (Berger 1999: 3).
Some theoreticians, such as Bryan Turner, tried to offer a more precise defi­
nition of secularization, by distinguishing ‘political secularization’ from ‘social 
secularization’. In his point of view, political secularization refers to the public 
domain and political regulation; it is a historical process of separation of church 
and state, defining the place of religion in public life. Social secularization deals 
with values, culture and attitudes which are demonstrated in forms of rituals and 
practices and sites in the social sphere. Therefore, while a state is able to enforce 
religious regulation in the political sphere, it is difficult to restrict the social func­
tions of religion and control it in the social sphere. It is therefore important to 
distinguish which kind of secularization is meant within the debate on secular­
ization (Turner 2010: 651–654).
José Casanova (2006) also explained secularization using three different defi­
nitions. First, the most popular definition: that of a decline of religious beliefs 
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and practice at the individual level. Second: the privatization of religion, argu­
ing that today, “we are witnessing the ‘deprivatization’ of religion. […] Reli­
gious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and 
privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization 
had reserved for them” (Casanova 1994: 5). The third definition refers to clas­
sic theories of secularization which defines it as the differentiation of the secu­
lar spheres (state, economy, science), usually understood as ‘emancipation’ from 
religious institutions and norms at the societal level. Casanova argues that these 
definitions are differently applied in the debate on secularization in the United 
States or Europe. Perhaps the traditional theory of secularization is proper for 
Europe or more precisely in some parts of Europe, but not for the United States 
or for other parts of the world. 
Another definition of secularization is provided by Charles Taylor. He does 
not reject the idea of declining practices and declared belief in many countries 
per se; rather he explains that such decline depends on how religion is identi­
fied. Religion as ‘historic faith’ or ‘explicit belief in the supernatural’ seems to 
have declined, but religion as a ‘wide range of spiritual and semi­spiritual be­
liefs’ or as ‘the shape of ultimate concern’ is still present. Therefore, Taylor 
also believes that religion has not declined at the individual level; perhaps the 
earlier forms of religion have been destabilized and marginalized, but religion 
has arisen in new forms (Taylor 2007: 426–427). Therefore, it would be more 
helpful to consider Pluralism and, as Berger claims, “instead of continuing the 
debate in terms of decline or persistence, they have identified pluralism, diver­
sity and fragmentation as more fruitful ways of thinking about religion today” 
(in Fox 2010: 315–316) Many people today still believe in God and still ascribe 
to a certain religion without accepting the crucial dogmas in it – what Grace 
Davie calls ‘believing without belonging’ (Davie 1990). In this process, reli­
gion also tries to redefine and recompose itself in various ways (Taylor 2007: 
513–514).
To define secularity Taylor refers to several ideas and then supplements them 
further. He locates the concept of the secular in earlier ideas such as in classical 
or medical accounts that deal with the realm of ‘earthly’ politics and ‘mundane’ 
vocations, contrasting the secular with the sacred. He also reflects on secular­
ization theory and its application to the societal and individual level where reli­
gion and religious belief and participation have a decreased significance in pub­
lic spaces, and are being replaced with universal, neutral rationality as a 
consequence of modernity. In addition, secularity results in the decreasing im­
portance of religious belief and practice in everyday life (Taylor 2007).
But Taylor offers another definition of secularity, which is considered by some 
theoreticians such as James K. A. Smith (2012) as a basis for describing a new 
epoch, namely the ‘post­secular age’. In his definition Taylor underlines the new 
conditions of belief. A secular society is where religious belief and belief in God 
is considered as one disputable option among others for the individual. “The 
shift to secularity in this sense consists, among other things, of a move from a 
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society where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one 
in which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the 
easiest to embrace;” (Taylor 2007: 3) therefore, this definition of secularization 
deals with how ‘plausibility structures’ of modern societies make religion con­
testable, rather than with the waning of religion in late modern societies (Smith 
2012: 163–164). Taylor claims that this new context prevents the naïve acknowl­
edgment of transcendent and naïve religious faith. 
The remarkable point is that in Islamic societies, despite the obvious influ­
ence of the secular attitude, secularity is forced to be privatized, while religion 
plays the central role in the public sphere. Nonetheless, secularity can be traced 
in different parts of the life­world, including individuality, cultural changes and 
religious rationality. Hence, it is essential to study secularity even in strongly 
religious societies such as Islamic countries (Burchardt et al. 2015: 11–12). How­
ever, clarification of different concepts of ‘secular’, ‘secularism’ and ‘secular­
ization’ is required in order to apply the proper term in such societies.
Secularism is defined as “a political doctrine” (Asad 2003:1) that refers “to 
the arrangements of the institutional separation of politics/the state and religion 
as well as to their ideological legitimizations” (Wohlrab­Sahr and Burchardt 
2012: 880). The concept of secularization refers to“sociological process mod­
els addressing processes of functional differentiation, religious decline, and pri­
vatization of religious practice” (ibid.). Secular as “an epistemic category” (Asad 
2003:1) is considered as “an analytical term for the culturally, symbolically, and 
institutionally anchored forms of distinction between religious and non­religious 
spheres and material spaces” (Wohlrab­Sahr and Burchardt 2012: 881) There­
fore, ‘the secular’ is conceptually prior to the political doctrine of ‘secularism’ 
(Asad 2003:16), and is more inclusive. The concept of the secular is not con­
fined to the relation between religion and state, but also includes other dimen­
sions of society and the public sphere (Wohlrab­Sahr and Burchardt 2012: 881). 
In this regard, secularity is considered a result of social conflicts related to trans­
forming the social sphere and religion, rather than an antireligious or irreligious 
attitude (ibid. 904). It demonstrates itself beyond institutionalized rules, in the 
public discourse and the scope of everyday life. In other words – “people’s life­
worlds, with their multiple forms of embodying religious and secular ways of 
being, knowing and sensing” (Burchardt et al. 2015: 5).
Accordingly the concept of secularity, as Wohlrab­Sahr and Burchardt (2012) 
explain, can take different structures in various societies. They use the concept 
of “cultures of secularity” as well as “multiple secularities” to refer to “new ways 
of thinking about the relationships between religion and secularity in moderni­
ty that go beyond secularization theories” (ibid.). Perhaps cultures of seculari­
ty do not exist all over the world; but rather depend upon social and political 
conditions; nevertheless, they emphasize that considering conceptual space for 
an analysis of secularity is of crucial importance, even in strongly religious so­
cieties (ibid.: 6). Accordingly, this book aims to investigate the concept of sec­
ularity in an Islamic context. 
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Fundamentalism is regarded as a reaction to secularization which is not re­
stricted to the West and Christianity, but also to Islam. Before exploring the ap­
plicability of such ideas for religion, particularly in the Islamic world, funda­
mentalism shall be explained in the following section.
The definitions of fundamentalism
The term ‘fundamentalism’ is widely applied to regional, national, and even glob­
al developments which hold both religious and political dimensions, and which is 
traceable in all religions and in every major faith, including Christianity, Judaism, 
Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism (Armstrong 2002, Afary 1997). 
Fundamentalism is a controversial term, with many­layered meanings which it has 
attained on its uneven trajectory across cultures, interest groups and disciplines.
Fundamentalism as a term was applied in 1910 for a series of articles by con­
servative American Protestant Christian authors under the title The Fundamen-
tals, in order to “defend biblical inerrancy; attack the so­called European ‘high­
er criticism’ that began to examine scriptures from purely philosophical 
(historical­linguistic), archeological, and anthropological perspectives; and re­
fute or counter assorted related threats” (Shupe 2011: 478). Thus, the fundamen­
talists offered a narrower definition of conservative Christian orthodoxy against 
the efforts to reconcile traditional Christian beliefs with new developments in 
the natural and social sciences. 
As this concept entered into the public discourse, in particular since the 1970s, 
it has clearly exceeded its narrow origin concerning U.S. Protestants. Funda­
mentalists took on political activism and identity politics that concerned events 
that resulted from modernism, such as the legalization of abortion, the sexual 
revolution, the gay rights movement, and the removal of religion from public 
education, or that challenged traditional gender roles, or caused moral questions 
(Nagata 2001). It was claimed that with modernity, human beings became more 
rational, and hence religion was not required anymore, or perhaps would be re­
stricted to a private sphere of human life. Fundamentalists rejected this view of 
religion and tried to bring it from its marginal position back into mainstream so­
ciety. This reaction was not confined to conservative Christian orthodoxy, how­
ever, but was also common in the other major religions of the world. In fact, 
emerging threats from Islamic groups and organizations such as the Taliban, 
Boko Haram, and the Islamic State, created by fundamentalists, introduced Is­
lamic fundamentalism as the strongest stream of fundamentalism (Wenzel 2011: 
180–182). 
Some scholars use the term ‘fundamentalism’ to refer to religious revival 
movements outside the Protestant tradition, while other scholars are reluctant 
to use the term to refer to cultural and political movements based on religious 
tradition with the same features. Some scholars utilize terms such as the ‘New 
Religious Politics’ (Kaddie 1998); Islamism (Göle 1996; Krämer 2011); or In­
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tegrism and Political Islam (see: Steinbach 2004). For some, employing funda­
mentalism to Islamic political movements is recalling another variant of orien­
talism, in keeping with the process of Othering (see Edward Said: Orientalism, 
1978). “In Said’s view, by constructive reductive notions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘fun­
damentalism,’ the West has attempted to claim for itself ‘moderation, rationali­
ty’ and a specific Western ethos” (Afary 1997).
The term fundamentalist is also used, albeit irresponsibly, to address any 
group that takes religion seriously and even to address all Muslims, as Nagata 
(2001) and Emerson and Hartman (2006: 128) explain. Some studies do not dis­
tinguish reformist movements from fundamentalist movements, and identify all 
Islamic revival movements as fundamentalist or as part of fundamentalist move­
ments (Wegner 2008; Köhler 2008). Some speak of ‘new­age fundamentalist re­
form movements’ – die neuzeitlichen fundamentalistischen Reformbewegun­
gen – (Kienzler 2007). 
In contrast to this view of fundamentalism, other studies draw attention to the 
distinction between various groups of Islamic revival movements (Riesebrodt 
1990: 148; Göle 2004). Riesebrodt’s (2000) definition of fundamentalism is
a specific type of religious revival movement which reacts to social changes perceived 
as a dramatic crisis. In such a movement people attempt to restructure their life­worlds 
cognitively, emotionally, and practically, reinvent their social identities, and regain a sense 
of dignity, honor, and respect. But, such goals are achieved in fundamentalism in ways 
which are different from other types of religious revival movements (Riesebrodt 2000: 
271)
After the 1979 Revolution in Iran, Islamic fundamentalism drew more academ­
ic and political attention (Nagata 2001: 486). Riesebrodt (1990) regards funda­
mentalism in post­revolution Iran as a form of patriarchal traditionalism that, as 
a result of state­driven secularization in Pahlavi’s era, recalls for a return to a 
‘book­centered’ religious order. Therefore, it not only renewed patriarchal con­
trols on women and gender roles, but it also revived paternalistic authority in 
politics and the economy. 
The first comparative study of fundamentalist movements was completed by 
Bruce Lawrence in 1989, entitled ‘Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Re-
volt Against the Modern Age.’ As Emerson and Hartman (2006) explain, Law­
rence argued in his book that “fundamentalism is an ideology rather than a the­
ology and is formed in conflict with modernism” (Emerson and Hartman 2006: 
130) In a comprehensive study named ‘The Fundamentalism Project,’5 the same 
features of fundamentalist movements were found across faiths, including; em­
5  The book series The Fundamentalism Project published by the University of Chicago Press, was 
sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and directed by religion historians 
Martin Marty and Scott Appleby from 1987 until 1995. The project was aimed at investigating 
fundamentalist movements throughout the world.
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bracing technological innovation; opposing relativism and pluralism; believing 
the absolute ‘truth’ lies only with them; and endowing themselves with the au­
thorization to enact the divine will and the ‘universal blueprint’ for human sal­
vation. As a result, fundamentalists see themselves as agents of a sacred power 
and are often intolerant of dissidents within and outside the community of be­
lievers. Regarding the texts of a tradition, fundamentalists are ‘consistently an­
ti­hermeneutical’ and reject every hermeneutical interpretation of scripture 
(Marty 1988). 
Among the fundamentalist movements, Islamic fundamentalism seeks a worl­
dview based on a golden age, with a  ‘utopian and past­oriented’ perspective (Ei­
senstadt 1996, cited in Moghissi 1999: 71; Göle 1996), seeking fulfillment of 
Islamic law in a contemporary society without any adjustment to the contempo­
rary needs of human beings. Islamic fundamentalism is defined as a movement 
aimed at ‘establishing an Islamic sociopolitical order’ through fulfillment of the 
Islamic law; therefore the unity of religion and politics in Islamic government 
is defended (Moaddel 2008: 1676–7). Similar to other religious fundamental­
ists, Islamic fundamentalists believe that “the focus of moral authority is God 
and that legal codes should reflect absolute and timeless divine law” (ibid.: 1680). 
However, Islamic fundamentalists have often interpreted divine and Islamic laws 
as their political projects dictate (ibid.). Losurdo (2004) describes a character­
istic of Islamic fundamentalism as protection of “the Islamic identity from con­
tamination and interference. The point is to put an end to centuries of ruinous 
religious subversion. This is a protection, a kind of ‘cultural cleansing,’ against 
all Western political tendencies” (Losurdo 2004: 11).
Fundamentalism in Islam became generally known with the establishment of 
the Muslim Brotherhood by Hasan Al­Banna in Egypt in 1928. The purpose of 
creating the Muslim Brotherhood was not only to fight colonialism and liberate 
Muslim societies from the West, but also to replace the materialist philosophy 
of Europe in an Islamic country with the culture, civilization and philosophy of 
Islam which was presented by the first generation of Muslims (Said Aly and 
Wenner 1982: 340). Al­Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, posited 
the dislodgment of true Islamic tradition as the cause of decadence in the Mus­
lim community. He pointed to the Quran and tradition of the Prophet (sunna) as 
resources of Islamic rules for every Muslim and says: 
Islam is a comprehensive system which deals with all spheres of life. It is a state and a 
homeland (or a government and an Umma). It is a moral system and power (or mercy and 
justice). It is a culture and a law (or knowledge and jurisprudence). It is material and 
wealth (or gain and prosperity). It is (Jihad) and Da’wah (or army and an idea). And fi­
nally, it is true belief and worship (Al­Banna n.d.: 7).
Therefore, Islamic principles must be implemented in all aspects of public life 
as well as in political, economic and ideological dimensions. This ultimately 
leads to a truly Islamic government, obliged to enforce Islamic law alongside 
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other responsibilities. It is also necessary to instruct the world about Islamic ide­
ology “by spreading the call of Islam to all corners of the globe until there is no 
more tumult or oppression and the religion of Allah prevails” (ibid.) He also de­
fines Jihad as a means to struggle in the ‘Way of Allah’ which has various forms 
including “struggling with the tongue, pen, or hand, and speaking a word of truth 
to a tyrannical ruler” (ibid.: 16–17).
This argument has been maintained by Islamic fundamentalists up to the pres­
ent day. However, it should be noted that this is not the only reaction to mod­
ernism and secularization from the Islamic world; there have been other reac­
tions, such as reformist efforts as well as secular perspectives, especially after 
the 1970s­80s. These were based on the debate on the separation of politics and 
religion, or the separation of religion and the public sphere. It is evident in some 
Islamic countries that recognize themselves as secular and confine Islamic law 
only to family laws like marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance. John L. Es­
posito (2002) also explains that many modern Muslim states have been influ­
enced by Western secular paradigms in their development’s programs. There­
fore, in some modern Muslim countries “the role of Islam in state and society 
as a source of legitimation for rulers, state, and government institutions was 
greatly decreased though the separation of religion and politics was not total” 
(Esposito 2002: 2).
Therefore, concepts such as secular, fundamentalism and reformism cannot 
not be only restricted to Christianity and the West, though it is of crucial impor­
tance to distinguish the context when applying these concepts. Casanova also 
explains in such debate “one needs to make clear the terminological and theo­
retical disagreements. Most importantly, one needs to historicize and contextu­
alize all categories, refocus the attention beyond Europe and North America, and 
adopt a more global perspective” (Casanova 2003: 17–29). 
Accordingly, the theory of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann on religion, 
as well as the impact of globalization and pluralism as outcomes of modernity 
on religion and individual freedom shall be discussed in the following pages, 
though their theory was formulated for explaining religion in the West.
2 2  The Dialectical Relationship Between Religion and Human Being: 
Pluralism, Rationality and the Crisis of Meaning
I will consider Peter Berger’s and Thomas Luckmann’s analysis of religion as a 
historical product which is constructed by human experience, even when it is 
considered as divine.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, in their work The Social Construction 
of Reality (1966), define society as a dialectic phenomenon. They argue that so­
ciety is a human product of human collective activities. They also emphasize 
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that human beings are likewise the product of society, such that the individual’s 
identity is shaped by social processes.
In Berger and Luckmann’s analysis, society consists of a dialectical process 
between externalization, objectivation and internalization. “Externalization is 
the outpouring of human beings into the world, both in the physical and the men­
tal activities of men [sic]” (Berger 1967: 3). It refers to every process in which 
subjective meaning in consciousness is constructed and then externalized, there­
by creating the sociality of the individual (Knoblauch 2005: 137).
Objectivation refers to the creation of a reality by human physical and men­
tal activity that confronts its original creators as an external facticity other than 
themselves. Through objectivation, human beings create institutions, interac­
tions and other things which all together form culture. These outcomes of hu­
man activities appear as objects which can exist independently from human ac­
tivities. Even religion and language, which appear to be natural or divine, are 
human products that are objectified and have become realities independent from 
human activities (Knoblauch 1999: 112). Based on the process of objectivation, 
Berger posits that, “all religious world­views are the products of historically 
conditioned and constructed human experience, whether they posit a divine re­
vealer or not” (in Dorrien 2001: 33).
Internalization occurs when this objectivized reality is re­appropriated by hu­
man agents, transforming it from the structure of the objective world into the struc­
ture of subjective consciousness. Berger and Luckmann consider internalization 
as a basis for understanding others and also for the apprehension of the world as 
a meaningful and social reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 150). It enables in­
dividuals to shape their personal identity through the internalization of socially 
objectified schemes of activities and their related meanings, that lead ultimately 
to the integration of individuals in the social world (Luckmann 2002: 28–29).
Based on this schema, Berger deduces that society is produced through ex­
ternalization, it becomes a reality through objectivation, and human beings are 
defined as a product of society through internalization.
One of the processes of internalization, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) ex­
plain, is socialization that inducts the individual into the subjective world of so­
ciety or a sector of it. Socialization allows the transfer of social reality, includ­
ing culture and subjective meanings, from one generation to the next. 
Individuals therefore identify themselves with these meanings; they also repre­
sent and express meaning (Dorrien 2001: 31).
The crisis of meaning
Berger and Luckmann (1995) point out that meaning is constituted in human con­
sciousness, so it is based on ‘purely subjective apprehensions’. This subjective 
constitution of meaning is the origin of all social stocks of knowledge such as 
patterns of experience and schemes of action, resulting from the objectification 
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of the subjective meaning of experience or actions. They explain that “these so­
cially objectified and processed stocks of meaning are ‘preserved’ in historical 
reservoirs of meaning and ‘administered’ by institutions” (Berger and Luckmann 
1995: 18). In their view, older streams of social action (‘traditions’) are of cru­
cial importance in shaping elements of meaning, and religion occupies a distinc­
tive place in the objectification of meaning in social reality. In Berger’s analysis 
religion aims to construct a value system based on a sacred cosmos. He says, “Re­
ligion offers a protective canopy of transcendent legitimacy, meaning, and order 
to the precarious constructions in human life” (in Dorrien 2001: 32). The value 
system – offered by religion – is objectified in the societal stock of knowledge. 
Social stocks of knowledge provide objective meanings that shape the actions 
of the individual. Therefore, there is a constant interaction between objectified 
meaning and subjectively constituted meaning. When this interaction is disrupt­
ed and when objectified meaning and subjective meaning overlap and contra­
dict each other, a crisis of meaning occurs. Accordingly, in societies which have 
a single and generally binding value system, the schemes of experience and ac­
tion objectified in social institutions are directed towards a common value sys­
tem superordinate to the specific meaning. Therefore the total stock of meaning 
stored and managed in social institutions is in basic concordance with practical 
life (Berger and Luckmann 1995: 18–24). 
Such societies provide no ground for the growth and extension of crises of 
meaning, because there is no contradiction between the objectified and subjec­
tive meanings of the value system. These conditions are found in pre­modern 
societies where a value system offered by religion takes a central place. Berger 
and Luckmannn recognize religion in pre­modern societies as a symbolic rem­
edy spreading throughout all of society, collecting all shared interpretations of 
reality into a coherent view of the world, which provide the foundation for so­
cietal morality (ibid.: 54). Since in pre­modern societies, the differentiation be­
tween diverse social functions is slight, religion; social structure; and personal 
identity overlap (Knoblauch et al. 2002: 26), and “religious representations are 
widely diffused among the various institutions” (Luckmann 1983: 129).
In modern society, however, the value system and meaning offered by reli­
gion are no longer the sole bears of superordinate orders of value for everyone 
(Berger and Luckmann 1995: 25–54), and this perhaps leads to the situation in 
which there is no longer concordance between objectified and subjective mean­
ing, and therefore different values and orientations that are ‘ultimately’ signifi­
cant for the individual are not massively and generally confirmed and support­
ed by the social order (Luckmann 1983: 132). For example, it is possible that 
while religion and its value system could have a strong position in the social or­
der, individuals may still look for a new value system which is not supported by 
religion, or vice versa. This provides the basic condition for the spread of crises 
of meaning. In fact, religion, which once legitimized the whole society, is no 
longer able to keep its old influence over other institutional sectors because of 
new issues experienced in the modern era. This sometimes leads to the differ­
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entiation of the social structure in specialized institutions, implying a profound 
change in the relationship between individuals and society and consequently the 
relationship between the individual and itself (Luckmann 2007: 223). 
In such a society, the economy, politics, legislation and knowledge separate 
themselves from the superordinate value system and determine the instrumen­
tal­rational objective meaning of schemes of action for the individual without 
religious underpinning in those areas for which they are responsible (see Berg­
er and Luckmann 1995: 25; Knoblauch et al. 2002: 26).
Pluralism and the crisis of meaning
Berger and Luckmann recognize modern pluralism – as an outcome of modern­
ism – as the most important factor in the creation of crises of meaning. They 
enumerate some structural causes of this fact such as population growth, migra­
tion and urbanization; industrialization; the media of mass communication, both 
printed material and the newest electronic media, which display a plurality of 
ways of life and thinking (Berger and Luckmann 1995: 37–38). It should be not­
ed that modern pluralism and its result – crisis of meaning – becomes a univer­
sal phenomenon through globalization.
Berger and Luckmann deduce ‘relativization of systems of values’, a ‘general 
uncertainty’ and ‘different schemes of interpretation’ from modern pluralization. 
In fact, modern pluralism in Berger’s and Luckmann’s view destabilizes ‘com­
mon­sense knowledge.’ It calls the world, society and personal identity into ques­
tion. There is no longer only one, true and unquestionable interpretation, but mul­
tiple interpretations with different perspectives which raise doubt for individuals 
about the manner of their lives. In this process, “the age­old function of religion – 
to provide ultimate certainty amid the exigencies of the human condition – has 
been severely shaken” (Berger et al. 1973: 166); the alternatives provided by plu­
ralism force people to think in a way that undermines the foundation of all ver­
sions of a good old world and assumptions of unquestioned existence.
Accordingly, religion becomes one option from many possible value systems 
and world views which could be chosen by an individual. As Berger points out, 
“we choose God instead of God choosing us” (Berger 1980, cited in Bruce 1999: 
128) Modernization and pluralism not only fundamentally changed the range of 
pre­given, unquestioned, taken­for­granted assumptions and existence determined 
by fate to a long series of possible choices by individuals. They also undermined 
the traditional source of meaning and all taken­for­granted verities. However, 
Berger emphasizes that “pluralism affects the how of religious belief, but not nec­
essarily the what” (Berger 2001: 194). It means, as Linda Woodhead explains, “it 
is still possible to hold religious beliefs even though they have ceased to be tak­
en for granted but it is impossible to hold them in the same way (as in the past)” 
(Woodhead 2001: 2). She claims that being religious in most modern societies is 
manifested in new ways even though these new forms of religiosity sometimes 
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appear similar to the old ways. As a result of this tension, religion tends to change; 
for example, the attempts of modern theology to cope with modern times through 
liberal­religious strategies (Dorrien 2001: 33). In pre­modern societies, people 
who ascribed to a specific religion were required to obey teachings that were ab­
solute, leaving no room for interpretation. Today however, there are ‘non­tradi­
tional’ interpretations of religion which allow individuals to exercise autonomy 
over their lives. These interpretations show a shift that reflects an understanding 
of religion as something that comes from God to something that is a result of an 
internal process of the self; from the after­life to this life. Consequently tradition 
and religion becomes a service to the individual and self, rather than something 
that the self and individual must serve or adjust to (ibid.: 65–66).
Therefore, religion must pay attention to ‘the wishes of their members’ (Berg­
er and Luckmann 1995: 46) as well as to new globalized values and new concepts 
such as individual rights, and gender equality, which are considered as cosmopol­
itan norms of justice. Woodhead describes these as non­negotiable values of ‘hu­
man life’ which are mediated and globalized through cultural exchanges such as 
film, fiction and popular music, which spread the uniquely modern universalism 
of humanitarian ethics and legislation (Woodhead and Heelas 2001: 51). 
Berger states that changes in lifestyle and in political, social, economic and 
cultural realities of modern societies resulting from modernization do not nec­
essarily lead to secularization – except in some parts of the world. Religion could 
be still understood as referring to a particular aspect of human existence, or to 
a supernatural meaning of life, offering a value system for the human being in 
a modern epoch (Knoblauch et al. 2002: 139). However it should be noted that 
if religion does not consider an individual’s wishes, modern rationality, and uni­
versal norms of justice – in other words if it does not adopt a new form that is 
compatible with modern society – the individual who wants to remain religious 
would find new ways to maintain their religion and perhaps define for them­
selves a religion with emphasis on particular features. For instance, despite the 
conservative viewpoint of the Catholic Church about using contraception, in the 
United States 90% of Catholics do use contraception and 82% think it is mor­
ally permissible (Yan 2013). 
Religion and rationality 
Religion in modern times cannot be against rationality, since rationality has al­
ways maintained a crucial role in human conduct. Luckmann argues, taking Max 
Weber’s perspective into account, that the contribution of religion in the histor­
ical process of the rationalization of human life should be noted as well. Berg­
er even recognized Jewish and Christian roots in the rationality of the West (in 
Bruce 1999: 13). Weber also, as Luckmann notes, defined a paradoxical func­
tion for religion that, as a product of the irrational dimension of human exis­
tence, initiates and reinforces the process of rationalization. Religion provides 
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a “socially stabilized interpretation of reality,” and systematized “solutions of 
everyday problems and critical situations in life.” It offers a meaningful inter­
pretation of the world for the individual “by providing a stable framework of 
orientation for the unstructured, ‘irrational’ subjectivities of individual exis­
tence” (Luckmann 1983: 144). Considering Islam, some define Islamic laws or 
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as a set of rules of worship (such as prayer and fast­
ing), and as rules of transaction (like marriage, divorce and sales) as well as po­
litical orders (including punishment and retribution) that have always claimed 
to be rational and scientific in the history of Islam. These rules have followed 
certain objectives in a rational context in the Islamic tradition (Mojtahed Shabe­
stari 2006: 163–165).
I use Berger’s and Luckmann’s theory in my research, since they show how 
individual agents and religion have a dialectical relationship and how this dia­
lectical relationship can be disrupted and a crisis of meaning emerges, in a way 
that religion becomes unable to offer a value and meaning system to satisfy the 
human need for meaning and spirituality.
This description of the role of religion in sociology provides an understand­
ing to further analyze theories that are particularly relevant to this research.
2 3  Islam and Structuration Theory: Between Individual Agency  
and Global Justice
The dialectical relationship between religion and individual agents can be fur­
ther explored through the concept of duality of structure in the structuration the­
ory of Anthony Giddens. He created a theory that investigated “the nature of hu­
man action, social institutions and interrelations between action and institutions” 
(Giddens 1991b: 201) and “the relationship between the individual and social 
forces as a part of the constitution of social order” (Giddens 1984: 2). One of the 
main premises of Structuration Theory is the ‘duality of structure’ concept, which 
offers a conceptual scheme for understanding how actors are both creators of so­
cial systems and are themselves created by social systems (Giddens 1991b: 204). 
In other words, “people make society and, at the same time, they are constrained 
by it” (Furseth and Repstad 2006: 66). Cohen (1988) stated how the ‘duality of 
structure’ “provides a basis for reconciliation of action and structure” (p. 297).
Defining structure
Giddens defines ‘structure’ as “rules and resources, recursively implicated in the re­
production of social systems. Structure exists only as memory traces, the organic 
basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action” (Giddens 1984: 377).
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According to Turner, rules are ‘generalizable procedures’ and ‘methodologies,’ 
which provide ‘formulas’ for the action of agents in a ‘social system’ or specif­
ic empirical contexts of interactions. Rules are generally used in conversations, 
interaction rituals, and daily routines. Rules contain ‘rights and obligations’ that 
are the bases for ‘sanctions’ and provide ‘interpretive schemes’ and ‘stocks of 
knowledge’ that are necessary for effective communication (Turner 1986: 972).
Resources are structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and repro­
duced by knowledgeable agents in the course of interaction (Giddens 1984: 15). 
Furthermore, as Turner explains, resources are “the ‘material equipment’ and 
‘organizational capacities’ of actors to get things done” (Turner 1986: 972). They 
are means to mobilize power. In fact, possessing material (allocative)6 and or­
ganizational (authoritative)7 facilities leads to power.
Based on Giddens’ definition of structure, religion can be considered as an 
element of structure, such that “religious cosmologies provide moral and prac­
tical interpretations of personal and social life, as well as of the natural world, 
which represent an environment of security for the believer” (Giddens 1991c: 
103). This definition also provided methodologies and formulas for actions in a 
social system; defining rights, obligations and sanctions; as well as providing a 
framework for communication.
On the other hand, religion could be also a resource for generating power 
based on Giddens’ definition. This is especially true for Islam, since Islam is a 
law­oriented religion. As Arafa (2012) explains, religion “sets the framework 
for permissible economic, social, and political systems” (p. 5), which can be 
considered as resources for mobilizing power. Al­Qaradawy (1995) further ex­
plained how “Islamic law contains provisions which organize the relation be­
tween the rulers and ruled in terms of rights, obligations and duties.” He also 
described the comprehensiveness of Islamic law, how “Islamic law encompass­
es the individual, the family, and the society” (p.112). Islam prescribes a special 
behavioral pattern for Muslims as individuals. For example, worship, personal 
morality, family relations (marriage, divorce, etc), financial matters, civil pro­
cedures (trading, lending), criminal or penal law and its related punishments 
(ibid.), including a wide range of those attributed to ‘law’ in the modern West­
ern context are regulated in Islamic law (Haddad and Stowasser 2004: 4).
However, Islam cannot be thought of as a monolithic, homogenous block, as 
there are different interpretations of the religion, each having diverse views on 
the legitimacy and applicability of all Islamic law as a framework for eco nomic, 
6  Giddens’ definition of ‘allocative resources’ in his Glossary of Terminology of Structuration 
Theory: “Material resources involved in the generation of power, including the natural environ­
ment and physical artifacts; allocative resources derive from human dominion over nature” (Gid­
dens 1984: 373).
7  Giddens’ definition of ‘authoritative resources’ in his Glossary of Terminology of Structuration 
Theory: “Non­material resources involved in the generation of power, deriving from the capa­
bility of harnessing the activities of human beings; authoritative resources result from the do­
minion of some actors over others” (ibid.).
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social and political systems in modern society. Based on Giddens’ definitions, 
Islam as a religion – in all its possible interpretations – can be considered as an 
element of ‘structural properties.’8
Modalities of structuration
In order to further explain the ‘duality of structure’ concept, Giddens developed 
the ‘modalities of structuration,’ recognizing three dimensions; signification, le­
gitimation, and domination. He explains how “actors draw upon the modalities 
of structuration in the reproduction of systems of interaction, by the same token 
reconstituting their structural properties” (Giddens 1984: 28).
Signification is when individual agents employ a communication of meaning 
through interactions and consequently interpretative schemes. These schemes 
of interaction, as Cloke et al. (1991) explains, “are capable of identification and 
analysis at the level of structure as semantic rules” (Cloke et al. 1991: 103). Gid­
dens identifies legitimation as how individual agents, through interactions, ap­
ply sanctions on their behavior. Based on this, “social norms can be identified 
and analyzed at the level of structure as moral rules” (ibid.). The third ‘modal­
ity of structuration,’ domination, is defined as when individual agents use pow­
er through interactions that provide facilities. “These enabling facilities can be 
identified and analyzed at the level of structure as resources that comprise the 
structure of domination” (ibid.).
All three dimensions in Giddens’ model can be found in the prevailing inter­
pretation of Islam, in which ‘the paradigm of duty/obligation’ dominates. This 
interpretation follows that only God has absolute power, the structure of domi­
nation belongs to God, and the power relations between human beings are de­
termined according to the divine rules. Moral rules and legitimation also are de­
fined in accordance with God’s will. According to this paradigm, “a Muslim’s 
main concern is (and must be) to know what he/she is obligated to do in order 
to avoid God’s wrath and punishment, and enjoy worldly happiness and eternal 
salvation” (Naraghi 2007). The paradigm also contains certain signification 
based on the ‘language of duty/obligation’ rather than the ‘language of rights’ 
that considers the human being primarily as a duty­bearer rather than a right­hold­
er. Thus, individual agents by interacting employ interpretative schemes in ac­
cordance with his/her duty towards God.
8  Giddens’ definition of ‘structural properties’ in his Glossary of Terminology of Structuration 
Theory: Structurated features of social systems, especially institutionalized features, stretching 
across time and space” (Giddens 1984: 377). 
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Religion and individual agents
Another key component of Structuration Theory is the idea of ‘reflexive moni­
toring,’ which is the ability that permits individuals to account for, explain and 
rationalize their actions, either to themselves or to others. The theory also em­
phasizes that rules and resources are produced and reproduced by agents. Gid­
dens characterizes human agents as knowledgeable and capable subjects who 
have the ability to reason and act purposively, but who also have the ability to 
act in contrast to these tendencies (Cloke et al. 1991: 97–99). Individual agents 
are the primary subjects in this idea, which brings up particular questions about 
the role of individuals when religion is one of the fundamental structures in a 
society. How influential are individual agents in the reproduction of religious 
law? How is the relationship between actors and religion defined in different re­
ligious thought streams? 
These questions must be examined through a concept Giddens termed as 
‘time­space distinction’ which refers to the complex relations between local ac­
tors and interactions across distances (Giddens 1991c: 64). He distinguishes two 
forms of integration: ‘Social integration,’ which refers to face interactions, where 
both actors are present at the same time and in the same place. ‘System integra­
tion’ is about “reciprocal relations between those who are physically absent” 
(Cohen 1989: 42).
In Abrahamic religions, including Islam, one important factor in the integra­
tion of religious followers in different times and spaces is the belief in the di­
vinity of religion and its claim to be a statement of revelation. This belief makes 
religion metaphysical, supernatural and totally remote from human knowledge. 
The question that arises here is whether or not the human agent is competent to 
influence or even change religious law over time and space. If the individual 
agent is able to intervene in divine law, the next question arises as to whether 
they are consequently undermining the divinity of religion. In a broader sense, 
can religious laws change over time and space in accordance to societal chang­
es without losing its divinity? The arguments concerning this idea for different 
streams of Islamic thought are discussed in the second part of this book.
Globalization and cosmopolitan norms of justice 
One of the most important factors in reflexively monitoring interactions, and the 
examining and reforming of social practices is access to information about the 
world and individual agents within it (Furseth and Repstad 2006: 67). In the 
modern world, rapid advancement of information and communication technol­
ogies creates a sense of interconnectedness; people living in ‘one world’ which 
Giddens recognizes as one dimension of globalization. According to Giddens, 
globalization itself is one of the fundamental consequences of modernity (Gid­
dens 1991a: 75, 175). Globalization is characterized by increasing economic, 
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political, social and ecological interdependence, and increasing global commu­
nication and mobility, as well as the increasing influence of new actors – espe­
cially supranational organizations, transnational enterprises and Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) or NGOs (Lenz and Schwenken 2002: 157). Mechanized 
technologies of communication therefore have led to broader understanding of 
events in a social system by individual agents.
Social systems, as Giddens points out, are situated within time and space 
(Cloke et al. 1991: 110). He uses the term ‘time­space distanciation’ in refer­
ring to complex relations between local involvement (circumstances of co­pres­
ence) and interaction across distance (the connections of presence and absence) 
(Giddens 1991a: 64). In Giddens’ opinion, “the level of time­space distancia­
tion in the modern era is much higher than in any previous period, and the rela­
tions between local and distant social forms and events become corresponding­
ly stretched” (ibid.). 
Giddens recognizes this ‘stretching’ process as the basis for globalization, 
“in so far as the modes of connection between different social contexts or re­
gions become networked across the earth’s surface as a whole.” Consequently, 
worldwide social relations intensified by globalization and distant localities are 
linked together (ibid.). Hence modern concepts such as the rights of the indi­
vidual or women’s/human rights as bases for norms of justice that cannot be 
restricted to special regions, but are converted into cosmopolitan norms and 
concepts and become universal. However these norms were born in the West 
and have their origins in Western philosophy and historical social political con­
texts.
The role of individual agency in constructing the identity
Modernization and shifts in norms have changed the conception of human agen­
cy and people’s ability to construct their own self­identity. Identity, according to 
Charles Taylor (1994), refers to “a person’s understanding of who they are, of 
their fundamental characteristics as a human being” (Taylor 1994: 25). The pro­
cess of developing identity does not take place in isolation, but is generated 
through dialogue with others; it is a dialogical relation with others, and “unshaped 
by a predefined social script” (ibid.: 34). Giddens also emphasizes the role of in­
dividuals in building identity in modern society and says that identity is not some­
thing given, but is created and chosen by the individual (Furseth and Repstad 
2006: 67). Therefore, new concepts of individual rights on the one hand, and the 
‘pluralisation of contexts of action’ as consequences of globalization and mo­
dernity on the other, are increasingly important in the constitution of identity and 
daily activity (Giddens 1991a: 5). This is because individuals have the opportu­
nity to make choices between alternative worldviews, including a religious world­
view that is “not necessarily congruent with collective religious sentiments” 
(Eickelman 2002: 120). The concept of human agency and identity was no lon­
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ger confined to the language of duty/obligation and no longer predetermined by 
some transcendental vision and authority. There is no doubt, however, about the 
importance of religion as one of the crucial factors in creating identity which 
binds people over time and space and leads to system and social integration. Nev­
ertheless, religion becomes one of the options for construction of human agen­
cy and identity alongside other options which can be chosen by the individual. 
In fact, women’s freedom and gender equality is one of outcomes of the re­
defining of human agency and identity. It carries a conception of autonomous 
human agency which is able to participate in forming and changing the social 
and political order. Even in social systems where structures continue to resist 
change the individual agent becomes autonomous through the tremendous im­
pact of globalization and tries to find a way to change the social and political or­
der. Lenz and Schwenken (2002) refer to the capacity of individual agents for 
developing international orientation and communication which can support them 
in entering global games. International orientation means “knowledge of glob­
al economic, political and cultural structures and institutions, and of global or 
transnational communication” (Lenz and Schwenken 2002: 159). In fact, Glo­
balization, through modern communication technologies, has facilitated the dif­
fusion of the new concepts resulting from modernity, such as individual rights 
and gender equality, as part of cosmopolitan norms of justice, allowing a broad­
er perspective of human freedom as well as providing a wider range of choices 
that in turn, gives human agents opportunities to take charge of themselves.
Religion and civil rights
Another point of Giddens’ theory of structuration, which is relevant in the study 
of the different perspectives of Islamic thought to gender equality and women’s 
rights in modern society, is the third dimension of modality of structuration 
which deals with using power at the level of interaction, and domination at the 
level of structure.
Power within a social system continues over time and space and implicates 
the regularized relation of autonomy and dependencies between actors or col­
lectivities in contexts of social interaction. Giddens calls this ‘the dialectic of 
control’ in social systems. This idea holds that “all forms of dependence offer 
some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities 
of their superiors” (Giddens 1984: 16). This implies that subordinate groups can 
exercise some control over a superordinate one and can influence the actions of 
others. Allocative and authoritative resources as the ‘storage capacity’ of differ­
ent societies across time and space provide different forms of power in differ­
ent types of society (see Urry 1991: 166). In modern societies the resources lead­
ing to power for individual agents can be defined as civil rights, the abuse of 
which could lead to totalitarianism in the arena of political power. Only public 
discourse and political participation as integral to civil rights can prevent total­
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itarianism (Jary 1991: 139). This idea is particularly important for the study of 
different perspectives on gender equality and women’s rights in modern society 
of the main currents of Islamic thought.
These last two points – the dialectic of control and the power of individuals 
through their civil rights to preventing totalitarianism – are expressed in theo­
ries of justice which are based on theories of recognition. Because of the impor­
tance of recognition theory for the definition of justice and other theories relat­
ed to this research, the proceeding section introduces this theory through its 
contemporary advocators, including Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser. 
2 4 Religion and Recognition
‘Recognition’ refers to the acknowledgment of another being in his or her sta­
tus, achievements or rights. In the philosophical and political definition of rec­
ognition it is emphasized that it is not only to respect and value another person, 
but is also the basis of understanding ourselves. 
There are two models of recognition (McQueen n.d.): first, the ‘response­mod­
el of recognition’ which acknowledges the pre­existing features of person. As 
Markell (2000) explains, it “resonates with the ordinary use of the word to refer 
to the re­cognition of something once known but lately hidden, forgotten, or ab­
sent” (p. 496). Through recognition people are brought into the center of dis­
course. Therefore recognition “asserts that people have a right not just to be re­
spected in their humanity but to be acknowledged publicly as what they already 
really are” (Appiah, 1994:149, cited in McQueen n.d.). Second, the ‘general­ 
model of recognition’ in which the person must act in a certain way in order to 
get recognition, is not about the already­existing thing. For example, a chairper­
son recognizing someone as a speaker in a meeting is not because of a status that 
already exists, but instead is a production of the chairperson’s institutionally au­
thorized act of recognition (Markell 2000: 496). 
Justice in Nancy Fraser’s view
Nancy Fraser identifies recognition and redistribution as two important dimen­
sions in her model of justice and injustice. The recognition paradigm deals with 
cultural justice, while the distribution paradigm with economic justice. She also 
recently added another dimension  – political representation  – to this model. 
Therefore, from her point of view, justice must be understood as a complex con­
cept with three vital dimensions that are irreducible to each other – political rep­
resentation, economic redistribution and legal­cultural recognition. 
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Fraser argues that political injustice or misrepresentation result from people’s 
inability to access their civil rights and to equally participate in public deliber­
ation and democratic decision making processes. Therefore, justice means that 
all citizens must have equal access to resources (Fraser 2010: 13). From a redis­
tribution perspective, for social justice to be realized, there must be a more eq­
uitable distribution of resources and wealth. In this context, socio­economic 
structures are considered to be root causes of injustice. Examples include ex­
ploitation, economic marginalization, and deprivation. Legal­cultural recogni­
tion is another type of social­justice, which Fraser explains as being rooted in 
cultural and social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communica­
tion. It is concerned with the way identities are positively or negatively valued. 
Examples of injustice in this perspective include cultural domination, non­rec­
ognition of the perspective of ethnic, racial, and sexual minorities, as well as of 
gender difference. The remedy for injustice in this perspective is cultural or sym­
bolic change. In Fraser’s view, at the heart of this recognition claim is a vision 
of a “difference­friendly world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cul­
tural norms is no longer the price of equal respect” (Fraser 2003: 19). 
The lack of a normative principle for participatory parity in these three di­
mensions leads to injustice. Justice “requires social arrangements that permit all 
to participate as peers in social life” (Fraser 2010:60). Therefore, to eliminate 
injustice requires destroying institutionalized obstacles, which prevent certain 
people from participating on an equal par with others as full partners in social 
interactions. Such obstacles in economic structures can deny people the resourc­
es needed for interacting with others as peers and lead to ‘distributive injustice,’ 
or the ‘mal­distribution’ of resources. In terms of the cultural dimension, peo­
ple might suffer from ‘status inequality or misrecognition,’ preventing them 
“from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalized hierarchies of cultural 
value” (ibid.), denying their right to be “reciprocally recognized in terms of their 
group identity, individual achievement, autonomous personhood, cultural dis­
tinctiveness, common humanity, or the requisite standing as partner in social in­
teraction” (ibid.: 32). In political representation, ‘ordinary­political injustice’ 
arises “within bounded political communities, when skewed decision rules com­
promise the political voice of some who are already counted as members, im­
pairing their ability to participate as peers in social interaction” (ibid.: 6).
Fraser further expounds her analysis by linking these social justice claims to 
gender. On the relationship between gender and the claim on economic distri­
bution, Fraser identifies the fundamental division between paid ‘productive’ la­
bor and unpaid ‘reproductive’ and domestic labor. This division places women 
as mainly responsible for domestic labor. The second division occurs within paid 
labor between higher­paid professional occupations dominated by men and low­
er­paid positions dominated by women, such as domestic service occupations. 
In Fraser’s opinion these lead to an economic structure with gender­specific 
forms of distributive injustice (Fraser 2003: 20).
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In terms of the relationship between gender and the recognition paradigm, 
Fraser recognizes andro­centrism as a major feature of gender injustice. She de­
fines it as “an institutional pattern of cultural value that privileges traits associ­
ated with masculinity, while devaluing everything coded as ‘feminine,’ paradig­
matically – but not only – women” (ibid.) Such institutionalized androcentric 
value patterns permeate into popular culture, social and everyday interactions, 
as well as into many areas of law (including family law and criminal law). This 
results in gender­specific forms of status subordination “including sexual assault 
and domestic violence; trivializing, harassment and disparagement in everyday 
life; exclusion or marginalization in the public sphere and denial of the full rights 
and equal protections of citizenship” (ibid.: 21). 
Fraser suggests two remedies for injustice: affirmation and transformation. 
‘Affirmation’ aims to change the unjust appearances of social arrangements with­
out disturbing the underlying framework that generates them, while the second 
remedy –‘transformation’ – aims at restricting the framework of the generation 
of injustice which derives from socio­cultural structures. For example, the gen­
erative framework of inequality situated in language and social arrangements re­
produce hierarchical binary oppositions like ‘heterosexual/homosexual’, ‘white/
black’ or ‘man/woman.’ According to Fraser’s suggestions, such binary logic 
must be deconstructed, rather than just re­evaluating heterosexual, female or black 
identities (McQueen n.d.). However, she recognizes the difficulty of deconstruct­
ing these identities in practice. For instance, “calls for deconstructing binary are 
far removed from the immediate concerns of most subjects of misrecognition, 
who are more disposed to seek self­respect by affirming a depreciated identity 
than by espousing the blurring of status distinctions” (Fraser 2003: 77). 
Fraser also emphasized the importance of who should count as the subject of 
justice. Today’s globalized world does not restrict the subject of justice to citi­
zens residing within territorial states or boundaries, nor should it be understood 
as “a domestic relation among fellow citizens” (Fraser 2009: 282). Undoubted­
ly, the impact of social processes on individuals’ lives oversteps territorial bor­
ders. In this process of communicating and network organizing, global mass me­
dia and cyber technology have considerable roles. This is particularly important 
for influencing supranational and international organizations, both governmen­
tal and nongovernmental, as well as increasing public awareness of political is­
sues (ibid.: 13–14). These issues include the many forms of violence against 
women (Siim 2010: 79), inequality in work and education, ecology as a gender 
issue and the equal participation of women in politics and decision making (Lenz 
and Schwenken 2002: 157), and ultimately in shaping transnational public opin­
ion including public opinion about the concept of justice in modern times and 
its relation to gender.
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Axel Honneth and the concept of reognition and justice
Axel Honneth, like Nancy Fraser, claims that at the core of all ideas about jus­
tice in modern societies, there is an egalitarian feature which emphasizes the su­
preme importance of equal rights for all members of society and ultimately af­
fording all members the same autonomy (Honneth 2004: 356). Similar to 
Fraser, Honneth’s theory of justice is rooted in the concept of recognition. While 
Fraser emphasizes ‘participatory equality’ in the three dimensions of econom­
ic, cultural, and political representation, Honneth believes that issues of distrib­
utive justice can be better understood through issues of recognition itself, and 
that recognition is essential to self­realization.
Recognition and self-realization
Honneth sees recognition as essential to self­realization. To achieve self­realiza­
tion, Honneth identifies three ‘patterns of recognition’ including love, rights, and 
solidarity. The concept of ‘love’ refers to needs and emotions which can receive 
‘confirmation’ in the form of emotional approval and encouragement from the 
concrete physical existence of other persons in our primary social relationships, 
such as family, close friends and lovers. This type of emotional recognition leads 
to self­confidence. The second concept, ‘rights,’ refers to what Mead calls a pro­
cess of assuming the perspectives of a ‘generalized Other,’ (in da Silva 2007) in 
which the individual learns to see him/herself from the perspective of his/her in­
teraction partner in order to interact as two persons with equal rights. This type 
of recognition deals with moral responsibilities to others as legal entities and 
leads to fundamental self­respect. Finally, the concept ‘solidarity’ relates to the 
recognition of abilities acquired in the course of lives. It helps individuals be­
come individualized and develop self­esteem. Therefore, recognition of this type 
is based on a person’s special individual characteristics formed by specific biog­
raphies. This is different from the relations of love and rights, which express uni­
versal features of human subjects. These three patterns of recognition provide 
human beings with the feeling of ‘dignity’ or integrity (Honneth 1992: 193–195).
Justice and individual self-determination
Honneth’s theory is founded on conditions of actualization of freedom in differ­
ent institutions as well as various practices and principles. He extracts a criteri­
on for social justice from the normative reconstruction of the social institutions 
of liberal democracy. His criterion is most applicable for modern societies that 
have social, cultural, economic, political, legal and moral principles based on 
individual freedom. With the rise in the prevalence of the idea of individual free­
dom, perspectives on the rules of social coexistence and social justice have 
evolved. Accordingly, individual freedom, individual autonomy and self­deter­
mination have become the prerequisite for social justice in modern society. 
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Consequently, according to Honneth, the normative foundation of justice in 
modern societies is not the will of the community, nor the natural order, but in­
dividual freedom and autonomy. Therefore, justice and individual self­determi­
nation are two concepts that must be understood alongside each other. A rela­
tionship between these ideas, he argues, must be freed from a theological 
framework in order to define the individual subject as the author of all social 
laws and norms (Honneth 2011: 37–40). A theocentric perspective, in contrast, 
is based on an obligation/duty paradigm in which no individual freedom is ad­
missible. In a theological framework, the individual is recognized as a duty­bear­
er rather than a rights­holder with individual autonomy. The question of individ­
ual autonomy is a new concept and an outcome of modernity and globalization, 
which cannot be addressed in the classical texts of various doctrines of Islam 
(see Arkoun 2006: 273). However, there has always been a discourse on the right 
of God and the right of the person in Islamic thought, with priority and primacy 
of the former over the latter. All aspects of human life, including respect for hu­
man rights, are a basic condition for respecting the rights of God and his auton­
omy (Arkoun 1994: 108). Therefore, defining justice based on individual free­
dom and autonomy needs a new paradigm, recognizing the individual as 
right­bearer rather than duty­holder to God.
The various currents of Islamic thought have discussed modern definitions of 
justice based on the idea that an individual is a right­bearer. Some schools of 
thought are becoming centered on individual freedom as a value related to mo­
dernity. Therefore, Honneth’s theory as a criterion for justice is useful for study­
ing the concept of justice in the main currents of Islamic thought. 
Honneth provided three different models of individual freedom to explain the 
concept of justice in modernity: negative, reflexive and social. Honneth posits 
negative freedom as an essential principle of modernity which ensures the au­
tonomy of the individual person. This implies that an individual has a right to 
act without external restriction and is independent of any compulsion to exam­
ine his/her motivation of action, as long as s/he does not overstep the equivalent 
right of his/her fellow citizens (Honneth 2011: 58). He also explains how the in­
stitution of legal freedom is an action system of negative freedom, which im­
plies subjective rights and individual freedom, including participatory rights as 
the foundation of democratic communication and decision­making. However, 
this idea is limited to private autonomy, which should be protected by law, and 
is not enough to develop a society, for which communal practices and coopera­
tion in civil society are necessary as well (Rendtorff 2012).
Reflexive freedom addresses self­relation, as well as self­determination of 
the human subject. It shows how the individual is free to choose and that his/her 
actions are guided only by his/her own intentions (Honneth 2011: 58–59). There­
fore, the individual regulates his or her actions rationally and has the freedom 
or the right “to form his own judgment about moral norms” (Mayerhofer 2012). 
Based on this idea of reflexive freedom, Honneth also defines moral freedom as 
a regulation of desire and a sort of rationalization of life in nature. Respect and 
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recognition of human dignity in social life are essential dimensions of this con­
cept of morality (ibid.). Every human being, regardless of status and cultural dif­
ferences, should enjoy definite ‘dignity.’ However, this idea contrasts with the 
traditional image of dignity that is based on a hierarchical pattern which offers 
an image of ‘equality with God’ (Ebenbürtigkeit Gottes). Therefore, the digni­
ty of the human being in modern times is no longer based on the premise that 
human beings are created in God’s image and likeness, but that the human be­
ings themselves are objects of dignity, which entails being considered by other 
human beings as a moral and independent person who is capable of rationally 
justifying his actions (Honneth 2011: 81). Dignity is linked to the moral self­defi­
nition and self­creation of individuals with moral autonomy, which implies tak­
ing responsibility for their own life and humanity (Rendtorff 2012). This sub­
ject is of crucial importance to understand the perspectives of the main currents 
of Islamic thought, especially when considering if they still define the dignity 
of the human being as an image of God. 
Honneth’s third area of individual freedom emphasizes that the idea of self­de­
termination and self­actualization – elements of reflexive freedom – are social­
ly available and require “institutional conditions to enable all individuals to reap 
the fruit of their respective freedoms” (Honneth 2009: 174). He explains that 
such institutional conditions refer to the social model of freedom, which brings 
additional social conditions into play. Therefore, “the idea of reflexive freedom 
cannot unfold without implicating the institutional forms that will make possi­
ble its realization” (ibid.: 175). In social freedom, social relations are consid­
ered as an embodiment of self­realization. In other words, recognizing others, 
which is only possible in social institutions, is a constitutive element of the free­
dom of individuals, such that “the subjects meet others with whom they can have 
relations of reciprocal recognition within their institutional practices, and there 
they can find the conditions of their own self­realization” (Okochi 2012: 14). 
Through his discussions of reflexive freedom, Honneth expanded the notion 
of freedom by including self­relational subjectivity. Similarly, his discussion of 
social freedom includes objectivity and social institutions. In his discussion, jus­
tice means that all individuals have the opportunity to participate in institutions 
of recognition. In such a system of justice, social freedom, alongside negative 
and reflexive freedom, is required to achieve meaning in individual lives as well 
as mutual recognition in the social arena. Honneth also investigated how the val­
ue of individual freedom, as a principle of justice, is generated in specific social 
areas: personal relationships (including friends, intimate or love and family re­
lations), market relations, and the public sphere of politics. Of particular inter­
est to this study is his discussion of the family as an important space for social 
freedom. 
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Family as a place for individual self-realization
Accoridng to Honneth, the modern family has substantially changed in the last 
sixty years in terms of the structural relationships between family members, 
which is now partially based on inter­subjectivity and equality (Honneth 2011: 
284). In the image of modern family that Honneth offers, traditional role­spe­
cific tasks such as father, mother and child are organized by patriarchy and so­
cially constructed norms that have been transforming into a cooperative social 
relationship based on love, equality and partnership rather than authority and 
paternalism (ibid.: 301). Members of such families are no longer conditioned to 
fulfill role­specific tasks; rather they care and reciprocally help each other, par­
ticularly in the situations of special existential pressures. In this respect, mem­
bers of the modern family recognize each other as human subjects who form a 
community for solidarity (Solidargemeinschaft). The family therefore becomes 
a place for individual self­realization, for preparing the members to transit into 
the public life in society. Families become support systems, nurturing each mem­
ber into the person they each want to become, respecting their own individual­
ity (ibid.: 315).
This is one perspective of the modern family that, in Honneth’s point of view, 
is a requisite for justice. Modern families exhibit equality and partnership in­
stead of paternalism and authority, an observation that shall be debated from the 
perspectives of the different streams of Islamic thought in next chapter. Such 
struggles for recognition and freedom become a cosmopolitan ideal, which ex­
pects that various institutions and principles be no longer confined to bounded 
political communities like the nation­state, but rather reflect global perspectives 
in modern globalized conditions.
Seyla Benhabib and the concept of cosmopolitan norms of justice
Various international instruments addressing human rights, such as the Univer­
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Declara­
tion on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity of 2008, can be considered as 
a practical aspect of the realization of recognition theory at the international 
level. UDHR guarantees people’s political representation, economic redistri­
bution and legal­cultural recognition, all of which Fraser considers as prereq­
uisites for justice. For instance, Article 21 of the UDHR guarantees the right of 
an individual to “take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives.” It also guarantees that the will of the people shall 
be the basis of the authority of government. Furthermore, such conventions and 
declarations are international recognitions of the legal rights of individuals (Ig­
natieff 2000: 288–289), which are, as Honneth posits, prerequisites for individ­
ual freedom and autonomy and ultimately required in order to achieve social 
justice.
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Seyla Benhabib in her work Another Cosmopolitanism (2006) recognizes the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 as a key instrument for the protection 
of human rights, which is the beginning of a phase in the evolution of a global 
civil society (Benhabib 2006: 16). She describes this phase as “a transition from 
international to cosmopolitan norms of justice” (ibid.). While norms of ‘inter­
national justice’ deal with agreements among states and regulate the relations 
between states, ‘cosmopolitan norms of justice’ believes individuals have cer­
tain rights and must “be recognized as moral beings worthy of equal concern 
and who are equally entitled to be protected as legal personalities their own pol­
ity, as well as in the world community” (Benhabib 2011b: 62). Therefore, all in­
dividuals are considered as “right­bearing not only in virtue of their citizenship 
within states but in virtue of their humanity as well” (Benhabib 2011a: 14). 
Benhabib explained cosmopolitanism based on Kantian tradition, saying that 
it must be understood “as the emergence of norms that ought to govern relations 
among individuals in a global civil society” (Benhabib 2006: 20). She posits that 
these norms are neither merely moral nor legal, but in fact frame the morality 
of the law in a domestic, and even more so, in a global context. She emphasized 
that these norms “signal the eventual legalization and juridification of the rights 
claims of human beings everywhere, regardless of their membership in bound­
ed communities” (ibid.). 
For a better understanding of cosmopolitan norms of justice, Benhabib uses 
Hannah Arendt’s term the right to have rights. While Arendt uses this in refer­
ence to political rights, which she defined as the ‘right to membership in a polit­
ical community,’ Benhabib proposes a ‘non­state­centered conception’ of this 
term, which refers to “the claim of each human person to be recognized and to be 
protected as a legal personality by the world community” (Benhabib 2011a: 4). 
The ‘non­state­centered’ concept raises the question of ‘who’ accounts for 
the justice and human rights mentioned by Fraser. A humanist approach appeals 
to the moral criteria of personhood and to address a “common possession of de­
fining features of humanity” (Fraser 2009: 290). However, the humanist princi­
ple is more abstract and “not genuinely reflexive” (ibid.). And as Fraser argues, 
such a one­size­fits­all frame of global humanity takes no account of actual or 
historical social relations and offers the same frames or scales of justice for vary­
ing issues (ibid.).
Benhabib also described the importance of forming commonalities to em­
brace diversity, and to overcome conflict, divide and struggle in universalism. 
She emphasized that if human rights are considered as universal, it cannot ig­
nore diversities. She resolved this by suggesting a “generalized as well as con­
crete other” (Benhabib 2011a: 6).’ By “generalized other” she means that every 
individual is entitled to the same rights and duties as other human beings, em­
phasizing humanity and moral dignity. On the other hand, the ‘concrete other’ 
refers to individuality constituted by a concrete history within a collective iden­
tity that characterizes human individuality (Benhabib 2011a: 6–7). Therefore, 
human rights and justice should consider differences and individuality, as well 
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as the common humanity among human beings. The most significant point is 
how rights related to differences and individuality should not violate the rights 
of common humanity.
Benhabib further supplemented the humanistic approach by referring to the 
legal form of human rights. In her opinion, universalism has a moral as well as 
legal meaning (Benhabib 2002: 27). She argues that human rights are “moral 
principles that need contextualization and specification in the form of legal 
norms” (Benhabib 2011a: 14). In fact, the role of the juridical, constitutional, as 
well as common law tradition of each human society cannot be ignored in the 
legal articulation of human rights. Since constitutional and common law might 
be based on cultural patterns and value systems in some human societies, con­
textualization faces the risk of cultural relativism, as well as what Benhabib calls 
‘strong contextualism’ (Benhabib 2002: 39). The main premise of cultural rela­
tivism is recognizing distinct but equal values and cultural patterns for every hu­
man society. Cultural relativism, as Benhabib criticizes, offers an interpretation 
of cultures as “hermetic, sealed wholes that are isolated from one another as well 
as being internally self­consistent” (Benhabib 2001: 250). Furthermore, it “priv­
ileges the homogeneity of cultures and identifies one axis of self­definition and 
identification, an ethnic one, as being philosophically privileged and relevant” 
(ibid.: 247). Therefore it “minimizes the significance of cross­cultural dialogue” 
(ibid.: 244). In contrast to this perspective, Benhabib points out, that “cultures 
are systems of meaning, value, and interpretation which must also be reproduced 
over time by individuals under the constraints of a material way of life” (ibid.). 
Modernity and globalization, as well as pluralism, are of crucial importance in 
this process of shaping cultural worldviews. 
Benhabib also recognized the right of self­government for individuals as a 
legitimizing factor for the existence of a varying range of interpretations and im­
plementation of human rights in different societies. This means the contextual­
ization and interpretation of human rights is possible “only if the people are 
viewed not merely as subject to the law but also as authors of the law. They can 
participate in opinion formation which is to regulate their lives in society” (Ben­
habib 2011a: 14), and as citizens or residents they can participate in opinion for­
mation concerning the laws related to their common lives. Hence, the right to 
have rights, as Benhabib explains, not only means a right of membership, but 
implies “the right to action and to opinion in the public sphere of a polity, the 
laws of which govern one’s existence” (ibid.: 15). Therefore, enjoyment of some 
universal human rights is a prerequisite for contextualization. 
In some societies, women are not only deprived of human rights, but their 
lack of rights is understood to be an aspect of a particular culture and cultural 
‘ethical life­world’. Benhabib emphasized that women’s rights must be consid­
ered “in the light of a universal moral language, which is context independent” 
(Benhabib 2002: 40). Women’s rights must be supported regardless of religion 
or culture. Otherwise, contextualization and interpretation could lead to viola­
tion of human rights, women’s rights, human dignity, and could ultimately lead 
MARZIYEH.indd   45 21.06.18   14:28
46
to injustice. Apart from being considered as a universal moral language, wom­
en’s rights need to be enforced in different societies, understood as part of the 
entire human rights framework, and they must have international support. One 
example is the recent declaration from the 57th Session by the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women (March 15th 2013), on ending all forms of 
violence against women and girls. While non­binding, the outcome document 
carries enough weight to pressure member states to protect women and girls 
against violence. As U.N. Secretary­General Ban Ki­moon pointed out, “Vio­
lence against women is a heinous human rights violation, a global menace, a 
public health threat and a moral outrage” (Nichols 2013). He further emphasized 
that “no matter where she lives, no matter what her culture, no matter what her 
society, every woman and girl is entitled to live free of fear” (ibid.). By this dec­
laration, states are expected to take responsibility to turn the declaration into re­
ality. However, there were attempts to derail the process by some conservative 
Muslim countries including Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Libya, Nigeria and 
Sudan, along with Honduras and the Vatican, who justified their opposition as 
defense of their cultural and religious life­world.
Human rights are recognized as a public language for solving conflicts in the 
international arena. On the one hand, human rights can set the appropriate moral 
standards for evaluation and criticism of constitutional law and social conditions 
in human societies. On the other, these standards create parameters for the inter­
national community to challenge violators of human rights. Here, “NGOs take 
the function of monitoring in order to push their national governments to imple­
ment international regulations. Therefore the implementation is accompanied by 
monitoring activities like the formulation of shadow reports or media coverage 
about the lacking implementation” (Lenz and Schwenken 2002: 174). Further­
more, violations may justify international actions meant to ruin the reputation of 
perpetrating states through “public shaming and blaming” (Lafont 2011: 19). 
2 5  Theoretical Approach to Analysing Changing Gender Norms  
in the Main Currents of Islam
This study aims to discuss modern concepts including women’s rights and gen­
der equality in various streams of Islamic thought. For this purpose, this chap­
ter began with a discussion on the sociology of religion and provided a back­
ground on efforts to define religion. The definition of religion has changed over 
the course of time. To gain a definition of religion in modern times as a source 
of a meaning system for human beings, a definition of secularity – as an out­
come of modernity – is required. Similar to the definition of religion, seculari­
ty has been defined and analyzed in many various ways in its history, ranging 
from societal to individual levels, from political to social realms, from the pri­
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vatization and marginalization of religion to differentiation of the secular spheres 
such as economy, state and science. Some speak of the failure of secularization 
theory, which predicted of decline of religion in both society and individual con­
sciousness in modern society. They argued that modernity emerged in the form 
of ‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2002) and the great world religions have 
kept their status through their ‘great culture­forming power’ (Habermas 2010). 
Accordingly, all modern societies do not follow one definite path of modernity, 
which ultimately leads to secularization, but rather they follow their own ways 
of modernity. 
There are others that speak of ‘post­secular society’ to address the continued 
existence of religious community in a constantly secularizing environment 
(Habermas 2006: 1–25). Therefore, a contemporary meaning of a secular or 
post­secular society refers to a society, as Taylor (2007) describes, where reli­
gion is one option among others for the human being. It means religion and be­
lief in God are no longer unchallengeable, but rather the plausibility of struc­
tures of modern societies has opened religion to question and debate which 
prevents naïve knowledge of transcendent values. 
In reaction to secularity, in its narrowest meaning as the decline of religion, 
there have been many efforts that have rejected the privatization of religion and 
tried to bring it into the mainstream of society. Such efforts, called fundamen­
talism, have not been confined to Christianity and West, but have manifested all 
around the world and in all the world’s religions. Recently, Islamic fundamen­
talism has come to be known as one very strong fundamentalist stream aimed at 
‘religious integrism ’, or attempts to roll the secular separation of religion, pol­
itics and society back to religious values and norms and to reintegrate religion 
in all realms of society (Taylor 2004: 375). However, it should be noted that fun­
damentalism has not been the only reaction of the Islamic world to secularity, 
but rather there have been reformist efforts to adjust the religion to the modern 
circumstances of human life, especially those based on the separation of poli­
tics and religion. 
These concepts are better understood when they are studied from a global per­
spective alongside their historical and local origins. Similarly, many theories de­
liberating such phenomena, which have originally been used in the context of 
the West and Christianity, can be compared and applied from a global perspec­
tive for other religions and non­western regions. Accordingly, my research frame­
work applies Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s theory to the role of religion 
in pre­modern and modern society. The essential point in this theory is the dia­
lectical relationship between the human being and society, which incorporates 
three processes; externalization, objectivation, and internalization. Externaliza­
tion refers to the process of constructing subjective meanings in consciousness 
which are then projected externally, while ojectivation is the concomitant pro­
cess of producing society – the creation of a reality by human physical and men­
tal activity which confronts the human being as an external and independent fact 
and an objective reality. Ultimately, internalization refers to the process of in­
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corporating objectivized reality into the structure of subjective consciousness, 
which is considered as process of societal influence over human beings. 
In this relationship, subjective meaning is constituted in human conscious­
ness and is the origin of all social stocks of knowledge. Tradition, therefore, is 
the objectification of the subjective meaning preserved in historical reservoirs of 
meaning and religion fills a crucial place in the objectification of meaning in so­
cial reality. Since there is a constant interaction between objectified and subjec­
tive meanings, they necessarily should overlap; otherwise it leads to a crisis of 
meaning. In pre­modern societies where religion was a single resource of value 
and the interpretation of reality and religious representation were broadly dif­
fused among all institutions, the differentiation between various social functions 
was so slight that social structures, personal identities and religion overlapped 
each other. In such societies, as Berger and Luckmann argue, the total stock of 
meaning stored and managed in social institutions was in conformity with prac­
tical life; there were no contradictions between objectified and subjective mean­
ings in the value system, and consequently, no ground for a crisis of meaning. 
In modern society, religion is no longer the single source of the value system 
for all members of society. Since the values and orientations of individuals can 
be totally different from values supported by the social order, the basic condi­
tion for spreading a crisis of meaning is provided in modern societies. Here, re­
ligion, which once conducted whole institutions, loses its influence over other 
realms of the social order because of the differentiation of social structures in 
specialized institutions. The cause of this crisis, according to Berger and Luck­
mann, is the modern pluralism that resulted from modernization, which leads to 
the relativization of value systems and general uncertainty. It brought all indis­
putable interpretations into question, destabilized common­sense knowledge and 
challenged all taken­for­granted interpretations of world, society and individu­
al identity. Pluralism provided alternative sources of value systems alongside re­
ligion, and expects the individual to choose among them. The differentiation of 
various realms such as economics, politics and law brings up new issues and 
needs for human beings, which in the modern epoch religion is not able to ei­
ther respond to nor to satisfy with its old worldview. Therefore, religion must 
offer a new value system that aligns with human desires and that recognizes 
more space for individual autonomy. Furthermore, religion should not expect 
human beings to function in opposition to human rationality. 
The dialectical relationship between individual and society or structure is also 
elaborated by Anthony Giddens in his Theory of Structuration. Religion, pro­
viding rules and resources through its moral and practical interpretations of per­
sonal and social life, as well as its obligations and sanctions, defines a frame­
work for interaction that can be considered as an element of structure. The 
dialectical relation between individual and structure can also be recognized as 
dialectical relation between individual and religion. 
Individual agents adopt a schema of meaning and interpretations for interac­
tion and also acknowledge a system of sanction on their behavior – moral rules. 
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In this way they legitimize the power of religion as a resource of meaning and 
interpretative schemes. However, individual agents play an essential role in pro­
ducing and reproducing rules and resources through the reflexive monitoring of 
interactions. Human agents are characterized as knowledgeable and capable of 
using reason in their actions and also those of others. Human agents examine 
what they receive from structure and religion and underline reasons for them, 
and concomitantly influence the rules and resources that are considered as the 
basis of structure and religion. Therefore, while human agents adopt the patterns 
of interaction offered by structure and religion and thereby legitimate its pow­
er, at the same time, they influence and reproduce its rules and resources. 
The important point is that if religion, as an element of structure, rejects this 
dialectical relation and discounts the reflexive monitoring of individual agents, 
it leads to what that Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann call a crisis of mean­
ing; since in this condition, the objectified meaning is inconsistent with subjec­
tive meaning. Another crucial point is that this dialectical relation between in­
dividual and religion has always existed, both in pre­modern and modern society. 
In pre­modern society, even though there was no differentiation among various 
realms such as economics, politics, law, and social institutions and they all fol­
lowed the conductive system offered by religion, this was also allowed by the 
reflexive monitoring of human agents. The patterns of meaning and interaction 
suggested by religion were recognized as rational and proper responses to hu­
man issues and needs in both personal and social life. In the modern era, where 
institutions are differentiated from each other, people follow their own rational­
ity void of religion’s legitimacy and therefore the dialectical relation between 
religion and individual becomes controversial. Human agents apply modern ra­
tionality to reproduce rules and resources in order to achieve patterns of mean­
ing and interpretations schemes proper to modern circumstances and issues. Re­
ligion, challenged by new conditions, must change and modify itself in this 
dialectical relationship. Thus, if religion closes its doors to the reflexive moni­
toring of individual agents, a crisis of meaning may occur. 
It should be noted that, considering pluralism, as discussed in Berger and Luck­
mann’s theory, religion in the modern epoch is not the single bearer of a value sys­
tem; rather it is only one option among others. This implies the importance of in­
dividual agents’ choice. Having individual agency requires a unique identity 
different from that predefined by the social order. This unique identity is created 
and chosen by the individual. In fact, the individual plays a crucial role in under­
standing who they are and their fundamental characteristics as a human being. 
Identity is not based on an understanding of a human being as obligated to tran­
scendental and divine rights, but rather is founded on an understanding of human 
beings as rights­bearers who expect recognition of rights by other human beings. 
Therefore, building identity is a dialogical relation with others and is neither shaped 
by a predefined social script nor predetermined by transcendental authority. 
One factor in the dialectical relation between structure and individual agent 
is a ‘dialectic of control’ which regulates autonomy and dependency in this com­
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plex. The individual agent requires allocative and authoritative resources to be 
effective and exercise some control in this relationship. Allocative and authori­
tative resources provide different forms of power for individual agents in differ­
ent types of society and in different times. In modern societies, the resources 
leading to power for individual agents can be defined as civil rights, or in gen­
eral, individual rights which are actualized in participation in various realms. 
Defining and recognizing this set of individual rights is essential to create an in­
dividual identity and to provide the basis for justice in the modern epoch.
Nancy Fraser categorizes these rights in the three dimensions of economics, 
politics and culture, and defines injustice as the outcome of the lack of social ar­
rangements for participatory parity in these three dimensions. Eliminating in­
justice therefore requires destroying institutionalized obstacles that prevent some 
people from participating on a par with others as full partners in social interac­
tions. Political injustice or misrepresentation results from people’s inability to 
access their civil rights and to participate equally in democratic decision­mak­
ing. Economic injustice is the outcome of ‘maldistribution’ of resources and 
wealth. Injustice in the cultural dimension refers to misrecognition of identity, 
individual achievement, and autonomous personhood which prevent human be­
ings from interacting on terms of parity because of institutionalized hierarchies 
of cultural values. These three dimensions can also explain injustice based on 
gender. For example, a gender­specific form of distributive injustice can be found 
in division between high­paid professional occupations for men and lower­paid 
labor like domestic service occupations for women. Another example is when 
androcentric cultural values dominate, in a society that devalues everything cod­
ed as feminine. Such androcentric patterns are institutionalized into popular cul­
ture and even in law, especially in those issues relating to family life. They are 
actualized in everyday life in forms of sexual assault and harassment, domestic 
violence, and trivializing, among others. 
Similar to Fraser, Axel Honneth claims justice in modern societies also has 
egalitarian features that provide equal rights for all members of society and rec­
ognizes autonomy for them. In his point of view, the important condition for jus­
tice in modern society is individual freedom. 
Individual freedom can be discussed in three models of freedom; negative 
(freedom from interference by others), reflexive (self­realization, making one’s 
own choices: self­determination), and social freedom, which refers to social con­
ditions necessary for the realization of individual freedom. In fact, reflexive and 
negative freedom can be realized only on grounds of social freedom. In other 
words, recognizing others, which is only possible in social institutions, is a con­
stitutive element of the freedom of individuals, such that the individuals have 
relations of reciprocal recognition within their institutional practices, and there 
they can find the conditions of their own self­realization.
Self­realization can be actualized in three patterns of recognition, including 
love, rights and solidarity. Love refers to emotional approval and recognition 
from primary social relationships like family that leads to self­confidence. The 
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concept of rights deals with moral responsibilities to others as legal beings, 
which brings self­respect. The concept of solidarity refers to individualized char­
acteristics that develop self­esteem and provide the human being with the feel­
ing of dignity. 
Honneth also explained the important role of personal relationships (includ­
ing friends, intimate or love and family relations) in generating individual free­
dom and self­realization as a principle of justice. His discussion on family is of 
particular consideration for this research. Traditional role­specific tasks such as 
father, mother and child organized by patriarchy and socially constructed norms 
have been transformed into a cooperative social relationship based on love, 
equality and partnership rather than authority and paternalism. 
According to Fraser, factors required for justice and equal access to rules and 
resources include economic redistribution, cultural recognition, and political 
representation. According to Honneth, personal relationships, market relations, 
and the public sphere of politics are the factors required for justice. Factors ap­
plied in this research are an assortment of both theories, including economic re­
distribution, cultural recognition, political representation, and personal relation­
ship which is manifested in the family.
The question here is who should count as the subject of justice? As Fraser 
points out, today’s globalized world does not restrict the subject of justice to cit­
izens residing within territorial states or boundaries and it should not be under­
stood as simply a domestic relation among fellow citizens. Undoubtedly, the im­
pacts of social processes on individuals’ lives overstep territorial borders. In fact, 
globalization – as a multidimensional phenomenon – alongside objective dy­
namics, is linked to economics, politics, and technology, and a subjective di­
mension which refers to an increased consciousness of the world as an intercon­
nected whole (Robinson 2007: 127; Steger and James 2011: 53). The process of 
globalization has diffused modernity around the world. In this case, modernity 
means the transformation of conceptions and the premises of relations between 
various elements of structure. It breaks down all traditional legitimation and 
brings different possibilities of new political, economic and social orders, which 
influence the dialectic relation between actor and structure. This rearrangement 
changes the conception of human agency and defines a new individual identity 
based on autonomy, and brings liberation from the bonds of traditional political 
and cultural authority. This new identity emphasizes the participation of indi­
viduals in constructing the social and political order, which means more empha­
sis on the role of individuals in the dualistic structure (Eisenstadt 2002: 5). Jus­
tice means the participatory parity in rules and resources of all members 
regardless of their gender, religion, ethnicity, or culture. Equal participation in 
constructing the social and political order must be considered as an overall cri­
terion applicable everywhere and which cannot be violated with a justification 
of ‘different culture’ or ‘religious values’. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) as well as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) can be considered as practical crite­
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rion to assess participatory parity, especially related to gender. Therefore, as 
Benhabib argues, they can be defined as ‘cosmopolitan norms of justice’ which 
considers individuals as having certain rights who must “be recognized as mor­
al beings worthy of equal concern and who are equally entitled to be protected 
as legal personalities by their own polity, as well as in the world community” 
(Benhabib 2011b, 62). Therefore, admission and commitment to the UDHR and 
CEDAW does not necessarily mean westernization, following western values or 
relinquishing cultural differences in a homogenization of cultures and global so­
ciety. Rather it is the just protection of human/women’s rights, providing the 
conditions for equal access to rules and resources for all individuals which help 
the fulfillment of justice in the current epoch. 
This theoretical framework presents an ideal type of modern society in which 
there is a dialectical relationship between individual and structure, or more pre­
cisely between human reason, and religion as established by revelation. The 
model also proposes justice to be understood as equal access to rules and re­
sources, regardless of gender in economic, political, and cultural dimensions, as 
well as in family life. Justice further means adherence and commitment to cos­
mopolitan norms, as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW).
According to this theoretical model, this study aims to investigate the main 
streams of Islamic thought regarding three subjects. The first deals with the con­
cept of the individual, including man and woman, and aims to gain the perspec­
tives of each main stream of Islamic thought on the equality of men and wom­
en as well as on the self­determination of individual agents in religious doctrine. 
Accordingly, it discusses the meaning of rights and their changeability, as well 
as the legitimacy of rights – whether rights are defined based on revelation or 
human reason, and ultimately if they can be defined based on gender. The sec­
ond concept is religion as structure. The definition of religion and the approach 
to the Quran and sunna as the source of revelation shall be debated here. The 
third concept is that of perspectives on the UDHR and CEDAW and their ac­
ceptability in Islam.
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3  Methodology for Comparative Research on the  
Main Currents of Islam
Now the methods used in my research will be discussed, including the compar­
ative method, the documentary research method, and expert interviews, which 
were used in the empirical section of the research. 
The comparative method
This research uses the comparative method to compare the perspectives of the 
main currents of Islamic thought on women’s rights and gender equality. Com­
parison is a fundamental tool in scientific approaches and analysis. It is applied 
to the intersocietal as well as the intrasocietal. One definition by Pennings (2006) 
looks at comparative social research in two ways. One is at “the level of politi­
cal and social systems based on its supposed core subject,” and another is by 
“the means of descriptive features that claim to enhance knowledge about polit­
ical and social phenomena as a process” (Pennings 2006: 19–20).
The comparative method in the first sense can be traced to two founding cre­
ators of Sociology, Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) and Max Weber (1864–1920), 
who conducted comparative analysis in their work. Both these scholars claim that 
the comparative method is consistent with the nature of sociological inquiry. How­
ever, they differ from one another in their strategy, epistemology and explanation 
of conducting the comparative analysis (Smelser 2013). Ragin (1989) employs 
the comparative method to verify the relationship between various phenomena 
and also “to determine the different combinations of conditions with specific out­
comes or processes” (Ragin 1989: 14). It is applied to the exploration of similar­
ities and differences of two or more cases regarding a specific phenomenon, with 
the aim of achieving a typology towards a better understanding and explanation 
of the cases. This method also helps to understand and explain divergent forma­
tions of a single phenomenon and reveal variations within what is presumed to 
be a united and undifferentiated category of units (Azarian 2011: 118).
In this research project, this method helps to investigate different interpreta­
tions of Islam and the origin of such diversities. The various currents of Islamic 
thought  – to be discussed in this book  – are classified into three prominent 
thought streams based on the compatibility of Islamic jurisprudential laws, with 
a time and space index, as well as the relationship between human reason and 
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Islamic jurisprudential laws. If viewed on a spectrum, one end would be the fun­
damentalists and the other the seculars, with reformists standing in the middle. 
Therefore, the three main streams of thought and their perspectives on women’s 
rights shall be compared in order to arrive at an understanding of the relation­
ship between various interpretations of Islam and women’s right and gender 
equality.
In comparative research, it is essential to develop a theoretical perspective in 
order to systematically relate the research question to possible research designs, 
rather than simply gathering a lot of information (Pennings 2006: 23). There­
fore, the three main currents of Islamic thought will be compared through a the­
oretical model that is illustrated in the chapter on theoretical framework.
The documentary research method
This study uses the documentary research method, which involves the analysis 
of literature that contains information about the research subject (Mogalakwe 
2006: 221). The documents are divided into two general categories: primary doc­
uments, which are those written by scholars of the main three streams of Islam­
ic thought, and secondary publications which are previous research works on 
the relationship of Islam and gender equality, and especially include studies on 
the views of prominent representatives from each stream of Islamic thought. 
This study is confined to investigating the representatives’ opinions of the main 
currents of Islamic thought in Iran after the revolution 1979, which is a Shiite 
Islamic country, in order to gain an integrated perception. 
Core aspects of expert interviews
Studying primary documents written by scholars of the main three streams of 
Islamic thought shows that they do not evince constant standpoints over time. 
In other words, every scholar has various phases of thought in his life. In some 
cases there are relatively opposite ideas presented in various publications by an 
individual scholar. To understand the present positions of these currents, expert 
interviews were carried out. The expert interview is applied based on the inter­
pretive paradigm of qualitative studies which refer to “those traditions in social 
research that are rooted in hermeneutic, phenomenological or interactionist ap­
proaches and which see as their main task the interpretations and understanding 
of text” (Klar and Opitz 1997: 342). 
In sociology, the interpretive paradigm views social interaction as an inter­
pretative process. This means “the definitions of situations and actions are not 
explicitly or implicitly assumed to be settled once and for all by literal applica­
tion of a preexisting culturally established system of symbols” (Wilson 1970: 
702); rather, they are open to redefinition by the participants in an interaction 
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on a specific occasion. Therefore, the participants produce a social world of 
which they are themselves a part. The normative paradigm, in contrast to the in­
terpretive, assumes that social interaction is governed primarily by rules and 
norms (Farrington and Murray 2014: 28). In this regard, interpretive qualitative 
research is a form of inquiry in which researchers have their own interpretation 
of what they see, hear, and understand, which can be completely different from 
the interpretation of their readers as well as the participants of the study (Cre­
swell 2009: 176) Accordingly, the categorizing of a stream of thought or a rep­
resentative based on certain indicators may be different from what that group or 
representative define for themselves. 
The interview methodology
This study employs the expert interview to collect updated information, com­
plementing insights coming from applying other methods such as a literature re­
view. Bogner and Menz (2009) distinguish this sort of interview as the system-
atizing expert interview in their threefold typology of expert interviews. Here 
the expert interview is not used singularly, but is seen as a complementary meth­
od. This is referred to as ‘triangulation’ (Flick 2014: 230). Furthermore, expert 
interviews in this research project can be considered as theory­generating, as 
suggested by Bogner and Menz in their typology, since they help develop theo­
ries on the insights of different streams of Islamic thought, “from reconstruct­
ing the knowledge of various experts” (ibid. 228)
In the course of this study, semi­structured expert interviews with open­end­
ed questions were conducted with representatives of the three streams of Islam­
ic thought. Since all representatives or experts were requested to express their 
views about the same themes, the results obtained through these semi­structured 
interviews can be compared with each other (Nohl 2012). Consequently, such 
comparison can lead to an understanding of the current debate on gender equal­
ity in mainstream Islamic thought. 
The interview sample
The sampling in this study follows a specific, predetermined criterion (Przybor­
ski and Wohlrab­Sahr 2014: 182). The streams of Islamic thought to be discussed 
here are categorized as: Fundamentalist, Reformist and Secularist. Such a cate­
gorization is based on each group’s perspectives on the changeability of Islam­
ic jurisprudential laws in a time and space index as well as the independence of 
human reason from revelation. If plotted on a spectrum, extreme fundamental­
ists would be on one end while extreme seculars will be on the other. Reform­
ists are situated in the middle. Using the term secular to describe one stream of 
Islamic thought does not mean that they are anti­religious or irreligious, but that 
they try to settle “rules about the ‘proper place’ of religion without rejecting re­
ligion as such” (Burchardt et al. 2012: 6).
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Since the researcher is a woman and the subject of research is women’s rights 
in Islam, conducting an interview with representatives of extreme fundamental­
ism was not possible. Instead, the representatives of fundamentalist­oriented 
thought who were interviewed were those who stand close to reformists on the 
spectrum of Islamic thought. There were three informants coming from this par­
ticular group. Some of the interview partners are anonymized because of possi­
ble political implications. The first interview partner, “A” did not agree to a di­
rect interview but had asked his son to receive the questions and to deliver his 
answers. The other two representatives of this group – “B” and “C” – were in­
terviewed directly in Teheran and Qom. 
“D”, “E”, and “F” were interviewed as representatives of the reformist­ori­
ented thought stream. They are recognized as the most significant and influen­
tial representatives and intellectual leaders of reformist thought in Iran. Since 
“D” lived in the United States at the time of the interview, the interview was 
conducted through Skype, while the other two interviews were conducted in 
Bonn, Germany. In the third group representing the seculars, Mojtahed Shabe­
stari and Mostafa Malekian were interviewed in Tehran. These men are recog­
nized as the only prominent representatives of the religious secular view in Iran. 
All eight interviews, with an average duration of 120 minutes, were conducted 
from January – June 2011.
These representatives were chosen as informants for this study since they are 
recognized socially as experts in this context (Bogner and Menz 2005: 61, 98). 
All of the experts in this study are male, since there was no female socially iden­
tified as an expert in Islamic theology. The female informants within the reform­
ist or secular orientation were identified as experts in Women’s Studies in Islam 
rather than experts in Islamic theology.
In an expert interview, the experts are considered as representatives of a group 
rather than as a ‘whole’ or singular person (Person als Ganzes; die gesamte Per-
son) (Meuser & Nagel 2005: 72), and their arguments for a certain subject rep­
resent the view of this group on that subject. However, each expert’s life expe­
rience and his knowledge of philosophy and the history of theology, as well as 
debates on global issues such as human rights, justice, etc. have influenced their 
insights and expert knowledge, which are discussed in this study. 
Creating structure and guidelines for interviews using the main questions
The structure of all the interviews was determined by specific main questions 
that follow certain issues of interest for the study. This facilitates a systematic 
order of information that allows the researcher to make comparisons between 
interviews (Kruse 2014: 213). Guidelines relate theoretical considerations to 
qualitative methods of collecting data. Though the guidelines could be drawn 
from the theoretical framework, they are not themselves theoretical questions; 
rather they are oriented to the research field and are intended for acquiring the 
necessary information needed to answer the research questions (Gläser and Lau­
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del 2009: 90–91). Therefore, the guidelines establish a connection between the 
theoretical frameworks that inform the concepts that are used to define the re­
search problem (Silverman 2010: 104), and are used in the empirical part of the 
research to gain answers to the research questions. 
While there are guide questions, the interviewee is allowed to explain in more 
detail and in greater depth other aspects of the subject matter that are not nec­
essarily mentioned in the guidelines. As such, the main points raised by the in­
terviewee were followed with ‘immanent questions’ (Helfferich 2011: 105) 
aimed at further elaboration of that point. This resulted in a narration that high­
lighted more aspects rather than provided a direct answer to a specific question. 
Therefore, the guidelines were not strictly followed, although all points men­
tioned in the guidelines were discussed. 
The guide questions were designed based on the “Sammeln, Prüfung, Sortie-
ren, Subsumieren”, more commonly known as the SPSS­Method, developed by 
Helfferich (2011: 182–189). The first step, Sammeln refers to collecting ques­
tions and brainstorming. In the second step, Prüfung means verifying questions 
based on their relevance to gaining proper information. Then, in the next step, 
Sortieren refers to sorting the questions according to their content. In the last 
step, Subsumieren, the verified and sorted questions are subsumed into the guide­
lines. The resulting guidelines were reviewed by a cleric who was familiar with 
religious terms, in order to make sure that the concepts used in the guidelines 
would be similarly understood by the interviewees.
Designing the main interview questions
The suggested theoretical model in Chapter Two presented an ideal type of mod­
ern society in which there is a dialectical relationship between individual and 
structure, or more precisely between human reason and religion as established 
by revelation. The model also proposed justice to be understood as equal access 
to rules and resources, regardless of gender in economic, political, and cultural 
dimensions, as well as in family life. Justice further means adherence and com­
mitment to cosmopolitan norms, as articulated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
According to the theoretical model in this study, the guidelines for the expert 
interviews are categorized into three groups. The first group deals with the con­
cept of the individual, including man and woman, and aims to gain the infor­
mant’s perspective on the equality of men and women in religious doctrine as a 
representative of his respective stream of Islamic thought; for example, in cre­
ation as well as in nature and biology. This group of guidelines also investigates 
the role of human reason in the relationship between the human being and his 
creator, as well as with other individuals in society. The concept of rights is dis­
cussed in this section to ascertain the respondent’s view on a human being’s 
identity as rights­bearer or obligation­holder to God. Accordingly, it discusses 
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the meaning of rights and its changeability, as well as the legitimacy of rights – 
whether rights are defined based on revelation or human reason, and ultimately 
whether they are defined based on gender. The second group of guidelines re­
fers to religion as structure. The definition of religion and the approach to the 
Quran as the resource of revelation shall be debated here. The third group of 
guidelines investigates the interviewee’s perspective on the UDHR and CEDAW 
and their acceptability in Islam. The last guideline, about the current legal in­
structions related to women’s rights in Iran as Islamic laws, tries to achieve an 
understanding of different currents of thought on equal access related to gender, 
rules and resources in different realms of life – economic, politic, cultural and 
family. 
The guidelines:
The three groups of guidelines applied in the research are as following:
Individual agency
 • What is the role of gender in defining the equality of men and women in the 
Islamic doctrine?
 • What is the role of human reason in the relationship between human beings 
and God as well as society
 • What is the role of human reason in defining human rights? Are human rights 
constant or changeable? 
 • How do differences between genders effect how their respective rights are de­
fined?
Structure
 • What is the place of Islamic law and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in your defi­
nition of religion?
 • Is the Quran a direct word from God or is it an outcome from the Prophet’s 
experience (Interpretation)?
UDHR and CEDAW as the criteria for global norms of justice and human dignity
 • Can the UDHR provide a foundation for justice and human dignity?
 • Can the CEDAW provide a basis for gender justice?
 • Can the current legal instructions related to women’s rights provide justice in 
society? How do you evaluate the laws related to women’s rights in the eco­
nomic dimension (such as right to work, inheritance, etc.), political dimension 
(executive tasks such as appointing women as judges or president, etc.), cul­
tural dimension (such as women’s veiling, etc.) , and in the family (such as 
polygamy, right to divorce, temporary marriage, etc.)?
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The interview analysis
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. Although all interviews were tran­
scribed verbatim in Persian, only the relevant passages for the interview guide­
line questions were translated verbatim in English. Nonverbal expressions (such 
as laughing, harrumphing, coughing, and stammering) were transcribed, only if 
they changed the meaning of a statement (Gläser and Laudel 2009: 194).
To analyze the interviews, ‘thematic evaluation’ (Kruse 2014: 206) was ap­
plied. The focus of evaluation is in reference to the themes on which guide ques­
tions are based. Therefore transcribed interviews were categorized and coded 
based on concepts determined by the guide questions. This means categories 
and codes were predetermined and derived from the guidelines, which in turn 
were deduced from the theoretical framework as well as research questions, and 
the data from interviews were fitted to them. As Creswell (2009) points out, 
while “the traditional approach in social sciences is to allow the codes to emerge 
during the data analysis”, for this study it was helpful to have “a larger theoret­
ical perspective on the research” (Creswell 2009: 187). In this case, ‘thematic 
comparison’ (Flick 2014: 237) using the codes and categories leads to a theo­
retical comparison between interviews in order to gain an “interpretation of the 
larger meaning of data” (Creswell 2009: 189), as well as provide comparabili­
ty of the current ideas of interviewees with their views mentioned in their pub­
lications. Furthermore, interviews within the same group were compared to get 
more detail about the views of the Islamic mainstream. This facilitates a presen­
tation of differences and similarities among perceptions of various currents of 
thought in Islam. 
Methodological norms and qualitative research 
There are three classical criteria to assess the procedure and results of research, 
namely reliability, validity, and objectivity. However, some writers prefer to use 
different terminologies for such criteria in qualitative research. For instance, 
Guba suggests four criteria to assess trustworthiness in a qualitative study: cred­
ibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, which are used in this 
research.
Credibility refers to an internal validity which ensures that the study mea­
sures what it is actually intended to measure. Credibility can be gained through 
a technique such as triangulation (Guba 1981: 85), which means taking differ­
ent perspectives on the issue under study by using several methods, or several 
theoretical approaches, as well as combining different sorts of data about theo­
retical perspectives, which are then applied to the data (Flick 2014: 184). In this 
study, the data and information about various streams of Islamic thought are ob­
tained from documents and a literature review, providing a basis and background 
for the research issue. This is complemented by expert interviews to explain and 
verify particular details in the current attitudes and outlooks of the streams of 
thought in Islam.
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Furthermore, the guideline questions for the expert interviews were discussed 
among peers and academic colleagues, to investigate and re­analyze the relation 
between theoretical concepts mentioned in the guidelines drawn from the theo­
retical framework, in order to gain data correctly. In this process, the research­
er had the opportunity to widen her vision by gaining constructive ideas and in­
terpretations from peers and academics. Guba considers such meetings and 
sessions as peer debriefing, which according to him is another method of ob­
taining credibility (Guba 1981: 85).
Transferability refers to external validity or generalizability, which shows to 
what extent the findings of one study are generalizable to other situations. While 
some qualitative researchers consider findings as specific to the particular cir­
cumstances of the study and not applicable to other situations, other researchers 
have a contrasting view (Shenton 2004: 69). In this study every expert is con­
sidered as a representative of a broader stream of thought. Therefore, transfer­
ability cannot be rejected. 
Dependability is another term for reliability. Reliability refers to the consis­
tency of the findings of a study with a replicated inquiry with the same context 
and the same methods, or at the same moment using different instruments (Flick 
2014: 481). The dependability of data and procedures in interview­based stud­
ies implies that “such repetition is rather an indicator of a prepared statement, 
in which some relevant aspects may have been left out, rather than a confirma­
tion of the correctness of what has been said” (ibid.: 483), but nevertheless, since 
the expert interviews in this study were conducted among representatives of var­
ious streams of thought, it is expected that the data and explanations obtained 
from experts do not change in general. However, time and space are important 
factors in which individual experts may change their ideas and perceptions. 
Confirmability relates to objectivity which requires that the instruments ap­
plied in the study should be independent of human skill and perception. In qual­
itative research this is not conceivable, since all questions are designed by hu­
man beings. Therefore, here confirmability means that the findings of the study 
are a result of research rather than the preferences of the researcher. One meth­
od to achieve confirmability is triangulation, which was mentioned earlier as a 
means to gain credibility (Shenton 2004: 72). Though it should be noted that the 
results from several methods could be different, either complementary or con­
tradictory. In both cases there may be a theoretical explanation for the different 
results rather than a problem in the confirmability of the research (Flick 2014: 
191). In this study, using triangulation by comparing the results from the liter­
ature review and expert interviews shows, in some cases, confirmability and, in 
other cases, complementary results.
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4 Women’s Rights in Iran and CEDAW: a Comparison
4 1 An Overview on the History of Women’s Rights in Iran
Iran has undergone two important revolutions in its modern history: the Consti­
tutional Revolution (1905–11) and the Revolution of 1979. Women played es­
sential roles in promoting both events with the hopes of achieving a better fu­
ture and to be recognized as independent citizens with equal rights. However, 
neither of the revolutions brought women many civil rights, and the Revolution 
of 1979 actually deprived women of rights they gained since the Constitutional 
Revolution. This chapter briefly examines the rise and fall of women’s rights in 
Iran since the Constitutional Revolution.
The Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911)
Women were involved in political activities prior to the Constitutional Revolu­
tion that served as a model for collective political efforts utilized during the rev­
olution. One notable example is that of the Tobacco Boycotts, when Nasir al­
Din Shah (1831–1896), the fourth shah of the Qajar dynasty (1794–1925) 
allowed and promoted the British to have a full monopoly of the tobacco indus­
try. This British domination led to enormous protests throughout Iran in 1891 
through enacting a wide scale boycott of tobacco. Women participated in these 
public protests, which even included violent attacks perpetrated by public offi­
cials. They participated in street riots, in fights and armed clashes, and joined 
underground activities. Mass protests and the successful boycott forced the gov­
ernment to cancel the tobacco concession in 1892 (Paidar 1995, p.50–51).
The Constitutional Movement is generally recognized in the history of Iran 
as the beginning of women’s participation in political processes in order to 
achieve citizens’ rights. The movement consisted of a coalition of intellectuals, 
bazaaris (the merchants and workers of bazaars, the traditional marketplaces of 
Iran), the ulama (religious scholars), and women. The overall goals of the Con­
stitutional Revolution aimed to centralize the state, to replace arbitrary power 
and a despotic government with a representative system, and to constrict the 
power of the clerical authority and their judicial control over the state. Howev­
er, Iranian women had further goals, including access to education and political 
enfranchisement. Women began to form their own opinions about their situation 
in Iran and the necessity of recognizing the importance of women’s contribu­
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tions in a modern society through organizing communication networks and se­
cret societies. They believed that reforms in the status of women were essential 
alongside improvements in other political and economic dimensions. In their ac­
tivities in the era of the Constitutional Movement, women also became able to 
utilize the publication process, and establish newspaper and journals not only to 
discuss the activities of constitutionalists, but also to promote women’s issues 
such as economic and educational equality, as well as the issue of the veiling of 
women (Afary 1996, Sanasarian 2013).
Education became a primary issue for women during the Constitutional 
Movement, as it was defined as being for men only, and women were consid­
ered to be incapable of learning. Education was viewed as a means for women 
to undertake responsibilities outside of the home and a necessary step towards 
allowing women to participate in the government. After serious efforts of pio­
neer women in this period, they established girls’ schools and gained access to 
education (Paidar, 1995; Sanasarian, 1982; Afary, 1996).
The issue of women’s suffrage was raised for the first time by Vakil al­Ru’aya, 
the deputy from Hamadan in the second Parliament in 1911. As new electoral 
law was drafted and debated which resulted in women being listed as disallowed 
to vote, he argued the idea of legal equality between men and women as crea­
tures of God and defended women’s right to vote. His argument was rejected by 
the other deputies. The logic behind not allowing women to vote was, as Mu­
darris argued, “God has not endowed them with the ability to be electors”. Mu­
darris considered women ‘among the weak’, whose ‘minds do not have the ca­
pacity’ to engage in politics. He also referred to the Quran verse (4:34) which 
mentions ‘men are in charge of women’; and in this way he claimed “they will 
have absolutely no rights to elect. Others should protect the rights of women” 
(cited in Amin 2002: 30–40).
Although the constitution did not grant women the right to vote, women’s 
contributions to the Constitutional Revolution were the beginning of a new era 
for women in Iran. It legitimized the integration of women and men in society, 
established the necessity of women’s education, and raised women’s issues such 
as family relations and veiling as a public and national concern. In fact, the Con­
stitutional Movement was the opening for women’s entry into society and into 
sociopolitical activities, as well as recognizing their issues and enabling them 
to organize themselves to claim their civil rights.
Women’s Rights in the Pahlavi Era (15 December 1925–11 February 1979)
The Pahlavi dynasty was founded by Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925 after a special­
ly convened assembly deposed Ahmad Shah, the last ruler of the Qajar dynas­
ty. Reza Khan was named as the new Shah of Iran. 
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Reza Shah Pahlavi (reign: 1925–1941)
As the first ruler in the Pahlavi dynasty, Reza Shah aimed to build a modern na­
tion­state through Westernization, although he also wanted to end Western priv­
ileges. His efforts included strengthening the army, encouraging industry, im­
proving infrastructure such as roads and railways, and promoting the 
secularization of the state. Reza Shah’s image of a modern society included sig­
nificant changes for women. Unveiled women wearing European clothes and 
working in appropriate jobs, like teaching, were a symbol of modernization 
(Sedghi 2007:64; Keddie 2007: 84). Under this ideology, Reza Shah made sig­
nificant advancements for women in terms of education and legal rights relat­
ing to family issues. However, women still faced many challenges under his 
reign, including the continued denial of voting rights.
Education was a powerful tool to spread the Shah’s ideology of a more mod­
ern and ‘Western’ Iran. The Ministry of Education was created in 1910 by Par­
liament, but it was under the strong influence of the clergy and was dominated 
by religious teachings. Reza Shah secularized the education system by taking it 
from the religious authority into the state domain. He further expanded girls’ 
schools and established secondary and vocational schools for girls. In 1936, 
women were admitted to the University of Tehran, two years after its establish­
ment in 1934. Many European professors were hired at the University and many 
students were sent abroad, but women were excluded from such programs 
(Sedghi 2007: 70–71). These improvements in the education system for wom­
en also promoted women’s participation in the labor market and increased rates 
of employment (Amin 2005, Paidar 1995). 
Reza Shah also made reforms in the legal system relating to family life which 
had previously been governed by Islamic laws. In 1931 a law concerning mari­
tal age raised the age for both men and women and recognized that a marriage 
contract should be based on ‘physical aptitude’ rather than age. The law raised 
the age for females from 9 to 15 and for males from 15 to 18. Other new laws 
further granted women the right to ask for divorce, although only under certain 
conditions. In conformity with Islamic laws, the man still had the absolute au­
thority to divorce. However, marriage and divorce proceedings were relatively 
secularized, as both actions were required to be notarized and registered in civ­
il bureaus rather than in religious courts. In other areas of family law, such as 
polygamy, custody, inheritance and guardianship, the family remained intact and 
based on Islamic laws in favor of men (Sedghi 74).
In January 1936, Reza Shah issued a decree calling for the unveiling of all 
women, which was influenced by Attatürk and his secularist gender policies in 
Turkey. In some cities, gendarmes enforced the unveiling by physically pulling 
off women’s chadors. Women were beaten for wearing veils, shops were pro­
hibited from selling goods to veiled women, and buses as well as baths were for­
bidden to provide services to veiled women (Ettehadieh 2004: 99). The pressure 
fell more on urban women, due to the lack of state presence in the countryside. 
The unveiling law marginalized the majority of religious urban women by cre­
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ating a sense of fear if they left the home, which discouraged women from ac­
cessing education and employment, and from participating in public activities. 
Consequently the law of unveiling failed to bring any liberation to religious 
women (Hoodfar 1999; Sadeghi 2010).
Under Reza Shah’s reign and despite his claims to modernize women’s sta­
tus, women’s demand for electoral rights to the Iranian parliament was reject­
ed. Through his efforts to centralize Iran, the Shah required control over all po­
litical groups, including women’s organizations. In the 1930s many women’s 
groups and organizations either incorporated into the state structure or gradual­
ly retreated because of strict censorship regarding what they could say or pub­
lish. Several women’s magazines were banned from publication in this era (Ked­
die 2007: 76; Hoodfar 1999). Independent groups were discouraged as the 
state­sponsored ‘Ladies’ Center’ was promoted, which was also under the lead­
ership of the Shah’s oldest daughter, Shams.
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (reign: 1941–1979)
During Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s reign, the laws put in place by his fa­
ther became more relaxed and there were several attempts to achieve women’s 
suffrage in Iran. However, the majority of these attempts were condemned by 
the clergy and were unsuccessful until 1963. 
The ideology of the clergy held that according to Islamic laws, voting was 
restricted to men, while women’s duties were confined to housework, mother­
hood, and childbearing. In their view, the existing laws protected women and 
any alteration would destabilize political order, bring social crisis, and lead to 
religious decline. Every effort for women’s suffrage was condemned by the cler­
gy, who viewed the political empowerment of women to be a ‘collapse of pub­
lic morality’ (Esfandiari 1997: 27). Clergy leaders, such as Ayatollah Khomei­
ni, mobilized religious followers to form mass protests against women’s suffrage 
in the name of Islamic law. The opposition imposed by the clergy shaped the 
political discussion and will within Iran and greatly delayed the acquisition of 
women’s suffrage. 
One of the first efforts towards women’s suffrage in this period was initiated 
by the Democrat Union of Women, the women’s organization of the Tudeh Par­
ty. The Tudeh Party was a branch of the Iranian Communist Party which aimed 
to achieve equal rights for men and women. The Democratic Union of Women 
created a women’s suffrage bill in 1944 and they collected over 100,000 signa­
tures in support. However, the bill was defeated in Parliament. 
Several Prime Ministers attempted to promote women’s suffrage. In 1946, 
Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam submitted a women’s suffrage bill, which was 
defeated by the clergy’s opposition (Sedghi 2007; Hoodfar 1999; Burki 2013: 
209). Prime Minister Mossadegh granted women limited voting rights in district 
and village council elections. Mossadegh also wrote an electoral reform bill, 
which would have given women the right to vote. However, the clergy opposed 
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this action and they ultimately forced Mossadegh to withdraw the bill before it 
was even debated in Parliament. Women’s suffrage was eventually debated in 
1959, but was once again defeated by the clergy (Burki 2013: 211). In 1962, the 
government of Prime Minister Asadollah Alam announced a new Local Coun­
cils Law that allowed women to vote in the local council elections.  However, 
the clergy opposition caused the government to publicly withdraw this law.
On January 9, 1963, Mohammad Reza Shah announced his White Revolu­
tion program, which included women’s enfranchisement as one of its six points 
of action. The points of the program included: “1. land reform; 2. sale of gov­
ernment owned factories to finance land reform; 3. a new election law includ­
ing women’s suffrage; 4. the nationalization of forests; 5. a national literacy 
corps, mainly for rural teaching; and 6. a plan to give workers a share of indus­
trial profits” (Keddie 2006:145). In order to legitimize the program, the Shah 
called for a national referendum. Unsurprisingly, the clergy did not support these 
reforms and Khomeini argued that “by granting voting rights to women, the gov­
ernment has disregarded Islam and has caused anxiety among the Ulama and 
other Muslims” (cited in Kian 1997: 76). 
Both sides of the issue organized protests about particular aspects of the White 
Revolution program. On January 22, 1963, the clergy organized demonstrations 
and strikes to protest the program, especially land reform and women’s suffrage, 
including the fact that women would be allowed to participate in the referen­
dum. The next day, women went on strike to demand their enfranchisement and 
their right to participate in the referendum. Participating women included teach­
ers, nurses, public and private employees. 
The referendum on the White Revolution was held on January 26, 1963 with 
the participation of both men and women. The referendum passed without diffi­
culties and was ultimately ratified on March 3, 1963. Accordingly, the Electoral 
Law of 1909, which deprived women – along with people who were insane and 
minors – of the right to elect their representatives and debared women from be­
ing elected to the parliament was amended to recognize women’s enfranchise­
ment. As a result, six women were elected as Parliament (Majlis) deputies, two 
women were appointed by the Shah to the senate, and the Shah appointed Far­
rokhru Parsa as the first female Minister for Education (Sanasarian 1982: 79–100). 
Women’s participation in civil society aimed to achieve further equal rights 
for women in Iran. The Shah’s twin sister Ashraf Pahlavi established the High 
Council of Women’s Organizations in 1959 and subsequently the Women’s Or­
ganization of Iran (WOI) in 1966. Although this structure clearly shows nepo­
tism and dependence on the Shah, the WOI implemented many improvements 
for women in Iran. These include the establishment of family welfare centers, 
health, education, legal aid, childcare facilities, vocational training and free con­
traception (Sedghi 2007: 97–8). The WOI also played an important role in draft­
ing the Family Protection Law (FPL) in 1967, which was subsequently revised 
in 1975 and brought some reforms in the area of family law, including age re­
strictions for marriage, divorce, child custody, and polygamy (Poya 1999: 51).
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The Family Protection Law made significant advancements for women’s 
rights in Iran. The FPL gave a woman the right to sue for divorce if her husband 
took a second spouse without her consent. In this way, the FPL aimed to restrict 
polygamy, but not to abolish it. Previously, when a marriage ended in divorce, 
child custody was immediately granted to the father. However, Article 9 of the 
FPL changed this process and declared that child custody would be based on a 
court’s decision. The FPL further raised the age of marriage to eighteen for wom­
en and twenty for men, although girls over the age of fifteen could get married 
with the permission of the Family Protection Courts. Article 16 of the FPL made 
it more difficult for a husband to prevent his wife from employment, becoming 
possible only if he could prove that his wife’s job damaged the dignity and pres­
tige of the family. Women also received the same right to prevent her spouse 
from entering into inappropriate work. 
In 1973, the state legalized abortion and excluded medical intervention from 
the list of crimes (Sedghi 2007: 140; Poya 1999: 51, Simon: 25). The act of abor­
tion was further simplified by an executive bylaw in 1976. This enabled parents, 
as well as single mothers, with justified and sufficient reasons to have unrestric­
tive abortion before 12 weeks of gestation. The physician was the person respon­
sible for evaluating this justifiability (Shamsi Gooshki et al. 2014: 73).
The clergy continued to oppose the FPL and to promote Islamic laws. Kho­
meini described his discontent with the FPL, saying:
The law that has recently been passed by the illegal Majles under the name of the Fam­
ily Protection Law in order to destroy Muslim family life, is against Islam, and both its 
originators and implementers are guilty before the shari’a. Women who are divorced in 
family courts should consider their divorces as null, and if they remarry they are com­
mitting adultery. Whoever marries such women knowingly is also an adulterer, and should 
be punished according to the shari’a by whipping. The children of these men and wom­
en are illegitimate and are not entitled to inheritance (Khomeini 1984: 314).
However, some controversial Islamic laws remained intact after the FPL. One 
includes the Passport law, which bans married women from leaving the country 
without notarized permission from their husbands. Another contentious law was 
Article 179 of the Criminal Code, which assigned no punishment to a husband 
who murders his wife after finding her with another man (Sedghi 2007: 149; Es­
fandiari 1997: 31).
The era of the Pahlavi dynasty was very important in the struggle for wom­
en’s rights in Iran, in which women achieved some of their demanded rights de­
spite all critics and weaknesses. This era also demonstrates the tension between 
the clerical community and women’s struggle for civil and equal rights.
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Women’s rights after the 1979 Revolution 
The Revolution in Iran occurred between spring 1977 and February 1979 to pro­
test against the monarchy for several reasons, including economic deprivation, 
political repression, and identification with Islam. The Revolution brought many 
groups together that previously did not have close ties due to religious or class 
differences, including women’s groups, men, and clergy. Women’s involvement 
in protests included wearing the veil as a symbol of political protest against the 
secular pro­West monarchy with the hopes of removing the monarchy and achiev­
ing a better future without gender discrimination (Moghadam 2003: 98). Their 
revolutionary inspirations and their attendance at public struggles against the 
Shah’s regime, in cooperation with men, caused Khomeini to change his stand 
and to affirm women’s political rights as a religious duty: “Women have the right 
to intervene in politics. It is their duty… Islam is a political religion. In Islam, 
everything, even prayer, is political” (Khomeini 1979 cited in Kian 1997: 76).
Nevertheless, only a few days after the revolution on February 26, 1979, Aya­
tollah Khomeini abrogated the Family Protection Laws of 1967 and 1975, claim­
ing it opposed Islam. With this annulment, some women’s rights in both the pub­
lic and private realm regressed to their previous form based on Islamic jurisprudence. 
For instance, the minimum marital age for women was reduced from eighteen 
back to nine, and divorce and child custody rights were left entirely to men. Po­
lygamy was reintroduced, despite being restricted in the former law. Women lost 
their right to serve as judges on March 3, 1979, which was reaffirmed with new 
legislation entitled the Judges’ Appointment Conditions Act in 1982 (Kar 2012:2). 
Furthermore, women were banned from being solo singers or being sent to other 
countries as diplomats, as these acts were perceived to be against Shari’a (Kar 
2010:7). On March 7, 1979 Khomeini imposed an edict to force women to take 
up the Islamic dress code (hijab) at their workplaces. Women demonstrated against 
the veiling imposition on March 8–9, 1979 which successfully postponed enforce­
ment of the decree until July 7, 1980. In 1983, the Parliament passed the Islamic 
Punishment Law that stipulated seventy­four lashes for violating the Islamic dress 
code in public spaces. These rules were extended in 1995 when “a note to Article 
139” of the Islamic Criminal Code reaffirmed the governmental penalty by man­
dating ten to sixty days of imprisonment for those who publicly resisted the hi-
jab” (Sedghi 2007:201). These new regulations divested women of many rights 
they had gained over the years of the Pahlavi regime. 
The war era (September 22 1980–August 20 1988) 
The Iran­Iraq war allowed the Islamic government to justify crushing organized 
political groups and oppositions, including women’s organizations. This led to a 
repressive regime, where many activists went into exile, while others were ar­
rested, imprisoned, and executed. Nevertheless, women began to publish jour­
nals to publicize women’s issues and to criticize the government’s gender poli­
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cies in a milder tone that was more acceptable for the hardliners. More Muslim 
women participated in criticizing the government from an Islamic framework, 
emphasizing the importance of building a just Islamic society. These women chal­
lenged discriminatory conditions through their reinterpretation of judicial texts 
that the government used to justify gender discrimination. Such efforts contrib­
uted to the emergence of the Islamic Feminist movement, which involved both 
domestic and international forces that sought to present a new gender vision on 
a women­centered interpretation of Islamic text (Hoodfar 1999; Sadeghi 2010).
One significant change in the laws related to women in this era was Khomei­
ni’s edict on granting the widows of martyrs in the war custody of their children, 
even after remarriage. Although this right was confined to the widows of mar­
tyrs rather than all women, it created a precedent for changing Islamic laws 
which were not supposed to be subject to any change. Despite the law’s limited 
scope, it was the beginning of recognizing the possibility of further changes in 
Islamic laws in favor of women (Hoodfar 1999; Mir­Hosseini 1996b).
The era of the Presidency of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (August 3 1989–August 2 1997)
The presidency of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is characterized by a more mod­
erate interpretation of Islamic texts regarding women’s rights. Rafsanjani fol­
lowed more pragmatic and moderate foreign and domestic policies to provide 
Iran with a better position in the international community. He pursued policies 
of liberalization with practical national interests over Islamic ideology and ideo­
logical perspectives. In his view, the goal of Islam is to achieve a better quality 
of life: “we want this world and the next world both, ideals and welfare togeth­
er – this is attainable” (cited in Esposito and Voll 1996: 69). The merging of Is­
lam and government after the revolution raised question on economic and so­
cial issues, which required scholars to seek more modern interpretations of 
Islamic law and to provide the government with a modern religious analysis. 
Rafsanjani’s efforts went beyond the political and economic spheres and includ­
ed promoting some measures to improve the status of women in Iran as well. 
At the beginning of his term, more journals and magazines (including those 
for women) gradually emerged, despite the censorship and threat of losing pub­
lication licenses. Seyed Mohammad Khatmi, the head of the Ministry of Islam­
ic Guidance and Culture, even removed some government restrictions on films, 
music, art, literature and journals. However, the Parliament forced Khatmi to re­
sign in 1992 after fearing that his policies promoted un­Islamic values. 
Despite the prevalence of traditional roles for women based on outdated in­
terpretations of Islamic texts, women became much more involved in civil so­
ciety. Wives and daughters of high government officials established women’s 
organizations and these women organized and attended conferences concerning 
women and family issues, including the UN Conference on Population and De­
velopment in Cairo in 1994 and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Bei­
jing in 1995. 
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The government further established organizations that addressed women’s is­
sues. In 1988, the Social and Cultural Council of Women was created to pro­
mote women’s economic and social activity. Furthermore, in 1992, the govern­
ment initiated the Office of Women’s Affairs, which was designed to improve 
women’s status and to report any problems and shortcomings directly to the pres­
ident. These organizations, despite their government­appointed members, pro­
vided forums for women’s complaints and they drew attention to women’s con­
cerns and gender discrimination (Kian 1997:81, Hoodfar 1999). 
One significant legal change during Rafsanjani’s presidency was the amend­
ment to the divorce provisions in 1992. According to these changes, registration 
of divorce required a court certificate; women were allowed to be appointed as 
advisory judges in family court (in cooperation with the main male judge); and 
men were required to pay their wives for their housework (Mir­Hosseini 1996). 
This highlights how women’s economic activity outside the home was gradual­
ly recognized, but housework and childcare were still regarded as women’s main 
responsibility. Khamenei, the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader (4 June 1989 
­) argued: “Islam authorizes women to work outside the household. Their work 
might even be necessary but it should not interfere with their main responsibil­
ity that is child rearing, child bearing and housework. No country can do with­
out women’s workforce but this should not contradict women’s moral and hu­
man values. It should not weaken women, nor compel them to bend or to stoop 
low” (cited in Kian­Thiebaut 2008). 
Throughout the 1990s, Rafsanjani also introduced a family planning program, 
“Less Children, Better Lives” that was designed to reduce the rapid population 
growth in Iran. The program included subsidized free condoms, vasectomy clin­
ics, affordable contraceptives, and nationwide education on family planning for 
married couples. Accordingly, the total fertility rate in the 1980s (6.5) dropped 
to 2.0 in 2000, 1.9 in 2006, and ultimately to 1.6 in 2012. The program was con­
sidered successful, especially concerning reducing fertility rates in rural areas 
(and in one generation) from 8.1 to 2.1 children (Esfandiari 2010). 
The era of the Presidency of Seyed Mohammad Khatami (August 2 1997–August 3 2005)
At the beginning of Khatami’s presidency, he attempted to promote a reformist 
agenda “from Islamic Ideology to the Reform of Islam” (Amir Arjomand 2009). 
Despite Khatami’s reformist actions, he encountered opposition from the fun­
damentalists who dominated Parliament. Under this context, many efforts were 
made to promote women’s rights and while some were successful, the opposi­
tion blocked many reformist actions.
Khatami won the 1997 election with seventy percent of the vote, which demon­
strates the hope and optimism of people for political reform and social change in 
Iran. Throughout both of his terms, Khatami advocated for freedom of expression, 
political tolerance, civil society, equal opportunities, rule of law, women’s rights, 
and constructive diplomatic relations with other states. The United Nations endorsed 
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Khatami’s ‘Dialogue of Civilizations and Cultures’ and declared 2001 as the Unit­
ed Nations’ Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations.”9 Civil society prospered in this 
era with more press, the closer coordination of all women activists, and the open­
ing of the Center for Women’s Participation. The center had the task of empower­
ing women to run non­governmental organizations to reinforce women’s participa­
tion in the sociopolitical, economic, and cultural process of civil society and to 
provide women with more freedom in the public sphere (Sadeghi 2010). Many 
women’s groups took advantage of Khatami’s ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’ and 
sought to participate in various international meetings and conferences, particular­
ly in Asia. These opportunities allowed Iranian women to share their experiences 
with other women’s activists, to gain new insights about women’s issues in other 
regions, and to enter the global women’s movement (Tohidi 2002). Khatami also 
promoted women’s rights by appointing women to significant political positions. 
Masoumeh Ebtakar, the first female Vice President of Iran, was appointed as head 
of the Department of Environment and Zahra Shojaee was appointed as the Direc­
tor of the Center for Women’s Participation. These appointments led to a change in 
public attitudes and behavior about taking women’s work more seriously.
However, only a small amount of legal reforms passed during Khatami’s pres­
idency. These limited reforms are especially surprising, as the sixth Parliament 
had thirteen female representatives that aimed to remove obstacles hindering 
women’s progress. The minimum age of marriage and the age of penal respon­
sibility for girls increased from nine to thirteen, although girls as young as nine 
could be married with the permission of the court. Another reform lifted the ban 
on unaccompanied single women studying abroad on government scholarships. 
Women were also granted custody of boys and girls up to seven years of age (the 
previous law entitled mothers to have custody of boys up to two years and girls 
up to seven). Decisions about custody of children after the age of seven were giv­
en to the court. However, other articles and reforms that promoted women’s rights 
provided by the sixth Parliament were rejected by the Council of Guardians10 
(Koolaee 2012; Esfandiari 2010). Another reform included the ‘law on insurance 
  9  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 2001. Dialogue 
among Civilizations. Available at: http://www.unesco.org/dialogue/en/background.htm (26 June 
2015).
10  Article 91 of the Constitution introduces the Guardian Council with the following terms: “With 
a view to safeguarding Islamic commands and the Constitution, so that the legislation of the Is­
lamic Assembly are not in contravention with them, a council named the Guardian Council shall 
be established composed of the following: 1) Six clerics, just and acquainted with the needs of 
the time and problems of the day. These individuals will be appointed by the Leader or the Coun­
cil of Leadership; 2) Six jurists who are qualified in various branches of law, from among Mus­
lim jurists, introduced to the Islamic Assembly by the Head of the Judiciary and appointed with 
the approval of the Assembly.” Also according to article 96, the majority of the clerics of the 
Guardian Council will decide whether the legislation passed by the Majlis is in conformity with 
the precepts of Islam, while the decision with regard to the conformity of the acts with the Con­
stitution comes from the majority of all members. A bill is passed into law after it is passed by 
the Majlis, approved by the Guardian Council, and signed by the President (Kar 2010: 44).
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for women’ which was passed by the sixth parliament and ratified by the seventh. 
The law aimed to entitle women to family property at the time of divorce and it 
was particularly important for many women who did not work in the formal sec­
tor of the economy. The seventh parliament also passed the ‘equality in blood 
money insurance law’ which stipulates that insurance companies are obligated 
to pay equal blood money to men and women, in the event that it is required (Koo­
laee 2012). Iran’s abortion law was also amended in 2005, which stipulated:
performing abortion by physicians is permitted with a definite diagnosis of retardation 
or malformation of the fetus that is unbearable for the mother, or is a life­threatening dis­
ease of the mother, by three specialist medical doctors and the verification of the Legal 
Medicine Organization (LMO). This act allows therapeutic abortion (TA) with the moth­
er’s consent, only before ensoulment that is considered four months after conception. In 
addition, the list of maternal and fetal problems that legally justify TA is open and the 
LMO holds the authority to verify such diseases (Shamsi Gooshki 2014:77).
However, according to this law, if a woman is pregnant as a result of rape, she 
still does not have the right to an abortion.
Many of Khatami’s reformist efforts were often blocked by the fundamental­
ists, and he ‘declared publicly that he lacks sufficient powers to implement the 
constitution and the rule of law’ (quoted in Moghissi and Rahnema 2001). For 
instance, both the Guardian Council and the judiciary11 (which have always been 
under conservative control)12 limited policies by refuting legislation and pursu­
ing legal action against anyone who challenged the system. These circumstanc­
es restricted the scope of freedom for the press and the actions of civil society. 
By May 1999, nineteen reformist newspapers were shut down and a number of 
reformist leaders were arrested (Vakil 2011: 140). The conservative and funda­
mentalist views remained rooted in the ideology that women must stay at home 
and perform household duties and raise children while men work to earn mon­
ey and manage the family (Koolaee 2012). 
One notable unsuccessful effort in this era was the Convention on the Elim­
ination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW was 
ratified by the reformist government and approved by parliament. However, the 
Guardian Council ultimately rejected it, arguing that it was incompatible with 
Islam. The Guardian Council then disqualified most reformist candidates from 
participating in the seventh and eighth parliamentary elections, which enabled 
11  According to Article 156 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the judiciary is ‘an inde­
pendent power’. And according to article 157, the head of the judiciary is to be a just Mujtahid 
appointed by the Supreme Leader and serve for a period of five years.
12  Since the head of the judiciary and also six clerics of the Guardian Council according to the 
Constitution are appointed by the supreme leader, through these arrangements there is, in fact, 
a guarantee that if the elected president or major elected body of the parliament are not under 
the control of the conservatives, they would not be able to divert from the policies of the su­
preme leader (See: Moghissi and Rahnema2001).
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the fundamentalists to regain control of the parliament. However, the reformists 
in the seventh parliament (2004–2008) proposed two conditions on CEDAW, 
that “international institutions should not have the right to violate Islamic laws 
and that international courts should not intervene in the internal affairs of Iran.” 
The proposal was rejected by the parliament; even by the female representatives, 
after identifying seventy cases where CEDAW violated Islamic laws. The con­
servative female representatives argued that CEDAW was based on the Western 
definition of women’s rights, which was not acceptable in the Iranian society. 
Some even claimed CEDAW created a more difficult economic situation for 
women since it would have banned polygamy. To conceptualize the contradic­
tion between CEDAW and Islamic laws, the next chapter compares the articles 
of CEDAW to civil codes of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which claimed to be 
based on Islamic laws. 
The political defeat of Khatami’s reformist agenda led to public frustration 
and political apathy, which facilitated the conservative success in the presiden­
tial election of 2005. 
The first term of the Presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (August 2005–August 2009)
Once Ahmadinejad won the election in August 2005, the fundamentalists held 
political power and they began pursing more legal actions that coincided with 
their traditional interpretation of Islamic laws. Although some women contin­
ued civil society efforts to promote women’s rights, the government implement­
ed several restrictive laws, many of which further restrained access to education. 
Women’s press and NGOs facilitated several demonstrations between 2004–
2006 including: the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign; the Women’s Access to 
Public Stadiums Campaign; the Mothers for Peace Campaign; and One Million 
Signatures Campaign to Change Discriminatory Laws. The ‘One Million Sig­
natures’ campaign received international recognition as the most influential cam­
paign against the discriminatory policies of the Iranian government (Tohidi 
2009). On one hand, the campaign called for an end to discriminatory laws that 
would ultimately be submitted to the Parliament. On the other hand, the cam­
paign wanted to become a dynamic, non­violent and non­ideological movement 
to enhance social awareness and sensitivity to women’s issues. They wanted to 
increase awareness on the impact of discriminatory laws on the daily lives of 
women and men in Iran through face­to­face interaction, as well as through vir­
tual space and new media (Ahmadi Khorasani 2009). Despite the peaceful na­
ture of the campaign, many activists confronted state repression and were ar­
rested for ‘disruption of public opinion,’ ‘propagating against the regime,’ and 
‘endangering of national security.’
In addition to restricting freedom of speech for women who participated in 
the ‘One Million Signatures’ campaign, the government continued to restrict 
speech and activities among civil society that began under Khatami’s presiden­
cy. The government intensified how they filtered websites, shut down indepen­
MARZIYEH.indd   72 21.06.18   14:28
73
dent newspapers and journals, closed various NGOs (including women’s asso­
ciations), and imprisoned several civil and women’s activists (Sadeghi 2012: 
126). In January 2008, Zanan, a magazine that served as a platform for secular 
women, reformist clerics, intellectuals, and jurists supporting women’s issues 
since 1992, was shut down by the Ahmadinejad regime. 
Throughout Ahmadinejad’s first term as president, the government further 
implemented several measures that restricted women’s access to education. Un­
der Rafsanjani and Khatami, women benefited from educational opportunities 
provide by Iran, particularly how universities and workplaces encouraged wom­
en from both traditional and reformist families to study at the universities and 
take a job. According to a report by the parliament’s research center, over a twen­
ty year period, there was a twenty­three percent increase in the number of girls 
taking nationwide university entrance exams, with sixty­five percent of girls 
passing the test (Vakil 2011:112). However, the seventh parliament proposed a 
new quota system for the universities, and although it was never ratified, it was 
implemented with a low ratio in 2007. The enforcement of this plan intensified 
in 2012 when thirty­six universities in Iran excluded women from seventy­sev­
en fields of study. In 2013, another fourteen fields were banned for women. Fur­
thermore, the government created a ‘region­based university application system’ 
which required a woman to have permission from her father or husband to study 
at a university in another city (Koolaee 2012). The government also proposed 
new gender segregation measures in order to ‘Islamize’ the universities. The jus­
tification for such schemes was to protect men’s opportunities in education and 
the labor market, in order to reduce the pressure of high unemployment during 
the economic crisis. These policies have been widely criticized as deliberate pol­
icy mechanisms to curb women’s access to higher education.
In 2007, the seventh parliament introduced the ‘Family Bill’ which included 
articles that restricted women’s status. Article 23 enabled a man to remarry with­
out the permission of his first wife and restricted the conditions of polygamy 
only to the financial ability of the man. Article 25 created a tax to be imposed 
on women’s dowries (mahr). Article 46 “criminalizes the marriage of a foreign­
er to an Iranian woman without proper authorization. The foreign man is sub­
ject to between ninety days and one year imprisonment, and the woman (if mar­
ried at her free will), her father (if he gave permission), and the marriage 
officiate will be sentenced as accomplices.”13 However, a protest by several wom­
en activists (including those who participated in the One Million Signatures cam­
paign) lobbied with religious authorities and representatives and caused the 
eighth parliament to ratify the Family Bill in 2013 without Articles 23 and 25. 
However, Article 46 remained with little change (Koolae 2012).
The Cultural Commission of the seventh Parliament further sought to revise 
Khatami’s cultural policies that allowed for women to abide by a more relaxed 
13  Foundation for Iranian Studies, 2007 Family Protection Bill, available at: http://fis­iran.org/en/
women/laws/07fpb (25 June 2015).
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Islamic dress code. The Cultural Commission created the ‘Social Security Plan’ 
(tarh-e amniyat-e ejtema’i), a measure to pressure women to strictly follow a con­
servative definition of the Islamic dress codes and to arrest women who resist for 
being ‘improperly­veiled.’ They also initiated the ‘Plan to Promote Public Chas­
tity’ which required all institutions to strictly enforce both women’s dress codes 
as well as the rule against mingling of men and women in workplace, universi­
ties, and restaurants among many other public spaces. Women’s working hours 
were also reduced, which was justified by claiming it would allow women to have 
more time with their families (Sadeghi 2012: 127; Koolae 2012). All of these pol­
icies restricted the presence and participation of women in public spaces. 
The Women’s Coalition 2009 presidential elections
Despite all of the government’s efforts to restrain civil society and the rights of 
women, the Iranian people became more conscious of the issues. People from 
various strata, from both religious and secular backgrounds, were mobilized to 
vote for more reformist­oriented candidates to stop Ahmadinejad from continu­
ing such restrictive policies in his second term. Different groups of women ac­
tivists formed a coalition of Iranian women to challenge the conservative gen­
der policies. The coalition entered into the debate pertaining to the tenth 
presidential election campaign with two specific demands; to make Iran a 
state­party to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and to eliminate the discriminato­
ry laws against women, specifically through the revision of articles 19,14 20,15 
21,16 and 11517 of the Constitution. These demands would unconditionally ad­
dress the principle of gender equality in Iran.
14  Article 19: “All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy 
equal rights; and color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.”
15  Article 20: “All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of 
the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, in conformity with 
Islamic criteria.”
16  Article 21: “The government must ensure the rights of women in all respects, in conformity 
with Islamic criteria, and accomplish the following goals:
    1. create a favorable environment for the growth of woman’s personality and the restoration of 
her rights, both the material and intellectual; 
    2. the protection of mothers, particularly during pregnancy and childbearing, and the protection 
of children without guardians; 
    3. establishing competent courts to protect and preserve the family; 
    4. the provision of special insurance for widows, and aged women and women without support;
    5. the awarding of guardianship of children to worthy mothers, in order to protect the interests 
of the children, in the absence of a legal guardian.”
17  Article 115: “The President must be elected from among religious and political (male) person­
alities possessing the following qualifications: Iranian origin; Iranian nationality; administra­
tive capacity and resourcefulness; a good past­record; trustworthiness and piety; convinced be­
lief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official religion of the 
country.”
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The coalition aimed to raise awareness among the people and to familiarize 
them with the discriminatory nature of the laws in the Constitution of the Islam­
ic Republic, as well as to familiarize the public with the principles of the CE­
DAW and the importance of the government accepting this convention. The co­
alition further wanted to use the presidential elections as a tool to challenge 
every candidate with his plan for gender equality, to influence the future gov­
ernment, and to apply pressure for the implementation for their demands as a 
part of civil society (Bakhshizadeh 2009).  
All candidates except Ahmadinejad responded to the demands of the wom­
en’s coalition by offering gender friendly policies. Mir Hossain Mousavi had al­
ready published his agenda for women a few days before the elections and in­
cluded reforms in legal, economic, and sociopolitical rights for women (Sadeghi 
2012: 123). 
Second term of the Presidency of Ahmadinejad (August 2009–August 2013)
At the beginning of his second term, Ahmadnejad proposed three women to be 
ministers in his cabinet. However, parliament only approved one of the women, 
Marzieh Vahid­Dastjerdi, as the Minister of Health and Medical Education. Va­
hid­Dastjerdi was the first female minister in Iran since the revolution and only 
the third female minister in Iranian history (after Farrokhroo Parsa as Minister 
of Education from 1968–71 and Mahnaz Afkhami as Minister of Women’s Af­
fairs from 1976–1978). This appointment was considered to be Ahmadinejad’s 
reaction to the debates on the government’s discriminatory gender policies 
during the presidential election of 2009, despite the fact that he neglected the 
demands of the women’s coalition. On the other hand, some viewed his choice 
of a female minister as a hypocrisy and a deceptive political show rather than a 
“genuine concern for the predicament of Iranian women” (Sadeghi, 2012: 125; 
Tohidi 2009). 
After Ahmadinejad’s re­election, often referred to as the ‘electoral coup,’ 
many activists left the country either forcefully or voluntarily. The government 
perpetuated systematic and violent political repression through brutal crack­
downs of peaceful demonstrations, mass arrests, torture, show trials, rape and 
sexual abuse of political prisoners. The few organizations that survived Ah­
madinejad’s first term, including the Center for the Defense of Human Rights, 
were shut down. Even the ‘One Million Signatures’ campaign became much less 
active, as many of its members fled the county. As a result, activities from civil 
society drastically declined during the second term (Sadeghi 2012: 130; Tohidi 
2009). The conservative discriminatory gender policies continued in Ahmadine­
jad’s second term, as the eighth parliament ratified the ‘Family Bill’ and the gen­
der quota system. 
In August 2012, Supreme Leader Khamenei issued a decree to change Iran’s 
family planning program. Khamenei criticized the program as an imitation of 
Western lifestyles and he regarded continuing the population control program 
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to be a mistake. He ordered officials to create a policy to encourage Iranians to 
marry young and to have more children, so Iran’s population could grow to 200 
million people. Accordingly, parliament revoked the population control program 
and it was replaced with ‘fertility programs.’ This resulted in cutting access to 
free or low price services for birth control, such as condoms, contraceptive pills 
or vasectomies. Another piece of legislation, the ‘Comprehensive Population 
and Family Excellence Plan’18 was proposed in parliament, which included ar­
ticles about the conditions of women and new restrictions on the use of contra­
ceptives. Women’s groups and activists widely oppose these measures and is­
sued a statement stating how “The Plan in Iran will only work to widen the 
country’s gender divide in labor. It will also place new and additional restric­
tions on women’s employment, particularly on unmarried women” (Amani and 
Anzia 2014). The legislation plan has been under discussion and has not been 
ratified. 
The Presidency of Hasan Rouhani (August 2013–2017)
Rouhani won the 2013 election as a moderate, promising to advance women’s 
rights and to reduce the government’s interference in everyday life. Although 
there has not yet been any legislation changing the discriminatory laws against 
women, there has also not been significant progress in opening the political cli­
mate or much activity from civil society (Casagrande 2014). Women activists 
are still arrested and persecuted based on the laws passed under Ahmadinejad. 
The 2015 Annual Report of the United Nations for Human Rights19 demonstrates 
the systematic discrimination against women in Iran, which has not been changed 
under Rouhani despite his calls for equal rights for women and men. 
As the Supreme Leader, Khamenei emphasized ‘gender equality’ as the great­
est intellectual mistake of the West. He argued that “If we want our view with 
respect to the issue of women to be healthy, logical and precise, we have to emp­
ty our minds of this talk that Westerners say about women, [such as] about em­
ployment, about management, about gender equality” (cited in Karami 2014). 
In Khamenei’s view, some occupations are specifically male jobs. He questions, 
“Why should a job that is masculine be given to a woman? What pride is there 
18  “The ‘Comprehensive Population and Family Excellence Plan,’ is a proposed legislation in 50 
articles aiming to encourage population growth in a departure from the current population con­
trol policies, which have been in effect for the past two decades. The plan’s main goal is to ‘in­
crease the pregnancy rate to 2.5% of the quantitative population growth until the year 2025, si­
multaneous with qualitative improvement of the population and its stabilization by the year 
2051’” (650 Activists Say New Population and Family Plan Would Stifle Women, Internation-
al Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, available at: http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2014/01/
women­population/ (06.05.2015).
19  Report of the Secretary­General, Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hu­
man Rights Council, A/HRC/28/26, 20 February 2015, http://blog.unwatch.org/wp­content/up­
loads/A_HRC_28_26_ENG.pdf (20 June 2015).
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in this for [a] woman to do a job that is masculine? I’m disappointed that some­
times women themselves show sensitivity on this issue, that what difference is 
there between us and men?” According to his argument, in Islamic thought the 
issue is a matter of seeing “the shapes are two shapes. One shape is for one job 
and one shape is for another job” (ibid.). In Khamenei’s opinion, women should 
manage domestic work and he claims “If someone wants to discuss the issue of 
women separate from the issue of the home, they are entangled in a contradic­
tion of understanding. These two have to be seen together, despite it being two 
issues.” He further explains how women provide a source of peace at home, “the 
source of peace for the man, and the source of peace for the children. If the wom­
an herself does not have mental and spiritual peace, she cannot give this peace 
to the family. A woman who is humiliated, who is insulted, who has pressure of 
work, cannot be a housewife, cannot be the manager of the house” (ibid.).
Although Rouhani has not taken significant action on the issue, he has taken 
a contradictory position to the Supreme Leader. Rouhani said, “This talk is true 
that the home is the foundation for society and reform begins in the home, but 
if we ignore half of the population of the country, we will not see real develop­
ment and growth in that country” (ibid.). He ennobles the valuable steps wom­
en have taken to achieve presence in the various field of culture, science, em­
ployment, schooling and work. He also refers to the Islamic view of men and 
women and says, “Those who are scared of women’s presence and excellence, 
or have other views, to please not attribute these wrong views toward religion, 
Islam, and the Quran” (cited in Karami 2014).
Conclusion
This chapter presented a brief overview of the history of women’s rights in Iran, 
from the establishment of the Constitution when women were deprived of so­
cio­political rights, to the era of Reza Shah who modernized the country by ban­
ning Muslim women from wearing the veil. This summary further covered the 
reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, when women fought for their suffrage but were 
ultimately defeat by the clergy, followed by the Shah ultimately granting wom­
en’s suffrage and granting rights via a regal decree. 
In this historical course, the era of Mohammad Reza Shah seems to be the 
most productive epoch for women’s rights attainments. However, awarding such 
rights to women was part of his policy of Westernization and modernization, 
rather than out of a belief in the necessity of gender equality.20 On the one hand, 
20  Mohammad Reza Shah explains his view on women in an interview with Italian journalist, Ori­
ana Fallaci in October of 1973: “In a man’s life, women count only if they’re beautiful and grace­
ful and know how to stay feminine and… This Women’s Lib business, for instance. What do 
these feminists want? What do you want? Equality, you say? Indeed! I don’t want to seem rude, 
but… You may be equal in the eyes of the law, but not, I beg your pardon for saying so, in abil­
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he saw the clergy’s power as an obstacle for his policy of Westernization; though 
on the other, the characteristics of monarchy prevented him from empowering 
civil society and independent political organizations in order to restrict the pow­
er of the clerical community. However, defining some women’s rights beyond 
the religious framework through monarchical command can be considered as an 
effort to restrict the power and influence of the clergy. Therefore, he aimed at 
the modernization of the country, though without modernization’s requirements. 
By using non­modernized methods and procedure like monarchical command, 
however,, his policy of modernization could not deeply embed in society, rath­
er, it remained superficial.
To have a better understanding of the social tensions and instability and also 
gain a historical overview of women’s rights in the era of post­revolution, it is 
important to clarify the Iranian political structure. Although the political system 
is a republic and the government consists of three independent branches (Leg­
islative, Executive, Judiciary), the system in Iran is different from other politi­
cal republic structures. Another essential organization collaborating within the 
Iranian political structure is the Iran Guardian Council. All powers and sub­or­
ganizations function under the supervision of the Supreme Leader. The Presi­
dent and the representatives of parliament are elected by the direct vote of the 
people. However, the Guardian Council – a 12­member body half of which is 
directly appointed by the supreme leader – vets the qualification of candidates 
for presidency and the parliament. Even after election, the President needs to be 
appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council also has vetoing pow­
er over the legislation passed by the parliament in order to ensure that legisla­
tion is in accordance with Islam. On the other side, the head of judiciary power 
is appointed also by the Supreme Leader; therefore, the Supreme Leader holds 
the ultimate authority over all powers; even the people’s vote in election is un­
der his control. The Supreme Leader follows a conservative policy in conformi­
ty with a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.
Accordingly, all arrangements of political structure are aimed at maintaining 
the power and ultimate authority of conservative policy. Nonetheless, the his­
torical overview shows that when the reformist policy based on a reformist in­
terpretation of Islam gained the opportunity to play a confined role in the mech­
anism of the political power system, civil society became more active and the 
political climate was relatively open for criticizing the dominant policy and de­
bating alternative policies. Hence, women activists as participants of civil soci­
ity… No. You’ve never produced a Michelangelo or a Bach. You’ve never even produced a great 
cook. And don’t talk of opportunities. Are you joking? Have you lacked the opportunity to give 
history a great cook? You have produced nothing great, nothing! … All I can say is that wom­
en, when they are in power, are much harsher than men. Much more cruel. Much more blood 
thirsty. I’m quoting facts, not opinions. You’re heartless when you’re rulers…” available at: http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/world/92745/shah­iran­mohammad­reza­pahlevi­oriana­fallaci 
(8 June 2015).
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ety found a space for their demands for gender equality. The reformist govern­
ment, relying on the reformist interpretation of Islam, amended a few parts of 
the discriminatory laws in order to provide equal opportunities for all citizens 
of society. The conservative government deprives women of their primary and 
human rights and forces them to return to the domestic sphere and leave the pub­
lic sphere to the men. This leads to the question of what distinguishes the re­
formist interpretation of Islam from the fundamentalist and also secular inter­
pretations, particularly regarding their views on women’s rights; and also, what 
restrictions does each interpretation have in defining human and women’s rights? 
In the following chapters this thesis discusses the three main interpretations of 
Islam and their perspectives on women’s rights and gender equality, utilzing a 
sociological theoretical analysis.  
4 2 The Emergence of CEDAW as a Global Norm of Gender Justice
Human rights have been asserted in many documents throughout the history of 
human rights struggles, including; the Magna Carta (1215), the English Bill of 
Rights (1689), the United States Declaration of Independence (1776), The Con­
stitution of the United States of America (1787), the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789), and the Bill of Rights of the US Consti­
tution (1791). However, the enforcements of some of these documents have ex­
cluded certain groups, such as women, people of color, or certain religious mi­
norities. Hence, the various groups often excluded from these declarations of 
human rights struggled for their rights, which were ultimately incorporated by 
worldwide efforts in the twentieth century to advance human rights internation­
ally. 
The League of Nations
The origins of international women’s human rights can be traced to the estab­
lishment of the League of Nations in the aftermath of World War I in 1919, 
which aimed to ‘promote international cooperation and to achieve internation­
al peace and security.’ The League of Nations further aimed to ensure the 
self­determination of peoples, and to prevent the occurrence of another world 
war through binding its members to international law and treaty obligations 
(Ishay 2008: 206–207). Furthermore, it promoted human rights in terms of fair 
and human treatment in labor, just treatment of natives in colonial territories, 
and it prohibited trafficking of women and children (Sterns 2012: 16). The is­
sue of women’s status was on the League’s agenda in 1935 and was set to be 
inquired into by a Committee of Experts in 1937 (Chinkin & Freeman 2012: 
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3). However, these negotiations and all others initiated by the League did not 
receive political backing from member states, due to the outbreak of World War 
II. The League of Nations did not recover from this lack of international sup­
port, which ultimately led to the failure of the League’s efforts (Norman and 
Zaidi 2008: 64–65).
Another essential event concerning the human rights of women (albeit on the 
regional level) was the Inter­American Commission of Women by the Sixth In­
ternational Conference of American States in 1928. This conference was respon­
sible for the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Nationality of Married Wom­
en, which was later incorporated into Article 9 of CEDAW (Chinkin and Freeman 
2012: 4).  
The UN Convention
After the failure of the League of Nations, the major international powers met 
in San Francisco and established the Charter of the United Nations on October 
24, 1945. The Convention aimed to preserve international peace and was rec­
ognized as “the first document in history that defines the protection of human 
rights as a legitimate international task” (Zwingel 2005: 77). The UN Conven­
tion was also the first international agreement to directly mention discrimina­
tion based on sex, specifying the equal rights of men and women and the fun­
damental rights of individuals, and the dignity and value of human beings in 
the preamble. Furthermore, Article 1 (paragraph 3) explains that one of the pur­
poses of the UN is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without the distinction of sex, race, language, or 
religion.
The formation of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), one of the six main organs of 
the United Nations established by the UN Charter in 1946, is primarily tasked 
with conducting research and taking measures to promote human rights and ba­
sic freedoms. ECOSOC is the UN’s central platform and principal body “for co­
ordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendation on economic, 
social and environmental issues, as well as for implementation of the interna­
tionally agreed development goals.”21 Various subsidiary bodies and committees 
were established by ECOSOC, including the Commission on Human Rights 
21  The United Nations’ central platform for reflection, debate, and innovative thinking on sustain­
able development, The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Available at: http://www.un­
.org/en/ecosoc/about/index.shtml (21 June 2015).
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(CHR)22which was created to develop “the human rights standard setting and 
codification” (Zwingel 2005: 77). ECOSOC also set up a Commission as a sub­
unit of the CHR with the task of analyzing the political status of women. At its 
first meeting in 1946, the sub­committee arranged its principles and concrete 
tasks, including the creation of a worldwide survey of laws on women and or­
ganizing a women’s conference. However, after the sub­committee did not re­
ceive full support from the CHR, they protested to the Human Rights Commis­
sion and demanded an independent commission under ECOSOC, which led to 
22  Under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), com­
posed of representatives from various political, cultural and religious backgrounds, took a se­
ries of actions. The Commission, with members representing different – even opposing – cul­
tural backgrounds and philosophies, tried to overcome obstacles resulting from divergent 
cultures and deeply rooted ideological divisions. The outcome was a document based on ‘val­
ue generalization’ (Joas 2013) resulted from the reconcilement of fundamentally different cul­
tural traditions. Accordingly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was ratified on 10 
December 1948. 
    The UDHR contains basic human rights ideals that emerged during the last centuries through 
the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution. Various personal rights such as those related 
to individual life, liberty and personal security, as well as equality before the law are mentioned 
in the first nineteen articles of the declaration. Articles 20–26 captured rights related to public 
and political participation and social and economic equity, such as social security, the right to 
work, the right to just remuneration, the freedom to join trade unions, limitation of working 
hours, periodic holidays with pay, and the right of education. Cultural rights and rights associ­
ated with communal and national solidarity are referred to in Articles 27–28. And finally the 
last two articles, 29 and 30, underlined the conditions in which the rights of individuals in so­
ciety and the state could be realized. 
    It should be noted that a declaration differs from a convention or a treaty. Declarations are not 
legally binding, while conventions are legally binding instruments concluded under interna­
tional law. The UDHR was developed as a declaration, an ideal standard with high moral and 
political significance, yet was not a legally binding force in international law. It was only eigh­
teen years later in 1966 that international human rights law, in two separate conventions, was 
created, entering into force in 1976: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) which focuses on issues such as the right to life, freedom of speech, religion and vot­
ing; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which 
focuses on food, education, health and shelter. Both covenants, together with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, formed the International Bill of Human Rights. With these con­
ventions, human rights were no longer restricted by domestic jurisdictions claimed by states. 
Both the ICCPR and ICESCR affirm the rights to self­determination (Article 1) and prohibi­
tion of any form of discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, or politi­
cal or other opinion (Article 2), thereby provide fundamental prerequisites for the realization 
of other human rights (Ishay 2008: 16–18, 223). In addition to these covenants in the Interna­
tional Bill of Human Rights, many conventions have been adopted by the United Nations to 
protect the rights of a specific group of oppressed persons including the European Convention 
on Human Rights (1952), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1954), the Con­
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD, 1965/1969), the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 
1979/1981), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1989/1990), and the Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW, 
1990/ 2003), etc.
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the establishment of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in 1947. 
Their responsibilities included:
Preparing recommendations and reports for the Economic and Social Council with a view 
to advancing women’s rights in the fields of politics, business, social life and education, 
and to treat problems in the sphere of women’s rights urgently which call for immediate 
attention in order to assert the principle that men and women have equal rights, to pre­
pare proposals to this end and to issue relevant recommendations (ECOSOC Resolution 
48(IV) of March 29, 1947, cited in Gaudart 2007: 13).
The Commission played an essential role in ensuring that the phrase ‘equal rights 
of men and women’ from the preamble of the UN Charter was retained in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The Commission also facili­
tated several conferences between 1949 and 1959, including the Convention on 
the Political Rights of Women (1952), the Convention on the Nationality of Mar­
ried Women (1957), and the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age 
for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962). Throughout the 1960s, the 
CSW gave more attention to family planning and its relationship to the status of 
women. A report prepared for ECOSOC about this relationship concluded; “fam­
ily planning offers obvious benefits to women as individuals, especially with re­
gard to their health, education or employment and their roles in family and pub­
lic life.” Furthermore, concerning the status of women, particularly their 
education, employment and position in the family and community, it has a “a 
marked, and even decisive, influence on both family size and on the success of 
family planning programs” (UN Doc. E/CN.6/575/Rev.1:109f cited in Zwingel 
2005: 86).
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (DEDAW)
Despite the fact that the UN Charter and the UDHR recognized the status of 
women and promoted the rights of women and non­discrimination based on sex, 
the commission was convinced that a universal document was required to fully 
protect and promote women’s rights, since the “existing international human 
rights laws were not effectively addressing the specific disadvantages and injus­
tices faced by women” (Hoq 2001: 680). Most of the disadvantages faced by 
women were not yet recognized as violations of human rights, but they were re­
garded as ‘cultural and traditional patterns’ (Zwingel 2005: 90). In fact, general 
human concerns were restricted to men’s concerns, neglecting those of women,
because men are generally not the victims of sex discrimination, domestic violence, or 
sexual degradation and violence… these matters are often relegated to a specialized and 
marginalized sphere and are regulated, if at all, by weaker methods. Unless the experi­
ences of women contribute directly to the mainstream international legal order, … inter­
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national human rights law loses its claim to universal applicability (Charlesworth 1995: 
105, cited in Zwingel 2005: 92). 
However, human rights law was not able to address all violations of women’s 
rights as it was confined to the public sphere and many violations occur in pri­
vate and in the family, where “the perpetrator and the victim interact in the in­
timate sphere of a family” (Schöpp­Schilling 2007: 7). Therefore, issues such 
as ‘honor killing’ and the various forms of physical and mental violence com­
mitted against women in the family are outside the scope of human rights laws. 
Accordingly, a gender­specific instrument was required that would provide the 
greatest potential to ensure substantive gender equality for women, in both the 
private and public domains (Hellum and Aasen 2013: 2). 
The first step in creating a convention of this type was the adoption of the 
non­binding Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(DEDAW) in 1967. CSW drafted the document that contained a preamble and 
eleven articles. 
International Women’s Year and adopting the Convention on the Elimination  
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
To draw world public attention to women’s issues, the UN declared the year 
1975 to be International Women’s Year. The First World Conference on Women 
took place in Mexico that same year, where delegations adopted the World Plan 
of Action for the implementation of the objectives of the International Women’s 
Year. Conferences to promote the advancement of women continued over the 
next few decades in Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995). 
This caused the UN to declare the subsequent ten years the ‘Decade for Wom­
en’ with a thematic focus on equality, development and peace. As Zwingel ex­
plains, “the Decade for Women, including the World Women’s conferences, in­
creased the knowledge on gender in intercultural comparison as well as the 
publicity of gender issues and triggered institutionalization of the UN’s gender 
policies in a variety of ways” (Zwingel 2005: 89). The most important effect of 
the Decade for Women was the process of moving from the non­binding DEDAW 
to adopting a legally binding convention on women’s rights.
Ultimately, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) was adopted on December 18, 1979 after a long process of 
complicated and highly controversial negotiations, with thirty votes in favor, 
none against, and ten abstentions. During the Conference at Copenhagen in 1980, 
sixty­four states signed CEDAW and two states even submitted their instruments 
of ratification. It entered into force on September 3, 1981, after being ratified by 
twenty member states. According to the terms of the agreement, state parties re­
port to the CEDAW Committee every four years regarding their progress in im­
plementing and enforcing CEDAW. Shadow reports provided by non­govern­
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mental organizations (NGOs) provide the CEDAW Committee additional 
information in evaluating progress in the official reports. 
Currently, 189 states are parties to the convention and only six UN mem­
ber states have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention.23 These states in­
clude Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Tonga, Palau (signed on September 20, 2011) and 
the United States of America (signed on 17 July 1980). Ratification or accession 
by many states does not, however, mean the “ban of discrimination against wom­
en on the grounds of sex and marital status or with the demand for equality, equal 
treatment and equal status of women and men.” Some states have applied the 
right of reservations (Article 28, para. 1 and 2)24 and have not accepted all arti­
cles of CEDAW, justifying the incompatibility of those articles to their politi­
cal, legal and religious arrangements. However, in practice, “many reservations 
run counter to the objective and purpose of the relevant articles” (Schöpp­ Schil­
ling 2007: 8).
Optional protocol
To strengthen CEDAW, an Optional Protocol was adopted on November 6, 1999 
by the UN General Assembly as an additional CEDAW complaints procedure. 
The Optional Protocol entered into force on December 22, 2000. It must be rat­
ified separately from CEDAW, which commits the states to recognize the com­
petency of the CEDAW Committee to receive and consider complaints from in­
dividuals or groups within its jurisdiction. The Committee is also permitted to 
conduct special, country­specific inquiries into alleged violations. 
The Optional Protocol to CEDAW is recognized as an effective enforcement 
of women’s human rights that enhances existing mechanisms for the implemen­
tation of human rights within the UN system. It placed CEDAW on equal foot­
ing with human rights treaties that have complaints procedures, such as the In­
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the 
23  ‘Accession’ is the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become a party to 
a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. It has the same legal effect as ratifica­
tion. Accession usually occurs after the treaty has entered into force. The Secretary­General of 
the United Nations, in his function as depositary, has also accepted accessions to some conven­
tions before their entry into force. The conditions under which accession may occur and the 
procedure involved depend on the provisions of the treaty. A treaty might provide for the ac­
cession of all other states or for a limited and defined number of states. In the absence of such 
a provision, accession can only occur where the negotiating states were agreed or subsequent­
ly agree on it in the case of the state in question (Glossary of terms relating to Treaty actions: 
Accession, United Nations Treaty Collection. Available at: http://treaties.un.org/pages/Over­
view.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml (13 May 2015).
24  Article 28: 1. The Secretary­General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all 
States the text of reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession. 2. A res­
ervation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be per­
mitted.
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish­
ment.25 The Optional Protocol further diffused knowledge of CEDAW and wom­
en’s rights throughout states and amongst individuals and it aimed to increase 
public awareness of women’s human rights (Tertinegg 2007: 21).
Structure of the CEDAW
The Convention consists of a preamble and thirty articles. The preamble argues 
that, despite the existing international human rights instruments, extensive dis­
crimination continues to exist; hence there is a need to go beyond current mea­
sures to require states to undertake specific measures to achieve equality of men 
and women. It also emphasizes the importance of women’s contribution to the 
welfare of families and society, which requires evolving traditional gender roles 
for men and women in both society and in the family. Concerning the upbring­
ing of children, women’s capacity to bear children must not lead to discrimina­
tion, because “the upbringing of children requires a sharing of responsibility be­
tween men and women and society as a whole” (CEDAW Preamble).
The articles of CEDAW are categorized in six parts. Part One (Articles 1–6) 
addresses the general purposes of the Convention and state parties’ obligations. 
It starts with the definition of discrimination in Article 1, which is not restrict­
ed to sex­based discrimination and also prohibits discrimination against wom­
en, ‘irrespective of their marital status’ which prevents them from enjoying their 
‘human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cul­
tural, civil or any other field’. Therefore, as Chinkin and Freeman explain, “CE­
DAW is not gender­neutral but addresses explicitly the need to eliminate dis­
crimination against women” (Chinkin and Freeman 2012: 9). The next five 
articles contain states’ obligations to empower women and to promote cultural 
change in order to reach equality between men and women.
Article 2 outlines specific areas of discrimination against women and Article 
3 underlines state obligations, including legislation to ensure the full develop­
ment and advancement of women. Article 4 refers to temporary special mea­
sures that should be taken by states for positive discrimination for women. Ar­
ticle 5 addresses states’ measures to modify social and cultural patterns based 
on ‘prejudice, customary and traditional practices, sex­role stereotypes and the 
alleged inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes’ (Schöp­Schilling 2004), 
and also recognizes common responsibilities of men and women in the family 
for the upbringing and development of children. Article 6 obliges states to take 
25  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women. 2000. United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/ (21 June 2015).
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measures, including legislation, to suppress trafficking in women and exploita­
tion through prostitution. 
Part two (Articles 7–9) address the political and public rights of women that 
parties are obliged to ensure on the national and international levels. These rights 
include the right to vote, the right to be elected to government positions, and the 
right to participate in the government’s decision making (Art.7). On the inter­
national level, rights such as representing a government and participating in the 
work of international organizations (Art.8) is outlined, while the right of ‘acqui­
sition and retention of nationality and the transmission of nationality to chil­
dren’ is referred  in Article 9. 
The third part (Articles 10–14) refers to the social and economic rights of 
women. These include the equal rights: to education (Art. 10), to employment 
(Art. 11), to health care (Art. 12), to access to financial benefits within the fam­
ily and all forms of financial credit, as well as participation in sports and all as­
pects of cultural life (Art.13); and also pays attention to the special needs of 
women in the rural sector (Art.14).
Part four (Articles 15–16) confer the civil laws, so that Article 15 deals with 
equality for men and women before the law, including those concerning con­
cluding contracts and administering property, and also the freedom to choose a 
place of residence and domicile, as well as equality in legal proceedings. Arti­
cle 16 calls for equality in marriage and family relations such as the equal right 
to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage; the same rights and responsibil­
ities during marriage and at its dissolution; decisions about the number of chil­
dren and their care; equal right to the property gained in the family; the prohi­
bition of child marriage and setting a minimum age for marriage, and also 
mandatory registration of marriages in an official registry. 
The fifth part (Articles 17–22) sets the implementation of the Convention 
through the monitoring mechanism of the CEDAW Committee. The procedure 
of establishment of an independent monitoring Committee is explained in Arti­
cle 17. Article 18 illustrates the procedure of report by states parties on various 
measures which they have taken to accomplish the Convention’s purpose in their 
countries. The Committee has the right to determine its own rules of procedure 
according to Article 19. Article 20 explains the process and period of the Com­
mittee’s meeting. Article 21 obligates the Committee to report to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations though ECOSOC to make suggestions and gen­
eral recommendations to the participating states. Article 22 depicts the role of 
specialized agencies in the reporting process. 
The sixth part (Articles 23–30) deals with various concluding provisions and 
modes of ratification and entry into force. Article 23 says “nothing in the pres­
ent Convention shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to the achieve­
ment of equality between men and women”. Article 24 emphasizes all neces­
sary measures at national level which should be undertaken by states parties to 
achieve full realization of the rights recognized in the convention. Articles 25–
27 explain technical conditions such as becoming bound by the Convention, re­
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questing a revision of the present Convention (Art. 26), and the procedure of en­
tering into force. Impermissible reservations and their conditions are explained 
in Article 28. The resolution of disputes concerning the interpretation or appli­
cation of the Convention and the possibility of referral of a dispute to the Inter­
national Court of Justice is illustrated in Article 29, and ultimately, Article 30 
recognizes the authenticity of the text in all languages of the UN (Zwingel 2005, 
Chinkin and Freeman 2012).
4 3  Women’s Rights in the Current Laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
in Comparison with CEDAW
Iran is one of the United Nations members that have not yet ratified the Conven­
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Al­
though Khatami’s reformist government passed a bill in favor of joining CE­
DAW that was ratified in parliament in 2003, the Guardian Council rejected this 
decision, arguing that CEDAW was incompatible with Islam. 
This section will compare CEDAW with discriminatory statutes in the cur­
rent laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to recognize the disputes of 
CEDAW with Iranian laws that claim to be based on Islamic laws.
Laws in the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) incorporate 
several types of provisions. The most important provision is in the Constitution, 
which determines the general framework of the political and social systems of 
the county. The Civil Code is another main provision of the legal system, which 
consists of statutes and laws that deal with civic and social relations between in­
dividuals and various circumstances of their lives.26 Another important provi­
sion of the legal system is the Penal Code, which covers all punishments and of­
fences defined in the laws. This section provides a review of women’s rights in 
the Iranian legal system in comparison with CEDAW. 
Women in the Constitution
Women and their position in society are of the utmost importance for the Islam­
ic government in Iran, so much so that their position is addressed in the pream­
ble of the Constitution: because of great oppression women suffered under the 
old regime [Pahlavi’s regime], they should benefit from a great restoration of 
their rights. The Constitution states that it is the duty of the Islamic government 
to provide the necessary facilities to strengthen the basis of the family as the 
26  Encyclopedia Iranica.Civil Code (qa¯nu¯n­e madanı¯) of Persia. Available at: http://www.iranica­
online.org/articles/civil­code (20 May 2015).
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fundamental unit of society and the primary basis for the development of soci­
ety. Accordingly, it emphasizes that women who are meant to take on the valu­
able and momentous task of motherhood are released from being regarded as an 
object or instrument in the service of promoting consumerism and exploitation.27
While the preamble and Article 1 of CEDAW draws attention to the defini­
tion of discrimination and the point that ‘the role of women in procreation should 
not be a basis for discrimination’, the preamble of the Constitution of Iran aims 
to recognize motherhood and the rearing of children as the main task for wom­
en, which affects the other roles of women in society. 
Article 19 of the IRI Constitution defines rights by recognizing equal rights 
for all people of Iran regardless of their ethnicity, color, race, and language – but 
not gender.28 Therefore, equal rights for men and women are not recognized by 
the Constitution. 
Article 4 of the IRI Constitution states: all civil, penal financial, economic, 
administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must 
be based on Islamic criteria. Islam is the sole source of legislation, which has 
serious implications for women’s rights. Article 20 of the IRI Constitution states 
that both men and women equally enjoy the protection of the law, as well as all 
human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. However, this article does 
not recognize unconditional equal protection, but rather it conditions this pro­
tection of equal rights to be in conformity with Islamic criteria. In the follow­
ing section, the comparison of the various provisions and laws of Iran to the ar­
ticles of CEDAW illustrates the unequal rights for men and women based on 
Islamic criteria.
Article 21 of the IRI Constitution explains the government’s obligations con­
cerning women’s rights in all respects, which are conditioned to be in confor­
mity with Islamic criteria and implies unequal rights for men and women in pol­
icies, programs, and legislations undertaken by the government. This article lists 
specific goals that government must implement related to women’s rights:
“1.  create a favorable environment for the growth of woman’s personality and 
the restoration of her rights, both the material and intellectual; 
  2.  the protection of mothers, particularly during pregnancy and childbearing, 
and the protection of children without guardians; 
  3.  establishing competent courts to protect and preserve the family; 
  4.  the provision of special insurance for widows, and aged women and women 
without support; 
  5.  the awarding of guardianship of children to worthy mothers, in order to pro-
tect the interests of the children, in the absence of a legal guardian.”
27  Preamble of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
Available at: https://faculty.unlv.edu/pwerth/Const­Iran%28abridge%29.pdf (26 June 2015).
28  Article 19 of the Constitution: “All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they 
belong, enjoy equal rights; and color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.” 
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It is obvious that all of these objectives, considered by the Constitution for the 
improvement of women’s rights, are restricted to family and do not include any 
improvement for women’s political, social, economic, or cultural rights. This 
depicts the priority of the role of women in the family rather in the public sphere 
in the Constitution; compare Article 3 of CEDAW, which obliges states to take 
appropriate measures in all fields, particularly in terms of political, social, eco­
nomic and cultural rights to ensure the full development of women in order to 
ensure enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Accordingly, the Constitution of the IRI as a main representation of the po­
litical and social system of the country does not recognize equal rights for all 
citizens including men and women, but rather is based on a discriminatory per­
spective on women’s issues.
Women’s rights in family law
Minimum age for marriage
Though the amended law in 2002 increased the minimum age of marriage from 
9 to 13 years of age for girls and from 15 to 18 for boys, children can be mar­
ried off by their father or paternal grandfather before the legal age for marriage 
(Kar 2008). According to Article 1041 of the IRI Civil Code, Marriage of girls 
before reaching the age of 13 full solar years and boys before reaching the age 
of 15 full solar years is subject to the permission of the Guardian and on con-
dition of taking the child’s best interest into consideration and approval of the 
relevant court. This article is in contrast to Article 16 of CEDAW which prohib­
its the child marriage.
Choice of spouse and permission of father
According to Article 1070 of the Civil Code, the consent of both marrying par­
ties to the marriage is the fundamental condition for the legality of the marriage. 
However, there are several limitations on the rights of a woman in this regard. 
To choose a spouse and enter into marriage, a woman who has not married pre­
viously requires the permission of her father or her paternal grandfather, even if 
she has reached the full age of majority. According to Article 1043, if, however, 
the father or the paternal grandfather withhold the permission without justifi-
able reason, the girl can refer to the Special Civil Court giving full particulars 
of the man whom she wants to marry and also the terms of the marriage and the 
dowry money agreed upon, and notify her father or her paternal grandfather 
through that Court of the foregoing particulars. The Court can issue a permis-
sion for marriage fifteen days after the date of notification to the guardian if no 
response has been received from the guardian to satisfy refusal. Women are also 
not allowed to marry non­Muslims or foreign nationals without special permis­
sion of the government, according to Articles 1059 and 1061 of the Civil Code, 
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respectively (Nayyeri 2013). As a result, the freedom of choice of spouse and 
entering into marriage as stipulated in Article 16 (a, b) of CEDAW are not rec­
ognized in the Civil Code of Iran.
Mahr (dowry)
Dowry is anything which can be called property and which can be owned and 
possessed as a marriage portion (Art. 1078 of the IRI Civil Code), which is fixed 
upon the mutual consent of the marrying parties (Art. 1080) by starting the mar­
riage. Article 1082 of the Civil Code recognizes the wife as the ‘owner of the 
marriage portion’ immediately after the performance of the marriage ceremo­
ny and gives her the authority to ‘dispose of it in any way and manner that she 
may like’. The wife has the right to refuse starting sexual relations with her hus­
band until he pays the entirety of the dowry, stipulated by Article 1085 of the 
Civil Code.29 Regardless, in actual social practices, women only receive the mar­
riage portion if the husband divorces her, rather than at the time of marriage.30 
After an amended act in 1997 due to hyper­inflation in Iran, a woman’s dowry, 
if agreed in cash, should be recalculated to take account of inflation, and it shall 
be paid in accordance with the change of the annual price index at the time of 
payment in comparison with the time of the contract, which shall be calculated 
by the Central Bank of Iran, unless otherwise agreed by the spouses at the time 
of contract…(Kar 2008; Nayyeri 2013). A dowry is considered as an economic 
right, legally provided for women.
Relations between husband and wife
Entering into the marriage establishes certain rights and reciprocal duties be­
tween husband and wife (Art. 1102 of the Civil Code). They are ‘bound to es­
tablish friendly relations’ and ‘must cooperate with each other for the welfare 
of their family and the education of children’, as Articles 1103 and 1104 stipu­
late. Nonetheless, Article 1105 of the Civil Code recognizes ‘the position of the 
head of the family’ as ‘the exclusive right of the husband’. The cost of nafaqah 
(maintenance) of the wife, according to Article 1106, is at the discretion of the 
husband in permanent marriages. Maintenance, according to Article 1107, in­
cludes all reasonable and appropriate needs of the wife such as dwelling, cloth-
ing, food, furniture, the cost of health and remedy, and a servant if the wife is 
accustomed to have servants or if she needs one because of illness or defects of 
29  “As long as the mahr is not paid to her, the wife can refuse to fulfill her duties toward her hus­
band, provided that the mahr is prompt. This refusal does not debar her from the right to na­
faqah (maintenance).”
30  According to Article 1092, “if the husband divorces his wife before the consummation of mar­
riage, the wife be entitled to half of the marriage portion.”
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limbs.”31 Though, as Article 1108 clarifies: if the wife refuses to fulfill the duties 
of a wife without legitimate excuse, she will not be entitled to the cost of main-
tenance. Duties of the wife include tamkin (sexual submission and obedience), 
meaning that a woman is obliged to meet her husband’s sexual desires at all 
times. A woman’s refusal to fulfill her husband’s sexual needs is known as nushuz 
(disobedience), which leads to the suspension of her right of maintenance. There­
fore, there is no space for women’s psychological needs and preparedness in the 
sexual relation between wife and husband, which may result in marital rape (Kar 
2008).
Article 5 of CEDAW calls for the modification of the social and cultural pat­
terns of the conduct of men and women based on an assumed inferiority or su­
periority of either sex, or on stereotyped roles for men and women. However, 
the Civil Code of the IRI legally determines the head of the family; defines the 
role of breadwinner and posits the duty of wives towards their husbands, which 
follows and strengthens stereotyped roles for men and women.
Right to work
The right to work is considered an economic right, although as it is restricted to 
married women only, it must be regarded as falling within family relations. The 
husband can, according to Article 1117, prevent his wife from occupation or 
technical work which is incompatible with the family interest or the dignity of 
himself or his wife. However, the article does not offer any definition of ‘fami­
ly interest.’ This ambiguity causes personal interpretations of ‘family interest’ 
to restrict women’s presence in the professional domain. However, Article 18 of 
the IRI’s Family Protection Law gives the same right to the wife: the wife can 
also request a similar matter from the court. If doing so does not cause inter-
ruptions in the livelihood of the family, the court will prevent the husband from 
continuing at the job.32 The husband’s interpretation of ‘family interest’ or in­
compatibility does not need to be approved by a court in contrast to the wom­
en’s request. Accordingly, women’s right to work is not considered ‘as an in­
alienable right of all human beings’ as conferred in Article 11 of CEDAW.
Right to movement and freedom to choose residence
A married woman cannot leave the country without her husband’s approval. Ar­
ticle 18 of the IRI Passport Law stipulates that she needs her husband’s consent 
to obtain a passport to travel outside the country. Furthermore, according to Ar­
31 The cost of health and remedy was added to the Article in 2002 (Nayyeri 2013).
32  Qanun­e Hemayat az Khanevadeh (The Family Protection Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran). 
Islamic Parliament Research Center. Available at: http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/97187 
(18.05.2015).
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ticle 19 of the same law, a man has right to impose a travel ban on his wife and 
request that her passport be seized.33
Articles 1005 and 1114 of the Civil Code provide men with the exclusive 
right to determine the place of a wife’s residence: the wife must stay in the dwell-
ing that the husband allots for her unless such a right is reserved to the wife. A 
wife who leaves her husband’s home against his will is considered disobedient 
(nashezeh), and hence, disqualified for maintenance rights. According to Arti­
cle 1115, If the existence of the wife and husband in the same house involves the 
risk of bodily or financial injury or that to the dignity of the wife, she can choose 
a separate dwelling; though, in these cases, the wife is required to prove to the 
court that she ‘faces a significant risk of bodily harm, threatening her life and 
personal safety.’ Therefore, the same right for men and women to movement and 
also to choose their residence and domicile, as mentioned in Article 15 (4) of 
CEDAW, are denied in the Civil Code of the IRI. 
Polygamy
Men have the religious and legal right to have up to four permanent marriages 
at a time. Although this right is not explicitly stipulated in the Civil Code, it is 
referred in other articles such as the article on the law of inheritance. Also, ar­
ticles 1075–1076 of the Civil Code recognize temporary marriage.34
In the Family Protection Act of 1968 and 1975, polygamy was restricted 
through having to obtain permission from a court of law. According to Article 
16 of the Family Protection Act, a man was allowed to marry a second wife only 
under specific circumstances, as following: consent of first wife; inability of first 
wife to perform marital duties, failure of the first wife to be obedient to the hus­
band; affliction of the wife to insanity or other difficult to cure disease; convic­
tion of the wife; addiction of the wife to harmful substances; wife’s abandon­
ment of family life; wife’s infertility; and disappearance of the wife.
Article 17 explains the procedure of second marriage in the following way:
The applicant must present two copies of the application to the court and explain his rea-
sons. A copy of the application shall be sent to his wife. The court shall give the permis-
sion only when it has taken the necessary steps, and, if possible, has made an inquiry 
from the present wife of the man, in order to assure the financial ability of the man and 
33  Qanun­e Gozarnameh (The Passport Law). Available at: http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/96904 
(cited in): Impact Iran. 2012. IRAN: Gender Discrimination at its Worst. Women Living Un­
der Muslim Laws (Wluml);For The Un Universal Periodic Review Of Iran, 20th Session Of The 
UPR Working Group. Available at: http://impactiran.org/wp­content/uploads/Women­Liv­
ing­Under­Muslim­Laws_Irans­UPR_second­cycle.pdf, (21 June 2015).
34  Article 1075: Marriage is called ‘temporary’ when it is for a limited period of time. Article 
1076: The duration of the temporary marriage must be definitely determined. 
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doing justice in the case of article 16(1). It is however the first wife’s right in all cases 
to apply for divorce if she wishes.
This article also defines a punishment term of six months to one year of impris­
onment for a man who violates this rule, as well as for the Registry Officer and 
the new wife if she is aware of the former marriage of the man. 
Though the Family Protection Law after the 1979 revolution was repealed, 
this article is still valid with a small change to the punishment of parties to the 
further marriage and the Registry Officer mentioned in Article 17, which is rec­
ognized as being against Shari’a. Nonetheless, polygamy denies the equality of 
men and women in marriage and family relations which are stipulated in Arti­
cle 16 of CEDAW.
Punishment for adultery
Sexual intercourse outside of marriage is defined as the crime of zina. The pun­
ishment for zina committed by an unmarried person (zena-ye-qeyre-mohsaneh) 
is one hundred lashes, and for a married person (zena-ye-mohsaneh), it is ston­
ing to death (Art. 225 of the new Islamic Penal Code). The punishment of ston­
ing is applicable for men and women; however, it is applied in a greater propor­
tion to women. Men can evade the conviction of adultery by claiming that they 
engaged in the relation through a temporary marriage, which permits sexual in­
tercourse with multiple wives outside a formal marriage; women are not afford­
ed this option under the Iranian Civil Code (Nayyeri 2013).
Inheritance
Article 907 of the Civil Code determines the inheritance for daughters and sons 
from their parent: If the deceased leaves no parents, but has one or more chil-
dren … If there are several children, some being boy(s) and some girl(s), each 
son takes twice as much as each daughter.
According to Article 913,35 the wife will only receive a quarter of the assets 
of the deceased spouse, if there are no children; if there are children, her portion 
is reduced to one­eighth. According to Article 946 of the Civil Code, the husband 
takes inheritance from the whole of the effects of the wife. The wife takes inher­
itance only from the ‘moveable property’ and ‘buildings and trees’. It does not 
include land or farms, which are known as ‘immovable’ property. Articles 946–
35  Article 913 – “In all the cases mentioned in this subsection, whichever of the spouses that sur­
vives takes his or her share which shall be half of the assets for the surviving husband and 
one­quarter for the surviving wife, provided that the deceased left no children or grandchildren; 
and it shall be one­quarter of the estate for the husband and one­eighth for the wife if the de­
ceased left children or grandchildren. And the remainder of the estate is to be divided among 
the other inheritors in accordance with the preceding articles.”
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948 explain this rule, though these were amended on January 25, 2009. Accord­
ing to the amended articles, “the wife may inherit from ‘the value’ of her share 
from the land. In such cases the current value of the land shall be assessed and 
paid to the wife. But the main rule remained unchanged and women still may not 
inherit a share from land, but from its value” (Nayyeri 2013).
According to Article 942 of the Civil Code: If there is more than one wife, 
one-fourth or one-eighth part of the assets, which belongs to the wife, will be 
divided equally among them. Also, according to Article 949, if there is no oth­
er inheritor, the man inherits all the assets of his deceased wife, while the wife 
may only inherit a quarter of the assets and the rest belongs to the State. There­
fore, women and men do not have the same rights to family benefits as men­
tioned in Article 13 of CEDAW.
Transfer of nationality
Article 976 of the Civil Code deprives women of the right to pass on their nation­
ality to their husbands and children. An amendment to this law in 2006 allows 
children of Iranian mothers, born in Iran and after reaching the full age of 18, to 
apply for Iranian citizenship but only if their parents’ marriage is officially ap­
proved.36 Accordingly, women do not have equal rights with men concerning the 
transfer of nationality to their children as emphasized in Article 9 of CEDAW.
Guardianship over children
According to Article 1168 of the Civil Code, maintenance of children is both 
the right and duty of the parents, with the right of guardianship over children 
and supervision of the affairs of children, according to Article 1181, given to the 
father or paternal grandfather. For example, deciding on a departure from the 
country for children below the age of 18 is possible only with the approval of 
the father or the paternal grandfather – the mother has no legal say in such mat­
ters (Kar 2008). Therefore, women do not have the same rights and responsibil­
ities as parents in matters relating to their children, as demanded in Article 16 
of CEDAW (d, e).
Honor killing
If a man discovers his wife in another bed, he is legally allowed to kill his wife 
and her lover, according to Article 630 of the old Penal Code. This article, which 
remained unchanged in the new penal code, reads: When a man sees his wife 
36  Qanun­e Taien­e Taklif­e Tabeieat­e Farzandan­e Hasel az Ezdevaj­e Zanan­e Irani ba Mar­
dan­e Khareji (The Law on Nationality of Children of Fathers of Foreign Nationality). Islam­
ic Parliament Research Center. Available at: http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/97918 (21 June 
2015).
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committing zina (adultery) with another man, provided that he is certain that 
his wife is willing [to have sex], he can kill both of them in the same position; 
however if he knows that his wife acts under coercion, he may only kill the man 
[i.e. her rapist]. The same rule applies to assault and battery” (Nayyeri 2013).
Right to divorce
Women do not have the same right to the dissolution of marriage, as Article 16 
(c) of CEDAW mentions. Article 1133 of the IRI Civil Code provides the man 
with the right to divorce his wife whenever he wishes to do so, but the woman 
is not entitled to the same right to divorce. According to Article 1130, women 
in certain circumstances can refer to the Islamic judge and request for a divorce. 
When it is proved to the Court that the continuation of the marriage causes in-
tolerable difficulty and hardship (osr­va­haraj) the judge can for the sake of 
avoiding harm and difficulty compel the husband to divorce his wife. If this can-
not be done, then the divorce will be made on the permission of the Islamic 
judge.”37
Nonetheless, women benefit from a few measures to improve their domestic 
rights, such as ‘marriage conditions’ which must be published in marriage cer­
tificates.38 These conditions have been in place since the beginning of Islam and 
“allow women to request certain rights, such as right to divorce, before the mar­
riage takes place. If the man agrees to them, then the woman is entitled to re­
quest a divorce from a court whenever she chooses” (Kar 2008). Therefore, such 
37  Note added to Article 1130 in 2002: “the following circumstances, if proved in the relevant 
court, shall be considered as a case of osr­va­haraj (intolerable difficulty and hardship):
     1. The husband’s leaving of marital life for, at least, six consecutive months, or, nine alterna­
tive months in a one year period, without any acceptable reason.
     2. The husband’s addiction to any kind of drugs or alcohol that damages the marital life, and 
his refusal, or impossibility of compelling him, to quit the addiction in a period prescribed by 
the doctor. If the husband does not fulfill his promise [to quit], or, again begins his abuse, the 
divorce shall be granted by the request of the wife.
     3. Final conviction of the husband to five years, or more, imprisonment.
     4. Betray or any kind of mistreatment of the wife that is intolerable in the wife’s condition.
     5. Husband’s affliction to incurable mental illnesses or contagious disease or any kind of incur­
able disease that disrupts the marital life.
     The circumstances mentioned in this article are not exhaustive and the court may grant the di­
vorce in other cases that osr-va-haraj is proved in the court” (Nayyeri 2013).
38  Article 1119: “The parties to the marriage can stipulate any condition to the marriage which is 
not incompatible with the nature of the contract of marriage, either as part of the marriage con­
tract or in another binding contract: for example, it can be stipulated that if the husband marries 
another wife or absents himself during a certain period, or discontinues the payment of cost of 
maintenance, or makes an attempt on the life of his wife or treats her so harshly that their life 
together becomes unbearable, the wife has the power, which she can also transfer to a third par­
ty by power of attorney to obtain a divorce herself after establishing in the court the fact that one 
of the foregoing alternatives has occurred and after the issue of a final judgment to that effect.”
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conditions can replace the law, though they will never be granted permanent sta­
tus since many men will not agree to all the conditions. 
Another amended act in favor of the financial situation of woman who is di­
vorced by her husband is the right to receive ujrat al-mithl (wages for house­
work) from her husband. This is a monetary value placed on women’s house­
work, determined by the court as compensation for household services rendered 
to the husband. However, despite all amended acts, a man still has unlimited 
power to divorce, and a woman only has a conditional right to divorce that must 
be proven to the court. This unequal right requires a woman, in most cases, to 
abandon all of her financial benefits, including her dowry, to obtain the man’s 
acceptance of a divorce. Therefore men and women do not have the same right 
to marriage dissolution which is emphasized in Article 16 (c) of CEDAW.
Custody of children
According to Article 1169 – amended in 2002 – For the custody of children, 
whose parents are separated, the mother has priority until the age of seven; and 
then, custody will devolve upon the father. This continues in a Note: After reach-
ing seven years of age, in the case of dispute, considering the best interest of the 
child, the court will decide who receives custody of the child. However, this ar­
ticle is conditional upon the fact that if a mother remarries, custody will devolve 
to the father, even during the priority age (before the child reaches seven years 
of age), as Article 1170 of the Civil Code stipulates: If the mother becomes in-
sane or marries another man during her period of custody, the custody shall de-
volve upon the father. Such a restriction is not valid for the father.
Women’s social, economic, and cultural rights
Some articles on women’s cultural, economic and social rights are mentioned 
in the Family Law protocol, such as the right to work, dowry, maintenance, in­
heritance, stereotyped roles of men and women, and the right to transfer the na­
tionality. Other women’s issues in these areas are as following.
Choice of clothing
Women, both Muslim and non­Muslim, are required to wear Islamic dress. Ac­
cording to Article 638 of the Islamic Penal Code, “Women who appear in pub­
lic places and roads without wearing an Islamic hijab, shall be sentenced to be­
tween ten days to two months’ imprisonment or a fine of fifty thousand to five 
hundred Rials.”39
39  Islamic Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran – Book Five. 2013. The Iran Human Rights 
Documentation Center (IHRDC). Available at: http://tinyurl.com/ndzlvg4 (16 June 2015).
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Age of criminal responsibility
Article 147 of the new Penal Code – approved in January 2012 – states that “The 
age of maturity for girls and boys are, respectively, a full nine (8 years and 9 
months) and fifteen (14 years and 7 months) lunar years.” Therefore, if a girl 
aged 9 and a boy aged 15 commit crimes, they will be treated as adults. 
Diya (Blood money)
According to Article 544 of the new Penal Code (similar to Article 300 of the old 
Code), “The diya (blood money) for murdering a woman is half that of a man.” 
Accordingly, if a woman is killed by a man, the murderer will be sentenced to 
death, if the family of the murdered woman pay the murderer half of the blood 
money, as stipulated by article 379. A new solution for this unequal treatment is 
noted in Article 545, which provides: In all cases of homicide where the victim is 
not a man, the difference between the diya and the diya of a man shall be paid 
from the Fund for Compensation of Bodily Harms.” Also, Article 554 explains The 
diya of [harm to] limbs and bodily abilities, up to one third of the full diya, is the 
same for man and woman; however if it reaches, or exceeds, one third of the full 
diya, the diya of woman shall be decreased to half. In such cases, the difference is 
not payable from the Fund for Compensation of Bodily Harms (Nayyeri 2013).
Article 299 of the new Penal Code stipulates that if a father or paternal grand­
father murders his child or grandchild, the perpetrator does not face the death 
penalty, while, if a mother kills her children, and is proven guilty, then she will 
get the death penalty (Kar 2008).
Testimony of women
In many type of crimes, the testimony of women is not accepted in a court of 
law. For instance, Article 119 states that “Testimony of women, whether alone 
or together with men, may not prove livat (a homosexual act between men).” 
Article 199 of the new Penal Code explains the standard of testimony:
The standard of testimony in all crimes is the testimony of two men, except in zina (il­
licit sexual intercourse), livat (homosexual act between men), tafkhiz (homosexual act 
between men without penetration), and mosaheqeh (homosexual act between women) 
which shall be proven by the testimony of four men. Zina may [also] be proven by the 
testimony of two men and four women, except in cases where zina is punishable by ex­
ecution or stoning in which then the testimony of at least three men and two women is 
required. In such cases, if two men and four women give testimony, it is only punishable 
by flogging. Bodily injuries, which require diya (blood money), may also be proven by 
the testimony of one man and two women. 
Therefore, the testimony of two women is the same as that of one man (Nayyeri 
2013).
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Homosexuality
Homosexuality is considered a crime, and those who commit homosexual acts 
will be severely punished. Articles 127–134 deal with homosexual acts between 
women, which will be punished by one hundred lashes. If the act is repeated up 
to four times, the accused shall be condemned to death (Kar 2008).
Women’s political rights
There is no legal obstacle for women to work as Members of Parliament or as 
Ministers and some other positions in the government, although it does not seem 
women are allowed to attain all positions at all level of government as stipulat­
ed in Article 7 of CEDAW.
Women as judges
After the 1979 revolution, women were removed from judicial bodies as offi­
cers of the court. Later, they were granted judicial standing and the right to serve 
as counselors, but women are still not allowed to issue and sign final verdicts 
(Kar 2008).
Women as presidential candidates
Article 115 of the IRI Constitution defines the qualifications of the president 
candidates with an Arabic phrase (rejal) which means ‘men’. It states: The Pres-
ident must be elected from among religious and political men; though it can be 
interpreted as ‘personalities’. The task of interpreting this Arabic phrase is giv­
en to the Guardian Council which has never announced the condition of being 
a man as necessary for for president candidacy. However, the ambiguity within 
this article can be used to deny the political right of a woman to be president, 
which is conferred in Article 7 of CEDAW. 
Conclusion
An overview on the laws of IRI concerning women’s rights illustrates that men 
and women are not equal before the law, as Article 15 of CEDAW stipulates. 
Furthermore, women are not provided equal rights in various aspects of cultur­
al, social, economic, and political areas as well as in the matters of marriage and 
family relations. Although the preamble of the Constitution considers the duty 
of the Islamic government as strengthening the basis of family, and releasing 
women from being an object or instrument in the service of promoting consum­
erism and exploitation; the laws do not seem to be successfully releasing wom­
en from being an object or instrument in other respects. Regarding family law, 
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marriage is understood as an economic contract between man and woman, so 
that the man gains household services and sexual ownership over his wife 
through the exchange of a dowry and maintenance as a sale price. In this per­
spective, a cooperative social relationship based on love, equality and partner­
ship between parties of a family has no place, but rather it is based on the norms 
of authority and patriarchy. Therefore, women are still object and instrument, 
though in the framework of family and in the service of husbands. Such a per­
spective legitimates a family based on a relation between boss and subordinate, 
and the obedience of wife to husband, is a woman is therefore unable to attend 
to women’s issues, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Consequently this 
perspective is unable to provide women with life circumstances to support indi­
vidual self­realization and human lives appropriate to human dignity. 
Regarding the fact that the source of this perspective for defining laws and 
provisions is Islamic law, the question arises as to whether such a perspective 
on women’s rights – which is not in accord with CEDAW – is the only interpre­
tation of Islam. The following chapters shall investigate other interpretations of 
Islam on women’s rights and their views on CEDAW.
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5  Three Streams of Thought in the Near East and Iran and 
Their Views on Women’s Rights
This section reviews the state of research on women’s issues in different streams 
of Islam as well as secular currents in the Near East, and is followed by some 
aspects of the historical development of the main currents of Islamic thought.
5 1  Women’s Position in Diverse Currents of Islamic and Secular 
Thought in the Near East: the State of Research
Gender equality is internationally recognized as a requirement for human lives 
and is crucial within the global conception of justice. In relation to religion, gen­
der equality is often considered a cultural factor that defines value systems, 
which has made the subject of ‘Islam and women’s rights’ a popular issue in 
several fields of human sciences. Studies relating to gender equality in the hu­
man sciences are generally based on three interpretations of Islam: the funda­
mentalist, the reformist, and the secular. Several studies also address the histo­
ry of gender equality in Islamic countries (Keddie and Beth Baron 1991; 
Mernissi 1988) and the conditions and status of women in Islam in the Middle 
East and North Africa (Beck and Keddie 1978; Keddie 2007; Ahmed 1992; Tuck­
er 1993; Hijab 1998). This section introduces a small contribution of the pleth­
ora of literature on women’s issues in Islamic societies and the interpretations 
of fundamentalists, reformists, and secularists. 
Studies on women’s issues in fundamentalist interpretations
Despite significant regional and political differences among Islamic Fundamen­
talist movements, they have certain similar features. Fundamentalist movements 
are inherently opposed to modern and secular values (Shupe 2011); however, 
they do not opt for anti­modern living conditions. These movements are also an­
ti­democracy and anti­feminist (Moghissi 1999: 76). Another characteristic that 
defines fundamentalism is violence (Juergensmeyer 2003), although not all fun­
damentalist groups are violent. They follow certain policies concerning matters 
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of family and gender relations by trying to turn women to more traditional roles. 
These methods include encouraging procreation, veiling of women, segregation 
of the sexes, control over female sexuality, and submission to patriarchal values 
(Emerson and Hartman 2006; Afary 1997; Haeri 1993). Shehadeh (2007) pres­
ents an analysis of the discourse on fundamentalism in the opinions of some 
prominent representatives, such as Morteza Mutahhari and Ruhollah Khomei­
ni, their views in relation to women and women’s role in society, and their aim 
to construct an Islamic society. 
One remarkable point that must be considered regarding fundamentalism is 
that Muslim women have also participated in its construction, and it is not sole­
ly imposed on women by men (Ingersoll 1995, quoted in Afary 1997; Shehadeh 
2007). Women are attracted to fundamentalism for several reasons, including the 
emphasis on family and the priority of raising children. Afary (1997) and Rinal­
do (2010) indicate and discuss many studies concerning this matter, some of which 
will be discussed here. Women might have more interest in traditional culture and 
show a willingness to accept apparently secure patriarchal values to gain the hus­
band’s loyalty and economic support, including that for the children (Hardacre 
1993; Kandiyoti 1988; Ong 1990; Ruthven 2007). This willingness can be relat­
ed to the insecurities in the structure of society, such as unemployment, the low 
status of jobs for women, lack of childcare and the responsibility for household 
services for children and the elderly. However, women’s position in a fundamen­
talist community is in a transitional phase, in that they are no longer largely con­
fined to the home, but are gradually undertaking active roles and participating in 
public and business lives (Ruthven 2007). In this transition, women applying fun­
damentalist norms achieve some personal autonomy and subjectivity in building 
the Islamic society, which is considered by some scholars as another reason that 
women support the fundamentalist movement. An example on the subject of the 
subjectivity of women is their personal choice for veiling which is discussed by 
Smith­Hefner (2007) and Mahmood (2005). According to Smith­Hefner, the veil 
is also a symbol of modern Muslim women in Java; it enables women to live away 
from home and to have professional careers. Accordingly some argue that veil­
ing of women, although it restricts women’s individual freedom, can also provide 
women with more opportunities to access education and employment, to work as 
a member of political organizations, and to participate in public spaces. 
Furthermore, veiled women in Muslim countries face less sexual harassment. 
The veil can protect women from sexual harassment in various forms, such as 
touching, fondling, stalking, and derogatory comments on the streets, in buses, 
and in work places, for which women not only have no recourse to law, but are 
also regarded as having seduced the men and are condemned for it (Abu Odeh 
1993). In Iran, according to Rostamian (1390/2011), the veil is not intended to 
restrict women’s freedom, but is necessary in order to protect morality, mental 
health and social security in society. The veil was also considered as a symbol­
ic rebellion against the state’s secularism and Westernization, taken up by edu­
cated women who rejected modernity that was defined by Western and secular 
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norms. Therefore, veiling provided a new generation of educated women with 
agency and an active role in creating an Islamic society (Brenner 1996; Göle 
1996). Göle recognizes veiling in Turkey as a symbol of the politicization of Is­
lam and explains how “Islamic veiling cross­cuts power relations between Is­
lam and the West, modernity and tradition, secularism and religion, as well as 
between men and women” (Göle 1996: 21). Here, veiling as a product of a new 
interpretation of religion is not because of tradition, but as a result of moderni­
ty. Therefore, the veiling movement demonstrates a politicization of women and 
women’s contribution in Islamic movements against Western values and implies 
women’s individual autonomy. Paradoxically, on the other hand, the Islamic 
movement is against the visibility of women and their movement from the do­
mestic private sphere to the public sphere (ibid.). 
Ahmed (1992) argues that the veil was a response to colonial discourse and 
was taken by women as a symbol of anti­colonialism and anti­Western identity. 
During the 1979 Revolution in Iran, many women donned the veil to depict their 
resistance to the secular, West­oriented regime of Pahlavi (Najmabadi 2001; Af­
shar 1999; Moghadam 2003). The veil is considered as the most visible symbol 
of Islamization, which demonstrates itself in gender relations and the family 
(Mouser 2007; Stivens 2006). Mernissi (1987) criticized veiling as a reassertion 
of patriarchy and considers that traditions such as veiling, segregation of the sex­
es, and pushing women to the domestic sphere, derive from a desire to control 
the potential threat for the social order posed by women’s sexuality. Further­
more, Mojab (2005) defined multiple meanings of the veil and challenged the 
assumption that women in Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Algeria using the veil to re­
sist the secular state does not lead to accepting patriarchy.
Studies on women’s issues in reformist interpretations
Although fundamentalism imposed patriarchal authority upon women, women 
have gradually attained individual autonomy (see above) and agency to rethink 
religious traditions, to reject gender relations imposed by fundamentalism, and 
to challenge the patriarchal tradition in Islam. A new consciousness and gender 
discourse emerged labeled ‘Islamic feminism.’ Islamic feminists reclaim an eth­
ical vision of the Quran that liberates women and insistently enjoins equality 
and justice (Anwar 2009: 177). This new strategy aimed to re­read the Quran 
outside of the traditional, patriarchal interpretation for the advancement and em­
powerment of Muslim women. Badran (2001) identifies Islamic feminism as a 
new discourse within feminism. In her point of view, religion is not monolithic 
and static and there is possibility for change within an Islamic framework. Mogh­
adam (2002) further argues that Islamic feminism could be regarded as part of 
a broader religious reformation within the Islamic world. 
Islamic feminism articulates a Quran­based idea of the equality of all human 
beings, irrespective of sex, race, or ethnicity. In this view, the Quran does not 
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mention specific gender roles, but it instead emphasizes the notion of mutuali­
ty of the conjugal relationship, in the way that spouses are regarded as each oth­
er’s protectors or ‘mutual helpers.’ This idea further holds that specific gender 
roles and the hierarchical order for women and men in the family are social and 
cultural constructions in the name of Islam (Badran 2009). 
Islamic feminism is not restricted to a definite region, but it is particularly ev­
ident where fundamentalism was strongest (Badran 2005:7). By the end of the 
1990s in Iran, the debate on Islamic feminism was especially prevalent among 
scholars who recognized the possibilities within Islamic discourse and the Is­
lamic Republic of Iran to develop and improve women’s position (Najmabadi 
1997, 1998; Tohidi 1998; Mir­Hosseini 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 1999). Islamic fem­
inism presents a vision of an ‘ideal Islamic society’ and women’s role within 
that society, which enabled them to criticize the past, present, and ‘traditional 
Islam’ (Paidar 1996). 
Nayereh Tohidi refers to the ability of Muslim women in Iran and elsewhere 
to renegotiate gender roles and codes, and to find “a path of compromise and cre­
ative synthesis” (Tohidi 1997: 106). In other words, women are ‘bargaining with 
patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti 1988, cited in Moghadam 2002), but also undermining 
patriarchal principles (Tohidi 1997; Kandiyoti 1988, cited in Moghadam 2002).
According to Najmabadi, Islamic feminism also creates a dialogue between 
religious and secular feminism; hence it provides a common ground and plat­
form for cooperation with secular feminists in order to improve women’s legal 
status and social positions (Najmabadi 1997, 1998).
Mir­Hosseini argues that new discourses on gender relations and debate on 
Islamic family laws have raised a new gender consciousness (Mir­Hosseini 
1996). She also emphasizes the necessity of developing religion, law, and gen­
der within the Muslim context and how gender equality is a ‘newly created is­
sue.’ One of the most controversial concepts is qiwama which refers to male 
guardianship over women and caused obstacles in realizing gender equality be­
fore the law. The idea is derived from verse 4:34 of the Quran40, and is therefore 
considered the basis for all laws concerning family relations. Although women 
may achieve some improvements in political/social relations, the area of fami­
ly law rarely changes. Kabaskal Arat (2003) also refers to barriers in Islamic law 
in the implementation of gender equality. She says that even in Islamic societ­
ies that are to some degree secular, gender equality cannot be fully realized be­
cause family law has never been secularized and is still largely based on Islam­
ic law.
40  “Men are in charge of women by [right of] what Allah has given one over the other and what 
they spend [for maintenance] from their wealth. So righteous women are devoutly obedient, 
guarding in [the husband’s] absence what Allah would have them guard. But those [wives] from 
whom you fear arrogance ­ [first] advise them; [then if they persist], forsake them in bed; and 
[finally], strike them. But if they obey you [once more], seek no means against them. Indeed, 
Allah is ever Exalted and Grand” (Quran 4:34).
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As a result, verse 4:34 of the Quran as a resource for family law has been the 
subject of a range of studies that attempt to reinterpret this verse. Some of these 
studies are addressed by Mir­Hosseini (2013) (such as Al­Hibri 2003; Wadud 
1999; Guardi 2004; Dunn and Kellison 2010; Marin 2003; Mubarak 2004; Mah­
moud 2006; Elsaidi 2011). Also, a recent piece of feminist research – Rethink-
ing Authority in Muslim Legal Tradition, edited by Mir­Hosseini et al. (2015) – 
with contributions from scholars from different disciplines, challenges male 
authority over women from within Islamic legal tradition.
The efforts to present egalitarian reinterpretations of the verse in the Quran 
and to generally develop women’s position in society have been undertaken not 
only by Islamic feminists, but also by reformist Islamic scholars since the emer­
gence of the reformist stream of thought. Reformist Islamic scholars have pre­
sented egalitarian representations of verse 4:34 of the Quran and have general­
ly helped develop women’s position in society. One of the earliest books on the 
status of women and their place in human existence was The Liberation of Wom-
en by Qasim Amin (1863 – 1908) in 1899. In this book, Amin criticized the way 
men treated women in Muslim countries, and he emphasized the necessity of re­
forms on women’s issues, such as education, polygamy, and the veil. He regard­
ed the liberation of women as a requirement for the liberation of Egyptian soci­
ety from its inferior position and used arguments based on Islam to call for an 
improvement in the status of women. Amin further developed his ideas about 
women’s emancipation in his second book The New Woman in 1900, which 
caused controversy. 
An historical review of various reinterpretations of the pivotal verse (4:34) in 
classical and contemporary discourses from fundamentalists to modernists are 
illustrated by Stowasser (1998). Stowasser argues that although some modern­
ists differentiated themselves from mainstream conservatism and aimed to re­
form traditional social structures, when it comes to the interpretation of this 
verse, they remained faithful to the fundamentalist interpretation. For instance, 
Muhammad Abduh (d.1905), a major reformist of Islamic theology who is con­
sidered one of the founders of Islamic Modernism, explained: “that in the God­
willed natural order of the family, the man is charged with leadership (qawama) 
to protect domestic life and well­being. He is to the wife as the head is to the 
body. Men merit this ‘superiority’ because of qualities they alone possess, some 
innate and some acquired” (cited in Stowasser 1998: 35). However, this new 
epistemology has brought forth a form of theoretical treaty rather than Quranic 
commentary, such as Fazlur Rahman’s effort to “establish a theoretical model 
that distinguishes between the Quran ‘literal’, situation­specific laws on the one 
hand and the eternally valid ‘reasons’, rationes legis, behind those laws on the 
other hand” (ibid.: 38).
Understanding women’s issues in various regions of the Islamic world re­
quires an historical context of the regions. For instance, in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, where the hijab is compulsory but women are fighting to shed the veil, 
the exegesis of religious sources is emphasized, according to which the veil is 
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not obligatory, while in Turkey, some women are contesting the ban on head­
scarves and the issue of the veil is not their priority.
On the matter of reformism, there are a significant amount of studies that de­
scribe the practical efforts taken by women in various Islamic regions in order 
to achieve legal reforms in the context of women’s lived social reality. These 
studies address, among others, countries and movements such as Morocco and 
Egypt and the global Musawah movement (Mir­Hossein et al. 2013); Turkey and 
Palestine (Afary 1997); the efforts of Afghan women’s activists for women’s 
rights in Afghanistan (Goodwin 2002); the efforts of the organization of Wom­
en for Afghan Women towards peace and economic stability (Mehta and Maaf­
farmoor 2002); Iran (Ahmadi Khorasani 2009); and legal reform on women’s 
work in Jordan (El­Azhary Sonbol 2004).
Studies on women’s issues in the secular stream 
Secularist feminism entered into the Muslim world even before Islamic femi­
nism. As Badran explains, “the foundational moment of women’s ‘secular fem­
inism’ may be traced to the late nineteenth century while the emergence of ‘Is­
lamic feminism’ became evident in the late twentieth century” (Badran 2005: 
6). Nonetheless, during the 1970s and 1980s, secular feminism stood in oppo­
sition to Islamists and their patriarchal definition of ‘religion’. According to 
Badran: 
Women’s secular feminist movements in the Middle East for many decades in the twen­
tieth century struggled with considerable success within the framework of the nation­state, 
to make its institutions fully open and responsive to the needs of women and men alike 
as citizens (Badran 2005: 11). 
Secularly­oriented tendencies, as Al­Ali (2000: 130) describes, accept the sep­
aration between religion and politics, although they do not denote an anti­reli­
gious or anti­Islamic position. However, secularist women do not recognize Is­
lamic law as the main source of legislation; rather, “they also refer to civil law 
and resolution of human rights conventions, as adopted by the United Nations, 
as frames of reference for their struggle” (ibid.). Therefore, according to this ap­
proach, legislation and government are separated from faith and religious law. 
One can be Muslim and still be committed to equality and universal human rights 
as the basis for legislation, even when these may conflict with certain Islamic 
traditions and values. Hence, secular feminism is neither about hostility to reli­
gion nor about negating religion in people’s lives. Rather, it is about separating 
state and religion and about the necessity of respecting human rights and gen­
der equality, and not violating these rights in favor of religious traditions and 
values. However, secular feminism in the Islamic world is often considered to 
be a Western imposition that belittles and marginalizes not just religions, but lo­
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cal cultural and moral values, particularly regarding the family (see: Ahmed­
Ghosh 2008: 106–107).
In these struggles, secular feminism reproaches Islamic feminists for delegit­
imizing secular trends and strengthening the legitimacy of the Islamic system in 
Iran, as well as weakening the struggle of women inside Iran. Islamic feminism, 
in this view, “fails to offer a liberating alternative to the dominant Islamic dis­
course” (cited in Moghadam 2002:1150) and follows ‘defeatist strategies’ to 
propose demands acceptable within an Islamic framework. Therefore these strat­
egies merely redefine gender identities such as manhood and motherhood. Real 
change and improvement in women’s position comes outside of a religious 
framework (Moghissi, Shahidian and Mojab, cited in Moghadam 2002). 
Nonetheless, some secular feminists believe that feminists should challenge 
the politics of the region. “If the current appropriate framework of social em­
powerment is Islam, feminists have to work with it to empower women. It is 
then for women in these situations to exercise their agency to bring the chang­
es to their lives that matches their aspirations” (Ahmed­Ghosh 2008: 106–107). 
In this cooperation of Islamic and secular feminism, Islamic feminism provid­
ed a new edge in Islamic countries through offering new tools, while secular 
feminists provide Islamic feminism with a progressive religious discourse (see: 
Badran 2005: 13–14). Al­Na’im (1995) refers to the dichotomy between reli­
gious and secular views about the rights of women in Islamic societies and sug­
gests the reconciliation and integration of the two types of discourse, and the 
minimization of the differences between them. On the one hand, discourse aris­
es from the authority of scripture, and on the other, it derives from human rea­
son and experience. Both discourses interact and overlap, which overshadows 
the sharp dichotomy between them. In other words, “it is conceptually mislead­
ing to speak of ‘purely’ religious or secular discourse about the rights of wom­
en” (Al­Na’im 1995: 51). However, it does not mean to discard the distinction, 
but to advocate for the human rights of women requires that one “fully engage 
in religious as well as secular discourse relevant to the matter! (An­Na’im 1995: 
51–54). Only a partnering of these discourses “might avoid the schism and stale­
mate that may exist in the discourse on women’s rights in the Islamic regions 
and help bring about at least some changes in women’s rights and positions” in 
the Islamic countries (Ahmed­Ghosh 2008: 113).
Conclusion
This section introduced a set of studies on women’s position in Islamic coun­
tries, which can be considered on a spectrum beginning with fundamentalism, 
moving gradually to reformist perspectives and ultimately to a combination of 
reformist and secularist discourses which seek to improve women’s rights and 
situation in Islamic regions. The remarkable point in this matter is that the ob­
jective and aim of the change from fundamentalist insight to a reformist/secu­
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lar perspective can be summarized as the strengthening and enlarging of wom­
en’s human rights in streams of Islamic thought, so that the reformist view 
represents the shift from merely re­reading the scripture in order to present an 
egalitarian interpretation of the critique on scripture. This was initiated by a 
group of writers such as Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988), Muhammad Arkoun (d. 2010), 
and Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (d. 2010). These authors have developed a “scriptur­
al interpretative methodology which utilizes non­Islamic sources of textual crit­
ics”, and “techniques from disciplines such as linguistics and literary criticism 
to advance the theory that the Quran is open to a diversity of interpretations”; 
(Mirza 2005: 310; Völker 2011), and as a result, they strengthen the foundations 
of the secular religious movement, which emphasizes that women’s human rights 
are required to for women to flourish in a way that is appropriate to human dig­
nity. Furthermore, according to An­Na’im, partnering secular and reformist 
views implies the union of revelation with human reason and experience. This 
requires a theoretical discourse to investigate the relations between revelation 
and human reason in various streams of Islamic thought and its importance in 
the improvement of women’s position in Islamic societies. This study contrib­
utes to the small but growing body of literature that investigates the relationship 
between revelation and human reason by examining the different currents of Is­
lamic thought and their perspectives on women’s rights, from a sociological per­
spective. 
5 2  Some Aspects of the Historical Development of the Islamic  
Mu’tazili and Ash’ari Schools
Muhammad (c. 570–632) was born in Mecca – a society based on tribal law and 
tradition. Meccans were traders who profited from the caravans that stopped in 
Mecca for water from its underground spring. Mecca was holy because it housed 
the Kabah, a bastion of idolatry, which was tended by the Quraysh – Muham­
mad’s tribe. The prevailing religion was paganism; though God was accepted as 
the High God. 
At the age of twenty­five, Muhammad married Khadija who was forty. Khad­
ija was a widow who had hired Muhammad to manage her caravans. In 610, 
when Muhammad was forty, he declared that an angel visited and spoke to him 
during his yearly spiritual retreat to a cave on Mount Hira. Khadija was his first 
convert, convinced that Muhammad had received revelation. In the first three 
years after his prophecy he shared his revelations with a small group of friends 
and family members, who became his followers. The Quryash and the leading 
merchants of Mecca responded to his public preaching with hostility, and they 
mistreated Muhammad and his followers. To escape persecution and mistreat­
ment, he and his followers migrated to Yathrib (later known as Medina) in 622 
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CE, the beginning of the Islamic calendar (Armstrong 2001). In Yathrib, Mu­
hammad established a political system uniting the significant tribes and fami­
lies, including Jews, Christians, Muslims and pagans, under the ‘Constitution of 
Medina’, which later became the basis of what is now known as the first Islam­
ic state (Marranci 2010: 365).
After eight years of war with the Quraysh, Muhammad conquered Mecca. By 
then Islam had spread throughout the Arabian Peninsula under a single Muslim 
polity. However, by his death in 632 CE, this community was split into two ma­
jor denominations: the Sunni and the Shi’a. This divergence was political, 
brought about by the question of succession. The Sunnis believe that the Proph­
et did not explicitly appoint a successor to lead the Muslim community before 
his death, so Abu Bakr – Muhammad’s close friend and a father­in­law as well 
as the most senior among his followers – was chosen by the majority of the com­
munity as the first caliph (the vicegerent of the Prophet). He reigned from 632 
until his death in 634. Unlike Muhammad, he appointed a successor, Umar ibn 
al­Khatab, who reigned for ten years. His successor, Uthman, was chosen by an 
electoral conclave of six of the most notable followers. The fourth caliph was 
Ali ibn abi Talib, Muhammad’s cousin and son­in­law. By contrast, the Shi’a 
believes that Ali was chosen by the Prophet as the first successor. 
Another distinguishing factor between the two parties is their understanding 
of the nature of the Prophet’s successor. In the Sunni view, the Prophet’s succes­
sor is a person who should protect the Divine Law through leadership over the 
community. The Shi’a believes that the successor must be chosen by God and 
the Prophet and is someone who should be able to interpret the Quran and Is­
lamic law. This person must descend from the line of Muhammad. Such a fig­
ure is called an Imam, who has the right to spiritual and political rule over the 
community. They believe that there are twelve Imams descending from Muham­
mad, the last of whom is in occultation, that is, not outwardly present in this 
world and yet alive. The twelfth Imam will appear one day to bring justice and 
peace to the world. For the Shi’a, Muslims must believe in the authority of the 
Quran and the teachings of Muhammad as well as the authority of the Imams 
(Nasr 2002: 10–12; Marranci 2010: 365–6).
Mu’tazili and Ash’ari
Among the different schools of theology in Islam, Mu’tazili emerged in Basra 
and Baghdad in the second century AH (after hijra, approximately the eighth 
century AD). The Mu’tazili school believed that reason and rationality were im­
portant for defining morality and justice. It recognized human reason as God’s 
gift to achieve rational judgment in morality, and it was considered prior to and 
independent of revelation. Accordingly, they emphasized the importance of rea­
son to knowing God and to evaluate the teachings of Islam, thus grounding Is­
lamic laws in human reason. In their view, it is not possible that God’s will con­
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tradict rational criteria. Therefore, the divine commands also follow the criteria 
of justice (Motahhari: 228–9).
The Mu’tazili was known for five theological principles, the two most im­
portant ones being the unity of God and divine justice. Their view on the uni­
ty of God led them to debate whether God’s attributes in the Quran were to be 
interpreted allegorically or figuratively. They regarded divine transcendence in 
a rational manner and warned against literal interpretations of the Quran in or­
der to avoid an anthropomorphic image of God. In other words, human char­
acteristics cannot be attributed to God, so that as Nasr points out, when “the 
Quran asserts that God is the Hearer and Seer, the Mu’tazili claimed that hear­
ing and seeing in this case had nothing to do with what we understand by these 
Attributes” (Nasr 2002: 155). By claiming this, they “denied the eternity of the 
Quran, which, being the Word of God, is obviously inseparable from the real­
ity of the Divine Names and Attributes” (ibid: 156). The other important Mu’ta-
zili principles of divine justice led them to assert the existence of free will to 
counter the idea of predestination. They asserted that God bestows freedom on 
people in order that they can choose whether or not to perform a specific act. 
It must be noted however, that the Mu’tazili idea of rationality is different from 
the way it is understood in modern times. This is because while human reason 
is of crucial significance, the idea of individual rights did not exist in this tra­
dition (ibid.).
The Mu’tazili provided grounding for a second major school of theology in 
Islam, the Ash’ari – named after its founding thinker, Abul­Hasan al­Ash’ari (d. 
330/941). Ash’ari emphasized that the meaning of the divine attributes be tak­
en and understood exactly as they are written in the Quran. According to the 
Ash’ari school the Quran was eternal, meaning that it does not change and con­
tains the exact words that were received by Muhammad. Its members tried to 
restrict the use of reason and insisted that reason must be subservient to revela­
tion. For this school, God’s will, as presented in the Quran, is absolute and can­
not be challenged. It is beyond human rules, and therefore beyond human rea­
son. All laws and principles created by humans are subordinate to the laws of 
God. This also means that justice cannot be defined by human reason. God’s will 
is the sole criterion for justice; therefore God’s will is justice. Furthermore, Is­
lamic law defines what is good and evil, and what is beneficial and harmful. This 
means that for the Ash’ari, whatever God does is just, good, and beneficial. This 
is in contrast to the Mu’tazili belief that God does only what is just, good and 
beneficial (Motahhari, 229).
Therefore, divine justice according to the Ash’ari school is a matter of faith. 
Good and evil are defined by God’s revelation and the only purpose of human 
reason is to understand God’s will as it is mentioned in the Quran. Consequent­
ly, only God’s absolute will is emphasized as the ultimate source of morality. 
Therefore, a human being’s duty is defined by the Ash’ari School as submitting 
and performing God’s commands as revealed to the Prophet (Sachedina 2009:59–
61; Islamic Philosophy Online).
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Key concepts in the main currents of Islamic thought 
Such disputes about human reason and its relation to revelation intensified in 
the eighteenth century, when Muslims faced challenges to their faith and the so­
cial order brought about by modernity and enlightenment from the West. There 
were various reactions within the Islamic world such as revival movements, Is­
lamic reformism and Islamic modernism. Some of these movements reinterpret­
ed sources of Islamic teaching from their own tradition to obtain new answers 
to the social, political, and economic challenges posed by Western ideas and in­
stitutions (Esposito 2011: 184). Others tried to retain their religious and cultur­
al identity by reviving the Divine Law. This Islamic resurgence was seen as an 
alternative solution, a religious justification to oppose Western secularism as a 
system that has caused political, economic, and military crises in the modern era 
(An­Na’im 1996: 4).
These reflections produced different interpretations of Islam that can be cat­
egorized based on their understanding of how compatible Islamic laws are with 
a specific time and space; as well as how they define the relationship between 
human reason and revelation. There are three major interpretations of Islam, as 
aforementioned. Within a spectrum, on the far right are fundamentalists, in the 
middle reformists, and on the far left are the secularists. Fundamentalists are of­
ten associated with traditionalists who also believe in the revival of the Divine 
Law. However, they deviate in the ways in which Divine Law should be revived. 
Fundamentalists believe that the only way to establish Islamic law in society is 
through political power, thereby politicizing Islam. As such, the political Islam 
proclaimed by fundamentalists “is a modern phenomenon that seeks to use re­
ligion to shape the political system” (Akbarzadeh 2012: 1). In their efforts to 
gain power, some fundamentalists – as extreme fundamentalists – might use all 
possible means, including violence, to gain access to political power in order to 
implement Islamic law, while traditionalists do not seek to gain access to polit­
ical power for its implementation. Today, however, their response to modern is­
sues is to oppose the imitation of Western culture and to denounce Western tech­
nology while pushing for a return to an Islamic culture and doctrine (Nasr 2002: 
181). 
As explained earlier, one key for distinguishing the various streams of Islam­
ic thought is to examine the compatibility of their perspectives on Islamic laws 
with a specific time and space. That is, examining to what extent the Islamic 
laws can evolve over time and space in accordance with social changes. The key 
point here is what Islamic law actually consists of. 
The sources of Islamic law
The first major source of Islamic law is God’s revelation, as found in the Qu­
ran. The Quran contains legal prescriptions and general moral instructions on 
what Muslims ought to do. The Quran as a source of Islamic law is comple­
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mented by the sunna, the normative model behavior of the Prophet, as Muham­
mad was divinely inspired and his behavior became a norm for the community. 
After his death, there was a problem­solving process in society which followed 
the majority opinion or consensus of a community of legal scholars and reli­
gious authorities. This process refers to another source of Islamic law called 
ijma, meaning consensus, which was derived from a saying of the Prophet, “my 
community will never agree on an error” (Esposito 2011: 95–101).
Through the course of time, Muslim societies have faced many new issues 
for which there have not been any solutions to be found in the Quran or sunna. 
For such situations, another alternative for Islamic law is ijtihad. It means go­
ing back to the Quran and sunna to reformulate a law in a fresh manner. Those 
who have the qualification to practice ijtihad are called mujtaheds. It must be 
noted, however, that ijtihad was not considered a source of Islamic law in the 
Sunni world until the fourth century AH (the tenth century AD), while in the 
Shi’a world, this has always been an option (Nasr 2002: 79). Both sources – ijma 
and ijtihad – imply the application of human reason in finding solutions for new 
issues that cannot be answered by the Quran and sunna. Therefore, the defini­
tion of human reason and its relationship with the main sources of Islamic law 
is a crucial criterion in categorizing streams of Islamic thought.
The following sections shall generally introduce these main streams of Islam­
ic thought; it proceeds with the narratives and opinions of representatives of each 
group followed by a comparison and analysis of the status of women’s rights 
and gender equality in each of the main thought streams, applying the theoreti­
cal model suggested in the chapter on theoretical models.
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Part Two:
Changing Gender Norms in the Main Currents of Islamic 
thought in Iran
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Introduction
In the following section I will analyze the different interpretations of women’s 
and human rights in the fundamentalist, the reformist and the secular perspec­
tives in contemporary Iran. Following the theoretical framework and documen­
tary analysis, my approach is to reconstruct the interpretations of three core is­
sues, which also underlie the guidelines of the expert interviews as outlined 
above. The first issue is that of religion, Islamic law and the Quran. The second 
refers to the view of human reason – and the potential endowment of men and 
women with it – as well as gendered rights, especially women’s rights. The third 
issue is how each perspective views human rights considering Islamic teachings 
and the universal norms of justice. While not all of these points will be covered 
in an equal way, they provide an interrelated set of issues for a comparative anal­
ysis. These issues are seen in their interrelationship and referred to each other 
in the discussion. The results focus on the following aspects as described above:
1. Structure (approach to religion, the interpretation of Islamic law and the Quran)
2. Individual agency (human reason in the relationship between human beings 
and God as well as society; defining gender equality in Islam and gender 
differences and human rights)
3. Global norms of justice and human dignity (CEDAW, UDHR) in an Islamic 
perspective
Ultimately the current legal instructions related to the women’s rights in Iran as 
Islamic laws will be discussed. Each chapter ends with a conclusion including 
discussions on the perspectives of each major thought stream on these aspects. 
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6  Revelation and Gender Norms in the Fundamentalist  
Perspective
An important starting point for this section is to differentiate the fundamental­
ists from the traditionalists, with whom they are often associated. Both groups 
have the same arguments about applying Islamic law and the relationship be­
tween human reason and revelation and re­Islamizing society. They differ in per­
spective when it comes to the ways of reviving the Divine Law. Fundamental­
ists seek to establish Islamic law in society through politicizing Islam, while 
traditionalists do not seek to gain access to political power for implementing Is­
lamic law. Traditionalists seek to ignore Western culture and Western technolo­
gy and push for a return to Islamic culture and doctrine (Nasr 2002: 181). While 
it is necessary to differentiate the two groups, and some arguments by tradition­
alists are mentioned, this chapter will only focus on the fundamentalists and dis­
cuss their opinions on social and political affairs and the impact of Islamic pol­
icies on women’s rights and gender equality. 
6 1 Religion as Structure
In this section, religion is considered as structure. The definition of religion and 
the approach to the Quran as the source of revelation shall be debated in the fol­
lowing. 
Definition of religion
Fundamentalists believe that Islam is a set of creeds which, in a given time and 
space, were revealed by God to Islam’s Prophet as the ultimate and absolute reli­
gion for human salvation. It is based on justice and its goal is the worldly and eter­
nal happiness of human kind. Islam has fixed and eternal laws which all believers 
must practice in every era and society without alterations, for it cannot be subject­
ed to any form of change. In fact, every change in Islamic law is, for Fundamen­
talists, an innovation in religion and therefore completely unacceptable. They em­
phasize that Islamic law is “the divinely revealed path, it is not the law that must 
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change or modernize, they say, but society that must conform to God’s will” (Es­
posito 2011: 257).
Fundamentalists believe that the fulfillment of justice is one of Islam’s goals. 
According to Mesbah Yazdi41 justice does not require any philosophical and in­
tellectual debate because the way to attain it is prescribed both in the Book (Qu­
ran) and the Tradition (sunna). Since the laws were accepted and adopted by the 
Prophet, they are just and fair and shall remain just and fair forever (Mesbah 
Yazdi 1386/2007: 22–23). In other words, since God’s will is ‘ipso facto just,’ 
obedience to his commands by all his creatures, as embodied in Islamic law, 
leads to perfect justice (Mayer 2007: 53). 
Fundamentalists do not recognize different interpretations of the Quran and 
tradition, emphasizing that the Prophet delivered God’s exact message to his fol­
lowers. Indeed, the Prophet’s way is very clear and it is apparent that there is no 
room for doubt and suspicion. As such, when someone claims that the way of 
the Prophet is as he interprets, he is in effect tarnishing the word of God, which 
is considered disrespectful towards Islam. Such people are considered devils 
who only interpret the word of God to their own advantage (Mesbah Yazdi 
1389/2010). In the fundamentalists’ opinion, the different readings of religion 
block and impede the way to finding the truth for future generations. They be­
lieve that different interpretations of the scripture are symbolic of the tempta­
tions of Satan to prevent humans from achieving the truth of religion. These in 
turn lead to disbelief and doubt in the truth of religious texts. Furthermore, var­
ious interpretations result in the attribution of human characteristics to God and 
41  Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi (born 1934) is a hardline Iranian Twelver Shi’i cleric and po­
litical activist. He was a member of the Assembly of Experts of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(1990–2016), which is responsible for choosing the Supreme Leader. From 1952 to 1960, he 
studied in Qom with Imam Khomeini (d. 1989); he also studied Quran exegesis, and the philos­
ophies of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra with Allamah Mohammad Husayn Tabataba’i (d. 1981). 
He also participated in Ayatullah Bahjat’s (d. 2009) fiqh seminars. During the Ahmadinejad 
Presidency, Mesbah received a more prominent role in politics. 
    His political activities began in the 1950s with his active participation in forming religious op­
position to the Pahlavi regime. When Khomeini was in exile, Mesbah Yazdi accompanied by 
some other students of Khomeini initiated discussions on Islamic perspectives on social prob­
lems such as jihad and the Islamic political system. He was also on the board of directors of 
Haqqani School in Qom in the 1960s, where for about ten years he also taught Qur’anic stud­
ies, philosophy, and ethics. Since 1975 he has established, directed, and taught in different ac­
ademic institutes such as the education department in the Dar Rah­i Haqq institute, the Baqir 
al­’ulum Cultural Foundation, and the Daftar­i Hamkari Hawzah va Danishgah (the office for 
cooperation between the Hawzah and the university). He is now the director of the Imam Kho­
meini Education and Research Institute in Qom. He has written numerous publications on Is­
lamic philosophy, theology, ethics, and Quranic exegesis.[Mesbah Yazdi, Mohammad Taqi. Bi­
ography.Official Website of Mesbah Yazdi, available at http://www.mesbahyazdi.org/
english/?biography/index.htm(29 June 2015). Also: Mesbah Yazdi, Mohammad Taqi, Biograph­
ical Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, available at: http://www.ency­
clopedia.com/international/encyclopedias­almanacs­transcripts­and­maps/mesbah­yazdi­mo­
hammad­taqi­1934(29 June 2015)].
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his word, leading to falsity and distortion of religion (Mesbah Yazdi 1389/2010). 
Therefore, fundamentalists reject different readings and claim that Islam is not 
compatible with different interpretations. The only valid interpretation is that 
presented by the Prophet and the Imams.
Muslims are not allowed to interpret and give opinions about the absolute and 
certain rules of Islam. Every rule explained by Islamic scholars during the past 
1400 years are correct and unchangeable. Expressing counterclaims about require­
ments, essentialities and absolute conceptions of Islam has no result but a life of 
sin and depravity and falling into hell. There is no space for personal opinion and 
authority in understanding and reading the absolute conceptions of Islam. Any 
idea other than God’s, the Prophet’s, the Quran and the Imams’ readings should 
be rejected as mere trash (Mesbah Yazdi 1378/1999 and 17 September 1999). 
Accordingly, fundamentalists believe the Islamic creedal system is beyond 
human reason and must therefore be followed by human beings, even though it 
seems to be against human rationality. However, those fundamentalists closer to 
the reformists on the continuum believe in dividing the Islamic precepts into 
changeable and unchangeable. They also divide Islamic law into two catego­
ries – essential unchangeable law and subsidiary (secondary) modifiable law, 
which shall be discussed in next chapter. In this way, “Islam is based on human 
values and aims to protect human rights, as well as to fulfill justice; therefore, 
Islam can be adapted to every civilization” (Interview B January 2011). In this 
definition the Islamic precepts are divided into two forms of confirmative (im-
za’i) and constitutive (ta’sisi) precepts. Confirmative, or imza’i, refers to the old 
traditions and customs practiced before the revelation, which were later adapt­
ed into Islamic precepts during Muhammad’s time. Therefore, the confirmative 
precepts can be changed to adapt to the current conditions of society. The con­
stitutive rules refer to the precepts received by the Prophet through revelation 
and have never been subject to change (Interview B January 2011).
In this regard, religion is a wide set of structures and ethical dos and don’ts, 
which must be distinguished from the soul or essence of religion. This essence 
refers to spirituality as a worldview, different from the Western understanding 
of spirituality (Interview C January 2011). In this view, spirituality means that 
the universe consists of material and nonmaterial or intangible elements. The be­
lief in the nonmaterial elements of the universe is the essence of religion. For the 
believer, the spiritual world is important and the material world is only a mani­
festation of the spiritual world and God’s eternal power. Therefore, all precepts 
related to worship and moral instructions are means to reach the spiritual world; 
hence they are essential and unchangeable. Precepts related to social affairs and 
the material world, in contrast, are changeable (Interview C January 2011).
Yet what creates the fundamentalist view is their definition of human reason. 
Human reason in this view is subservient to and dependent on divine revelation. 
Nonetheless, there is no definite boundary between reformists and fundamen­
talists on the spectrum of streams of Islamic thought and their views overlap in 
certain aspects.
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Islamic law
In the fundamentalist view, since religion is aimed at managing human society 
and educating the human being, it is necessary to have rules and regulations in 
accordance with the requirements of society as well as human nature. These reg­
ulations and laws have inevitably remained the same throughout human histo­
ry. This is because human nature is unchangeable. Changes are manners and 
habits of human beings in the material world. Hence, the only one capable of 
legislation is one who knows the characteristics and the essence of human exis­
tence. In other words, only God has the right to legislate laws for human beings. 
As a result, the human being requires religion and revelation to manage his/her 
individual as well as social affairs to reach salvation and felicity in social and 
individual life (Interview A January 2011). Accordingly, fundamentalists also 
reject the idea of the flexibility of laws according to time and circumstance. They 
argue “if the laws obey the times, then who should the times obey? That would 
imply that laws should follow the wishes of the people” (Omid 1994: 57), who 
are fallible and liable to make mistakes because of their free will. In a funda­
mentalist point of view, the law is responsible for controlling and conducting 
society. For this reason, human beings need to rely on eternal and absolute val­
ues, as well as on a set of laws and practices that are beyond time and the wish­
es of fallible people. Such eternal law, according to fundamentalists, can be 
found in Islamic law aimed at the salvation of human beings in this world and 
in the afterlife (Mesbah Yazdi 1378/1999). 
Furthermore, Islamic law in the fundamentalist view begins with the rights 
of God and defines all worldly rights in the light of God’s rights. “Thus, all 
rights accorded to others in business transactions and other civil matters are 
linked to the rights of God, which impart value as sacred and ontological guar­
antees” (Arkoun 1994: 112). Therefore, law is sacred and “the free creation of 
law by means of reason is excluded” (Lane and Redisi 2004: 93). According to 
Fundamentalists, the truth, as the basis for law, has been received from above 
and should be realized on earth through Islamic law. This is in contrast with 
the process of law creation in democratic systems, where the truth is gained 
from below by the countless interactions between groups and individuals (ibid.: 
71–2). 
Approaches to the Quran: a direct word from God or the Prophet’s experience  
(Interpretation)
In order to be able to criticize the Quran, Secularists and some reformists desa­
cralize the text and claim that it is not exactly God’s word. They consider the 
Quran as a historical text. Fundamentalists reject this view and consider the Qu­
ran as the direct word of God, and thus consider it holy and not subject to crit­
icism. 
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Javadi Amoli42 distinguishes the truth of religion from religious cognition. 
The truth of religion refers to the essence and existence of religion which comes 
from God and is manifested through a set of beliefs, morals and rules to guide 
human being towards salvation (Javadi Amoli 1372/1993). 
Religious cognition, as Javadi Amoli (1372/1993) explains, is divided in two 
aspects. First, revealed cognition is an intuitive knowledge that is free from any 
falsity and errors, as this knowledge was revealed to the Prophet by God. There­
fore, the Quran is God’s word, which was received pure and untarnished by the 
Prophet. The second layer of religious cognition deals with people’s perception 
and understanding of revelation rather than the revelation itself. Javadi Amoli 
named this kind of religious cognition narrative or interpretative cognition. As 
a result, only the Prophet possesses revealed cognition and what is acquired by 
the people is merely an interpretation and understanding of revelation. Accord­
ingly, the Quran is the direct word from God revealed to the Prophet (Javadi 
Amoli 1372/1993).
In this view, God was also able to consider people’s ability to perceive at the 
time of the revelation; therefore, God sent the message to the Prophet in a way 
that was comprehensible for the people. Accordingly, the revelation was articu­
lated in the current language of the Prophet’s time, based on the culture of that 
time (Interview B January 2011). This accordance with the culture and language 
of the time of the Prophet was restricted to the form of revelation. It means that 
however the culture and language confine the form of revelation, the content and 
essence of revelation are not limited to that form, so that the revelation helps the 
improvement of human reason, as well as culture in different epochs. Therefore, 
the parts of revelation which are scientifically rejected, such as verses about sev­
en heavens, are only a mistake in the interpretation and human perception of the 
verses and not a mistake in revelation (Interview B January 2011). In this view, 
the Quran is the direct word of God; although God’s voice is ubiquitous, only 
the Prophet was able to hear it through his transcendence by God’s will. As such, 
the Prophet was only obligated to convey God’s message to other people (Inter­
view C January 2011). Therefore, fundamentalists, even those close to reform­
ists, reject secular and reformist attempts to justify such misunderstandings by 
considering the Quran and revelation as the Prophet’s experience rather than a 
direct word from God. 
42  Abdollah Javadi Amoli (born 1933) is an Iranian Shi’a cleric and an Islamic scholar. After mid­
dle school in 1944 he entered in the theologian seminary of Amol, and continued his religious 
education in Mashhad, Tehran until he went to the theological seminary of Qom in 1955. He 
has remained there since, first as a student and then as a master in the present day. After the 
1979 revolution, he undertook different posts, such as the Chair of the Revolutionary Court, a 
member of the Supreme Judicial Council and member of the Assembly of Experts for Consti­
tution. He has been one of the regular Friday prayer leaders in Qom since 1979 [Javadi Amo­
li, Abdollah. Biography. Esra International Foundation for Revelatory Sciences.Available at: 
http://www.esranews.org/biography.aspx (29 June 2014)].
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6 2 Individual Agency and Human Reason
This section deals with the concept of the individual, including man and wom­
an, and aims to present the fundamentalist perspective on the equality of men 
and women in religious doctrine, and the role of human reason in the relation­
ship between the human being and the creator, as well as with other individuals 
in society. The concept of rights is discussed in this section to ascertain the view 
on a human being’s identity as rights­bearer or obligation­holder to God. Ac­
cordingly, it discusses the meaning of rights and its changeability, as well as the 
legitimacy of rights – if rights are defined based on revelation or human reason, 
and ultimately if they are defined based on gender.
Human reason 
Human reason in the fundamentalist perspective is recognized as a legitimate 
resource to understand revelation. Fundamentalists do not deny human reason 
and consider the human being to be intelligent, though this intelligence needs 
to be guided by revelation (Nasr 2002: 66), because human reason is insufficient 
“to criticize what are treated as divine edicts”(Mayer 2007: 61). In the funda­
mentalists’ point of view, only God has comprehensive knowledge about all hu­
man conditions, and human knowledge is dependent on how much of this knowl­
edge God ‘reveals’ to human beings. Reason in this sense is restricted by God’s 
will (Akhtar 2011: 189–198). Therefore, human reason without revelation is in­
sufficient to conduct human affairs, whether in political, economic, or social 
matters of society as well as in personal life. 
The role of human reason in the relationship of the human being with God and society
The fundamentalist view on the role of reason is similar to that of the Ash’ari 
school. Both insist that reason must be subservient to revelation, though funda­
mentalists recognize reason as a requirement for understanding the revelation 
and divine precepts for individual and social life.
In this regard, the value of reason according to the Quran is to contemplate 
nature and God’s creation (Interview A January 2011). However, the Quran also 
emphasizes that reason without revelation is insufficient to understand nature 
and God’s creation. As social beings, humans need regulation and rules to gov­
ern their social relations. Consequently, the rules and regulations should be writ­
ten only by a person who relies on divine revelation. Hence, religion is neces­
sary for the relationship of human beings with God, as well as with other people 
and society. Moreover, revelation must serve as guidance for reason and empha­
sizes that reason must follow revelation, even if one is not able to understand it 
(Interview A January 2011). 
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Human reason plays a crucial role in knowing God and his characteristics. In 
other words, it is important to believe in God and religion, as well as to under­
stand the message of the Prophet. Human reason is also necessary in order to be 
able to accept faith. It also performs an essential role in the relationship between 
human beings and society, as well as in perceiving and discovering the divine 
rules for social life. The divine rules are revealed through revelation, but human 
reason has influence in discovering and interpreting them (Interview B January 
2011). However, reason unaccompanied by revelation is incomplete, since rea­
son would only follow human desires that detach human beings from divine na­
ture. The human is confined to his material environment and is not able to de­
fine law without revelation. Saanei (Interview B January 2011) also refers to the 
Islamic precepts and instructions about social affairs and managing society and 
says that the separation of religion from politics in a religious society is unac­
ceptable. 
Besides, the basis of reward and punishment is found in the human ability to 
reason (Interview C January 2011). In fact, knowledge and awareness determine 
how a human values God. Thus, the person who worships God consciously 
stands in higher rank compared to the person who worships God unconscious­
ly. Therefore, human reason is the criterion for believing in God, though reason 
is not independent from revelation (Interview C January 2011).
Changeability of rights
Fundamentalists are of the opinion that human reason is insufficient for defin­
ing human rights. It must be guided by revelation. However, Fundamentalists 
who lean towards reformism differentiate rights from laws or precepts, arguing 
a rational basis and flexibility of rights, while still recognizing the importance 
of revelation. 
This view considers some rights constant and some rights changeable, ac­
cording to different events in human life. Nevertheless, defining rights must be 
based on revelation, even when reason has an important role (Interview A Jan­
uary 2011). In this way, exploring the human truth and purposes of the created 
world is beyond the access of human reason. Therefore, gaining knowledge is 
possible only through revelation. Hence, revelation is the origin of all knowl­
edge which is necessary also for defining rights. 
There is also a difference between rights and Islamic precept. Rights are a 
kind of property, whereas Islamic precept does not belong to anyone. Rights can 
sometimes be transferred; inherited or even revoked but this is not the case for 
Islamic precept. In fact, Islamic precept is determined by God through a reli­
gious legislator. Therefore, it is constant and not changeable, while rights are 
changeable (Interview B January 2011).
Another categorization is that based on basic and fundamental rights, such as 
the right to freedom, the right to life, etc. which are constant and are essential 
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to human beings. Such rights are innate and are implied by virtue of being hu­
man. Other rights are based on social interests and are thus changeable and their 
changeability does not affect basic and fundamental rights (Interview C Janu­
ary 2011). 
Equality of man and woman in religious doctrine
The fundamentalists believe that men and women are created equal in humani­
ty and human dignity. However, extreme fundamentalists do not recognize that 
every human being has human dignity. They argue that only believers of God, 
those who submit to divine precepts, follow divine guidance and practice puri­
fications to achieve human perfection have dignity. Though man and woman are 
equal before God, fundamentalists argue that human dignity does not mean they 
have equal rights. This is because rights are defined based in the natural differ­
ences between men and women. 
In Javadi Amoli’s (1372/1993) opinion, humanity and human dignity are es­
sential and constant. Race and gender are secondary characteristics that do not 
have any influence on humanity. Such secondary factors are simply a means for 
knowing other humans better. In his opinion (1372/1993), the human being con­
sists of two essential components. First, it is human’s worldly instinct that at­
tracts the human to the material world. Secondly, it is her/his divine disposition 
that guides him to God. There is continuous conflict between the two compo­
nents that is experienced by both man and woman. The important point is hu­
man efforts to achieve perfection, which is only possible through edification, 
purification and by paying more attention to divine disposition. This is the only 
way to achieve human dignity. Since divine disposition is abstract, it cannot take 
any material characteristics like being male or female. Consequently, man and 
woman are equal in their humanity and human dignity. They similarly face the 
same struggles between worldly instinct and divine disposition, as well as the 
means for purification to achieve human perfection (Javadi Amoli 1372/1993). 
Another representative of this group (Interview B January 2011) considers 
all people equal in matters that are out of their control and that they cannot 
change. If God preferred one race over another, for example, it would mean that 
He is not a just God which is contrary to Islamic teachings. 
Furthermore, based on some Quran verses, human beings are created equal 
regardless of race, gender, and ethnicity (Interview B January 2011). Therefore, 
there is absolute equality in the creation of humanity and the human dignity of 
man and woman. However, man is naturally tough while woman is naturally del­
icate. Thus, man and woman complement each other and are therefore equal. 
There are some limitations and differences in the rights of men and women based 
on their social obligations, but these differences do not imply discrimination in 
creation (Interview C January 2011).
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Gender difference and men and women’s rights
In the fundamentalist perspective, though man and woman are created equal and 
have the same responsibilities before God, they do not enjoy equal rights, for 
their rights are based on natural and physical characteristics, which differ.
In Javadi Amoli’s (1372/1993)) point of view, there are two aspects in a human 
being’s life. One is divine disposition, which is his/her responsibility to God. In 
this aspect, gender difference is secondary and not a fundamental point in deter­
mining rights. The other aspect is a human being’s responsibilities in social rela­
tions, as he/she fulfills his/her responsibility to God. It is in this aspect that gender 
plays an important and determining role. For example, both men and women must 
try to come closer to God, though the manner of becoming closer to God, such as 
Jihad (crusade) and martyrdom are considered differently for man and woman.
In the opinion of a fundamentalist representative close to reformism, rights 
are defined by humans and should be based on justice. While he believes that 
depriving a woman of her rights is an injustice, if such deprivation is based on 
Islamic precepts, he does not consider it as an injustice; but rather tries to find 
an argument for it (Interview B January 2011). An example that he gives is the 
law of inheritance, which shall be discussed later in this chapter. 
This view argues that even when man and woman are equal in creation, they 
do not enjoy the same rights because of their difference in nature; for example, 
man is created to be tough and by contrast woman is delicate (Interview C Jan­
uary 2011).
6 3 Global Norms of Justice and Human Dignity
This section investigates perspectives on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrim­
ination Against Women (CEDAW) and their acceptability in Islam. 
In the following, the UDHR and women’s rights are discussed in the works 
of contemporary fundamentalist representatives in Iran. Although similar argu­
ments are mentioned by other prominent thinkers in this stream of thought such 
as Morteza Motahhari (1919–1979) or Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba’i 
(1903–1981), this study mainly restricts itself to current and living thinkers to 
gain a picture of the contemporary debate on these subjects. 
UDHR in the fundamentalist perspective 
The fundamentalist perspective speaks of ‘metaphysical human rights’ which, 
according to fundamentalists, was neglected in the UDHR. They recognize 
‘God’s right’ as the source and origin of rights in the Islamic judicial system. 
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All sources of Islamic law including the Quran, tradition, consensus and ijtihad 
are aimed at discovering and retelling the will of God. All of these sources orig­
inate from and are not independent of God’s will. In this view, human rights 
must be perceived as a minor branch of ‘God’s rights.’ Since in the Universal 
order, absolute sovereignty and omnipotence is only for God and all other pow­
ers are derived from him, God’s right is the source and origin of all rights (Mes­
bah Yazdi 1388/2009: 70; 95). They also argue that since human beings are God’s 
creatures, they are unquestionably of divine origin, and therefore follow the di­
vine order. Accordingly, in this perspective, only God is “the author of law and 
the source of all human rights” (Arkoun 1994: 106). Therefore, God determines 
the boundaries of a human’s duties and rights. God can also take a human be­
ing’s life or order a person to do this as He is the owner of human beings’ bod­
ies and lives, and all human beings are responsible and obligated to treat their 
lives and bodies based on God’s injunctions. Accordingly, “there is no such thing 
as human rights without human responsibilities. All human rights derive from 
the fulfillment of responsibilities to the Giver of human life” (Nasr 2002: 30). 
Mesbah Yazdi (1388/2009) criticizes different articles of the UDHR and re­
jects them as being against Islamic law. In his opinion, Articles 6–15 of the Dec­
laration do not have any opposing notion with Islamic laws, yet to him some 
rights such as equality, fraternity, nondiscrimination, the right to freedom and 
individual security mentioned in Articles 1–4 appear more like slogans. He be­
lieves that the rights mentioned in these articles cannot be proved by rational 
analysis independent from revelation, therefore discussing and determining such 
rights would require religious perspectives mentioned in Islamic law. In his dis­
cussion of the third article of the UDHR according to which ‘everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of person’, Mesbah Yazdi points out that con­
ceptually the right to life is absolute and that, for example, no one shall be killed 
even if he has committed a crime or offense. However, he claims that this abso­
lute right is an illusion and that people who believe in the inviolable right to life 
do not believe in the right of God, and only regard and define such laws based 
on the advantages and disadvantages such laws might have on society. He be­
lieves that if a person kills someone, the murderer should be killed too. (Mes­
bah Yazdi 1388/2009: 87).
Furthermore, fundamentalists argue that slavery and servitude is more or less 
justified by the Quran, and that the existence of many laws concerning slaves 
implies the legality/legitimacy of slavery in Islam. Criticizing the fourth article 
which states that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the 
slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms, Mesbah argues that one may 
deserve slavery by his or her misleading thoughts, actions and intentions. For 
example, slavery may be justified if someone rebels against Islam’s true and just 
system which warrants human salvation. Therefore, in the view of the funda­
mentalists, the cause of human slavery is not race, color, sex, nationality etc., 
but hostility towards and conflict with a legal and just Islamic government (ibid.: 
167–171). He argues that if such a person was allowed to be free, he may join 
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Islam’s enemies and fight against Islam. But if this person is enslaved and forced 
to live in an Islamic society, he will gradually be instructed with true pedagog­
ical principles and be led to salvation and eternal happiness. As his argumenta­
tion shows, Mesbah does not denounce slavery; indeed, he advocates it depend­
ing on definite conditions and situations. 
Moreover, according to fundamentalists, Islam regards some wars as permis­
sible and even obligatory. They recognize the legality of war and conflict in defi­
nite conditions and do not regard war as unethical and unpleasant. In their opin­
ion, Islam is not against exerting power and military force; it in fact advises and 
promotes their use in some special situations and circumstances. According to 
the Islamic judicial order, every Muslim has the right to fight any atheistic and 
inhumane system with weapons and war, which is regarded as a required and 
necessary part of human life. Furthermore, Muslims shall treat prisoners of war 
as slaves in order to secure them from presumable dangers and to convert them 
to Islam, through good and moral treatment by Muslims (ibid.: 168; 99). Fun­
damentalists such as Mesbah also accuse those who oppose slavery in Islam as 
going against Islamic teachings. This is because fundamentalists believe that the 
best service to Islam is to fulfill Islamic principles, including the fair treatment 
of slaves, by providing favorable conditions, treating them well and release them. 
As these are all mentioned in the Quran, to fundamentalists it means that the 
Quran has progressive rules on slavery (ibid.: 176).
With regard to the fifth article of the UDHR (‘no­one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’), fundamen­
talists argue that this article is aimed at proving that some Islamic laws such as 
whipping the adulterer, cutting the hand of a thief, and the death penalty for the 
murderer of an innocent human are inhumane and savage. Mesbah argues that 
the perpetrator him/herself, offending against morality and the law, has humili­
ated and belittled humanity and hence, according to rational and traditional te­
nets, deserves appropriate punishment for the unlawful act. According to this 
view, protecting beliefs and morality are more important than protecting a hu­
man being’s life. If someone belittles and threatens true beliefs and decent mo­
rality the perpetrator has menaced something more valuable than life and thus 
deserves heavy punishment (ibid.: 93). 
Mesbah also criticizes Article 16 which says: “Men and women of full age, 
without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to mar­
ry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution.” He believes that an Islamic government, in or­
der to protect Muslims’ spiritual decency, can order its subjects not to marry 
non­Muslims (ibid.). Moreover, fundamentalists do not accord the same rights 
to men and women in choosing spouses from other religions. Furthermore, Ar­
ticles 18 and 19, referring to freedom of thought and conscience without any 
condition of human responsibility to God, are challenged by fundamentalists by 
claiming that freedom of religion and freedom to change religion are equivalent 
to apostasy and heresy and are not acceptable in Islam (ibid.: 95).
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Fundamentalists also reject the UDHR because they believe it is an outcome 
of human reason and does not consider religious teachings. Fundamentalists be­
lieve that religion encompasses all sciences that result from human reason, for 
the revelation is the mother of all sciences. Javadi Amoli (1377/1998)
 explains that if the UDHR is defined as an outcome of human reason, it is 
traceable in religious teachings, though usually the sciences as outcomes of ra­
tionality and human reason are not regarded as being in accordance with reli­
gious knowledge. He criticizes this idea and argues that reason is a religious 
proof, which verifies the religious precept, and therefore all reason’s outcomes, 
including the natural, human sciences as well as philosophy and mathematics, 
are subsidiaries of religion. 
Javadi Amoli (1377/1998) argues that defining human rights requires a com­
mon source which is beyond various customs and rituals generally accepted by 
all people, regardless of their different traditions and norms, race or color. He 
claims the common source is provided by divine knowledge, which implies the 
will of God, who is aware of human nature and good and evil. Therefore, all hu­
mans can accept human rights determined by God, as it is in accordance with hu­
manity’s essence and true identity. The right of legislation belongs only to God. 
Non­divine rules are incompetent and incapable in determining human rights. Ja­
vadi Amoli further points out that the ideal human rights are defined by Islam, 
which provides universal guidance for all aspects of human life. Accordingly, he 
considers that the UDHR was formulated according to traditions and norms, which 
is merely a contract and lacks philosophical and ethical foundation or recognition.
Fundamentalists, closer to the reformist view claim that some articles of the 
UDHR were mentioned in Islamic teachings, so that the declaration is not a new 
concept for Islam. They emphasize that the articles of the UDHR must be de­
bated separately and point out that only a few articles are against Islamic pre­
cepts, such as the law of inheritance. In this opinion, Islam respects human rights; 
hence, Islam is compatible with the UDHR. The concepts and rights mentioned 
in the UDHR are traceable in the teachings of the prophets, although human be­
ings have not been able to perceive these aspects. There might be other points 
in religious teachings that human reason may discover in the future (Interview 
C January 2011). The UDHR was defined after the Second World War, while 
human rights in Islam were spelled out fourteen centuries ago, when Islam re­
jected all racial, gender, and geographic discrimination and recognized human 
rights for human beings. For instance, the right to life as the important human 
right is respected in Islam and no one is allowed to violate this human right to 
life (Interview B January 2011). 
In the perspective of representatives close to reformism the rights laid out in 
the UDHR can be categorized into three groups: 1. the rights of individual free­
dom, such as the right to protect and defend the individual from other humans 
and states, the right to life, and the right to religious freedom or belief; 2. the 
rights of political freedom, such as the right to participation in political and so­
cial affairs, the freedom of the press, or the right to peaceful assembly and free­
MARZIYEH.indd   126 21.06.18   14:28
127
dom of association, and 3. basic social rights, such as the right to work and the 
right to social security. All these three groups were mentioned to some extent in 
Islamic teachings. In the International Conference of Muslim Scholars in 1981, 
it was found that about twenty rights from the UDHR were mentioned in Islam­
ic teachings. The only difference between rights mention in the UDHR and in 
Islam is that the UDHR was based on an individual­centered approach, while 
the rights in Islamic teachings were based on a God­centered perspective, which 
is more comprehensive with regard to human rights (Interview C January 2011).
CEDAW in the fundamentalist perspective
Fundamentalists reject equal rights for men and women. As a result, they are ab­
solutely against the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina­
tion Against Women (CEDAW), while the view closer to the reformist perspec­
tive would accept it. However, reformist acceptance is under the condition of a 
reservation of all Islamic laws related to women’s rights. Therefore, it does not 
seem that accepting the CEDAW brings huge developments in gender equality. 
The first fundamentalist representative recognizes the CEDAW as an effort 
towards considering men and women to be similar, which he believes to be ‘un­
just’. He argues that justice means everything taking its proper place, and who 
knows better than God – the creator of human beings – the place of men and 
women, with their different and specific natures. In his point of view, we are 
obliged to follow justice. The West tries to provide women with equal rights to 
men, which he regards as a huge mistake, since from the divine perspective men 
and women are completely different (Interview A January 2011).
Another group representative (Interview B January 2011) believes that Islam 
not only respects women’s rights, but also allows some privileges for women. 
For instance, the punishment for apostasy for a woman is being jailed until she 
repents, while the punishment for a man who commits apostasy is execution. He 
emphasizes that there is not any discrimination between man and woman. Some 
cases mentioned in the Quran might seem to be discriminatory, such as the dif­
ference in inheritance for men and women; however, such cases have logical jus­
tifications that are ultimately in favor of women’s rights. Accordingly, in his 
point of view, ratifying such an international convention is acceptable, though 
under conditions of the right of reservation to interpret the provisions in the light 
of Islamic law.
In this view, the articles of CEDAW are restricted because they assess wom­
en’s rights based on the social requirements of certain groups of people in the 
West; they do not deal with humanity and humanness. Hence, they are not uni­
versal; rather they are about the special interests of a particular confined group. 
Therefore, the CEDAW needs other agreements in accordance with other cul­
tural circumstances. Nonetheless, this does not lead to rejecting the ratification 
of the CEDAW (Interview C January 2011). However, ratifying CEDAW re­
quires the right of reservation for Islamic countries in order to respect Islamic 
MARZIYEH.indd   127 21.06.18   14:28
128
law and the right to refuse those articles against Islamic teachings such as the 
law of inheritance in Islam (Interview C January 2011).
6 4 Women’s Rights in the Fundamentalist Perspective
This section, in investigating the fundamentalist view on the current legal in­
structions related to women’s rights in Iran as Islamic laws, tries to achieve an 
understanding of different currents of thought on equal access related to gender, 
and the rules and resources in different realms of life – economic, politic, cul­
tural and family.
Women’s rights in the fundamentalist perspective have been defined based 
on the notion of ‘desert­based’ justice (Kadivar 2013), originating from Aristo­
tle’s idea of distributive justice, which essentially means that individuals receive 
rewards based on their merits. Such an idea of justice understands inequality 
among persons as a natural order and people are accorded an unequal share of 
rights, depending on their merits. Justice in this sense means receiving rewards 
that are proportionate to one’s merit and injustice is receiving more or less than 
what one actually deserves (Aristotle 2004: 118–120). 
This concept of distributive justice is an idea that has been approved and used 
by Muslims in defining what justice means in Islam. Justice as putting every-
thing in its place and giving everyone their proper rights reflects Muslim phi­
losophers’ understanding of the Aristotelian notion, which justifies slavery and 
gender inequality. According to Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba’i43, equal­
ity resulting from social justice does not mean that all social ranks are distrib­
uted evenly among all members of society (Kadivar 2013: 219–222). This no­
tion of justice is the basis for the fundamentalists’ perspective on women’s rights 
in Islam. They believe that some verses in the Quran talk of innate characteris­
tics that are present in both men and women. However, they also argue that man 
and woman are by nature biologically different and thus any action taken against 
the intention of nature would result in a disaster. As Motahhari argues, this dis­
parity between men and women demands different rights, obligations, duties, 
and retributions. Only when rights are defined according to this natural order, 
can natural justice, domestic happiness, and social progress be achieved (Motah­
hari, cited in Kadivar 2013: 221).
In this section the different categories of women’s rights are discussed from 
the viewpoint of the fundamentalists’ perspectives: cultural, economic, politi­
43  Seyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba’i (16 March 1903 – 15 November 1981) commonly known 
as Allameh Tabataba’i was one of the most prominent thinkers of philosophy and contempo­
rary Shi’a Islam. He is famous for Tafsir al­Mizan, a twenty­volume work of Quranic exege­
sis, which he worked on from 1954 until 1972 (Algar 2006).
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cal, and women’s rights in the family. Fundamentalists emphasize differences 
and similarities in men and women by defining their rights within the family and 
in social affairs. It should be noted that these categories must not be taken as 
separate dimensions, but are in fact linked to each other. As such, some rights 
do not fall within only one single category. 
Cultural dimension
Common traits of men and women
Fundamentalists posit that according to the Quran, man and woman are both hu­
man and have common human traits. Thus, in humanity, both men and women 
are equal. The way to reach perfection in humanity is also the same for both of 
them. Men and women are similar with regard to faith and belief in God and 
they have the same responsibilities and duties. Accordingly, on the matter of 
worship and spiritual transcendence, men and women are not different from each 
other (Mesbah Yazdi 1388/2009): 181–185; Javadi Amoli (1389/2010): 278.
Different aspects of men and women
In Javadi Amoli’s view, every being created by God embodies God’s various 
characteristics. The different traits of men and women imply the different char­
acteristics of God. To emphasize this point, fundamentalists refer to a quotation 
from the Imam Ali (the first Imam in Shi’a and the fourth Caliph in Sunni): “the 
wisdom of women is in their beauty and the beauty of men is in their wisdom” 
(Javadi Amoli 1389/2010). He explains that such divergence does not mean that 
there are two kinds of human beings. Rather this difference means that women 
express reason and wisdom through compassionate sympathy, eloquence and 
quality of speech, purity of deed, manner of greeting, etc. Men on the other hand 
exhibit intellect and rational reasoning. Such difference does not mean one is 
superior over the other, or makes one better than the other. It simply means that 
both man and woman embody different characteristics of God (ibid.: 33–4). Ac­
cordingly, he argues that these differences represent both God’s wrath and com­
passion. God’s wrath is associated with man’s behavior while his compassion is 
attributed to woman’s behavior. Man and woman complement each other in that 
wrath and compassion are both necessary in life (ibid.: 206–8). 
Rational difference between man and woman:
Javadi Amoli identifies two kinds of wisdom – wisdom that is necessary for so­
cial life and wisdom that allows humans to become closer to God. He believes 
that men and women have unequal wisdom in terms of social life. This means 
that men have more capacity to manage political and social affairs. Yet this does 
not mean that man is more virtuous or more God­like. Neither does it mean that 
MARZIYEH.indd   129 21.06.18   14:28
130
man is superior to woman. These differences do not have heavenly advantages 
or disadvantages. In the afterlife, these ideas of superiorities have no credit; these 
intellectual tools have no use (Ibid.: 228–230). According to Javadi Amoli, to 
become closer to God, intellect must be bound to the way of the heart. He attri­
butes the heart to emotions and feelings, which he claims to be more pronounced 
in women than in men. He notes that when women cry, it cleanses and purifies 
their heart, therefore bringing them closer to God (ibid.: 220–222; 153–154).
Physical difference between men and women
Mesbah Yazdi (1388/2009) distinguishes men from women by their physical and 
spiritual aspects. In terms of the physical, he talks about women’s menstrual cy­
cle, which makes them weak and frail. Within this cycle, it is necessary for them 
to have more rest. This condition results in particular distinctions in the social 
roles and expectations of men and women, and in turn becomes the basis for 
their rights in family life. 
Mesbah also points out differences in terms of their sex organs. He explains 
that when women are pregnant or lactating, their sex organ is inactive while 
men’s sex organ is active all the time. This makes the function of each sex or­
gan very different from each other. As such, bio­psychological aspects from 
these differences should be considered when making laws. For instance, such 
aspects justify men’s right to polygamy and temporary marriage during times 
that the wife is not able to meet his sexual needs (Mesbah Yazdi 1388/2009: 
215–216).
Another physical or natural difference between men and women, according 
to Mesbah, is the size of their brains. He said that compared to men, women’s 
brains are smaller, which explains differences in cognitive abilities. He claims 
that differences in cognitive abilities mean that women are less rational and log­
ical than men. For example, women have lower IQs than men (ibid.: 226–227).
Psychological differences
According to Mesbah, the most striking psychological difference between men 
and women is women’s weakness in reasoning and logical thinking, as above. 
However, he claims that this weakness is not necessarily a bad quality, because 
it makes women more able to perform domestic duties and responsibilities (ibid.: 
218).
He further explains that another psychological difference between men and 
women is how women want to be loved while men tend to love. He posits that 
women’s need to be attractive to men, for example by wearing make­up, is a 
way for them to seduce and lure men to fall in love with them. He also believes 
that women seek the protection of men because it is more natural for men to pro­
vide such protection. Once again, these traits are important in the family, entail­
ing different duties and rights for men and women (ibid.: 219–220).
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Education and knowledge acquisition
Javadi Amoli explains that women have the right to education and must be per­
mitted at all times to acquire religious knowledge. However, her husband can 
prevent her from obtaining further education in other fields when he feels that 
such education is not necessary, and is against the family interest (Javadi Amo­
li 1389/2010: 310–311). 
Special advantage of women in Islam
Javadi Amoli explains that the responsibility of women to bear children and be­
come mothers is a special privilege that God has given to women. Another priv­
ilege is how women mature earlier than men. This means that they are accepted 
to the divine realm six years earlier because they are now able to perform reli­
gious duties (ibid.: 338–339).
Veil (Hijab)
The veil, according to Mesbah (1388/2009), is necessary to temper the sexual 
desire of men towards women. This allows men to maintain their loyalty to their 
wives and avoid betrayal of their family (Javadi Amoli 1389/2010:310–11). Re­
fusal to wear the veil is a violation of God’s right. Javadi Amoli argues: “Wom­
an should completely understand that her veil is not only for herself so that she 
cannot say: I want to give up my right” (ibid.: 351). He explains that when the 
Quran’s speaks of the veil, it means that the veil is a means to respect and re­
vere women, meaning that men should not look at them maliciously. This does 
not apply to non­Muslim women because non­Muslim women are deprived of 
this reverence. He argues that the veil should not be regarded as a limitation 
since the Quran propounds that veiled women are an embodiment of reverence 
and the grace of society and therefore, they are honorable (ibid.: 350–352).
In reference to veiling, the representative closer to a reformist standpoint (Inter­
view B January 2011) explains that in Islam there are some reasons for the regula­
tions of the practice, including the necessity for women to have a cover to protect 
her from the contaminated looks of men. Therefore, the veil protects women in so­
ciety. Furthermore, it protects society from decadence and immorality. The veil 
also fences the dignity and reverence of woman. Similarly, every decent person, 
regardless of their religion or culture, does not appear in public with every kind of 
covering. The form of veiling must be in accordance to the norms of each society. 
Veiling is necessary to protect the chastity and social propriety which must be 
respected by both men and women, since chastity is acceptable by human nature 
and natural disposition, just as nudity is against human nature. However, the defi­
nition of chastity changes in different epochs and spaces (Interview C January 
2011). A man’s dress code is different from a woman’s dress code, so that cov­
ering the head and face is not necessary for men but is necessary for women, and 
the woman must cover her adornments by veiling (Interview C January 2011). 
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Women’s rights in the family
The importance of women’s role in the family
In the fundamentalist approach, the importance of women in society is expressed 
through the crucial role of women in the family as wife and mother, since the 
prosperity of society depends on the happiness and prosperity of families. As 
Javadi Amoli (1389/2010) explains, intimacy between husband and wife, as well 
as cooperation and friendly relations within the family, results in a healthy so­
ciety and is only established because of the role of women in the family. 
Kindness, forgiveness and devotion among family members are the manifes­
tation of motherhood; though the father, according to Javadi Amoli, is respon­
sible for the administrative and executive affairs of the family. This is reflected 
in the Quran (4:34) which says men are superior to women. However he argues 
that the foundation of the family is loyalty, kindness and solicitude and this is 
the duty of the mother because she unites both her and her husband’s families. 
In such a family, the man is responsible for meeting the needs of family mem­
bers and protecting them while the woman is responsible for the good treatment 
of her husband, supporting the family, taking on the responsibilities of home, 
protecting children and property and honor. Therefore, there is a mutual respon­
sibility between wife and husband within family boundaries (Javadi Amoli 
1389/2010: 173; 39–40). 
Similarly, Mesbah Yazdi (1388/2009) also emphasizes the ideal order of fam­
ily in which the woman is responsible for feeding infants, babysitting and house­
keeping and it is man’s duty to provide for the expenses of all family members. 
Thus, society should provide favorable conditions so that husband and wife can 
perform their respective duties and responsibilities. He emphasizes that, notwith­
standing this fact, housekeeping almost in all societies is a woman’s duty, while 
in Islam a woman is not obliged to do it and she can receive payment for doing 
any housekeeping and even for feeding the baby (Mesbah Yazdi (1388/2009): 24).
Guardianship and superiority of men over women
The Quran accords guardianship over women to men (4:34) as the heads of fam­
ilies, who are therefore more capable of providing. Javadi Amoli (1389/2010) 
emphasizes a few points about this verse. First, he confines this superiority only 
to the terms of the relationship between a wife and her husband. Secondly, this 
superiority does not indicate perfection and being closer to God, rather it is a 
form of responsibility and labor division. This does not mean that men are more 
virtuous. The essence of this superiority is one’s duty towards others. It is in this 
sense that men are responsible for their wives and families (Javadi Amoli 
1389/2010: 325–326). Mesbah argues that because men have more intelligence, 
they are responsible for the expenses of the family and consequently they are 
more meritorious and befitting the managment of the family (Mesbah Yazdi 
1388/2009: 241).
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The head of the family is based on the Quran (4:34) saying ‘Men are in charge 
of women by [right of] what Allah has given one over the other and what they 
spend [for maintenance] from their wealth.’ This verse does not mention a pre­
cept and a decree, but is rather a description taken from the contemporary situ­
ation in the Prophet’s society. This does not mean that women are not able to 
manage family or society; but the role of head of family or society is granted 
only to men (Interview B January 2011). 
Inheritance law
Javadi Amoli (1389/2010) argues that a criterion for women’s inheritance is to 
be found in the Quran, which states that men’s share is twofold of women’s. He 
argues that since men have the responsibility of providing for the family and for 
women’s life expenses; and also having to pay dowry, their greater inheritance 
should be considered as compensation for this inequality (Javadi Amoli 1389/2010: 
343; Mesbah Yazdi 1388/2009: 240; Interview B January 2011; Interview C Jan­
uary 2011). This view also regards a marriage without a dowry as invalid and 
void. The dowry should not be considered as a deal, but is symbolic respect for 
the woman and should be considered as a gift to honor her with. Furthermore, if 
the shares of men and women are equal, half of society’s economic and financial 
capital will remain useless and stagnant, because as Mesbah argues, women can 
never be as economically active as men, though they can enjoy the benefits de­
rived from the capital inherited by the men. Men are producers and women are 
consumers (Mesbah Yazdi 1388/2009: 268). Men are obliged to take responsibil­
ity to cover the family expenses, because even if the woman works, what she 
earns belongs to her alone and she has no responsibility for family expenses. 
Therefore, according to Islamic doctrine, the tedious and exhausting effort to earn 
is relegated to men and this is a rule in Islam. In practice, it is possible that a 
woman manages the family in the economic sense and this is not forbidden in Is­
lam, but legally it is defined as a man’s obligation. Considering such arguments, 
the inheritance law in Islam is just and fair (Interview B January 2011).
Javadi Amoli also argues that inequality in inheritance law does not imply 
that women are of lesser value because they have a lesser share than men. This 
is because the criteria for value is not to be found in wealth and affluence. Wealth 
is only of economic importance and does not have value in the afterlife (Javadi 
Amoli 1389/2010: 341). The inheritance law is a constant and unchangeable pre­
cept of Islam, since the Quran mentions a clear and permanent law on this sub­
ject (Interview B and Interview C January 2011). 
Right to divorce 
Fundamentalists believe that the family should be honored and therefore they 
provide very strict conditions for divorce. In Islam, women do not have the right 
to divorce, while this right is granted completely to men. However, it is possi­
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ble for women to obtain this right if and when the husband agrees to grant the 
woman the option to divorce in their marriage contract (Javadi Amoli 1389/2010: 
175; Mesbah Yazdi 1388/2009: 241, Interview B and C January 2011).
Polygamy and temporary marriage
According to Mesbah Yazdi (1388/2009) physical differences between men and 
women, particularly differences in terms of their sex organs and related bio­psy­
chological aspects, justify men’s right to polygamy and temporary marriage.
The view closer to reformism (Interview B January 2011) considers the ma­
jority of Islamic precepts related to women as confirmative rules which refer to 
old traditions and customs practiced before the revelation, and which were lat­
er adapted into Islamic precepts during Muhammad’s time. Therefore, the con­
firmative precepts can be changed to adapt to the current conditions of society. 
Polygamy, according to this view, belongs to such Islamic precepts, and is prac­
ticable so long as the first wife is not displeased. But because today all women 
would be essentially displeased to see her husband with another woman, it is 
not acceptable. Polygamy is also allowed in Quran, although under the condi­
tion that the man can ensure justice among the wives, otherwise he is not al­
lowed to practice polygamy. It should be noted that some verses of the Quran 
refer to the personal obligations of human beings to God (such as those verses 
related to worship) and others are addressed to the entire society and are con­
sidered as social rules. He recognizes that polygamy falls under the second group 
and explains that a further marriage requires a court’s permission after the man 
proves his ability to fulfill justice in financial and emotional issues between his 
wives. Temporary marriage in this view is only for exceptional cases such as 
times of travel, where the man has no access to his wife. In order to satisfy his 
sexual needs, he can marry a woman for a short time. Temporary marriage in 
these circumstances, however, is not valid for a woman, though she can marry 
temporarily. It means that if a woman needs to satisfy her sexual instinct and has 
no access to her husband, she must first get divorced in order to be able to get 
temporarily married (Interview B January 2011). 
Polygamy is rejected by some representatives close to a reformist position; 
they emphasize the ‘indecent’ face of polygamy in the current epoch and con­
sider it as an injustice (Interview C January 2011). 
Women’s civil, social and economic rights
According to a fundamentalist point of view, women’s right to political partici­
pation can be explained through arguments about their capacity for political and 
religious leadership. Javadi Amoli (1389/2010) argues that there are two kinds 
of revelation: legislative revelation and informative revelation. He explains their 
difference from the Quran’s view. The Quran has assigned legislative revelation 
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to men and Javadi Amoli interprets this as the ‘responsibility of being a Proph­
et,’ which according to the Quran (21:7) is accorded to men because it is an ad­
ministrative issue dealing with relations between people, leadership in war and 
peace, receiving financial budgets and regulating them, distribution of properties 
and adjusting people’s affairs. On the other hand, informative prophecy means 
to know the events taking place in the world, what the future of the world might 
be and to know one’s own future and that of others. According to Javadi Amoli, 
this kind of prophecy comes from the Divine and is a support for legislative proph­
ecy and administrative responsibility. This is not confined to men, and women 
can achieve this position and rank as well (Javadi Amoli 1389/2010: 129–130).
Another remarkable point here is women’s capacity to be God’s regent. Ja­
vadi Amoli says that being God’s regent has nothing to do with gender. Being a 
man is only relevant in administrative affairs (ibid.: 162–3), as dictated by leg­
islative revelation. He does not argue against women’s right to participate in po­
litical, economic, and cultural affairs, because the time of legislative revelation 
is over, with Muhammad being the last prophet. Therefore, women have the right 
to participate in social, political and economic fields provided that both men and 
women follow specific conditions. First, they must perform their responsibili­
ties without physical contact. Secondly, according to Javadi Amoli, executive 
responsibilities are distributed fairly according to each man and each woman’s 
intelligence, capabilities, and characteristics, considering the fact that men have 
more executive responsibility (ibid.: 143–144). Mesbah also admits that in Is­
lam women’s right to participate in political and social activities are recognized 
as they are members of society. However, their physical and psychological ca­
pacities must be considered in appointing their positions or when granting them 
responsibilities (Mesbah Yazdi 1388/2009: 186).
Women’s judgment
According to Mesbah Yazdi (1388/2009) and Javadi Amoli (1389/2010), some 
Islamic jurists believe that being male is not a requirement for being appointed 
as a judge in Islamic courts. However, in the Shiite tradition, being male is a 
necessary condition. Having scrutinized various traditions in this regard, Java­
di Amoli explains that some difficult responsibilities are obligatory for men but 
women do not have to take them. In other words, accepting the responsibility of 
being a judge is obligatory for men but not for women. Furthermore, being a 
judge in an Islamic court entails a responsibility to execute legislative punish­
ments. Thus, women can train students, hear trials and conduct consultations 
among other judges about the cases but have no right to decide on the final sen­
tence (Javadi Amoli 1389/2010: 299–304; Mesbah Yazdi 1388/2009: 229). 
However, in the views closer to reformism (Interview B and C January 2011), 
there is no prohibition in Islamic doctrine for women to take executive tasks in 
society, such as becoming a judge or president. Gender is not a criterion for com­
mitment to such activities.
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Blood money
Javadi Amoli believes that in Islam, blood money is not based on a human be­
ing’s spiritual value; rather it is based on their economic contribution. There­
fore, because man is the breadwinner, his blood money will be of greater value 
than that of a woman. The difference between the blood money of men and wom­
en does not add anything to men’s status and does not lessen the value of wom­
en, because some material and financial differences have no relation to spiritu­
al status. There is no rational or traditional correlation between blood money 
and spiritual perfection, so it cannot be said that the higher the amount of blood 
money, the more sacred is the soul of the murdered person or the closer he is to 
God (Javadi Amoli 1389/2010: 345–348).
Closer to reformism (Interview B January 2011), evidence in the Quran that 
defines unequal blood money for man and woman is not recognized. The Qu­
ran’s reference to this subject refers to the necessity of paying blood money and 
it does not mention the specific amount. Therefore, the argument that since the 
man is economically responsible for the family, his blood money should be more 
than woman is rejected and since there is not any difference between the life of 
a man and a woman, blood money must be therefore be equal (Interview B Jan­
uary 2011). The amount is not fixed and can be variable based on the amount of 
injury. Furthermore, considering the different social circumstances in contem­
porary society in which women have a more significant role in economic affairs, 
the law of blood money must be revised and determined regardless of gender 
(Interview C January 2011). 
Women’s testimony
Mesbah Yazdi (1388/2009) explains that there are two requirements for witness­
ing: firstly, the witness should be alert and clever in the instance of observing an 
event and he or she should be able to record the event exactly and with accuracy. 
Secondly, the witness should not be affected by emotions and passions at the time 
of testifying and must be able to explain what has been witnessed correctly and 
completely. Comparing the perceived traits of men and women, Mesbah comes 
to the conclusion that men are more capable and meritorious with regard to both 
of the aforementioned aspects. When there is no possibility of a man’s attesta­
tion, a woman’s witnessing should be credited. In this case, because of the pos­
sibility of forgetting the event or being under effect of emotions and passions, a 
woman should be accompanied by another woman in order to lessen the inaccu­
racy of her attestation as much as possible (Mesbah Yazdi 1388/2009: 253–254).
Javadi Amoli (1389/2010) believes that the Quran (2:282) also makes a com­
ment about the credibility of women when it says that the testimony of two wom­
en is equal to one man’s. This is not because of a deficiency in women’s wis­
dom or a possibility of flaw and fault in recognition, but due to the fact that if 
one of them made a mistake, the other one will correct her. According to Java­
di Amoli, women’s domestic and child care responsibilities restrict their ability 
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to observe and remember what they have witnessed. As such it is necessary to 
have two women so that if one forgets the other will remind her (Javadi Amoli 
1389/2010: 344–345). 
Women and Jihad
Javadi Amoli (1389/2010) believes that if a country is at war and is threatened 
by foreigners, women should also defend their country, which requires military 
training. In such circumstances, women are required to participate in jihad along­
side men. Women are allowed and sometimes obligated to serve as leaders during 
war, because defense is not restricted to men. Whenever defense is necessary, 
women are supposed to support men either as combatants or as service provid­
ers (Jibid.: 314).
Women’s economic rights 
Regarding women’s economic rights, Javadi Amoli explains that the Quran rec­
ognizes women’s economic affairs as independent from that of men, pointing out 
that it emphasizes that everyone has their own business, and that men and wom­
en are economically independent of each other: “To men is allotted what they 
earn, and to women what they earn” (Quran 4:32) (ibid.: 292–293). Javadi Amo­
li also says that the superiority and guardianship of men over women in a family 
is not a changeable rule, but if a woman is competent in managing her econom­
ic affairs, she can come to a compromise with the man and protect her econom­
ic independence under specific conditions in a marriage contract (ibid.: 327).
Conclusion
The theoretical model outlined in the chapter on theory can be used to analyze 
four points of the fundamentalist perspective. The first refers to the dialectical 
relationship between the individual and structure in general, and particularly the 
dialectical relationship between human reason and religion as an element of 
structure. Such a dialectical relationship, as discussed in the chapter on the the­
oretical framework, is recognized as a prerequisite for the modern society. Sec­
ondly, the theoretical model argued that in case of failure of the dialectical re­
lationship between the structure and the individual, objectified meaning and the 
value system presented by religion becomes incompatible with subjective mean­
ing and the value system at the individual level. This incompatibility results in 
the crisis of meaning in modern society. The third point focuses on the notion 
of justice in the dialectical relationship between the structure and the individu­
al, which explicates the participatory parity of individuals including men and 
women in rules and resources in different political, cultural and economic di­
mensions, as well as the basis of the relationship between men and women in 
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the family, if it is characterized by equality and partnership instead of paternal­
ism and authority. And finally, the fourth point recognizes the UDHR and CE­
DAW as setting global criteria for justice and equal access to rules and resourc­
es for both men and women. In the following, these four points shall be argued 
from a fundamentalist approach. 
Dialectical relationship between structure and individual (religion and human reason)
According to fundamentalism, human reason is considered as a subset of reve­
lation without independent authority. As a result, the dialectical relationship be­
tween religion and human reason, in the broader sense between structure and 
individual, cannot be constituted, for human reason is considered a part of rev­
elation and the dialectical relationship between two elements is only possible 
when two factors are independent from each other. Human reason is not quali­
fied to impact revelation in this view. 
Crisis of meaning 
Since in modern society religion is not the single presenter of meaning and the 
center of the value system, it is possible that the subjective meaning differs from 
the objectified meaning; in other words, the individual value system diverges 
from the value systems offered by religion. For instance, the individual value 
system tends to esteem human dignity through a notion of egalitarian justice, 
which emphasizes participatory parity in resources and rules of all cultural, po­
litical, economic dimensions, especially regarding gender and the relation based 
on equality and partnership in the family. In contrast, the value system present­
ed by religion is based on desert­based justice and natural differences between 
men and women. Therefore, an individual meaning system based on egalitarian 
notions of justice is not equivalent to the value system presented by the funda­
mentalist view. The value system in the fundamentalist perspective might pro­
vide a religious life, though it is incompatible with subjective meaning and val­
ues. It leads ultimately to a crisis of meaning, not only for the individual but also 
for religion as well. In reaction to this crisis, fundamentalism tries to impose its 
value system onto other sources of value systems. It also tries to negate other 
meaning and value systems using different methods, for instance through re­
stricting cultural communication, or implementing harsh and unacceptable pen­
alties for dissidence, such as the death penalty for apostasy44. In its radical form 
44  For example, the case of Raif Badawi (born 1984), a Saudi Arabian writer and activist who was 
found guilty of offences related to his blog, the Saudi Free Liberals Forum, as well as accusa­
tions that he insulted Islam.He was sentenced to 1000 lashes to be administered at a rate of 50 
a week over 20 weeks and 10 years in prison. He also received a fine of 1 million riyal (equal 
to about $267,000). Available at: (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/17/saudi­blog­
ger­raif­badawi­global­pressure­release) 
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it might lead to legitimize terrorism in the extreme fundamentalist view. Here, 
it seems that religion loses its essence and its essential message to respect and 
love humanity and human dignity, in order to retain its old authority. 
Justice as participatory parity for men and women in political, cultural and economic dimensions 
and in the family
The fundamentalist meaning and value system emphasizes desert­based justice, 
based on which it does not recognize participatory parity for men and women 
in rules and resources; hence this view would not be able to provide opportuni­
ties and social or political arrangements to encourage the flourishing of a ‘truly 
human life’ for both women and men that is considered appropriate to human 
dignity. 
To achieve a better understanding of the notion of justice applied in the fun­
damentalist view and its difference to justice as participatory parity, two points 
will be explained in the following section. These points include the notion of 
justice and the debate on natural differences between men and women. 
The notion of justice
Although in both the Quran and sunna some acts were recommended as forms 
of justice and some were prohibited as unjust and cruel, there are not any spe­
cific measures and final definitions of justice in enough philosophical detail to 
indicate the constituent elements of justice, or the necessary conditions for the 
realization of justice. Nonetheless, justice, being just and efforts to fulfill jus­
tice were recommended to believers in the Quran and the tradition (Rosen 2000: 
154). For example, O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm for 
Allah, witnesses in justice, and do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from 
being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness (Quran 5:8). Indeed, Allah 
commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge be-
tween people to judge with justice (Quran 4:58). The concept is so important 
that even the aim of prophets and religion is the fulfillment of justice: Allah sent 
the prophets as bringers of good tidings and warners and sent down with them 
the Scripture in truth to judge between the people concerning that in which they 
differed (Quran 2:214).
Therefore, what is recommended in the Quran is a moral and ethical defini­
tion rather than a philosophical definition of justice (Mojtahed Shabestari 
1387/2008). The philosophical definition does not have a divine resource, but 
rather can be traced back to ancient Greece. It should be noted that the impact 
of Greek philosophy on Islamic scholars has a long history, from the translation 
movement over a period of the Abbasid Caliphate between 750 and 1150 CE, 
which started in Baghdad with the translation of major scientific works in phi­
losophy, medicine, and mathematics from languages such as Greek and Sanskrit 
into Arabic (Rababah 2015). Therefore, the influence of Greek thought, espe­
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cially that of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, on Islamic thought has been obvious. 
As a result, the philosophy of such notions as desert­based justice did not orig­
inate from religion. The Quran did not present a certain concrete definition of 
justice; but devolved full responsibility for defining the notion of justice in ev­
ery epoch to human beings, based on their perceptions of justice, as well as the 
circumstances and needs of every age. Thus, justifying discriminatory laws 
against women through a definite notion of justice with a background of classi­
cal Greek philosophy does not relate directly to Islamic teachings, especially in 
applying desert­based justice to explainations of gender inequality in the dis­
course of contemporary Islamic thought. Regardless of critiques and challeng­
es to the notion of desert­based justice mentioned by modern thinkers, this in­
dicates the unresponsiveness of contemporary Islamic thinkers to the current 
debates on such philosophical subjects. It also shows fundamentalists’ inatten­
tion and ignorance of other philosophical debates which arose after classical 
Greek philosophy. 
Proponents of desert­based justice argue that equal persons must be treated 
equally and are entitled to equal rights, but unequal persons must be treated 
based on their desert. This perspective is close to one of Aristotle’s definitions 
of justice, in which he states that since persons are unequal by nature; natural 
justice requires a concept of geometrical distribution in which unequal persons 
receive unequal shares. This notion of justice is also known as distributive jus­
tice and ‘proportional equality’. However, it does not explain what constitutes 
merit or desert and who merits a share in the rule (Mathie 1987: 66, quoted in 
Ward 2010: 2).
In fact, various concepts of justice are discussed by Aristotle in the fifth book 
of the Nicomachean Ethics. Since ‘unjust’ means either lawless or unfair, as Ar­
istotle states, ‘just’ means either lawful or fair. He furthermore distinguishes 
‘universal justice’ from ‘particular justice’. The former refers to lawful behav­
ior in general and implicates complete virtue, since it can be exercised in rela­
tion to another person and secures advantages for another person (Aristotle 2004: 
115). Justice differs from virtue in its relation to somebody else, while virtue 
only deals with the moral state of one individual. Particular justice is considered 
as fairness and equality and is a virtue of character like other moral virtues, such 
as courage, honesty, etc (Leontsini 2015: 28). Particular justice is either distrib­
utive or rectifying. Distributive justice deals with the fair distribution of bene­
fits and burdens and ensures that everyone receives their fair share of goods. In 
other words, each person gets what he or she deserves by means of the so­called 
‘geometrical proportion’, which stands for a just distribution of goods between 
persons. “It means geometrical proportion in distribution prioritizes the evalu­
ation of persons rather than shares, and assumes that persons are unequal” (Ward 
2010: 4).
Just rectification restores a balance for unequal distributions between two par­
ties. It is based on an ‘arithmetical’ proportion, since “[o]nly when the whole 
has been divided into two equal parts can a man say that he has what is proper­
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ly his” (Aristotle, quoted in Ward 2010: 5). The arithmetical proportion is based 
on the evaluation of shares rather than persons. In this view, all persons are con­
sidered equal rather than unequal. Here, fairness also means that everyone re­
ceives what he deserves, but according to this perspective, all persons are and 
deserve the same (ibid.).
Political justice is another concept of justice discussed by Aristotle. It “ob­
tains between those who share a life for the satisfaction of their needs as per­
sons free and equal, either arithmetically or proportionately” (Aristotle 2004: 
129). As Ward (2010) explains, “political justice is based on ‘rule of reason’ and 
rule of law upheld by ruling and being ruled in turn by equal citizens who, rec­
ognizing each other as equals, accept equal shares of good things for themselves” 
(p: 6). Political justice can be based on natural law or particular legal law. Where­
as natural law is the same everywhere, legal law is man­made and varies in dif­
ferent places according to particular circumstances (Aristotle 2004: 130–131). 
Law is universal, but since there are certain aspects that cannot be rightly artic­
ulated in general terms, law takes account of the majority of cases. Therefore, 
law states a general rule, but some exceptional cases might arise. In such cases, 
equity is a rectification of law in so far as law is defective on account of its gen­
erality (ibid.:140–41). Therefore, the law by its nature is universal, as Aristotle 
states, and it applies equally for everyone. It means ‘equality before the law’, 
which implicates that the persons who come before it are the same rather than 
different. The rule of law, and consequently political justice, tends to apply rath­
er an arithmetical form of equality that assumes that persons are the same (Ward 
2010: 7).
Accordingly, distributive justice is only one kind of justice discussed by Ar­
istotle; although it provides a definition of desert­based justice among Muslim 
philosophers, which is used to justify slavery and gender inequality.45 But also, 
since it is based on the state of nature and natural bodies, and physical and men­
tal differences, it cannot bring justice for people with serious physical and men­
tal disabilities (Nussbaum 2009: 121).
On another point, all religions including Islamic streams of thought, empha­
size human dignity for every person, even though such a definition of justice 
based on the state of nature is inconsistent with human dignity. Although, the 
notion of ‘inherent dignity’ is not mentioned in the Quran, some verses imply 
the notion. For instance, verses on the creation of human beings indicate equal­
ity in creation: O mankind! We created you from a single [pair] of a male and a 
female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other, not 
that ye may despise [each other] (Quran 49:13). Furthermore, We have certain-
45  Also Aristotle’s aristocratic bias excludes women, slaves and craftsmen from citizenship. Wom­
en are, in his writing on biology, “a deformity, though one which occurs in the ordinary course 
of nature,” and that their very existence is due only to the need for men to be reproduced sex­
ually, so that their (superior ) form can be kept separate from their (inferior) matter (Okin 
1989:54)
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ly honored the children of Adam and carried them on the land and sea and pro-
vided for them of the good things and preferred them over much of what we have 
created, with [definite] preference (Quran 17:70). Therefore, gender, race, sta­
tus and power do not produce dignity (Kadivar 2013: 215). On this account, 
many Islamic thinkers believe that the Quran recognizes human dignity for all 
human beings by referring to the children of Adam rather than only to believers 
or Muslims (Alousi; Ebn Ashur; Tabataba’i; cited in Ayazi 2012).
But the question here is how human dignity can be respected and maintained 
in a society. From a religious perspective, human dignity can be maintained 
through spirituality and righteousness. Even so, spirituality and righteousness 
require justice, a sense of security in economic needs and social comfort as well 
as the right to determine destiny through participation in political affairs. There­
fore, social, economic, political, and even cultural factors are of utmost impor­
tance in constituting an environment that provides the social freedom necessary 
for inner freedom and spirituality. 
Also from a non­religious perspective, dignity is an obscure notion that should 
be considered with interrelated notions of ‘respect’, and ‘justice.’ As John Raw­
ls (in Nussbaum 2009) describes, it has no obvious content of its own, though 
essentially it is the worthiness of a living person. Therefore, all human beings 
are common in an inherent dignity that deserves respect from laws and social 
institutions, and they require a political arrangement to provide every person 
with life circumstances that ensure their lives flourish as appropriate to human 
dignity (Nussbaum 2009: 117–130; Nussbaum 2001:81; Nussbaum 1999: 234).
The cultural and social patterns of representation, interpretation, and com­
munication, which consider biological differences as a basis for different emo­
tional and rational faculties, and accordingly define proportional access to so­
cial and political and economic resources based on such differences, cannot 
provide opportunities for women to flourish in a truly human life. Furthermore, 
institutionalizing such interpretations into popular culture as well as in law and 
social institutions and patterns of everyday interactions prevent women from 
participatory parity in different cultural, economic and political resources, and 
positions women as minors who are in need of tutelage and guardianship, rath­
er as human beings with free will and authority. Such interpretations are incon­
sistent with equal human dignity for all human beings. Therefore, they violate 
justice, respect and human dignity. 
This is all a result of a certain human definition and interpretation of justice – 
which is not related to a divine definition of justice – as well as its failure to pro­
vide any practical approach to respecting and maintaining human dignity (equal­
ly for men and women) in society. It is therefore vital to revise the definition of 
justice and to present a decent definition proper to human dignity for all human 
beings, which is compatible with human nature – not masculine nature in the 
discourse of patriarchy. It would not be necessarily contrary to religious teach­
ing, but more consistent with the fulfillment of justice as the aim of religion. 
Such a new definition of justice would lead to a new attitude to the UDHR and 
MARZIYEH.indd   142 21.06.18   14:28
143
the CEDAW as practical endeavors to respect and maintain human dignity and 
as cosmopolitan norms for justice.  
Natural differences between men and women
The dominant argument for defining rights for women in the fundamentalist per­
spective, as Tabataba’i reasons, is:
Biologically, the average woman is inferior to the average man in brainpower, heart, veins 
and nerves, let alone height and weight. For this reason, women’s bodies are softer and 
weaker and men’s rougher and physically stronger; and women have gentler feelings such 
as love and tenderness and a greater interest in beauty and self­adornment, while men are 
more rational than women. Thus, women’s life is emotional and men’s life is rational. In 
Islam, the difference in social duties and obligations [of men and women] is due to their 
different emotional and rational faculties. For example, men are specialists in politics, 
law and warfare, where rationality plays a greater role, while women specialize in rais­
ing children and managing the household… Consequently, men have overall control be­
cause of their rationality, while women get more assistance because of their emotional 
advantages (cited in Kadivar 2013: 219–220).
Such views on gender differences are not mentioned in the Quran and of course 
are not restricted to the Islamic fundamentalist perspective; rather, it is a gener­
al debate with a long history that did not originate from a specific religion. Sev­
eral publications from the field of popular psychology mention that women and 
men are naturally opposed to each other in thinking, emotions and communica­
tion. For example, the book Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus which 
has sold more than 30 million copies and been translated into fourty languages, 
or the endless stream of articles on this subject in popular magazines all over 
the world, though most of their claims are clearly refuted by massive amounts 
of research (Connell 2015: 33). Therefore, attention to the current debates on 
sex differences and gender studies by fundamentalists and their contribution to 
such discussions from a religious view help them to protect their religion from 
refutable opinions perpetuated by pop psychology. 
The various theories on the origins of sex differences can be categorized into 
three groups. First, biologically­oriented theories consider “the body as a ma­
chine that manufactures gender difference” (Connell 2015:36). Within this 
group, evolutionary psychology applies evolutionary principles especially con­
cerning sexual selection pressures. Evolutionary psychologists believe that cur­
rent gender differences “originated from successful ancestral adaptation to the 
different reproductive demands faced by men and women” (Bussey and Bandu­
ra 1999). Women, based on this model, invested more in offspring, were choos­
ier than men about potential mates, adapted to their greater imposed role in re­
production and parenting, and competed with other women to attract long­term 
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partners who provide needs for their life and for their children. Men competed 
with other men for sexual access to women and tended towards more aggres­
sion, competition, and risk taking, controlling women’s sexuality and matin with 
many females (ibid.; Wood and Eagly 2002: 700). The features of sex­differen­
tiated social behavior described in this theory seem to be similar to the funda­
mentalist view of gender difference. However, the argument based on evolution­
ary principles and assumptions about sexual selection pressures and in general 
the theory of evolution has been unacceptable and rejected by the streams of Is­
lamic thought, including fundamentalism. 
The counterpoints of biological theory are the sociological theories that con­
sider the body “as a kind of canvas on which culture paints images of woman­
hood and manhood” (Connell 2015: 38). Therefore, gender is a social construc­
tion, marked by the peculiarities of each culture. 
This approach has been applied in different fields of human science. For psy­
chological constructionists, the gender system is a product of relations between 
people and their language for describing their world. They show how the social 
understanding of gender inequality is a gestalt determined by social inequalities 
inherent in the language (e.g., use of male pronouns as generic) (Wood and Ea­
gly 2002: 700). Also cultural studies influenced by Michel Foucault elaborate 
“how modern systems of knowledge had come to sort people into categories, 
and how these categories were interwoven with techniques of social discipline 
that police their bodies”; therefore they consider “bodies as the product of dis­
ciplinary practices. Bodies are ‘docile’ and biology bends to the hurricane of so­
cial discipline” (Connell 2015: 38). As Connell states, the docility of bodies are 
overstated in such post­structuralist research. Instead, bodies are active in social 
processes, for example, through seeking pleasure, experience, and shaping cours­
es of social conduct (ibid.: 39).
 In sociology, social constructionists explain that sex­differentiated behavior 
is determined by taking over social roles in terms of their presumed ‘sex roles’ 
as man or woman, which functions in terms of a sexual division of labor – i.e., 
domestic work for women – and gender hierarchy (Eckes and Trautner 2012: 
23). However, it is not clear why the sex role of a man is more highly esteemed 
than that of a woman (Connell 2015: 41). As explained by West and Zimmer­
man (1987) in their article Doing Gender, gender is generated in routine inter­
actions where men and women learn to display a set of sex­typed behavior in 
their social interactions (Connell 2015: 73; Wood and Eagly 2002: 700).
The third theoretical group suggests considering gender differences from both 
the biological and social context in which men and women live (Wood and Ea­
gly 1999). Similar to social constructionism, this biosocial approach emphasiz­
es ‘sex roles’ within a social context. The problem, as Connell posits, is that 
these two realms are not comparable and it is very possible to run the risk of giv­
ing priority to biological explanations, to the extent of collapsing back into a bi­
ological dichotomy (Connell 2015: 41).
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This idea of ‘character dichotomy’ (Connell 2015) emphasizes differences 
between two concepts when they are sharply distinguished or opposed. In pop 
psychology, also based on character dichotomy, one set of traits is defined for 
women and another set for men. As a result, most research on this subject fo­
cuses on gender differences. But the remarkable point is that applying a new sta­
tistical procedure, known as ‘meta­analysis’46, for gender difference research 
reveals that “across a wide range of the traits and characteristics measured by 
psychology, sharp gender differences are rare. Broad similarity between wom­
en and men is the main pattern” (ibid.: 46–47). Another point that the research 
shows is that psychological gender differences are not fixed, but rather they 
change over time. They can be “created, erased, or reversed, depending on the 
context” (Hyde 2005: 589, cited in Connell 2015: 46). However, attention to 
similarities does not mean to deny the differences. All human bodies around the 
world are different from each other in physical ability and disability, being old 
or young, sick or well, and they change through growing older, and coming 
across various events during their path of life. As Connell argues, it is not suffi­
cient to apply a ‘difference’ framework, but another framework is required which 
focuses on relations. Gender is also a system of social relations within which 
individuals act and their bodies become interconnected through social practic­
es. It is a social embodiment, which expresses the relation between bodies and 
is subject to historical process, hence it changes and can never be fixed (Con­
nell 2015).
But it seems obvious that gender as a system of social relations cannot rely 
on difference and dichotomy systems in order to set forth human dignity, but 
rather it obstructs legal­cultural recognition, which prevents human beings from 
interacting on terms of parity in cultural and social patterns of representation, 
interpretation, and communication due to their gender. This is not restricted to 
a cultural dimension but it also permeates political and economic dimensions 
and prevents human beings from participating in all three dimensions of culture, 
economics and politics, leading to injustice. 
Perhaps differences and dichotomy systems alongside the notion of des­
ert­based justice were once rational and acceptable, but today there is a need to 
move towards an egalitarian notion of justice based on human dignity, which is 
due to new social relations including gender, and is based on human dignity. 
This seems to be a prerequisite to creating a world based on love for human dig­
nity and humanity that provides all human beings, regardless of differences in 
race, nationality, religion, ethnicity, culture, gender, physical and mental abili­
ty and disability, with life circumstances to enable them to lead flourishing hu­
man lives appropriate to human dignity. Assuredly, the purpose of religion could 
not exclude this. 
46  Meta­analysis summarizes and compares results from separate studies on the same issue to 
reach a statistical analysis of the whole set of studies (See: Card 2012). 
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UDHR and CEDAW as global criteria for justice
Of course, there is no place to speak of the UDHR and CEDAW in a fundamen­
talist point of view, since they believe that all human and women’s rights were 
defined by God, and they do not admit any rules on these subjects written by hu­
man beings. However, moderate fundamentalists pay attention to such interna­
tional conventions and declarations in order to present the rational face of Islam, 
although concepts such as gender equality, justice and human dignity still need 
to be debated more thoroughly. 
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7  Gender Norms Between Revelation und Human Reason  
in the Reformist Perspective
The reformist­oriented thought stream is often defined as a response to moderniza­
tion and globalization. Though, it should be noted that several of the core issues men­
tioned by reformists have a longer history. For instance, “the debate on the relation­
ship of revelation and reason did not begin in the Muslim world with the rise of 
modern science and the impact of Enlightenment thinking from the West” (Clarke 
2006: 165). The thought pattern of reformist discourse can be traced back to Islam’s 
early history and the Mu’tazili. They were influenced by classical Greek philosophy 
that recognized reason as the capacity to understand the goodness of justice and the 
evil of injustice independent from revelation. They also recognized that justice is de­
fined by sources outside of religion based on rational thought. Hence, whatever rea­
son finds just should also be religiously obligatory, and whatever reason finds unjust 
should be religiously prohibited. Therefore, whatever reason rules, the Sharia will 
also uphold. Mu’tazili did not gain the same support as the Ash’ari school, which 
was based on the fallibility of reason in assessing a human being’s true rights as well 
as the incapability of reason to define justice (Robinson 1998). According to this 
school, the notion of justice must be shaped based on what the Lawgiver, i.e. God, 
identifies as just and unjust as found in the religious texts and this is not open to ques­
tion. This rational approach is not reflected in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) because 
in defining fiqh, human reason is considered incompetent in comprehending all hid­
den harms and benefits of matters; therefore, human reason is a futile and unreliable 
source in discovering true human rights (Kadivar 2011b: 50).
This discourse found special importance in the mid­nineteenth century with 
Muslims’ encounters with modernity, which often began through external threats 
such as European military expansion into Muslim lands. These encounters re­
sulted in moral and spiritual decline, as well as a downturn in science and tech­
nology and military strength in Muslim societies. Sayyid Jamal al­Din Asadaba­
di (1838–1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) are known as the ‘fathers 
of reformism’ in Islam. Asadabadi considered reform as the only way for Mus­
lims to counter European domination. Abduh also recognized how changes were 
necessary to preserve ‘society’s moral fabric’; therefore changes “were not only 
permitted by Islam, but were, indeed, its necessary implications” (Hunter 2009: 
15), in order to bridge the modern world and the traditional world of classical 
Islam. As such, the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) belongs to the traditional worl­
dview which must be revised. Fiqh is not only based on revealed message, but 
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consists of a commingling of revelation and the customs and conventions of the 
society during the Prophet’s time. Therefore, reformists recognize that an incon­
sistency between religion and modernity is derived from the customary aspect 
of Islam, rather than the sacred message of religion. Hence, as Kadivar47 says, 
the main duty of religious experts and scholars is “to extract the sacred message 
again and to push aside the sediment of time­bound customs” (Kadivar 2011b: 
65). For instance, Abduh emphasized the responsibility of fiqh for downgrading 
women’s status from the high level it has in the Quran (Abu Zayd 2013: 154). 
In their efforts to find the causes and solutions for their issues, the reform­
ists emphasized the restoration of Islam’s rationalist and scientific spirit and re­
interpretation of the religious teachings to suit current conditions and needs of 
Muslim societies. In reference to their location on the spectrum, the reformist 
perspective recognizes reason as capable of understanding justice and a human 
being’s true rights as independent of revelation. Therefore, reformist schools of 
thought diverge in terms of philosophical outlook, concepts of the authenticity 
of human reason, methodology of analyzing Islamic scripture and legal sources 
as well as their view of the allowable scope for interpretation (Hunter 2009: 3).
7 1 Individual Agency and Rationality in the Reformist View
Human reason
In contrast with Sunni Islam, where Ash’ari traditionalism gained more promi­
nence over Mu’tazili rationalism, Shi’a Islam adapted Mu’tazili rationalism and 
thus maintained the important role of reason in Shi’a jurisprudence. Therefore, 
47  Mohsen Kadivar (born 1959) is a philosopher and theologian. After abandoning his studies in 
electrical engineering at Shiraz University in 1978 he graduated with the equivalent of a bach­
elor‘s degree in Theology and Islamic Studies from Qom University in 1989. He earned the 
certificate of Ijtihad – the highest degree in Islamic religious tradition – from the theological 
seminary of Qom in 1997 under the supervision of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri Na­
jaf Abadi. He finished his Ph.D. in Islamic Philosophy and Theology from Tarbiyat Modarres 
University in Tehran in 1999. During 1992–1998 he taught as a visiting instructor for graduate 
students on Islamic philosophy and theology at Imam Sadegh, Mofid, Shahid Beheshti, and 
Tarbiat Modarres Universities. He also acted as Chair of the Islamic Thought office at the Stra­
tegic Research Center in Tehran for seven years until 1998.
    Because of his critical analyses on the theory of “absolute rule of the appointed jurisconsult” 
(wila¯yat-i intisa¯bı¯-yi mutlaqah-yi faqı¯h) by Ayatolloh Khomeini, he served a prison term of 
eighteen months until 2000. Since 2009 Mohsen Kadivar has been a visiting research profes­
sor of Islamic studies at the Department of Religion at Duke University (Durham, North Car­
olina, United States). He has published numerous works on: human rights and democracy in 
Islam, classical and modern Shi’a theology and legal theories, Shi’a political thought, classi­
cal Islamic philosophy, and modern Quran studies [Kadivar, Mohsen. Biography.Official Web­
site of Mohsen Kadivar.Available at: http://en.kadivar.com/sample­page­2/ (29 June 2015)].
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reformists following the Mu’tazili school do not believe that human reason is only 
for understanding the revelation and that it exists in the shadow of divine law, as 
fundamentalists do. Instead they consider human reason as God’s gift, which 
should be applied to manage the political, economic, and social affairs of society. 
However, they do not believe in ‘the self­sufficiency of reason’ but rather still ac­
knowledge the need of human reason for revelation. This fallibility of human rea­
son, as Yousefi Eshkevari48 explains, does not prevent human beings from rely­
ing on it (Yousefi Eshkevari 2010b: 20). In fact, from a reformist point of view, 
reason and revelation are never in conflict, but rather they complement each oth­
er (Kadivar cited in Hunter 2009: 65–66). However, the perspective closer to sec­
ularism considers a more critical role for human reason, as Soroush49 points out:
48  Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari (born 1950) is a cleric and researcher in Islamic theology and histo­
ry. He is also a journalist, and a former member of parliament. He studied for 13 years in the 
theological seminary of Qom. After the revolution he was elected as representative in the first 
Iranian parliament, though only serving one term, deciding to focus on cultural and research 
activities after the end of his term. He was a lecturer on the history of Islam at the Allameh Ta­
batabaii University for four years, before being barred from teaching at the University when 
he spoke for Dr. Kazem Sami, an Iranian dissident, during his funeral.
    Eshkevari wrote for different journals and magazines which were banned by the government. 
He founded the Ali Shariati Research Centre in cooperation with other researchers in 1997 and 
has since served as its director. He was also contributor to the Great Encyclopedia of Islam, 
and an editor of the Encyclopedia of the Shi’a. 
    In December 2000, he was condemned to death for ‘apostasy’ and ‘war against Islam’ by the 
Special Court for the Clergy because of his speeches at the Conference on ‘Iran After the Elec­
tions’ held in Berlin on April 7–9, 2000, sponsored by the Heinrich Böll Foundation. The sen­
tence was later commuted to five years in prison. 
    In the course of the protests over the 2009 presidential elections in Iran, Eshkevari came to Ger­
many and has continued his research on Islam and Quran there [Yousefi Eshkevari, Hasan. Bi­
ography.Official Website of Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari.Available at: http://yousefieshkevari.
com/?page_id=2 (29 June 2015)].
49  Abdolkarim Soroush (born 1945) earned his degree in Pharmacology from Tehran University. 
He later moved to London to pursue further studies in analytical chemistry, and after graduat­
ing in this subject from graduate school at London he studied the history and philosophy of sci­
ence for five and a half years at Chelsea College.
    Soroush returned to Iran after the Revolution and was appointed as the Director of the newly 
established Islamic Culture Group. He was also a member of the Cultural Revolution Council 
which was responsible for reopening the universities and restructuring the syllabi of universi­
ties, which were shut down after the revolution.  
    In 1983, Soroush abandoned his governmental post and dedicated himself to teaching and re­
search. He gradually became more critical of the political role played by the Iranian clergy, pub­
lished his controversial articles on religious pluralism, hermeneutics, tolerance, clericalism etc. 
in the monthly magazine Kiyan, which was clamped down on in 1998 by the Islamic Republic 
government. Soon after, he lost his job and his security in Iran. Since 2000, Soroush has been a 
Visiting Professor at Harvard, Princeton, Colombia, Chicago and Yale Universities, the Wissen­
schaftskolleg in Berlin, and the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. His ar­
eas of expertise include the writings and philosophy of Rumi, Islamic and Democracy, Quranic 
Studies and Philosophy of Islamic Law, Islamic Political Philosophy, Intellectual and Religious 
History of Modern Iran [Soroush, Abdolkarim. Biography.Official Website of Abdolkarim So­
roush.Available at: http://www.drsoroush.com/Biography­E.htm (29 June 2015)].
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The role of rationality in the arena of religion has, thus far, been that of a timid and dis­
creet servant of understanding and defense of religion. However, defense and affirmation 
cannot be complete without a critique and analysis. The enterprise of rationality is an all­
or­nothing project. One may not employ reason to attest to the truth of one’s opinion, 
without leaving the doors open to its fault­finding critique. The attempt to enjoy the sweet 
affirmation of reason without tasting its bitter approach is pure self­delusion (Soroush 
2002: 154).
In the reformist perspective, the Islamic legal system is divided into non­world­
ly and worldly aspects (Naraghi 2005). The sacred aspect of the Islamic legal 
system refers to the non­worldly and eternal factor, which is congruent with the 
worldly aspect rather than parallel to it. This aspect refers to essential precepts 
concerning matters of faith, ethics and devotion such as praying, fasting, belief 
in the afterworld and prophecy, which are immutable and fixed. In the reform­
ist view, these are beyond the perception of human reason and reasoning in the 
realm of rationality. The second group of precepts – non­essential – deals with 
the worldly aspects presented in human interactions and sociopolitical affairs 
which are time­ and space­bounded. This realm is allocated for the appraisal of 
reason; thus, the collective reason of humanity is the yardstick of such precepts 
in Islam (Yousefi Eshkevari 2013). As Naraghi (2005) explains, Muslims should 
follow collective reasoning to identify the social and worldly benefits of socio­
political affairs in their worldly lives. Only if these worldly benefits of society 
are met, their non­worldly and eternal benefits will be satisfied. In other words, 
reasonable and worldly benefits in sociopolitical life precede eternal and 
non­worldly benefits. One must first recognize and identify the reasonable and 
worldly benefits of a legal and social system, and only then identify its eternal 
aspects (Naraghi 2005: 2). Accordingly, religion in this perspective should be 
reasonably demand­responsive for the exigencies of the time. 
All reformists believe in the authority of human reason and profess that ev­
ery reasonable action in modern times are verifiable by religion. This is justifi­
cation for accepting the new concepts and events brought about by modernity 
under the condition that there is no evident rejection of those new concepts found 
in clear and strong wording, or are explicitly against ethical rules in the Quran – 
i.e. essential law. Depending on the extent of deviation, essential law can pre­
cede human reason in some reformist views, depending on their location on the 
spectrum. To decide which verses contain essential laws and which verses refer 
to rules that were only relevant in certain situations, they emphasize the impor­
tance of analyzing the historical context of revelation and religious sources (Abu 
Zayd, cited in Amirpour 2013: 69). Therefore, they accept the authority of hu­
man reason conditionally but the range of acceptance is related to their position 
on the spectrum. 
Reformists, like the other two groups, recognize the main aim of religion to 
be the fulfillment of justice. They believe that in the Quran and the Tradition, 
Muslims are ordered to seek and serve justice. Yet determining the meaning of 
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justice and the sociopolitical system providing the circumstances to fulfill jus­
tice has been left to humans and human reason. Thus, fulfilling justice in the 
present society is the duty of humans and human reason of the present time. 
They allocate an essential role to justice in the interpretation of Islamic rules, 
and their application to contemporary conditions (Hunter 2009: 66). Therefore, 
human reasoning is of crucial importance because of its role in defining justice 
as the main aim of religion.
The role of human reason in the relationship of the human being with God and society
Reformists distinguish two realms of cognition. One is cognition of God and 
some metaphysical concepts like the afterworld, which they believe is beyond 
human reason. Though human reason is necessary to conceive this realm, in fact, 
the decision to accept religion is a choice undertaken by human reason; without 
the guidance of revelation, and reason has no access to this realm. The second 
realm consists of all worldly affairs, which deals with human interactions and 
social transaction and is the scope of authority of reason. However, there is not 
any consensus among reformists as to what extent reason in this area has author­
ity or is independent from revelation. 
The absolute role for human reason in relationships between human beings and 
God and nature is not definable (Interview D March 2011). Instead, human rea­
son should be accompanied by revelation, for reason alone is not sufficient to 
comprehend all of God’s characteristics and features as mentioned in the Qu­
ran. Human reason is limited and it must be guided by revelation to be able to 
understand such features. In debating reason, three distinct concepts should be 
noticed. The first concept is rationality, which is being able to differentiate right 
from wrong. The second idea is irrationality, which is contrary to reason. The 
third is non­rationality, which is not contrary to reason but is beyond it. Through 
rationalizing religion, some essential parts of religion which are beyond reason 
will be lost. Therefore, in the relationship between God and human beings, hu­
man reason plays a minimal role, even though in relationships between human 
beings it has a prominent role, as it does in the conduct of all human affairs, 
though still accompanied by revelation (Interview D March 2011). 
The idea that science can guide human affairs and religion only has a second­
ary role is rejected (Interview D March 2011). As an example, the first inter­
viewed representative of reformism refers to sexual relationships among human 
beings, saying that as a believer, he cannot accept homosexuality, even if his rea­
son would not be able to reject it rationally, because revelation has a clear per­
spective on this subject and defines it as a ‘perverted’ relationship (Interview D 
March 2011).
In this regard, the second representative (Interview E February 2011) points 
out that in the history of human beings, reason has always played an important 
role, albeit the domain of authority of human reason is changeable. He believes 
in self­justifying critical reason as a proper means for managing today’s human 
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issues. He considers no other sources which could limit autonomous reason – 
autonomous reason can recognize its own limitations. He refers to reason as a 
precedent criterion for believing in a religion. In his opinion the prophets were 
sent in one respect to arouse and apply human reason. While he emphasizes the 
important role of reason, he also stresses that sometimes it alone is not able to 
perceive all truths in the world. For example, in the relationship between God 
and human beings, though reason is of crucial importance, he believes that know­
ing God requires faith in the first stage. It means that believing in God’s exis­
tence needs faith more than rational arguments. Even in relations between hu­
man beings, human reason cannot explain everything, such as love or hate.
In this regard, the third reformist representative who stands closer to secular­
ism (Interview F May 2011) explains that rationality has a determining role in 
the relationship between human beings and God. Sometimes human beings ar­
bitrarily make reason follow revelation. This means following revelation is also 
a choice undertaken by human reason. Sometimes, reason decides not to follow 
revelation, since it recognizes that it alone is adequate to regulate the relation­
ship between human beings and God, and there is no need for the prophets and 
revelation. Similar to this is the relationship between human beings and society. 
He distinguishes various rationalities such as scientific, religious, artistic and 
philosophical rationalism, but considers a stable and essential concept of ratio­
nality leads to a dictatorship of rationality. He also explains that rationality is an 
outcome of collective reasoning instead of individual. He also speaks of a ‘col­
lective’ rationalism rather than an individual rationalism. It is also rationality’s 
task to figure out its limitations, and to determine if there is another source for 
cognition outside rationality (Interview F May 2011).
Equality of man and woman in religious doctrine
Similar to fundamentalists, reformists believe that men and women are created 
equal in humanity and human dignity, though reformists also recognize the dif­
ferent physical and psychological features between men and women, which in 
no way privilege either one of them and do not influence human dignity. “In the 
Islamic view the criterion for closeness to God is virtue and God­consciousness 
regardless of gender” (Interview D March 2011). The values mentioned in the 
Quran for closeness to God are not distinguished between genders. Also, human 
dignity in this view is based on the essence of humanity, which is not dependent 
on gender. Women and men are, of course, different in physiological, psycho­
logical and biological aspects, although these differences are complementary to 
each other and they do not influence human dignity. Therefore, in the Islamic 
perspective, men and women are equal in creation and neither one is superior 
over another because of gender (Interview D March 2011). 
Similarly, representative E (Interview February 2011) explains that based on 
the Quran, all creatures are created in pairs, including human beings. They are 
also created differently, though the differences help them to know each other 
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better. He (Interview E February 2011) emphasizes the fact that the idea that all 
human beings are equal in their humanity can be derived from a verse in the Qu­
ran that mentions how we were created from a single soul. Man and woman are 
different in their physiology which leads to behavioral differences, though this 
is not a reason for defining different rights for them.
The third representative of this group (Interview F May 2011) citing Jean­
Jacques Rousseau – “Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains” – con­
siders this world as the world of inequalities, and points out that even men are 
different from each other; some are strong and some are weak. However, in the 
Quran it is said that God venerates human beings regardless of gender; hence 
there is no difference in the humanity of men and women. He also explains that 
some contemporary philosophers, including nominalists, maintain that there is 
no ‘nature’, and humans only have history rather than essence and nature. This 
means human beings have undertaken a historically progressive evolution. It is 
not possible to claim that there is a ‘perpetual fact’ in human beings throughout 
history. We cannot claim a constant nature for human beings, one which has re­
mained fixed and unchanged throughout history. The word ‘nature’ implies the 
concept of ‘constant’ and this is a suspicious concept. Even genetic studies and 
neuroscience recognize the fluidity of human existence, rather than claim that 
human nature is stable. Though it could be said that human beings are similar 
to each other, it is an indefensible argument to attribute similarities among hu­
man beings to a constant nature. He (Interview F May 2011) emphasizes the flu­
idity of man’s and woman’s existence, which rejects the dichotomy system be­
tween genders and recognizes the general difference between all human beings 
rather than between only men and women. Therefore, he believes that women 
and men are similar to each other. By defining a constant fact in men’s and wom­
en’s ‘nature’ they could erroneously be divided into two and remain distinct from 
each other forever.
Changeability of rights
Contrary to fundamentalists, reformists recognize the role of human reason in 
defining rights. Reformists acknowledge that throughout history, some rights 
have been eliminated – such as rights related to slavery – and some rights have 
emerged, such as women’s rights and homosexuals’ rights, regardless of wheth­
er such new concepts of rights are acceptable and legitimate in religious view­
points. Furthermore, reformists generally take notice of the role and impact of 
religion in defining rights over the course of time, whether in positive or nega­
tive aspects. 
The first representative of reformism (Interview D March 2011) does not rec­
ognize the absolute constant character of rights but neither does he suggest that 
all rights are completely changeable. He provides slavery as an example – a prac­
tice that was completely acceptable in the past but one that is in no way tolerat­
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ed today; similarly, gender equality which was not recognized eighty years ago 
is now considered an international norm. There are also rights, such as proper­
ty rights or the right to life which have both been recognized throughout histo­
ry but their meanings have evolved through time.
Ontologically, he (Interview D March 2011) claims that there are certain 
rights recognized by believers as God­given rights, which are, for seculars, nat­
ural rights. It should be noted that for believers, God is always present in histo­
ry and human development; hence the distinction between God and reason is 
false, because reason works by God’s will. Epistemologically, reason plays an 
essential role for defining rights. 
In the second representative’s point of view (Interview E February 2011), hu­
man rights are non­constant and contractual, are formed by human reason and 
are based on time and space circumstances. He says that human beings have the 
ability to manage their affairs; though throughout history, religion has been one 
factor for determining rights. He argues that the prophets aimed to offer a solu­
tion for their society’s problems and to manage the social, economic and polit­
ical affairs of their society. Therefore he distinguishes prophecy from gover­
nance. The government requires acceptance of some conventional traditions in 
the community, though such traditions in the prophet’s society were later con­
sidered by jurists as sources for fiqh and religious precepts. He emphasizes that 
in pre­modern societies, religion was necessarily the main source for determin­
ing rights and laws. In the modern era however, society needs no more proph­
ets; instead, human reason provides a basis for determining rights and laws. This 
does not lead to the end of religiosity but only the end of prophecy. Therefore, 
he does not recognize any privilege for religion to determine human rights. The 
source for rights and laws are collective reasoning and human knowledge and 
experiences. 
For the third representative (Interview F May 2011), it is also obvious that 
rights are changeable rather than constant. He explains that we are now in the 
paradigm of rights, in contrast to the paradigm of duty­obligation. Today human 
beings are defined by their rights, as opposed to being duty­bearers whose du­
ties are defined by an authority such as God or the king. In the paradigm of rights, 
we encounter new concepts in the course of time, which were not considered as 
rights in the past. For instance, speaking of the rights of homosexuals in the last 
decades was inconceivable, but today these rights are slowly becoming acknowl­
edged and indisputable. 
He (Interview F May 2011) mentions that all rights we recognize today as 
human rights can be derived from non­religious sources; in some cases they are 
even contrary to manifestations of religion. However, some arguments point to 
the religious basis of human rights principles. Even, those people who do not 
believe in religion, pay attention to religious discrimination in order to avoid 
such discrimination in defining human rights. Therefore religion is of crucial 
importance in both the negative and positive sense in determining human rights. 
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Gender difference and women’s rights
Although all reformists agree on rights for everyone regardless of gender, they 
have differing perspectives when it comes to defining equal rights for women. 
Some reformists advocate certain affirmative actions for women because of their 
different physiological features, such as special rights for pregnant or lactating 
women. They consider law of maintenance, as well as prohibition of work such 
as mining for women, as affirmative action in developing countries.
The first representative (Interview D March 2011) affirms equal rights for all 
human beings regardless of their gender. However, he recognizes the existence 
of special rights that provide support to women because of their biological and 
physiological differences from men. For instance, he refers to laws addressing 
violence against women including marital rape, the special needs of pregnant 
and lactating women and affirmative action for women in labor and employment. 
For example, he said that some forms of labor are harmful to women’s health, 
such as mining, and should not be permissible. Another example is military ser­
vice. He believes that women should not be allowed to serve as combatants; rath­
er they should be encouraged to take on administrative/office jobs or medical 
care in the military. Another form of affirmative action is the law of alimony in 
Islam, which is supposed to be paid by the man in the family in developing coun­
tries. He explains that in such countries the work force is usually male and there 
are not many job opportunities for women, therefore prohibition of this law 
would be detrimental to women.
The second representative (Interview E February 2011) explains that while 
there are biological and natural differences between men and women, these can­
not justify unequal rights or laws for them. He refers to Aristotelian essential­
ism and the concept of desert­based justice which in the past recognized unequal 
rights for men and women because of the essential difference between them. To­
day, such views are not acceptable because of modern thought based on egali­
tarian justice, which is also incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.
In this regard, the third representative (Interview F May 2011) points out that 
even if we accept the statement that there is inequality in nature between man 
and woman, it does not mean that they should experience unequal rights too. 
This is the same logic that governs over racism and slavery. For example, Ary­
ans believe in the fundamental difference between their race and non­Aryans 
such that this differentiation logically determines their rights and privileges. He 
believes that such an argument suffers from a logical mistake – that even knowl­
edge cannot be a source of value (evaluation). It means that when we discover 
a fact that two things are different, it does not automatically mean that we must 
consider different values for them. In other words, from ‘it is’ one cannot derive 
‘it must’.
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Approach to Religion and Islamic Law as Structure in the Reformist Perspective
Reformists categorize all religious precepts into two groups: essential and 
non­essential (under different names). They acknowledge the second group, 
non­essential precepts, as the means to achieve the objectives of Islam. Accord­
ingly they are valid and legitimate as long as they help reach this objective. Thus, 
they are immutable and temporary. These non­essential precepts are to be found 
in the realm of human interaction and social affairs and do not comprise the wor­
ship precepts. Reformists’ efforts also aim to present a religion based more on 
moral aspects rather the fiqh commandments. In other words, they try to relieve 
religion from the shadow of fiqh and to propel it in the direction of morality and 
ethics. 
For the first representative (Interview D March 2011), religion is more than 
a mere experience, and he claims that a different understanding of religion is 
elitist. He says that definitions of religion must encompass the majority. He like­
wise proposes a definition that describes religion as a set of fixed and permanent 
set of rules or instructions. He divides religiosity into four layers. The first lay­
er is ‘faith and belief’, which is of crucial importance in defining religion. This 
implies trust and belief in God and the afterlife. Belief requires performance of 
and commitment to rituals, which should be considered as the second layer. 
These include prayer, pilgrimage, fasting, etc. Without such rituals, a person can 
hardly be recognized as believer. The third layer is morality, which is necessary 
for religion. The fourth layer pertains to regulations and terms for religious prac­
tice which are mentioned in the fiqh, including precepts relating to civil law, pe­
nal law, public and private law and fundamental rights. He argues that more than 
ninety­eight percent of the verses in the Quran are related to the first three lay­
ers, while only about two percent concern the fiqh, although fiqh has overshad­
owed other layers of religiosity. Nonetheless, the omission of fiqh from religion 
means relinquishment of the practical part of religion, which could only result 
from imposing extreme rationality, ultimately leading to the dissolution of reli­
gion. 
He (Interview D March 2011) presents three criteria for the validity of pre­
cepts: compatibility with reason, compatibility with justice, and compatibility 
with morality. He explains that all Islamic instructions from the age of revela­
tion met these criteria. However, in the modern era some of them, especially 
laws related to women, do not meet such criteria and should therefore be mod­
ified. He explains that the criterion of being rational is accepted by all Islamic 
jurists, but there is no agreement on what rational is or not, although in his view, 
such dissensions are normal in human science too.
According to the first representative (Interview D March 2011), determining 
which of the Islamic laws are conditional or unchangeable requires special 
knowledge of the Quran and the Prophet’s tradition as well as knowledge about 
the capabilities and limitations of human reason in the modern era. Such knowl­
edge is more juristic than philosophical or theosophical. He explains that in re­
ligious knowledge, there are two kinds of precepts – essential and apparent. The 
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essential laws are based on an exact verse from the Quran. While sometimes the 
verses may have a very specific meaning, it is probable that they may refer to 
other meanings. In this sense, he says such laws are questionable. He claims that 
most of the precepts found in fiqh are questionable and as such, they may be 
changed or modified. It is possible that the Islamic jurists have different inter­
pretations of essential precepts. However, jurists are not allowed to impose on 
others to take as essential what they believe and / or reject other interpretations 
of such precepts. Therefore, there exists a kind of internal religious pluralism, 
based on different interpretations which, in turn, could be challenged by other 
jurists.
In the second representative’s point of view (Interview E February 2011), re­
ligion as a system of ontology and epistemology of human beings, deals with 
values and dos and don’ts, as well as the social affairs of human beings with the 
aim of human salvation. He enumerates three different realms in religion. The 
first is worldview, which is constant and independent from time and space cir­
cumstances. In philosophical terms, ontological assertion could be false or true, 
but not amendable. For instance the assertion that God exists may be true or 
false, but whatever the answer is, it is not possible to change or alter it. The sec­
ond category is ethical dos and don’ts, which are based on worldview. He says 
these may be in the form of ideologies and says that they are also eternal and 
beyond time and space. 
The interviewee (Interview E February 2011) divides the realm of religion 
into two parts: the worship precepts and the social precepts. He recognizes wor­
ship precepts as invariable, since belief in God requires some practical actua­
tion; simply believing in the heart is not adequate. On the other hand, social pre­
cepts that regulate human relations in politics, economy and community are 
changeable based on time and special circumstances. He explains that even ac­
cording to traditional fiqh, some provisions are changeable according to the ‘re­
lationship between the subject and precept,’ such that if the subject changes, the 
precept must change as well. Though the important point is, unlike traditional­
ists and fundamentalists, social scientists, experts and parliamentary represen­
tatives have to figure out if the subject has changed. He said these are not de­
pendent on the foqaha (jurists and experts in Islamic Law) who do not have 
enough information about the changes of the subject in modern times. He rec­
ognizes a criterion for evaluating the Islamic precepts in the modern era, which 
could be more rational, equitable and ethical than other precepts. Furthermore, 
he adds that the precepts are not relevant per se, but they are just means to reach 
a specific aim – human salvation. Merely being mentioned in the Quran does 
not mean the obligation to follow them in present day social life, but their effec­
tiveness in the fulfillment of the religious aim – justice – must be noted. 
Similarly, the third representative (Interview F May 2011) explains that reli­
gious precepts can be divided into essential and contingent precepts, noting that 
the contingents are neither sacred nor the main objectives of religion. He ex­
plains that a contingent precept could have been expressed in other forms in oth­
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er times and spaces. The essentials are the aims of religion, which can be cate­
gorized into six subjects including protection of property, life, generation, 
rationality, identity and religion. All contingent precepts are means to achieve 
these aims. Therefore, they are just methods and valid only in so far as they can 
help achieve the aims, otherwise they should be substituted with other means. 
He distinguishes the precepts pertaining to worship from this categorization, be­
cause these precepts, such as the form of prayer, have their own logic that is not 
obvious for believers. However, he recognizes these as temporary laws and 
changeable unless it could be proved that they are permanent precepts. 
The other point he (Interview F May 2011) emphasizes is the superiority of 
religious morality over religious jurisprudence (fiqh), giving more importance 
to a set of moral principles instead of some strict juristic precepts. He under­
scores that a religion without ethics and morality loses its meaning as a religion.
The different ways by which reformists, both past and present, accommodate 
change are presented in by Yousefi Eshkevari in his article Rethinking Men’s Au-
thority over Women (2013: 199–201). In the following, the most important solu­
tions will be introduced, which have been debated since the 1979 revolution in 
Iran. 
The changeable and unchangeable 
Soroush (2011) explains that while traditional fiqh is not changeable, it does 
contain some concepts which imply changeability in Islamic regulations, even 
in the traditional sense. For example, dividing the regulation into two – the es­
sential and the non­essential, is a principle accepted by all jurists. The contro­
versial point, in both the Shi’a and Sunni branches of Islam, has been the appli­
cation of the principle, i.e. determining what the essentials are and what the 
non­essentials are. Soroush gives a historical example ‘the Friday prayers’ 
(jum’a) which are recommended in the Quran50 and were always upheld by the 
Prophet, have been abandoned by Shi’ites for twelve centuries. Some Shi’i ju­
rists (foqaha) considered this prescription as an essential, but acknowledged that 
it needs some certain conditions for upholding it; yet according to them, these 
condition have been absent for the last twelve centuries, after the Twelfth Imam. 
Hence, the Friday Prayers could be relinquished. As a result, determining what 
exactly an essential is at the discretion of the jurist (faqih), and not the written 
word (Soroush 2011: 9–16).
Similar to the precept of Friday prayers, as Soroush explains, some brutal 
physical punishments, such as cutting the hand of the thief or stoning, that are 
mentioned in the Quran or in the sunna or in both, cannot be applied today ac­
cording to some Islamic jurists (foqaha) because their application depends on 
the having an Islamic state in the sense that the Prophet or an Imam is the head 
50  “…when the call is proclaimed to prayer on Friday, hasten earnestly to the Remembrance of 
Allah, and leave off business…” (Quran 62: 9)
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of the state, which is not observed today. Soroush emphasizes that this is not a 
reformist idea, but the division of rules into essential and non­essential is a gen­
eral principle held by the traditionalist jurists, who have their own arguments in 
differentiating essential and non­essential regulations. However, there is no com­
mon agreement on what is to be counted as essential among them (ibid.: 11–12).
Another consideration in fiqh, which implies the changeability or non­change­
ability of Islamic rules, is the idea of the ambiguous and the non­ambiguous. 
The verses of the Quran are classified into muhkamat (non­ambiguous) and mu-
tashabaht (ambiguous). Even the Quran itself mentions these two categories: 
He it is Who has sent down to thee the Book: In it are verses basic or fundamen-
tal [of established meaning]; they are the foundation of the Book: others are al-
legorical (3:7). Similar to essential and non­essential, there is consensus that 
ambiguity and non­ambiguity exist, but determining verses as ambiguous and 
non­ambiguous is again at the discretion of the commentators of the Quran. 
A third consideration is the metaphorical and literal expressions in the Qu­
ran. Since the Quran is quite poetic, as Soroush (2011) points out, some verses 
can be interpreted metaphorically or literally. There is not a fixed group of vers­
es that are to be interpreted either metaphorically or literally. This depends also 
on the commentators of the Quran.
Soroush argues that from an ontological perspective, there is nothing ambig­
uous or non­ambiguous per se, essential or non­essential, metaphorical or liter­
al, but rather the distinction is epistemological or hermeneutical. This means 
“the distinction is something that emerges in the process and in the context of 
interpretation” (Soroush 2011: 11–14) rather than something already given and 
revealed to the Prophet. Therefore, there are various ways of determining what 
is changeable and unchangeable for different people in different times through­
out the whole history of fiqh. Consequently, what is available for us is the inter­
pretation, not the text itself. Based on this argument, Soroush concludes that “Is­
lam is nothing but a series of interpretations of Islam” (ibid.).
The criteria for determining the changeable and unchangeable
In the reformist perspective, there are some criteria for distinguishing the change­
able from the unchangeable. Kadivar (2011b) highlights three characteristics of 
the Islamic precepts that are non­worship related in the age of revelation and be­
lieves these are necessary for Islamic rules in various times and spaces.
Every Islamic rule should be firstly, rational by the conventions of the time; 
secondly, just by the conventions of time; thirdly, must serve as the best solu­
tion for the interests of humans, compared with the precepts set by other reli­
gions and legal systems of the time. Therefore, Islamic rules cannot be unjust, 
violent, degrading and irrational, but rather they were formulated by the wise 
Lawgiver in accordance with the best interests of the worshippers. According­
ly, Islamic regulations in the Prophet’s time were based on collective reason, in­
cluding conventions of justice and fairness at that time. They were also superi­
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or to the existing laws and traditions of that community. Their validity remains 
as long as they maintain these criteria. Accordingly, some precepts are perma­
nently valid, for these are related to the quality which does not vary in different 
times and spaces, and some precepts, which mostly consist of commands and 
precepts mentioned in the Quran and Sunna – especially those related to social 
transactions – are conditional and temporary; thus, they are practical “only as 
long as the circumstances that make them in keeping with people’s best inter­
ests persist” (Kadivar 2011b: 66–68). 
In Kadivar’s opinion, the conflict between Islamic precepts and ideas that 
have resulted from the modern epoch such as human rights, women’s rights, re­
ligious minorities’ rights, and the indecency of violent physical punishment, do 
not originate from the permanent precepts, but are temporary rules which should 
change in order to meet the requirements of rationality, justice, and compatibil­
ity with existing conditions in the contemporary age. Though such precepts were 
mentioned in the Quran and revealed by the Lawgiver, “they did not rank among 
the Lawgiver’s permanent, unchanging laws” (ibid.: 72). For Kadivar, it is a de­
nial of God’s eloquent wisdom to say that God did not consider the implications 
of time and place when he revealed his word to the Prophet. That would mean 
abandoning people to their own devices. At that time, “there was great need for 
such precepts, in view of the limitations of collective rationality in the age of 
revelation. Despite his perfections, the Prophet would have been unable – with­
out the direct assistance of God – to solve the countless problems related to or­
ganizing religion and running society” (ibid.). Consequently, the best way was 
to formulate temporary precepts related to the best interest of the society during 
the time of revelation, along with the permanent precepts of Scripture and tra­
dition, as Kadivar argues. 
Similar to Kadivar, Eshkevari recognizes reason and justice as the most im­
portant factors for applying non­worship related Islamic rules. He argues, if Is­
lam is a rational religion, no rules in Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence will 
be against rationality and vice versa. There are no justifications to consider the 
Islamic rules, which were enacted in a specific place and time for a particular 
society, as perpetual and unchangeable (Yousefi Eshkevari 2010b: 13). For Es­
hkavari, justice is an important criterion for assessing Islamic rules. He believes 
that although the concept of justice is very common and has a general meaning 
understandable by all at all times and places, the recognition of the instances of 
justice is entirely a rational subject and is to be undertaken by people. Eshka­
vari believes that justice as a main principle in Islam is unchangeable within Is­
lam, while all rules bounded to social situation, time and place are subject to 
change. If every rule can be just and in the interest of human beings within a 
community at a specific time and can be unjust for others in a different time and 
place, it must therefore be changed (ibid.: 18–19).
Both Eshkevari and Kadivar identify ijtihad (the practice or the quality of ex­
tracting the Islamic rules and instructions from religious sources) as a means to 
distinguish precepts that are changeable in accordance with the demands of time 
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and place from the unchangeable and permanent precepts of the Islamic laws. 
In other words, ijtihad is the knowledge of extracting Islamic instructions from 
the main religious resources – the Quran and sunna (Prophet’s tradition). Ijti-
had is the personal interpretation of Mojtahed, a highly qualified Islamic jurist 
with a high level of religious knowledge, making him competent in interpreting 
the Islamic laws. He is allowed to issue fitva (a formal legal opinion to an Islam­
ic law) by ‘ijtihad’. This is a Mojtahed’s duty: to distinguish the changeable and 
unchangeable precepts based on the interest and ‘expediency’ (maslahat) of so­
ciety at the time (Yousefi Eshkevari 2010; Kadivar 2011b: 73).
The distinction between Accidentals and Essentials (intrinsic and contingent) (zati va arazi)
According to Soroush, the greatest part of the Islamic precepts, which is under­
stood as the entirety of Islam, is the accidental or contingent type and as such is 
not the main goal of the prophetic mission. The contingent aspects of religion 
are those that could have been different from what they are now, including lan­
guage, social and cultural contexts, and legal aspects (in Hunter 2009: 79).
Soroush’s theory explains that the sacred text has a natural and human side. 
What he considers as the accidental (arazi) part of the Quran is the reflection on 
the history and culture of Arabs. In his view, the sacred aspect and the main goal 
of the prophetic mission should not be defined based on its accidental aspects, 
but the sacred element. Therefore the main goal of the text is a message that, 
though presented in the sociocultural and historical contexts of a specific soci­
ety, is beyond those sociocultural and historic components. The historical and 
cultural elements of Arab society at that time do not reveal the sacred essence 
of the text (in Naraghi 2005). 
Soroush (2008) explains in an interview published in his website that revela­
tion is developed within societies; thereby it “adapts itself to the environment 
and takes on the color of the environment in every way” (Soroush 2008).  There­
fore, religion takes on the historical background and events that took place in 
Arab society at the time, as well as the language spoken in the society and even 
the legal aspects. Consequently, religion did not express disagreement with many 
concepts of Arab society at the time. “The new rulings barely amount to one per 
cent; ninety­nine percent consists of the rulings that were then current among 
Arabs” (ibid.). Therefore one of the main tasks of Islamic scholars should be to 
separate essential components of the religion from its other aspects.
In Soroush’s view, these are all contingent and accidental elements of reli­
gion and nothing becomes sacred just because of being historic or Arabic. As a 
result, some Islamic rules such as rulings on slaves or stoning existed in pre­Is­
lamic Arab society and continued to be the social regulation after Islam emerged. 
Soroush believes that understanding Islam in such a way that its ideal society is 
ancient Arab society is contradictory with the timeless and universal essence of 
Islam. It is not possible to consider modern society as an expansion of ancient 
society (Soroush 1388/2009a: 58–62).
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This distinction is discussed by other reformists as well. Eshkevari also sep­
arates Islam as faith (iman) from Islam as culture (farhang), and considers Is­
lam as faith as beyond time and space and Islam as culture as bound by time and 
space. He claims that the latter disguises the essential message of Islam towards 
justice and liberation by its ‘formalistic rituals and preexisting customs.’ (in 
Hunter 2009).Under the prevailing cultural historical dimension of Islam, it 
would be difficult to speak of gender equality or a democratic political system. 
In order to achieve an Islamic society compatible with modern concepts, a re­
formist interpretation of Islam, or in his words, ‘religious intellectualism’ (ro-
shanfekri-e dini) (ibid.) is required, focusing on Islam’s essential values, such 
as “justice and respect for human dignity, and utilizing a rationalist method of 
interpretation of sources” (ibid.: 75).
Traditional Islam vs  Islam as an End in Itself (Historical Islam vs  Spiritual Islam)
This line of reasoning is discussed in greater detail by Kadivar.51 He distinguish­
es traditional and historical Islam from spiritual Islam, or what he calls ‘Islam 
as an end in itself’. In his explanation of traditional Islam, the cultural, tempo­
ral and spatial circumstances of the Prophet’s epoch are recognized as Islam, 
and hence are sacred, inalterable and ideal forms of Islamic thought. In this per­
spective, the form and appearance of Islam at the time of revelation is consid­
ered as the ideal and genuine form of Islam. Therefore most of the efforts for re­
vival are towards the reconstruction of the conditions and exigencies of those 
early days. On the other hand, Islam as an end in itself, 
by passing over the temporal and spatial conditions of the age in which the religion arose, 
considers religiosity through the cognition and realization of the spirit of religion and the 
goals of Islam. Based on this view, theoretical and practical alignment with the aim and 
the purpose of the Revelation and the spirit of Islam, i.e., piety, is the criterion for being 
religious, and not the mere observance of the particular temporal and spatial superficial­
ities and forms of the Age of Revelation (Kadivar 2011a: 460).
In this perspective, religious scholars try to identify and abandon those com­
mandments which deal with temporal issues that no longer have relevance in 
achieving the major goals and timeless criteria of faith. 
51  Kadivar deals with this subject in his 2002 article: Az Isla¯m-i Ta’rı¯khı¯ bih Isla¯m-i Ma’nawı¯’ 
(From Historical Islam to Spiritual Islam), which was translated in English under title From 
Traditional Islam to Islam as an End in Itself in 2011 with his updated views. This research in­
troduces his concepts based on this English translation of the article with his last revisions. 
Kadivar, Mohsen 2011a. From Traditional Islam to Islam as an End in Itself. Die Welt des Is-
lams, International Journal for the Study of Modern Islam, 51, Brill, Liden, The Netherland, 
459–484, available at: http://en.kadivar.com/2011/12/11/from­traditional­islam­to­islam­as­an­
end­in­itself­2/ (26 June 2015).
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In this approach, as Kadivar elaborates, Islam is a faith which is eternal and 
beyond time and space and is based on “virtues, norms, and wise, just, and ra­
tional commandments” (ibid.: 478). In this sense, religion consists of “faith and 
belief, ethical and moral virtues, the commandments of the fiqh of ritual wor­
ship (fiqh-i‘iba¯dı¯) and some of the principles in the jurisprudence of human in­
teractions (fiqh al-mu’a¯mala¯t)” (ibid.). The main part of the jurisprudence of hu­
man interactions should be considered as an answer to the exigencies of time 
and place, such as all commandments regarding criminal law and the penal code, 
and civil law (including family rules and non­criminal personal law)’. For this 
reason, Islam ‘signed off’ on some pre­Islamic regulations as they existed, or 
only reformed a few aspects which are called verdicts of approval (ahka¯m-i 
ima¯’ı¯), versus verdicts of innovation (ta’sı¯sı¯)”, for they were in accordance with 
the justice and human communities’ worldly interests in that time (ibid.: 479). 
The criteria for the legitimacy and persistence of fiqh regarding human inter­
action (mu’a¯mala¯t) is, according to Kadivar, not violating justice and not vio­
lating the way of reasonable people (sı¯ra-yi ‘uqala¯’). Kadivar explains that jus­
tice returns to the criterion of reason, and is provided by reasonable people, but 
its importance has resulted in its emphasis and even preeminence over the oth­
er criteria in this debate.
Based on these arguments, Kadivar resolves that in this view of Islam, prac­
tical commandments and forms are not superior to religion’s goals, but rather 
they are only means to provide a way to achieve ‘Faith’s lofty goals.’ Hence they 
are legitimate as long as they are in the service of attaining these goals (ibid.: 
480). Any commandment which is opposite to the criteria of justice and the way 
of reasonable people in this time “will be ipso facto outside the circle of religi­
osity and it will be discovered that it is among the temporary and non­perma­
nent commandments of religion” (ibid.: 483). The remarkable point here is that 
such commandments are not replaced with another religious commandment, but 
they are substituted with ‘reasonable laws’ which are posited by public wisdom, 
because “legislation is restricted to God and the Prophet alone and, in fact, we 
have absolutely no record in preserved tablet (lawh-i vaqi’) to indicate the ex­
istence of any other commandments in the sharı¯‘a to be elucidated” (ibid.: 481; 
483). Consequently, it is not only the jurists who are responsible for assessing 
the agreement of religious commandments with the criteria of justice and the 
way of reasonable people, but also the mainstream scholars of religion and Is­
lamologists who have a “profound comprehension of religion and religious texts” 
as well as “a practical knowledge of the exigencies of the times, the way of rea­
sonable people and the criteria of justice” (ibid.: 482). 
As a result, in this perspective, the scope of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) is 
gradually diminishing and “it was gradually becoming more evident that some 
of the commandments of the sharı¯’a were not permanent and are therefore cat­
egorized as variable commandments which are disfavored at the present time, 
by grace of religion’s vast dimensions, the pious found the opportunity to deep­
en faith and promote a vaster wisdom” (ibid.: 481).
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Religion vs  Religious Knowledge (Theory of the Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge)
The theory of the Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge, devel­
oped by Soroush between 1988 and 1990, distinguishes religion from the un­
derstanding of religion in an epistemological view and characterizes religion as 
flawless, sacred and heavenly, constant, complete, eternal, immutable, and free 
from cultural specificities and unblemished by the artifacts of human minds; 
while the understanding of religion, as a human endeavor like any other type of 
human knowledge, is not sacred but earthly and human, flawed and in flux, rel­
ative, and time­bound (Soroush 1388/2009b: 486–488; Soroush 2002: 31). Rea­
son does not assist or supplement religion, but “it struggles to improve its own 
understanding of religion” (Soroush 2002: 31). Hence it is not possible to speak 
of the agreement or disagreement of reason and revelation, for they belong to 
different realms. Religion is God­sent and as such it is pure and absolute, though 
understanding and realizing it is a human endeavor and in this process of being 
understood by human beings, it loses its purity and absoluteness (Kamali 1995). 
This implies religious knowledge which makes religion – though created by 
God – entirely human and subject to all the dictates of human knowledge, in the 
same way that nature is create by God, while physics or mathematics are creat­
ed by humans. As a branch of human knowledge religious knowledge is incom­
plete, impure, insufficient, and culture­bound, and therefore “it is religious 
knowledge, not the scripture itself that takes the pigments and aroma of cultures, 
undergoes change, and needs purification” (Soroush 2002: 33). As a result, what 
must be altered in order to reconcile Islam with the circumstances of the mod­
ern world, is not religion, but religious knowledge, for it is religious knowledge 
and the human understanding of religion that may be either in accordance or in­
consistent with other parts of human knowledge. Therefore, what the revivalists 
do is replace one understanding of religion with another, while accepting the 
eternal nature of the Quran and the Tradition (Soroush 2002: 31–33; Jahanbakhsh 
2001: 147–148). 
Soroush emphasizes that the goal of this theory is not “to modernize religion, 
reinterpret or complement shari’a, relativize or deny the truth. Rather, the theo­
ry aims to make explicit the process through which religion is understood and 
the manner in which this understanding undergoes change” (Soroush 2002: 34). 
Understanding of religion is evolving and is in constant exchange with other 
branches of human knowledge. Since human knowledge will never reach its 
summit, religious knowledge will also be perennially subject to change. In oth­
er words, it is subject to ‘contraction and expansion,’ (Hunter 2009: 79) though 
religion will remain immutable. 
The remarkable point here is that religious knowledge should be under the 
light of modern concepts and consistent with the modern understanding of the 
world (Soroush 1386/2007: 349). Accordingly, religious knowledge should have 
three important axes in Soroush’s view. First, coordination and agreement with 
the sciences of the era; second, being influenced by and receiving support from 
modern science; third, being able to respond theoretically and practically to the 
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questions of its time (Soroush 1388/2009b: 247). These characteristics demon­
strate religious knowledge as a secondary knowledge which is directly under the 
influence of other branches of science and employs the findings of other fields 
of science in their analyses and studies. Hence, speaking of independent reli­
gious knowledge is not possible, because it is directly or indirectly dependent 
on a human understanding of the external world (ibid.: 156–160). Even natural 
sciences and religious knowledge are inter­dependent. It is not possible to have 
a completely different and independent understanding of humans, the universe 
oand nature in the natural sciences and in religious studies. Since human under­
standing of the world has fundamentally changed, it is absolutely necessary to 
change theological understanding. Soroush’s criticism of fundamentalists is that 
their understanding of religion is based on their traditional understanding of hu­
mans and society. However, this traditional understanding of the world has long 
been replaced by modern views (ibid.: 189).
Soroush goes beyond this and states that human knowledge is what provides 
the reasoning for acceptance of religion; therefore it has priority over religious 
knowledge. It is human knowledge that logically and practically identifies the 
geography of religious knowledge and its limits. If there is not any understand­
ing of the world, then there is no need to imagine the need for a prophet in it, 
and also if there is not any understanding of justice and injustice, then there is 
no way for us to tell whether a religion is just or unjust. Hence, philosophy, psy­
chology, sociology and human studies are all prior to religious knowledge. No 
religious knowledge can be developed without a previous world view and it will 
not remain constant if that prior view of the world shifts. Soroush concludes that 
even acceptance of religion, similar to understanding of religion, depends on 
non­religious foundations. Things like being just or being rooted in human soul 
or being able to guide humans to felicity, are the bases of accepting a religion 
by most believers. All of these bases have to be defined independently from re­
ligion (ibid.: 191; 248).
Approach to the Quran
In order to critique the Quran as a historical rather than a sacred text, one must 
trace the idea back to the Mu’tazili, when the Quran was not understood as the 
direct word of God. This controversial idea has been followed by some thinkers 
up to the present day, though it has been rejected by many reformists. 
Between 1997 and 1999, Soroush developed his theory of The Expansion of 
the Prophetic Experience which he considers as the companion volume of The 
Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge. In his first work, he deals 
with the evolution of religion, explaining that religious knowledge is distinct 
from religion itself, as well as providing a discussion on the interpretation of 
text. In the theory of the expansion of the prophetic experience he explains the 
historicity of the Prophet’s revelatory experience, and claims that the Quran is 
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not the unmediated word of God. This idea was also mentioned by Mohammad 
Mojtahed Shabestari in a series of articles titled Qera¯’at-e Nabavı¯ az Jaha¯n 
[Prophetic Reading of the World], where he talks about the Quran as a singular 
reading of the world by the Prophet – that is, a reading essentially established 
on, and rooted in the divine revelation (wahy), but not equivalent to it (Mojta­
hed Shabestari, quoted in Madaninejad 2011: 61).
In the theory outlined in The Expansion of Prophetic Experience, Soroush in­
vestigates “the actual process of revelation and the way in which the text, which 
we endeavor to interpret, emerged and materialized, because the way in which 
a text comes into being affects the meanings that we obtain from it” (Soroush 
2008). He argues that is because of the influence of our presuppositions in un­
derstanding a text. Hence, this theory deals with one of the most important pre­
suppositions in the interpretation of a text, i.e. the theory about the genesis of 
the text. Accordingly, Soroush explains “the relationship between the Prophet 
and the text that he produced; the text that we heard from him and now have as 
a keepsake” (Soroush 2008). This debate ultimately raises the question of: “what 
religious­devotional duty does this construal of the Koran – as a Prophet­pro­
duced text – lay before us?” (ibid.).
In an interview on his theory in 2007 published in his website, Soroush con­
siders revelation as ‘inspiration’. In a traditional perspective, revelation is dif­
ferentiated from inspiration; it is rather a message to convey to the people, passed 
to the Prophet from God by Gabriel. In this approach, the Prophet is considered 
as just a passive instrument and is irrelevant both in the content and the rendi­
tion of revelation. By contrast, Soroush emphasizes a pivotal role for the Proph­
et in the production of the Quran. He analogizes revelation to poetry as a means 
of knowledge in understanding the process of revelation: “the poet feels that he 
is informed by a source external to him; that he receives something” (Soroush 
2007). The Prophet also had a similar feeling: “that he is captured by an exter­
nal force. But in fact – or better: at the same time – the Prophet himself is ev­
erything: the creator and the producer” (ibid.). That is, the Prophet may arrive 
at a discovery, under God’s supervision and guidance. That is, in Soroush’s view, 
the Prophet has ‘God’s endorsement’ (Soroush 2008).
To convey the discovery – the content of revelation – the Prophet applies his 
own language, images and knowledge; therefore, his personal history and per­
sonality have crucial importance in shaping the text. Accordingly, the content of 
the revelation is from God, while its rendition was influenced by the Prophet. In 
this way, the Prophet is also the creator of the revelation, as Soroush describes, 
and revelation has a human aspect. “A human view of the Koran makes it pos­
sible to distinguish between the essential and the accidental aspects of religion. 
Some parts of religion are historically and culturally determined and no longer 
relevant today” (Soroush 2007). This is in contrast to the traditional perspective, 
which recognizes the revelation as infallible. Today revelation is considered in­
fallible by many Islamic scholars, but “only in purely religious matters such as 
the attributes of God, life after death and the rules for worship” (ibid.). Some 
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parts of the scientific, historical and social matters that are mentioned in the Qu­
ran are regarded as inaccurate and may even be wrong. These kinds of errors in 
the Quran are usually justified by the argument that “the Prophet ‘descended’ to 
the level of knowledge of the people of his time and spoke to them in the lan­
guage of the time” (ibid.). Or, according to the traditionalist perspective, con­
temporary human understanding is insufficient to comprehend the truth in the 
words of the Quran. But from Soroush’s point of view, on the one hand the Proph­
et spoke in his own language and knowledge and only said what he believed. It 
does not seem that his knowledge about the universe and humanity was greater 
than other people in his era. On the other hand, such errors in the Quran are not 
beyond human understanding; rather they are mistakes which were made by the 
Prophet according to his understanding of the time. However this does not vio­
late his prophethood and does not deny the godliness of revelation, for he was 
a prophet and not a scientist or a historian (Soroush 2007). Soroush explains that 
the Prophet had a monotheistic experience which he expressed in a time­ and 
space­circumscribed language proper to people’s perception of his time. In his 
opinion, attributing the identity of the narrator to God is allegorical, since nar­
rating is a human concept, and this was done to make revelation apprehensible 
for human perception. Soroush considers the Prophet in the process of revela­
tion as someone who is prepared by God to be active and creative rather than a 
passive individual who just receives God’s message. In fact, the Prophet is the 
speaker because God wants it so. Therefore, the Prophet speaks and what he says 
is attributed to God figuratively, and hence the Quran is the Prophet’s words as 
well as God’s words. So, God speaks through the Prophet’s language. Soroush 
explains that the language of every nation is related to their requirements; hence, 
it is obvious that the Arabic language during the Prophet’s time was not able to 
express some philosophical ideas. The Quran was written in this context, shaped 
in the framework of the Prophet’s experience. Though, according to Islamic mys­
tics, as Soroush says, no language framework sufficiently expresses all concepts 
of the Quran.52 As a result, Muhammad’s discovery of God‘s perfect message 
is framed by cultural features and limited knowledge in the Prophet’s epoch and 
it was not beyond time and place, because the Prophet himself was not beyond 
time and place. In this way, Muslims should identify and translate the essential 
message of the Quran over time (Soroush 2007). 
Accordingly, Soroush tries to elaborate a natural phenomenon even in the 
deepest layers of religion; i.e. the Prophet’s experience of revelation, which is 
intensely impacted by the Prophet’s personality. Hence, revelation in its prog­
ress and completion has a deep and strong natural and human face. At the same 
time, while accepting these human aspects of the revelation experience, he cau­
tiously tries to avoid converting the revelation into a completely human and con­
ventional one. From his point of view, accepting the conventional aspect of rev­
52 Personal communication 2011.
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elation is not in any way the same as denying its sacred essence (Arash Naraghi 
2005).
Like Soroush, Kadivar believes that the Quran must be read historically. The 
sacredness of God’s word is not in question, for the Quran introduced and de­
fined itself as God’s word. Nonetheless, he maintains that the Quran, on the one 
hand, is inviolable, containing necessary and timeless wisdom, and on the oth­
er, it includes verses that are no longer relevant and need to be abandoned when 
practicing contemporary exegesis (Madaninezhad 2011: 10; 54–55).
Soroush’s opinion has been criticized by other reformist representatives, who 
argue that some thinkers do not recognize the Quran as God’s immediate words; 
they rather see it as the Prophet’s monotheistic experience. As such, he attributes 
the questionable issues mentioned in the Quran to the Prophet as a human be­
ing with a knowledge that is limited to the time and space of his life. A repre­
sentative (Interview D March 2011) claims that if a sentence is wrong, it does 
not make any difference if the sentence is from God or from the Prophet because 
it is not acceptable to follow a Prophet who utters a wrong sentence. Therefore, 
recognizing the Quran as the Prophet’s words is not the resolution for Muslims’ 
issues in the modern epoch. In his point of view, the Quran is the direct word 
from God, since it introduced itself as God’s word. On the other hand, the Qu­
ran is the prophecy credential, which means that the prophecy of Muhammad is 
admissible because of the fact that the Quran is understood as a miracle of the 
Prophet and not vice versa. This recognizes the Quran as the Prophet’s reading 
based on a prophet­centric interpretation, which emphasizes the role of the 
Prophet more than the Quran. 
Therefore in his (Interview D March 2011) point of view, the Quran is the di­
rect word of God even though its language is of the Prophet’s time and space. It 
does not imply any wrongness in the realm of divinity or prophecy, and the Qu­
ran still contains its universal and essential values beyond time and space. There 
are also some verses that only refer to the time or context of when it was re­
vealed to the Prophet. He (Interview D March 2011) also notes that there are 
some verses in the Quran that are abrogated by other verses. Such abrogated 
verses have been revealed to the Prophet by God, and will forever be a part of 
the Quran. It implies that there are temporary and conditional precepts in the 
Quran, which reached the end of their time with the revelation of the succeed­
ing verses. He explains that considering all precepts as eternal is inconsistent 
with the concept of abrogation. It should also be noted that many verses in the 
Quran refer to the afterlife, God and God’s characteristics, and other subjects 
which are to be understood only in religion as no other knowledge is able to dis­
cuss such themes. The Quran therefore is not a book of laws, but a book of guid­
ance and morality and therefore a book for all times and spaces.
In the second representative’s opinion (Interview E February 2011), it is not 
necessary to deny the Quran as revelation and to consider it simply as the Proph­
et’s experience in order to justify changing some precepts. He explains that such 
an interpretation tries to attribute the miscues in some verses to the Prophet’s 
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knowledge limited to his time, not to God. He rejects this argument saying that 
what the Prophet said was approved by God. He believes that attributing the mis­
cues to the Prophet and not to God still implies an incompetency of God’s knowl­
edge. Therefore, he reasons that it is contrary to what is written in the Quran that 
says the Quran is God’s word. It is also contrary to the way the Prophet intro­
duced the Quran. Ultimately he claims that following this argument may pro­
vide new interpretations of God, or of revelation which could be totally differ­
ent from prophecy and Islam. Though he emphasizes that he is still open to new 
arguments, he finds the traditional perspective on the Quran as God’s word re­
vealed to the Prophet more logical. 
7 2 Reformists and Global Norms of Justice and Human Dignity
UDHR in the reformist perspective
The reformist view recognizes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a 
practical framework for the abstract idea of justice, whose fulfillment in society 
is the aim and basis of religion. Since in this perspective being just is consid­
ered as the necessary perquisite for the acceptance of religion, if an understand­
ing of religion is in contradiction with the UDHR, its correctness and accept­
ability should be considered suspicious. However, there are some conflicts 
between parts of the UDHR and Islamic values in a traditional understanding. 
Soroush, in clarifying this tension, distinguishes between the ‘paradigm of duty/
obligation’ and the ‘paradigm of right’ (Soroush, 1381/2002: 53–54; Soroush 
2002: 62). The language of religion differs from the language of science and 
philosophy in that, in the language of religion, “human beings are not the focal 
point of the discussion, the focal point is God, and the Shari’a revolves around 
the axis of religion and divine duties” (Kadivar 2011b: 49). Hence, all duties 
and commandments given by a supremely sovereign authority make a human 
being a ‘duty­bound creature’ only, whose main concern consists of identifying 
and respecting his obligations, which are known as Shari’a precepts, in order to 
“avoid God’s wrath and punishment and enjoy worldly happiness and eternal 
salvation” (Naraghi 2007: 148).
In the modern era, rights replaced obligations and duties, even in the sphere 
of religion. In this respect, human beings have the right (not a duty) to have and 
also to choose a religion, while in the paradigm of duty, human beings are ob­
ligated to be religious. In this view “the society is seen as a temple whose pur­
pose is to please its creator” (Soroush 2002: 63). By contrast, the “viewpoint of 
rights envisions society as a marketplace where the aim is satisfying the mem­
bers. The former pursues the satisfaction of the creator, the later that of the peo­
ple” (Soroush 2002: 64). Accordingly, the discourse mentioned in the Quran in 
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comparison with the modern discourse belongs to the language of duties rather 
than the language of rights, though this is not to say that the language of reli­
gion or the Quran deny the rights of humans. But they have focused on duties 
rather than rights and considered human beings as duty­bearers rather than 
rights­holders (Soroush 1386/2007: 365–366).
Therefore, traditional and fundamentalist interpretations of Islam are based 
on an epistemic configuration which is different from, and even contrary to the 
epistemic constellation and philosophical presupposition of ‘human rights’, and 
it is impossible to identify the current concept of human rights in this kind of 
understanding of religion (Kadivar 2011b: 48; Soroush 1386/2007: 380).
Kadivar also illustrates the conflict between traditional and historical Islam 
and human rights norms in six instances: “(1) inequality between Muslims and 
non­Muslims, (2) inequality between men and women, (3) inequality between 
slaves and free human beings, (4) inequality between commoners and jurists in 
public affairs, (5) freedom of conscience and religion versus punishments for 
apostasy, and (6) extra­judicial punishments, violent punishments, and torture” 
(Kadivar 2011b: 47). He argues that the issue of such tensions is not minor and 
superficial, and is deeper than simply being the different opinions of various ex­
perts on Islamic law. According to traditional Islam, the verses and narratives 
are the basis for unchanging and absolute precepts beyond time and space which 
are never abrogated. Regarding the argument that God is just and wise, every 
single Shari’a precept is seen as indubitably just and wise. As a result, such in­
equalities are legitimate in traditional Islam. Therefore these conflicts need to 
be debated more and situated in the conventions of the era of revelation (Kadi­
var 1386/2007: 114–115; 2011b: 57).
For a better understanding of the fundaments of such conflicts, Kadivar dis­
tinguishes ‘true human rights’ from the internationally accepted notion of ‘hu­
man rights’, and argues that 
True human rights are a part of the intrinsic interests that have been fully taken into ac­
count by All Knowing God in the formulation of Shari’a precepts. These rights are un­
changing; they do not vary over time, in the different stages of the advancing life of hu­
manity and in different locations. The creator of these rights is the Creator of human 
beings. Performing one’s duties and Shari’a precepts is the surest way of abiding by hu­
man beings’ true rights (Kadivar 2011b: 49).
Accordingly, the best way to identify true human rights is to study the text and 
the narratives. However, reason, as a source of discovering the Shari’a precepts 
from a shi’i 53perspective, “can take us from one Shari’a precept to a second 
Shari’a precept that is a corollary of the first precept. This kind of proof is known 
53  Shi‘a is a branch of Islam which holds Ali ibn Abi Talib as Prophet’s successor, while Sunni 
Muslims believe that Muhammad did not appoint a successor and consider Abu Bakr as first 
Caliph who was appointed  through community consensus (Shura) (Oloruntele 2016).
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as non­self­justifying reasoning and it is incontestably accepted” (ibid.: 50). 
Therefore, the main sources of discovering Shari’a precepts are narrated proof 
and reasoned proof, though that must be non­self­justifying reasoning. 
In order to clarify the relationship between Islam and human rights, it is es­
sential to investigate the authority of human reason in discovering human be­
ings’ true rights without the assistance of the Shari’a, revelation and narration. 
In traditional Islam, human reason is recognized as incompetent to under­
stand true human rights. This idea of the “innate incapacity and congenital fault­
iness of the human mind” (ibid.: 50) is not limited to the act of assessing harms 
and benefits in human life, but also considers that the human mind and reason 
is restricted and incomplete in defining what does or does not constitute jus­
tice. Thus, in traditional or historical Islam, the source of defining human rights 
and justice are confined to the narrations of scripture and the sunna which are 
stipulated in the immutable Shari’a precepts. Consequently, inequality based 
on religion, creed, gender, slavery, or being an Islamic jurist (faqı¯h) is accept­
ed. However, from the traditional perspective, these inequalities are not consid­
ered as any form of discrimination; but rather, “they are the very essence of jus­
tice” (ibid.: 50).
Therefore, the Shari’a precepts are superior to human laws, including the 
conventions on human rights which are based on fallible and limited human rea­
son and are consequently not acceptable. This is because conventions such as 
the UDHR are based on a thought system which recognizes the relative capabil­
ity of human reason to identify and assess harms and benefits, as well as human 
needs. ‘Self­justifying critical reason’, as an outcome of modernity plays an es­
sential role in defining human rights. Therefore, all conventions on human rights 
are products of the‘collective reason of contemporary human beings. Similarly, 
this thought system upholds the capability of human reason to define the crite­
ria of justice; hence, the justice or injustice of human relations and laws can be 
assessed by collective human reason. Concisely, traditional Islam is based on 
narrated account and the human rights system relies on reason; therefore, the 
tension can be regarded “as a conflict of narrated words versus reason (naql wa 
‘aql)” (ibid.: 52–53).
In the reformist interpretation of Islam presented by Kadivar, which he calls 
intellectual Islam or Islamic modernism in his article on human rights, believ­
ing in the eternal message of God’s revelation emphasizes that the sacred mes­
sage is riddled with the customs and conventions of the revelation’s era. There­
fore, the conflicts between historical Islam and modern concepts such as human 
rights originate from time­bound customs, which demonstrates itself in the fiqh 
of social transactions. Therefore, in this modernist Islam, the main attention is 
on faith, morality and worship rather than the fiqh of social transactions. The ad­
vocators of intellectual Islam believe in a traditional Islam, but they claim that 
the part of the fiqh of social transactions has become the main part of Islam and 
overshadowed the realms of faith, morality and worship. They do not deny the 
need for Islamic jurisprudence, though their view on this is critical in that they 
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underline how the precepts of this realm must be assessed through the three cri­
teria of justice, rationality and the ability to fulfill the species’ interests by the 
conventions of the time. Hence, in the case of conflict between a narrated proof 
and a rational proof, it is the task of rationality to reassess the narrative, i.e. the 
rational proof is preferential over the narrated proof. As a result, the new fiqh of 
social transactions, or in other words the jurisprudence of human interactions 
downsizes in this perspective (ibid.). 
The concept of considering the rational proof as a yardstick for narrated proof 
is not new, but has been presented by Islamic Mu’tazili and Shi’i scholars, who 
believe that God must act justly, as Kadivar explains. From their point of view, 
“narration­based Shari’a precepts can be abrogated by the rulings of definite rea­
son” (ibid.: 65). Kadivar notes that “the position of Islamic experts who view 
reason as one of the four legitimate proofs in connection with the Shari’a effec­
tively means that a narration­based Shari’a precept can be abrogated by a rea­
son­based Shari’a precept” (ibid.: 65–69).
In addressing the issue of conflicts between traditional Islam and human 
rights, since the characteristics of human rights as given in the UDHR and ap­
plicable to all six areas as identified by Kadivar (see above) are more rational, 
just and preferable, in comparison to traditional fiqh, the precepts of historical 
Islam on these issues are not acceptable and must be abrogated. It is clear that 
“equal rights for all and the rejection of discrimination on the basis of religion, 
gender, slavery and religious expertise, as well as on freedom of religion and 
thought and the rejection of extrajudicial and violent punishments and torture” 
(Kadivar 2011b: 70) are more in accordance with justice, rationality and the ex­
igencies of the modern era.
Kadivar elaborates on the process of evaluating compatibility of precepts of 
fiqh to the notion of human rights. He distinguishes two sets of perspectives in 
the Quran and sunna. The first view is compatible with human rights and con­
sists of the propositions that are consistent with the notion of human rights, as 
well as the propositions that explicitly acknowledge human rights for human be­
ings only because of being human. In such cases, “the narration­based proofs 
are fortified with reason­based proofs” (ibid.).
Kadivar explains that the second set of narrations is irreconcilable with hu­
man rights, including propositions and textual support that are in conflict with 
human rights, such as: defining unequal rights based on religion, gender, reli­
gious knowledge; the legitimization of slavery and unequal right for slaves; le­
gitimation and support for violent and degrading punishment; and the rejection 
of freedom of religion. For such narrations, reason­based proofs are applied as 
criteria for assessing the applicability of the precepts in the current era. More 
precisely, in Kadivar’s words, “the argument of reason, corroborated by the nar­
ration­based proofs of the first set, abrogates the narration­based proofs of the 
second set, which conflict with human rights, and reports that their terms have 
expired. With the expiry and abrogation of the conflicting proofs, the conflict it­
self is fundamentally resolved” (ibid.: 71). 
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Accordingly, the UDHR is acknowledged by reformists as an international 
legal set of criteria to protect human dignity, though they believe it is not com­
plete and perfect, but rather needs improvement. They also recognize that some 
paragraphs are contrary to the traditional fiqh; but in their points of view such 
conflicts are with the non­essential and temporary precepts, which must be al­
tered in order to fulfill egalitarian justice (Interview D March 2011; Interview 
E Feruary 2011; Interview F May 2011).
The first reformist representative (Interview D March 2011) Criticizing the 
UDHR, refers to the Universal Declaration of Duties and Responsibilities, which 
does not refer to religious duties at all; however, he posits that the Universal Dec­
laration of Duties and Responsibilities refers to inter­human duties, placing them 
before duties towards God, nature, the environment, and the observance of pub­
lic morals. He explains that there is nothing in the UDHR that prohibits insulting 
prophets or hate speech against religious beliefs. Nor does it restrict the absolute 
freedom to nudity which he believes violates the basis of family. In this sense 
therefore, while he believes that human rights are just, moral and rational, he also 
believes that they are not perfect and are not immune to mistakes. He believes that 
rights need to be understood from a critical perspective, so that they can be en­
hanced to accommodate certain nuances. Moreover, he also explains that although 
the UDHR is a product of the West, it is an intellectual product of collective rea­
soning, evolved in the course of time which could be considered applicable to all 
human societies. He cites six contradictory ideas between traditional Islam and 
the UDHR: gender discrimination, slavery, clergy discrimination, freedom of re­
ligion and belief, religious discrimination and punishment of execution for apos­
tasy, and the violent penal system. He claims that the UDHR is closer to the true 
essence of Islam than is believing in and justifying these realms of discrimination. 
In this regard, the second representative (Interview E February 2011) recog­
nizes the UDHR in its current form is a universal, practical set of criteria for 
supporting individual rights which are not based on a certain religion or culture. 
He considers the UDHR as a result of human efforts throughout history to pre­
vent wars and discrimination. Therefore, the realization of the UDHR at the in­
ternational level, as an international law – despite its imperfection – would be 
an important step towards creating peace and equality. However, some of its ar­
ticles are contrary to traditional fiqh, even with the acknowledgment that these 
precepts of fiqh are changeable. 
In the third representative’s point of view (Interview F May 2011), the UDHR 
in its current form is an adequate framework to protect human rights and could 
be a foundation for all constitutions. He explains that today, the philosophical 
principles of human rights are less discussed, since they seem to be perfect, 
though in Soroush’s view they need still to be challenged. He (Interview F) rec­
ognizes all paragraphs of the UDHR, in so far as they protect and uphold human 
dignity. However he emphasizes a religious interpretation of human dignity; that 
is, a dignity derived from the thesis that humans are a part of God, and there­
fore, human beings are honorable. 
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CEDAW in the reformist perspective
Since the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) is recognized by reformists as an effort to eliminate discrim­
ination against women in fulfillment of justice, it is necessary that it be enforced 
in society. Similar to the UDHR, they have some critiques on CEDAW, though 
these vary depending on their view on physiological differences between men 
and women. 
The first representative (Interview D March 2011) considers the CEDAW as 
a general document that prescribes gender equality in all affairs, regardless of 
physical and biological differences between men and women. In explaining his 
point, he draws an example from sports, saying that rules will always be differ­
ent between sports played by women and those that are played by men, and these 
differences have never been thought of as inequality; variations in the rules are 
because of physical differences. Similarly, he reasons that labor and employ­
ment rules must be different between men and women. For example, women 
should work fewer hours than men precisely because of their physical differenc­
es, rather than justifying it based on women’s lesser intellectual capacity. Nev­
ertheless, he points out that CEDAW is very abstract and does not put much em­
phasis on physical differences. He also challenges provisions in CEDAW on 
co­education, saying that in practice, the better and more expensive colleges, for 
example in the USA, are single­sex colleges. He also says that since he is against 
discrimination he supports CEDAW, as it contains some positive rights such as 
equal rights to marriage, divorce and guardianship of children. 
The second representative (Interview E February 2011) says that, similar to 
the UDHR, CEDAW contains some articles which are incompatible with tradi­
tional fiqh. Since CEDAW, in his point of view, aims to eliminate inequalities 
against women, it would be closer to the essential aim of religion – the fulfil­
ment of justice in today’s world. Since Islam is based on the essential equality 
between human beings, all conventions that aim to respect to human dignity is 
compatible with Islam and should be enforced in Islamic society. 
Similarly, the third representative (Interview F May 2011) recognizes CE­
DAW, and emphasizes the elimination of all forms of discrimination, whether 
to women, children or those with other religions. In his view, discriminatory cas­
es should be deliberated to figure out the basis of the discrimination. He distin­
guishes discrimination from difference and says discrimination refers to a situ­
ation in which two persons deserve to have equal rights but one of them is 
deprived of such rights because of unsubstantial reasons. He recognizes discrim­
ination against women for historical, economic and subsistence reasons, which 
are rooted in old myths and inaccurate and incomplete insights which should be 
acknowledged and destroyed. He believes that CEDAW is an effort in this di­
rection.
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7 3 Women’s Rights in the Reformist Perspective
Reformists distinguish the essential precepts from non­essential creeds in Islam 
and attribute most of women’s rights to the second category, which means such 
precepts must be changed based on justice and collective reasoning. But reform­
ists vary in determining the boundaries of the essential precepts on women’s 
rights. They also differ from each other in their arguments and justifications for 
women’s rights, which does not make it possible to arrive at a specific and stip­
ulated reformist perspective on women’s rights.
Women’s rights in Shari’a
Kadivar (2013) applies the argument for assessing the Shari’a precepts related 
to women’s rights according to the three criteria of being just, rational and su­
perior to other methods. In this manner, he recognizes two categories of narra­
tions in the Quran and sunna about women’s rights. The first group is composed 
of narrated­proofs, which refer to equality between men and women, granting 
them the same rights without any legal difference; while the second category 
suggests the superiority of men over women, and thus defines more rights for 
men, though also making them responsible for the protection of women. 
Kadivar (2013)also posits that the verses indicating equality fall into five 
groups. The first group of verses implies equality in creation, which consists of 
all verses that maintain that man and woman have the same essence, and that 
there is a non­gender­based supremacy in creation – for example: O mankind, 
indeed we have created you from male and female and made you peoples and 
tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight 
of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted 
(Quran 49:13), and O mankind, fear your Lord, who created you from one soul 
and created from it its mate and dispersed from both of them many men and 
women. And fear Allah, through whom you ask one another, and the wombs. In-
deed Allah is ever, over you, an Observer (Quran 4:1). 
The second group refers to verses on equality in which gender does not in­
fluence salvation and the way that God treats men and women, such as Whoev-
er does righteousness, whether male or female, while he is a believer – We will 
surely cause him to live a good life, and We will surely give them their reward 
[in the Hereafter] according to the best of what they used to do (Quran 16:97). 
Another example can be seen in: 
Indeed, the Muslim men and Muslim women, the believing men and believing women, 
the obedient men and obedient women, the truthful men and truthful women, the patient 
men and patient women, the humble men and humble women, the charitable men and 
charitable women, the fasting men and fasting women, the men who guard their private 
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parts and the women who do so, and the men who remember Allah often and the women 
who do so – for them Allah has prepared forgiveness and a great reward” (Quran 33:35).
The third group of verses refers to the responsibility of men and women to pro­
tect each other (9:71): The believing men and believing women are allies (pro-
tectors) of one another. They enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and 
establish prayer and give zakah [regular charity] and obey Allah and His Mes-
senger. Those – Allah will have mercy upon them.
The forth group deals with the verses related to equal rewards and punish­
ments in this world and hereafter mentioned in the Quran (48:5, 6, 25; and 57:12–
13; also 5:38 and 24: 2, 26, 31).
The final group focuses on equality in married life, such as: they are your 
garments and you are their garments (Quran 2:187), which also evinces equal 
shares for spouses in their shared life, and And of His signs is that He created 
for you from yourselves mates that you may find tranquility in them; and He 
placed between you affection and mercy. Indeed in that are signs for a people 
who give thought (Quran 30:21). Kadivar emphasizes the source of tranquility, 
love and mercy as a logical foundation of family (Kadivar 2013: 214–216). This 
point is also emphasized by Muhammad Abduh, who distinguishes the image of 
women and women’s rights in the Quran from what fiqh presented. For exam­
ple, despite how such love and mercy was avowed between men and women in 
this verse, the jurist definition of marriage considers marriage as “a contract that 
renders the female vagina the property of a male” (Abu Zayd 2013: 153.. There­
fore, he emphasizes the responsibility of fiqh for downgrading women’s status 
from the high level it has in the Quran (ibid: 154). 
Regarding the first category of narrated proofs for gender equality, Kadivar 
does not refer to any narrations from the sunna and restricted his five types of 
verses indicating gender equality to the Quran. 
Narrated (textual) proofs for the superiority of men over women 
Kadivar (2013) refers to four main verses from the Quran and two hadiths men­
tioned by the Prophet and Ali54 that are inconsistent with equality and which up­
hold men’s superiority over women. These are as follows:
“Divorced women remain in waiting for three periods, and it is not lawful for 
them to conceal what Allah has created in their wombs if they believe in Allah 
and the Last Day. And their husbands have more right to take them back in this 
[period] if they want reconciliation. And due to the wives is similar to what is 
expected of them, according to what is reasonable. But the men have a degree 
54  Ali ibn Abi Talib (598–661) was the cousin and the son­in­law of the Prophet Muhammad. He 
was the fourth caliph from 656 to 661, but the Shi’a Muslims consider him as the rightful im­
mediate successor to Prophet (New World Encyclopedia).
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over them [in responsibility and authority]. And Allah is Exalted in Might and 
Wise” (Quran 2:228).
“And do not wish for that by which Allah has made some of you exceed oth­
ers. For men is a share of what they have earned and for women is a share of 
what they have earned. And ask Allah of his bounty. Indeed Allah is ever, of all 
things, knowing” (Quran 4:32).
“Men are in charge of women (the protectors and maintainers of women) by 
[right of] what Allah has given one over the other and what they spend [for main­
tenance] from their wealth. So righteous women are devoutly obedient, guard­
ing in [the husband’s] absence what Allah would have them guard. But those 
[wives] from whom you fear arrogance – [first] advise them; [then if they per­
sist], forsake them in bed; and [finally], strike them. But if they obey you [once 
more], seek no means against them. Indeed, Allah is ever Exalted and Grand” 
(Quran 4:34).
“Is then one brought up among trinkets, and unable to give a clear account in 
a dispute (to be associated with Allah)?” (Quran 43:18). 
The two hadiths to which Kadivar refers are:
1. From the Prophet Muhammad as mentioned in the Bukhari collection55: 
…the prophet said: people who entrust their affairs to women will never know prosper-
ity and find salvation.
2. Attributed to Imam Ali in Nahj al-Balagha after the Battle of the Camel:
O people, women are inferior to men in faith, in wealth and in reason. The Proof of their 
deficiency in faith is that they do not pray or fast during their menses, the proof of their 
deficiency in reason is that the testimony of two of them equals that of one man, and the 
proof of their deficiency in wealth is that their share in inheritance is half of that of men. 
So keep away from bad women and be careful with the good ones, and do not give in to 
them when they are good, so that they do not expect you to obey them when they are bad 
(Kadivar 2013: 217–218).
These narrated (textual) proofs have provided the argument for desert­based jus­
tice applied by Islamic fundamentalist and traditionalist view to justify unequal 
rights and discriminations against women. In order to assess these narrated (tex­
tual) proofs, Kadivar (2013) refers to the foundations of the rational perspective 
of Islam mentioned by the Shi’a and the Mu’tazili (People of Justice) which shall 
be explicated in the following. 
55  Sahih al­Bukhari is one of the most trusted collections of hadith among Sunni Muslims collect­
ed by the Muslim scholar Muhammad al­Bukhari. It was completed around 846/232 AH (Koe­
nig and Al Shohaib 2014).
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Rational arguments for gender equality 
According to the rationalist perspective in Islam, one claimed by both the Shi’a 
and the Mu’tazili, “certain acts are either good or evil inherently, that is to say, 
without a ruling from lawgiver” (Kadivar 2013: 217). They also recognize the 
capacity for reason, independent of revelation, to decide whether such acts are 
good or evil.
Kadivar considers rulings related to women’s rights to be part of the realm of 
reason. It means that “when we are absolutely sure that the Lawgiver has not 
forbidden it, our rational ruling can be counted as a Shi’a ruling” (ibid.: 217). 
Legal justice concerning men and women is a good thing according to reason­
able people and practical reason. Legal justice as an outcome of rational facul­
ty benefits the public, which is of interest to the whole human species and is nec­
essary for the maintenance of order in human society. Similarly, legal 
discrimination and injustice causes harm and corruption, and therefore is con­
demned by reasonable people as unwholesome and evil. Consequently, legal jus­
tice is sought by reasonable people in order to gain beneficial influence and to 
reject harmful consequences in human society. This is correlated with the Shari’a 
rulings and with God, “because it is a basic principle of the ‘People of Justice’ 
that the Lawgiver is reasonable and in fact, is the head of all reasonable people” 
(Kadivar 2013: 217).
Accordingly, desert­based justice, once legitimate and acceptable, can no lon­
ger be of interest to human society; rather it is egalitarian justice which is more 
compliant with the spirit of the Quran and the essential message of Islam. The 
basis of defining rights for humans has changed – from being entitled by virtue 
of membership to social categories such as females, slaves or blacks, to the ac­
ceptance of the principle that rights must be enjoyed simply by virtue of being 
human (Kadivar 2013). He emphasizes that what is important in defining rights 
is the humanity in both the human spirit and in nature, which is the basis for dig­
nity and respect for all human beings regardless of gender, race, color, religion, 
political ideology, social status or any other attributes. Therefore, “humans have 
equal rights because they share this divine essence. Human dignity derives from 
this shared essence which is also the cause of equal rights. Human beings de­
serve the same rights because they share the same essence” (ibid.: 224). As a re­
sult, legal discrimination is in contradiction with human dignity. Furthermore, 
Kadivar points to the relationship between justice, dignity and the necessity of 
legal equality or, in other words, the correlation between dignity and egalitari­
an justice. In this way, dignity cannot be respected without justice in the form 
of legal equality for all human beings (ibid.: 225).
According to Kadivar, the rational arguments for justice fortify the textual ar­
guments and narration­based proofs for equal rights as the spirit of the Quran: 
“these two kinds of rational and textual arguments have restricted the textual ar­
guments for inequality in terms of their time frame. On the basis of these two 
types of textual and rational arguments as the contextual evidence, the textual 
arguments against equality are temporal rulings that become situational prem­
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ises whose validity has expired” (ibid.: 230). According to this argument, all 
Shari’a precepts related to unequal women’s status are debatable; and there is 
strong evidence that precepts such as “men’s privilege and qiwama [male guard­
ianship] over women, corporal punishment of a disobedient wife, permitting the 
marriage of an underage girl, men’s right to unilateral divorce, two women’s tes­
timony being equal to one man’s, a woman’s blood money being equal to half a 
man’s, a son’s inheritance being twice that of a daughter, men’s obligation to 
pay maintenance and dower” (ibid.: 227) are not eternal and fixed laws. For ex­
ample, jurists refer to the Quran 4:34 which says, “men are qawamun of wom­
en because God has favored the one more that the other, and because they sup­
port them,” to justify men’s control over women. The reformists reject two 
arguments mentioned in this justification: the first is that God has favored men 
more than women and the second, that men support women with their wealth. 
Neither of these two causes is valid today, as according to reasonable people the 
biological, physical and psychological differences between men and women can 
no longer serve as an indication of men’s superior rights. Rather, such privileg­
ing of men is just pure discrimination and injustice (ibid.). 
On the other hand, economic activities by both men and women in the fam­
ily and in society are recognized today as a normal phenomenon. Therefore, the 
second justification that men support women with their wealth is no long valid 
(ibid.: 227; Yousefi Eshkevari 2013: 203–204). The Quran verses in which God 
provides this justification give a ruling that is mutable and temporal. In this way, 
the first part of this controversial verse is debated by both Kadivar and Eshkev­
ari in rejecting arguments for the superiority of men over women, although the 
second part of the verse which suggests beating women “as the last solution for 
bringing a rebellious wife back to obedience’” (Abu Zayd 2013: 163) is not 
brought up in this debate.
Egalitarian justice and women’s rights in the family
Reformists, as in other streams of Islamic thought, regard justice as the main 
objective of religion, and thus every Shari’a commandment should be an inter­
pretation of what justice entails. Therefore all precepts in the realm of human 
interaction have to be based on the principle of justice. The family is one of the 
most important foundations of social and civic institutions, which should real­
ize a justice­based relation between members of the family and provide access 
to all human resources and rights. The necessity of debating and defining rela­
tions in the realm of family in the modern era is obvious, especially with regard 
to the essential role of family in Islam, as well as the considerable changes in 
the concept of family and the governing rules of its members over the course of 
time. 
In pre modern society, “family organization had a pyramid­like structure, with 
a man as the head; he had the authority over women and children. Family mem­
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bers were naturally assigned rights in accordance with the patriarchal ethos on 
which the social order was based” (Yousefi Eshkevari 2013: 195). But this pat­
tern of family cannot answer the current exigencies; therefore, Eshkevari sug­
gested a form of family as “a joint enterprise (mulk musha’) in which no one – 
husband, wife, children or others – is distinct from others in essence or natural 
rights” (ibid.). Rights are based on what is recognized as good practice in our 
time and according to collective human reasoning. It means these rights are based 
on local­ and time­bound definition of justice, which is an outcome of the best 
accepted practices of the time or the convention of the time (’urf al-zaman). The 
convention of time (’urf) “represents the sum collective knowledge and accu­
mulated experience of successive generations” and is recognized as a primary 
criterion for the understanding of justice in various eras (ibid.: 196). Therefore, 
there is not any eternal and fixed definition of justice, in spite of being one of 
the fundamental concepts in Islam, but rather it is according to the definition of 
reasonable people and based on conventions of the time. As a result, all Shari’a 
non­ worship commandments on women’s rights, which are related to social in­
teractions, cannot be eternal and immutable, but rather should be redefined based 
on the criteria of justice and collective human reasoning.
Approach to the legal instructions related to women’s rights
According to the first representative (Interview D March 2011), reformists 
should utilize the potential of Islamic traditional thought because most people 
in society follow traditional perspectives so as not to violate people’s religious 
sensitivity. A successful reformist effort to present an interpretation of Islam 
compatible with modern concepts like women’s rights must consider people’s 
religious sensitivity, as well as the fact that society is transitioning from tradi­
tional to modern. Thinkers should facilitate this transition by being conscious 
about traditional paradigms, while also taking small and easy steps in introduc­
ing alternatives. 
He (Interview D March 2011) explains that in the traditional perspective, 
there are some positive points for women’s rights that are ignored because of 
patriarchal thought; for instance, the economic independence of women which 
is clearly mentioned in the Quran. This precept is unchangeable and could be 
applied today to defend women’s right to employment, as well as to challenge 
the need for a woman to have her husband’s permission to work.
The interviewee D also says that according to traditional fiqh and perspec­
tives, a woman has the right to demand wages for everything she does in her 
husband’s house, such as cooking, washing, sewing, and even for nurturing the 
children. This wage is different from alimony which the husband is obliged to 
pay. He gives an example and says that the husband should pay his wife as much 
as he would pay a maidservant. However, this aspect of fiqh is currently ignored, 
especially regarding women’s financial rights in the case of divorce. Women usu­
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ally have no knowledge about their rights and Islamic jurists (foqaha) find it ad­
vantageous for men to maintain their silence on such positive rights for women 
in traditional fiqh. 
Another example is men’s unilateral right to divorce which he (Interview D 
March 2011) claims, is not mentioned in the Quran. Since man and woman have 
equal rights to get married, accordingly they should have equal rights to divorce. 
Another example is the appointment of women as judges which, he explains, 
pertains to equality between men and women in non­criminal laws. The argu­
ment about criminal cases has always been about women’s ability to make sound 
decisions. While there is no prohibition against the entry of women into the ju­
diciary, women generally do not choose this field. He explains that in many cas­
es the traditional fiqh has the capacity to reconcile with women’s rights. Only in 
the case that applying such women’s rights is unsuccessful using traditional fiqh 
would speaking of a new solution become necessary. Below is an explanation 
of his point of view (Interview D March 2011) on some Islamic laws related to 
women’s rights.
Polygamy: he recognizes monogamy as the desirable family system in Islam 
and polygamy is just for exceptional circumstances, which should be severely 
restricted. For instance, polygamy may be allowed during war when the popu­
lation of men becomes disproportionate with women; or in the case of a wom­
an’s reproductive disability, provided that the woman permits it. However, he 
rejects polyandry in the case of male reproductive disability saying that polyan­
dry is against human nature and is not allowed even in exceptional circumstanc­
es. He compares this to homosexuality, which is not permissible under any con­
dition. 
Temporary marriage: in his view, temporary marriage is an Islamic solution 
to organizing relationships before permanent marriage, in order to prevent ‘per­
verse’ and ‘swinger’ men. Today, however, many married men misuse tempo­
rary marriage to satisfy their sensuality which should be prevented through new 
regulation. 
Marital age: in his view,, marital age is related to time and geographical cir­
cumstances which should be determined by parliament in every country. He ex­
plains that sexual maturity must not be the only criterion for marriage, but equal­
ly important are social and economic maturity. Hence he rejects early marriage.
Custody: he says that in general, custody is accorded to the mother since chil­
dren, up to a certain age, need a mother’s care more than a father’s,.Athough he 
believes it would be better if the court decides according to the child’s interest, 
taking into consideration the ability of each parent to provide for the child’s 
needs. 
Divorce right: similarly, the family court should decide about divorce, and 
therefore, men and women have the equal right to divorce.
Head of family: he also rejects the notion that families must be headed by a 
male. He explains that managing a family is like managing a country; it should 
be democratic and take the voices of and consent of all parties into consideration.
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Woman’s obedience to husband: according to the interviewee, in traditional 
fiqh, women’s obedience is necessary in a sexual relationship; however, he also 
emphasizes the importance of consent from both parties to a sexual relationship. 
He recognizes the patriarchal ideologies of society in the past as the origin of 
this law, rather than religion.
The right of determining the place of domicile: he says that the woman has 
the right to determine the domicile in a marriage contract. If the woman did not 
claim this in the marriage contract, and if the husband is in charge of the fami­
ly, he has the right to determine the domicile; otherwise, if both wife and hus­
band are employed and there is the possibility of either one losing their job, the 
court should decide about this matter.
Father’s permission for marriage: in traditional fiqh, the father’s permission 
is necessary for the marriage of virgin women only. Since in the past women got 
married so early and without any education, they were not able to recognize their 
interest and needed their father’s permission. However, today women and men 
are both conscious, and therefore if the permission is necessary, it should be for 
both men and women. 
Women’s veiling: he raises some points on veiling. First, he is against com­
pulsory veiling, although regards veiling as required to some extent. Second, he 
distinguishes between veiling in religion and the law of veiling in a society. The 
law of veiling should be a result of the expert opinions of representatives, tak­
ing into account the culture and social circumstances, and must only be imposed 
with the consent of women. Therefore, it is changeable according to time and 
space. Third, he does not recognize equality in veiling for men and women, since 
in his view they are physically different. Women’s body veiling is a permanent 
law in fiqh, which is not changeable. He states that what is mentioned in the Qu­
ran refers to the need to cover the attractive parts of a woman’s body; therefore, 
a body’s veiling is more important than veiling the hair or the head. He believes 
that wearing a veil in the West is a matter of adornment, because in the Islamic 
perspective it symbolizes family honor, which must be maintained and preserved. 
Fourth, women’s veiling is recognized as the outward symbol of an Islamic so­
ciety. Fifth, he claims that the rate of conversion away from Islam is higher 
among women than in other religions. One reason for this could be the empha­
sis on women’s veiling and chastity as well as women’s rights in the family in 
Islam.
Stoning: he rejects this form of punishment, though he urges hard punish­
ment in accordance to the norms of the time for adultery, since adultery destroys 
the foundations of family and is not a common transgression. 
Executive tasks such as appointing a woman as judge or president: he points 
out that there is no prohibition against this, although in practice, women them­
selves usually vote for and choose men for sensitive and important roles.
Inheritance: he argues that inheritance should be considered along with ali­
mony and Mahr (bridal money, dower). While the woman may inherit less than 
a man, it is the man’s responsibility to pay maintenance for his wives. So if in­
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heritance law was changed, the law of maintenance must be changed as well, 
though women usually agree more to alimony than inheritance. He also explains 
that there are of course single women, which in his view are exceptional cases, 
and the law must be written based on generality, not based on exceptional cas­
es. 
He mentions that inheritance law is one of the most important laws in fiqh. 
This law is mentioned in some exact wording in the Quran, clearly expressing 
the specifics of inheritance. Therefore, it is difficult to talk about this law. He 
outlines some details which could be beneficial to women without changing the 
law. For instance, according to the current law in Iran women only inherit the 
house and not the land. However, according to his research, this can be gener­
alized to encompass the right of women to inherit land as well. Nonetheless, the 
inheritance precept could be revised only if expert studies proved that the omis­
sion of alimony and dowry and equality in inheritance would be in the interest 
of women. He said that it is also necessary that women claim and demand this 
kind of change for it to win the majority in parliament. However, in the current 
situation, he claims that the inclusion of inheritance with alimony and dowry 
cannot be considered as discriminatory. 
He emphasizes that in discussions about women’s rights, the subject of sex­
ual issues and freedom as well as a family’s rights should be noted. There are 
some permanent precepts based on exact wording in the Quran, which prohibit 
all kinds of sexual relationships out of marriage. Family rights are respected by 
chastity.
The second representative (Interview E February 2011) points out that based 
on his methodology for analyzing Islamic social laws, he recognizes all Islam­
ic laws related to women are changeable and impermanent. He emphasizes that 
such laws require expert opinions according current social circumstances. He 
adds that although he believes in equal rights for men and women, he cannot in­
stantly accept the equal right to inheritance without expert opinion and the de­
cision of parliament representatives in order to fulfil justice in society. 
Interviewee E also recognizes the veiling of women as a changeable law in 
accordance with the circumstances of time and space, although covering the 
head and neck presumably originates from the Quran. According to the relation 
between subject and precept, the subject and the accompanying philosophy have 
changed from that in the Prophet’s time. The justification for women’s veiling 
in the Prophet’s time was the prevention of harassment of women. Today how­
ever, such reasoning may no longer be applicable; the subject has changed, and 
therefore, the precept of veiling must change as well. 
He (Interview E February 2011), in distinguishing non­veiling from nudity, 
mentions that historically, women’s bodies have been the target for male abuse 
of women. Therefore, covering the body is necessary for both men and women. 
He also talks about the observance of privacy as emphasized by religion. This 
helps to maintain morality and virtue. Hence, covering – not veiling – is a mor­
al issue rather than a fiqh precept in today’s society.
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He also explains that the old system of family in Islamic societies was con­
structed by jurists (foqaha) in their time and space circumstances, which are 
based on an image of a family with the tutelage and guardianship of a man. Of 
course such images of family lead to inferiority, non­autonomy and discrimina­
tion for women, not only in marital life but also in general. Inequitable laws such 
as the right to divorce, custody, polygamy, temporary marriage, father’s permis­
sion for marriage, executive tasks, stoning, and so on, are a result of this per­
spective of the family and women which must be fundamentally revised and re­
built according to an Islamic value system based on the current concepts of 
justice, rights, and equality in today’s world.
The third representative (Interview F May 2011) believes that all fiqh pre­
cepts related to women’s rights are contingent and not essential. Being contin­
gent means that they could have taken other forms in other circumstances. All 
discriminatory laws such as marital age, custody, or the right to divorce are sub­
sidiary and related to exigencies of the Prophet’s time and space. He emphasiz­
es that all fiqh precepts are temporary, unless it could be proved that they are 
permanent. This insight is contrary to those of many other jurists, who consid­
er the fiqh precepts as permanent, unless it could be proved that they are tempo­
rary. In his point of view, all fiqh precepts, even inheritance law, which are clear­
ly mentioned in the Quran, are conditioned to outer circumstances. There is no 
eternal and permanent precept which is based on human nature. 
In reference to veiling, he (Interview F May 2011) says that though most ju­
rists recognize it as an essential decree for Muslim women, there is a general 
decree mentioned in the Quran that says that no Islamic precepts should cause 
believers trouble or tribulation. He emphasizes that assessing if a precept puts 
one in trouble or not is an individual decision. Therefore, for Muslim women, 
wearing the veil must be a personal decision. He also distinguishes the veil from 
modesty and explains modesty as a feature for Muslim women. 
Conclusion
The four subjects resulting from the theoretical framework are applied in this 
section to discuss the reformist view in this research: 1. the dialectical relation­
ship between individual and structure in general and between human reason as 
an integral part of individual and religion as a constituent of structure; 2. the cri­
sis of meaning in modern society which resulted from the incompatibility of 
subjective meaning and objectified meaning; 3. participatory parity of individ­
uals (men and women) in rules and resources in different political, cultural, eco­
nomic dimensions as well as the foundation of relationships in the family; and 
finally, 4. the UDHR and CEDAW as sets of global criteria for justice and equal 
access to rules and resources for men and women, which is recognized by all 
reformist streams, in spite of all their critiques of both of them. 
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Dialectical relationship between structure and individual (religion and human reason)
The emphasis on the role of reason in assessing the Islamic legal system is the 
characteristic feature of the reformist stream; they acknowledge human reason 
as the most important capital of a human being. Believing in a certain religion 
is the decision of reason, but human beings do not consist of reason alone. Rea­
son independent from revelation is restricted to calculating the advantages and 
disadvantages of mundane matters which confines human beings within a lim­
ited range. Such constraining reason does not suffice for all human needs; but 
rather reason alongside faith attends to the different dimensions of human be­
ings. Furthermore, human reason might be shrouded by human desires, igno­
rance, prejudice, etc., and thus revelation guides reason out of such human char­
acteristics. Revelation and reason both connect God with human beings and 
cannot be in conflict with each other (Kadivar 1392/2013: 33, Soroush 1381/2002: 
102–104). However, at the same time and similar to the need of reason for rev­
elation, revelation needs to be responsive to the time­ and space­bound needs of 
humans, which are determined by reason; for instance, the three criteria of jus­
tice, rationality and ability to fulfill the species’ interests by the conventions of 
the time is required to validate Shari’a precepts. However, these three criteria 
ultimately return to the single criterion of reason. Accordingly, the dialectical 
relationship between reason and religion can be realized in this perspective. The 
question here then becomes whether or not human reason – collective reason­
ing in the reformists’ emphasis – is able to assess all precepts resulting from rev­
elation independently from the revelation.
To respond to this question, reformists divide the precepts into two catego­
ries. One is the essentials, which are those precepts concerning matters of faith, 
ethics and devotions such as praying, fasting, belief in the afterworld and proph­
ecy, and which are immutable and fixed. In the reformist view, these are beyond 
the perception of human reason and reasoning in the realm of rationality. The 
reformist representative, who stands on the boundary to secularism, recognizes 
this group of precepts as temporary and changeable laws, unless they can be 
proven to be permanent precepts. Nonetheless, the general reformist view ac­
knowledges these kinds of creeds as the foundation of faith and belief for Mus­
lims, and thus constant and unchangeable. 
The second group of precepts – the non­essential – deals with the worldly as­
pects presented in human interactions and sociopolitical affairs which are time­ 
and space­ bound. This realm is allocated to the realm of appraisal of reason in 
the reformist perspective; thus, the collective reason of humanity is the yardstick 
of such precepts in Islam. It must be noted however, that reformists do not pres­
ent a definite criterion for distinguishing the essential from non­essential pre­
cepts. For instance, the prohibition of homosexual rights, although it is in the 
realm of human interactions, is considered as an essential and unchangeable pre­
cept (Interview D March 2011).
The question of the authority and independence of reason from revelation in 
assessing non­essential precepts still remains unanswered. The reactions to this 
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contentious issue vary in different reformist approaches. The view closest to sec­
ularism approves of the authority and independence of reason in this realm. Al­
though they believe in the fallibility of reason, they assign managing this field 
to collective reason. In fact, what distinguishes them from secularists is that 
though they believe in the authority of reason, they still regard fiqh – especially 
the essential precepts – as necessary means to achieve the essence and spirit of 
religion, although in their view fiqh only provides a framework for the means to 
reach religious experience as the essence of religion. For example, in one rep­
resentative’s opinion (Interview F May 2011), fiqh today is not able to present 
any solution for modern social life and is not in the position to replace the need 
of experts, scientists, managers and philosophers to resolve today’s issues. Nev­
ertheless, he still insists on the necessity of fiqh and jurists, though with more 
emphasis on ethical and moral values. 
The reformist approach, despite recognizing an essential and strategic role 
for reason, generally tries to align reason with revelation so that reason does not 
solely assess the matters of this realm. For instance, in evaluating the matter of 
human or women’s rights, the narrated (textual) precepts from the Quran and 
sunna are divided into two groups – those compatible or incompatible with hu­
man or women’s rights. The compatible group is consolidated by rational argu­
ment; arguments accompanied by textual evidence assess the incompatible group 
of narrated precepts to affirm that their validity has expired. It means that ratio­
nal arguments need to be verified by textual evidence. Therefore, this reformist 
approach does not believe in ‘the self­sufficiency of reason’ and self­justifying 
reasoning, which means that reason is not independent from revelation (Kadi­
var 1387/2008: 41). Hence, the criteria of assessing Shari’a precepts cannot be 
prior to religion; reason is insufficient and in need of revelation. 
This method demonstrates the incessant interaction between reason and re­
ligion through validating rational arguments by textual evidence and canceling 
the validity of precepts incompatible with human and women’s rights. Howev­
er, in some cases this reciprocal relation turns into a unilateral relation. In the 
event that a new concept or new (human) right emerges in the modern world 
and is affirmed by collective reason, but does not have the support of compat­
ible narrated proof and instead has only some inconsistent textual evidence, the 
question is whether collective reason in such cases still remains a measuring 
criterion? A practical example on this issue is the matter of homosexuality, 
which, as one representative (Interview D March 2011) explains, even if rea­
son accredits this, it is repudiated and prohibited as a permanent and unchange­
able precept in Islam. Accordingly, though reason is highly praised in the re­
formist perspective, where it becomes inconsistent with the essential precepts, 
it will be rejected.
Another issue is the definition of reason in the reformist view. ‘The method 
of reasonable people’ as the criterion for the Islamic legal system demonstrates 
itself in the common usage (’urf) of the age, which means the outcome of the 
best accepted practices or conventions of the time (Kadivar 2011a: 461; Youse­
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fi Eshkevari 2013: 196). However, “the convention of the time – especially the 
convention of non­Muslim Society – is not attributable in the case of essential 
precepts and a fixed value of Shari’a” (Kadivar 1392/2013). Therefore, in addi­
tion to the ambiguity of the boundaries of essential and non­essential precepts, 
the definition of ‘the way of reasonable people’ cannot be a comprehensive defi­
nition of reason or collective reason, especially with the stipulation of the con­
ventions of the time in Muslim society. This seems to be aimed more at defend­
ing the cultural and Islamic values of Islamic society against non­Islamic values. 
For instance, reformists recognize the UDHR as an outcome of ‘the way of 
reasonable people’ – though stemming from non­Muslim society – and empha­
size the necessity of enforcing the UDHR, including women’s rights, in all con­
stitutions. Although reformists argue that women’s equality was not imaginable 
a century ago, today the collective reason and essential Islamic teachings rec­
ommend this in spite of being in conflict with some Islamic jurisprudence. Re­
formists, attributing this conflict to the non­essential precepts, justify such rights 
as being more in accordance with the spirit and essence of Islam. On the other 
side, ‘the way of reasonable people’ acknowledges the UDHR as an effort to 
protect human dignity, which is affirmed in Islamic teachings as well and rec­
ognizes human rights for all because of the fact of being human, regardless of 
their gender, color, race, religion, nation, physical ability and disability, being 
old or young, sick or well. However, it is not clear what excludes homosexual 
rights from the principle of human dignity and what places this in the category 
of essential precepts. Accordingly, the definition of ‘the way of reasonable peo­
ple’ in the reformist view is inexplicit and indistinct. 
This ambiguous definition of reason also leads to a confusing understanding 
of the relationship between religion and justice. Reformists, similar to the Mu’ta-
zilite, recognize justice as a criterion for religion and ‘a prior principle to reli­
gion’. On the other hand, however, the definition of justice and justification of 
the different approaches to it are matters of reason or ‘the way of reasonable 
people’ (Kadivar 2013: 214). In this argument, the relationship between justice, 
religion, and reason does not seem to follow a logical principle, but rather cre­
ates a vicious circle. Justice as a non­religious criterion for assessing the appli­
cability of revelation’s precepts is provided by reason, which is insufficient and 
in need of revelation, but it is vague how justice remains independent from re­
ligion.
Since reason in this perspective is not recognized as totally independent from 
revelation, it is not possible to speak of a constant dialectical relationship be­
tween human reason and religion. Though there is such a relationship in some 
cases and it is disimilar to the relationship described by fundamentalists in which 
human reason has no authority and is considered a subset of religion, here hu­
man reason has relative authority, though it is still dependent on religion. 
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Crisis of meaning 
The reformist stream emphasizes that the spirit and essence of Islam is consis­
tent with some modern concepts and values, such as respecting human dignity, 
egalitarian justice, human rights, and equal rights for women. In their efforts, 
they try to present a reading of Islam that considers human time­bounded exi­
gencies. However, the range of this consideration is restricted to the non­essen­
tial precepts and there might be contradiction with the subjective values which 
are categorized as essential precepts, such as homosexual rights or some cases 
of women’s rights, which will be argued in the following.
Justice as participatory parity for men and women in political, cultural, and economic dimensions 
and in the family
The approach closest to the secular view regards women’s rights to participato­
ry parity as new issues in Islamic theology that have never been discussed by 
any traditional Islamic scholars; the few cases mentioned on this subject repre­
sent the dominant culture of the scholars’ time, and which need a fundamental 
shift. 
The general reformist view on this subject is to draw out the inequality for 
women found in the traditional fiqh. Only when there is incapacity of the fiqh to 
provide equal conditions, can changes in precepts be considered. While this 
method initially seems defensible, in practice its results would be disputable. 
In fact, every legal system determines rights for individuals based on a cer­
tain view and definition of the individual. Fiqh also defines women’s rights based 
on a particular definition of and perspective on women. Now the question is 
whether this perspective considers woman as a mature and knowledgeable indi­
vidual agent who has the ability to reason and act purposively, or considers her 
as a person in need of support both in financial and intellectual aspects, there­
fore taking a patronizing perspective, and putting the woman under the man’s 
tutelage. If defining women’s rights is based on such a patronizing perspective, 
although certain rights might be approved equally, nonetheless equal rights will 
not be achieved. In such a perspective, women are not able to act purposefully. 
In accordance with her physiological and biological conditions she is also not 
able to distinguish between what is good and in the best interest, or evil and 
harmful. Therefore, the law undertakes the responsibility of such individual de­
cisions for women, defines certain professions for them and prevents them from 
participating in certain economic activities. This patronizing view prevents the 
provision of psycho­cultural factors and sociopolitical context to empower wom­
en and enhance their self­awareness on the one hand, and on the other provides 
her with legal­cultural recognition in society. As a result of such conditions, 
women themselves, following the dominant cultural norms, vote for men in im­
portant political positions, in cases where there is no prohibition on the partici­
pation of women. As the first representative (Interview D March 2011) claims, 
women generally do not choose to participate in the judiciary; athough they are 
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allowed to enter this field, though in practice – at least in Iran – women are still 
not allowed to be appointed as judges. 
The patronizing perspective postulates marriage for all women and argues 
that the inheritance law should be considered along with maintenance and dow­
ry as a package, which is only valid for married women, so that the single wom­
en are marginalized and are recognized as exceptions and the minority. There­
fore, the laws in such a view are written only for a patron’s decisions and policies, 
rather based on the requirements of society. The principle of human dignity and 
equal rights for all people regardless of gender, race, nation, and religion seem 
to be inclusive only for the group who follow the mainstream and are not for ev­
eryone in society. Such a view does not provide social arrangements that permit 
all persons to participate as peers in social life and prevents this through legal 
action, which leads to injustice. 
The package of inheritance, alimony and dowry as a package for married 
women only is also questionable. Alimony without the precept of woman’s obe­
dience to a husband cannot be imaginable, and both of them together make an­
other package. Women’s obedience, as reformists explain, is necessary in sexu­
al relationships, which might otherwise lead to marital rape. Therefore, all 
precepts of fiqh are somehow interrelated with each other; thus the whole of fiqh 
precepts on women’s rights should be considered as a set which originates from 
a special perspective on women. Following the same mindset, familial relation­
ships transform into one of market and a place for transaction instead of being 
based on a cooperative social relationship embodying love, equality and part­
nership. In this form of family, traditional role­ specific tasks are not altered, so 
that the father is responsible for matters in the public sphere, and mother respon­
sible for the private sphere following the norms organized by patriarchy. The 
only exchange undertaken is that members of a family are business partners look­
ing for more profits from each other. Such a family does not provide a place for 
individual self­realization or for preparing the members to transit into public life 
in society.
The reformists believe in egalitarian justice, but this justice cannot be real­
ized by finding some solutions or articles in fiqh precepts and redefining few of 
them, such as equal rights for blood money, divorce rights, no longer requiring 
the father’s permission for marriage and so forth. A paradigm shift in the atti­
tude and mentality of society is needed which can in turn change the current pa­
tronizing perspective and misrecognition of the autonomous personhood of 
women. 
It seems that the representatives of the reformist view are tending gradually 
towards full egalitarian justice rather a restricted sense of it. Eshkevari’s sugges­
tion of a form of family based on ‘a joint enterprise’ is an example in this pro­
cess. This consists of equal rights for members and emphasizes partnership and 
a community for solidarity, rather than one that is ruled by patriarchal norms. 
This pattern is based on the idea of fulfillment of justice in the family.
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8 Seculars and Human Reason
As mentioned in the previous chapter, it seems that reformists are gradually lean­
ing towards the secular stream, in that they do not stand in a fixed position on the 
spectrum. Instead they have been moving toward more recognition of the author­
ity of human reason and its independence from revelation. The thinkers discussed 
in this chapter once presented reformist interpretations of Islam in different ways, 
for instance, through dividing Islam’s legal system into two groups of essential 
and non­essential precepts. However, they are currently representatives of a new 
stream of Islamic thought in Iran that acknowledges the futility of fiqh for mod­
ern human beings and advocate new perspectives on religion and being Muslim. 
This chapter peruses the viewpoints of major thinkers of this stream of thought, 
whose opinions have been impressive and influential in the debate and discourse 
on different interpretations of Islam in Iran after the 1979 revolution.
8 1 Structural Approach to Religion
In the secular view, religion is based on an individual spiritual experience in which 
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is refuted as a set of necessary creeds for conducting 
the behaviors of human beings with the aim of salvation. Instead, it recognizes the 
necessity of defining guidelines in the realm of human knowledge in every era. 
Rational reading of Islam vs. text-based reading of Islam
Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari56 (1389/2010) speaks of two definitions of be­
ing Muslim based on two interpretations of Islam. First is a text­based interpre­
56  Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (born 1936) is an Iranian philosopher, Shi’a Islamic theolo­
gian, writer and professor at Tehran University. He earned the certificate of Ijtihad – the highest 
degree in Islamic religious tradition – from the theological seminary of Qom after 18 years of 
studying different courses including Islamic philosophy, theology, jurisprudence and exegetical 
methodology. In 1970 he became director of the Islamic Center in Hamburg, where he learned 
German and supported the Christian­Islamic dialogue. There, he had opportunity to engage in 
dialogues with a number of intellectuals and religious representatives from around the world, 
challenging modern philosophy, theology and religious knowledge. Upon returning to Iran in 
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tation which has been the dominant interpretation in all reformist streams and 
religious intellectual efforts over its history in the last 150 years.
In this view, the Quran and sunna (tradition) as God’s words or as reflective 
of God’s words must be read, understood and applied in human life. The human 
being identifies himself as Muslim, though the definition of being Muslim is de­
termined by history. It means that everything in history which has been under­
stood as Islam and all historical events which have occurred in the name of Is­
lam provide and determine a definition of being Muslim, in the way that being 
Muslim means a commitment to following the definite set of rituals and precepts 
which have been provided in the course of history. But the Muslim individual 
lives in the modern era and confronts modern concepts which, on one hand are 
inevitable in his/her life today; and on the other, are, in some cases, inconsistent 
with the Quran and Sunna. In response to this issue, reformists revert to the very 
beginnings of Islam, attempting to retrieve and redefine the first message. In or­
der to do this, they try to reconstruct the understanding of the Quran and sunna 
(Mojtahed Shabestari1389/2010). Therefore, the reconstruction of understand­
ing plays an important role in this view. Mojtahed Shabestari himself placed par­
amount importance on reconstruction in the last period of his intellectual life. 
He tried at this time to understand the first message reflected in Quran and sun-
na, applying a new hermeneutic57 and re­understanding based on human expe­
rience and reason in the modern era. In an interview (January 2011) undertak­
1979 and participating in the revolution, he became a representative in the first Iranian parlia­
ment, though due to various reasons, he turned away from politics and joined the faculty of the­
ology and religious studies at the University of Tehran as a chaired professor to teach compara­
tive theology and religion. He tried to maintain his connection with religious institutions in the 
West through teaching as a visiting professor on various topics such as modern hermeneutical 
approaches to the major Islamic scriptures and discourses, and the status of democracy and hu­
man rights in the very background of legislative foundations of Islam. In 2006, he retired unwill­
ingly during the course of forced retirements in the Iranian education system. [Mojtahed Shabe­
stari, Mohammad. A Brief Biographical Portrait.Official Website of Mohammad Mojtahed 
Shabestari.Available at: http://mohammadmojtahedshabestari.com/biography.php (18 June 
2015)].
57  Mojtahed Shabestari explains that every text has a hidden reality which requires its interpreta­
tion to be discovered. The understanding of a historical meaning of a text required the scientif­
ic rules of the hermeneutic approach. The text does not speak by itself; instead the questions 
raised by the interpreter begin to reveal its content, though such questions were not posed at the 
time of the text. With this in mind, it is obvious how the questions of the interpreter are affect­
ed by his prejudgments, pre­understandings, and prejudices, which place great importance in 
discovering the meaning of the text. In fact, the questions which derive from human knowledge 
depend on the interpreter’s historical and cultural location, rather than on the text itself; hence 
they only provide one interpretation of the text. Such questions also can be based on the inter­
ests and expectations of the interpreter; so that a particular set of questions provides particular 
answers which are demanded. Consequently interpretations of a text are different, and focus on 
various part of the text and omit others; therefore, obtaining a complete final interpretation is 
impossible and the process of interpretation never ends. In the process of interpretation, it is also 
important to understand the text in its historical location. In fact, the interpretation is a transla­
tion of the meaning of a text from its historical processes and its cultural and linguistic experi­
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en for this research project, he said that he has passed this phase of insight, 
recognizing it as text­based efforts which pursue understanding and reconstruc­
tion of God’s words in the Quran and sunna. All reformist efforts include dis­
tinguishing the changeable from the constant precepts; discovering the essence 
of unchangeable creeds and maintaining them as unalterable, and abandoning 
other parts of the text as historical; and identifying the distinction between the 
essential and intrinsic from the contingent and accidental, which are seen as 
based on a historical definition of being Muslim. Such efforts on one side strive 
for adherence to God’s words in the modern world by upholding the essentials 
as God’s words. On the other side, they seek a solution to reconciling modern 
concepts with the message and teachings of the text by replacing the inconsis­
tent precepts with new ones and confirming the new precepts as the essence and 
spirit of the message of the Quran and sunna. Such efforts and text­based inter­
pretations have so far been the common point of all reformist thought streams 
(Mojtahed Shabestari1389/2010).  
In this perspective, the text is of utmost importance and freedom from the text 
would be very difficult. In fact, the text plays three functions, as Mojtahed Shabe­
stari (ibid.) explains, referring to Jan Assmann58. The text is primarily a means 
for storing various interpretations, which is demonstrated when one refers to the 
text. Secondly, the various interpretations are institutionalized in the text, and 
thirdly, they provide the future understanding of the text. Accordingly, the re­
formist efforts to reconstruct the first message of the text cannot be separated 
from these three functions of text­based reading and cannot claim to deal with 
the pure text (ibid.).
If a text­based interpretation is the first, the second interpretation of Islam be­
gins from an initial presumption which says that the individual decides to be 
Muslim and to accept modern concepts such as human rights. Today, humanity 
faces several ideas, including various philosophical and sociopolitical thought, 
as well as different religions and the concept that it is the human being who 
chooses value systems according to his/her demands and needs. Accordingly, a 
person might choose their own religion and consequently also chooses the con­
tent of religion, rather than a religion as a closed set. Religion in this view pro­
vides an opportunity to transcend the external aspects and trappings of life, to­
wards the inner aspects and consciousness of life (ibid.). Religion is a means of 
exploring and looking for the meaning in life which Mojtahed Shabestari calls 
‘sense of presence’ and ‘experience of presence’. It is an experience that allows 
the individual to change his/her situation from a prison­like, limiting condition 
to another horizon free of such limitations. It is about a reorientation from the 
self in different dimensions of identity and its historical, social and linguistic 
selves to another state which is free of such limited dimensions. Such ‘experi­
ences into the interpreter’s historical context (Mojtahed Shabestari 1375/1996:13–30;Hunter 
2009:69; Vahdat: 2010; Alinejad: 2001).
58 Jan Assmann (born 1938) is a German Egyptologist.
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ence of presence’ is not a privilege of the elite and people with particular fea­
tures, but rather it is available to every human being (Mojtahed Shabestari, cit­
ed in Vahdat 2010: 200).
In this perspective, the individual is aware that religion is not the only foun­
dation of life; instead, life is based on other aspects and sciences required for 
today’s existence. The humanity of the person is not defined based on religios­
ity, but rather philosophy, science and ethics, and these are included as various 
factors for defining humanity. Religion is only one aspect of human life among 
others with the definite function of providing a value and meaning system, which 
is freely chosen by the individual (Mojtahed Shabestari 1389/2010). 
Regarding the question of why the individual chose to be Muslim, it should 
be noted that everyone who is concerned with this dimension of life, lives with 
a particular religious heritage, and it is obvious that this religious heritage be 
studied, in order to figure out whether it contains what he or she is searching for. 
Islamic heritage is demonstrated in various arenas of philosophy, jurisprudence 
and theosophy (ibid.). However, the common aspect of all diverse branches is 
the belief in Unitarianian (Universality and Unity of God) (Palmer 2003: xi) 
and the endeavor for transcendence from the limited customs of daily life to the 
inner aspects and consciousness. This endeavor is a personal experience for ev­
eryone. In this way, all options and sources of enlightenment are allowed, such 
as Rumi’s poetry or the verses of the Quran. It does not mean that religion is de­
rived from Rumi’s poetry or the Quran, but rather that these are facilities that 
provide a person with the experience of transcendence. Such person is a unitar­
ian, though he determines his/her own unitary experience. In this endeavor, he 
or she also acknowledges some modern concepts and ideas such as human dig­
nity and human rights (ibid.). 
The question here arises why such a person considers him­ or herself as Mus­
lim rather than simply a spiritual person. Mojtahed Shabestari argues that such 
a question comes from a perspective based on a historical definition of being 
Muslim. Since the Islamic view and shari’a have been shaped in the course of 
time, the definition of being Muslim is based on commitment to the shari’a; and 
consequently non­commitment means being a non­Muslim. Therefore, such 
questions which are based on the historical definition of Islam and the defini­
tion of ‘Muslim’ should be challenged. 
The Prophets’ uprisings were always against the traditions of the time and 
aimed to release people from the habituality of tradition. They invited people to 
apply their reason and rationality in order to arouse their spirit of truth­seeking 
(ibid.). The religious traditions have been shaped and gradually institutionalized 
after the Prophets’ time. In an institutionalized religion, God is restricted to its 
framework; it means God’s ‘absoluteness’ is denied (Mojtahed Shabestari, cit­
ed in Vahdat 2010: 215). Institutionalized religion resulted from religious tradi­
tions aimed at functioning more to protecting and retaining the identity of the 
community that followed the particular religious tradition and ritual. Accord­
ingly, the Prophet’s invitation and message is reduced to the institution of reli­
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gion. Unitarian (movahed) Muslims chooses their demeanor, lifestyles and 
thoughts by using reason and rationality rather than imitating the institutional­
ized and habituated traditions. They have their own personal experiences and in­
terpretations of the revelation. Therefore, efforts to impose and dictate a definite 
interpretation of religion only prevent the individual from experiencing that re­
ligion. Consequently, the unitary Muslim does not follow the definition of be­
ing Muslim in the way that has been determined by history (Mojtahed Shabe­
stari, cited in Ghobadzadeh and Rahim2012: 343).
Mojtahed Shabestari (1389/2010) argues that even in the fiqh perspective, be­
ing Muslim is defined by some jurists as believing in unitarian and prophecy, 
which is compatible with the definition of being Muslim as a conscious and pur­
poseful choice. In this definition of being Muslim, prophecy and revelation do 
not place an important role on defining and choosing religion. Mojtahed Shabe­
stari insists that in this definition, the unitarian Muslim does not deny the proph­
ecy, though he or she does not acknowledge the assumption that the Prophet 
brought a definite set of creeds from God and invited all people to fulfill this set 
of commands in their lives. Instead, it is recognized that the Prophet had a uni­
tarian reading of the world and according to his experience, a divine aid sup­
ported him in this understanding and interpretation, so that he refers everything 
to God. But such an experience is not restricted to the Prophet. In fact, he invit­
ed other people to witness such a divine experience. Accordingly, the revelation 
and prophecy is an invitation to such teachings and experiences rather than a 
presentation of a set of creeds as something beyond human perception, claim­
ing that the only way to salvation is the fulfillment of this set of creeds. For such 
unitarian Muslims, the Prophet is the initiator of such an experience and he or 
she follows the prophet in this sense (ibid.).
The Muslim in this perspective accepts and confirms the necessity of mod­
ern concepts, such as human rights, since central to the idea of human rights is 
the concept of the human being is an end in itself, not a means to other objec­
tives. A human being has the right of freedom of opinion, freedom of religion 
and other rights. Such rights provide Muslims with better opportunities for di­
vine experiences (ibid.).
Mojtahed Shabestari criticizes reformist efforts which look for modern con­
cepts or their equivalent in the text and say it is possible to bridge some ethical 
commands in the Quran and sunna or other pre­modern texts with current con­
cepts like human rights, which are products of modernity. In this view, ethical 
commands in the Quran and sunna do not have the capacity to confirm modern 
concepts (Hunter 2009: 72). Mojtahed Shabestari also rejects the reformists’ 
solution to simply disregard those parts of the text that are inconsistent with mo­
rality and rationality on the grounds that the text is more than 1400 years old. 
In his view, a philosophical and scientific analysis of the text is required but it 
is not in order to discover a definition of being Muslim or various percepts in 
the text. Applying philosophical methods to understand and investigate the text 
is contrary to the understanding that the text is a metaphysical text and scrip­
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ture. It must instead be treated as a historical text that can be the subject of hu­
man studies, such as the philosophy of language. This view looks at the text 
based on the supposition that a human has spoken or written it (Mojtahed Shabe­
stari, 1389/2010).
Faith and freedom 
As mentioned earlier, institutionalized religion prevents religious and unitary 
experiences for humans, but Mojtahed Shabestari (1382/2003) insists that reli­
gion and revelation should evoke this kind of experience in the recipient, for 
such experience constitutes the core of faith. 
He defines faith as an ‘inner encounter with God’, beyond the legalistic un­
derstanding of the text which forces people to do or respect something as pre­
cepts from God. In this view, faith is a conscious decision human beings can 
only make if they are regarded as possessing freedom of thought and free will, 
faith’s utmost conditions (Mojtahed Shabestari, cited in Amirpour 2013). Free­
dom is the manifestation of the autonomous self (Rajaee 2007: 222). Obtaining 
outer freedom requires living in a healthy society, where political and govern­
mental facts are in accordance with the individual’s freedom of thought and will. 
Outer freedom is a necessary prerequisite for taking advantage of interior free­
dom which is a prerequisite for faith (Mojtahed Shabestari, 1382/2003: 37). In 
fact, freedom is both an end for human life and a means for living based on faith, 
since “the reality of being human is to be free always” (Mojtahed Shabestari, 
cited in Rajaie 2007). Because a decision to live based on faith cannot be forced 
upon a person from the outside, “(a)ll religious dogmas that prescribe what peo­
ple should or should not believe in are thus not guideposts to true faith, but rath­
er barriers that hinder the free development of faith” (Seidel 2004). Therefore, 
faith places great importance on both inner and outer freedom. As a result, free­
dom is ingrained in faith which leads to various experiences of faith – faith plu­
ralism (Dabbagh 1387/2008).
According to Mojtahed Shabestari, faith as a religious experience should be 
considered the core concept of religiosity in a ‘new theology.’ Accordingly, re­
ligion could provide morality for the modern world (Mojtahed Shabestari, cit­
ed in Amirpour 2013). The modern world has its own features which are in con­
flict with traditional religion and therefore demands a new form of morality and 
religion.
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Rationality and spirituality
Mostafa Malekian59 (1381/2002) also believes that all people living in the mod­
ern era are different from people in traditional societies in terms of ideas and 
worldviews. They are also cognitively different, with distinct emotional expres­
sions and patterns of behavior. In fact, the modern human is characterized by 
self­determination and self­legislation which is in accordance with reason and 
leads to an active subject instead of a passive object, satisfied with an already 
provided and predetermined interpretation of the world. Self­determination is 
itself an outcome of rationality and reasoning as the most significant and ines­
capable elements of modernity, which are in contrast with traditional understand­
ing. The traditional human is obedient to an outer and foreign force. Tillich called 
this phenemenon “heteronomy,”60 which is essentially taking something to be 
true on the authority of another with a blind and unthinking obedience. The mod­
ern human being is autonomous and independent, doubting everything and seek­
ing evidence and satisfactory reasons for beliefs (Malekian 1381/2002: 275).
Another characteristic of modernity is desacralization and the reduction of 
the power of traditional metaphysics; specifically the desacralization of persons, 
replaced with the idea of ‘egalitarianism.’ This means to use critical rationality 
in evaluating the arguments of people who are considered as sacred in a tradi­
59  Mostafa Malekian (born 1956) is an Iranian philosopher, translator and editor. He studied Me­
chanical Engineering at the University of Tabriz but dropped out to pursue a degree in Philos­
ophy at the University of Tehran. While there, he felt unsatisfied, so he decided to further pur­
sue theology at Qom and studied there for 18 years. However, he found deficiencies in the 
theological seminary regarding  education, didactics and research but continued to give lec­
tures in philosophy at various institutions, including Tehran University and Tarbiat Modares 
University. When protests erupted following the 2009 presidential election, he was dismissed 
from teaching at universities and research centers. 
    Malekian defines five thought phases in his life. The first stage, which began when he was 17, 
as an Islamic fundamentalist, lasted for 11 years. During the second phase, lasting five years, 
he identified as traditionalist. At this phase, he said he was influenced by writers such as René 
Guénon, Frithjof Schuon, Titus Burckhardt, and Martin Lings, and also non­Muslim tradition­
alist such as Ananda Coomaraswamy and Wolfgang Smith. In 1987 he entered in the third phase 
as a modernist Islamist, identifying himself as a religious intellectual, religious reformist and 
Islamic modernist. He remained in this phase for 10 years until he found Islamic modernism 
indefensible. Though he emphasizes that the thinkers who defend this perspective have helped 
Islamic culture, the project itself has logical problems. He turned to Christian existentialism in 
his fourth thought phase and found consolation the works of philosophers and theologians like 
Søren Kierkegaard, Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo, Gabriel Marcel, and Fyo­
dor Dostoyevsky. Eventually, in 2001 he transitioned into the fifth phase, which he refers to as 
a phase of ‘rationality and spirituality,’ and claims that the first cause of human sufferings is 
the inability of human beings to find a balance between rationality and spirituality throughout 
history. In most cases, he said that only one or the other could prevail, but that if human beings 
are able to strike a balance between the two, it would help pacify human suffering (Malekian 
1392/2013: 49–54).
60  Paul Tillich, New World Encyclopedia. Available at: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/
entry/Paul_Tillich#Theonomy.2C_autonomy.2C_and_heteronomy, (18 June 2015)
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tional understanding of religion, and to reject arguments which have been tak­
en as true and valid just because of their sacred identity. Instead, any argument 
can be valid and accepted, if it provides logic reasons. For instance, Malekian 
cites Buddha, saying “you must test what I say; if it is correct do it … I am not 
infallible; I don’t think of myself as infallible, you also should not think of me 
as infallible” (Malekian cited in Sadeghi­Boroujerdi 2014: 296–297).
Another significant characteristic of modernity is uncertainty in the reading 
of history. The traditional understanding of the history of some religions, includ­
ing Islam, considers certain events and episodes as sacred, while for a modern 
human there is a lack of trust in the certainty of such historical knowledge. There­
fore, religion in the modern era must be independent from history and histori­
cal narratives (Malekian 1381/2002: 275–277).
Modernity is also characterized by its emphasis on ‘the here and now’, which 
refers to the concerns of the temporal world, in contrast to the eternal and here­
after, and offering solutions for concrete problem in this world rather than as­
signing the solutions to salvation and heavenly glories in the afterlife (ibid.: 278). 
Accordingly, the modern human is more concerned with satisfaction in this world 
rather than otherworldly rewards. This does not deny the existence of an after­
world, but rather recognizes that the modern individual accepts a particular ac­
tion because of its function and efficiency in this world (ibid.: 316).
Malekian argues that traditional religion is no longer able to provide the mod­
ern human with inner satisfaction. Traditional religion has its own features, such 
as expecting people to obey religious authority, to trust peremptorily in the his­
torical basis of religion, to live their lives for the sake of preparation for life in 
the hereafter, to adopt a metaphysical system, to believe in the sacredness of cer­
tain entities, and to view their own religion in an absolute fashion (Tavassoli, 
2011: 161–62).
Accordingly, the modern human being who wants to be rational faces two 
choices. First, he or she can abandon religion completely and thereby lose the 
positive advantages of religion. A second option is that he or she adopts a new 
form of religion, which Malekian calls ‘spiritualism’, to replace the traditional 
understanding of religion. He emphasizes the second choice because of the hu­
man need for spirituality, and argues that traditional religion, which once had 
positive functions, is no longer defensible (Malekian 1381/2002: 365). Spiritu­
ality is a form of “rational religion” (ibid: 275) which is applicable to moderni­
ty, as well as providing human beings with inner satisfaction, a sense of mean­
ing in life, peace, joy and hope in the here­and­now. It is a religion that does not 
rely on historical facts as much as traditional religion requires, as it tries to dis­
engage religion from its localities and concrete and historical contexts. Spiritu­
ality is also not rooted in text; thus it is not restricted to a certain scripture. In­
stead it is beyond all major world religions and can provide the benefits of 
different religions. The spirit of today’s world demands that religion serves hu­
man beings, rather than humans serving religion (ibid.: 386). Therefore, tradi­
tional religiosity is not possible in the modern era, even if it is desired. Spiritu­
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al religiosity is possible and desirable because unlike institutionalized 
traditional religion, it is focused and concerned with the essence of religion, 
which is, in Malekian’s view, spirituality (ibid.: 316).
Accordingly, he suggests a new project he calls ‘rationality and spirituality’. 
Rationality in this perspective is not local and temporal and is not limited to a 
specific time and space. It is universal (ibid.: 45). Spirituality needs deep and 
total rationality which means to consider the individual not only as a thinking 
machine but also as one who confirms and accepts the emotive and conative di­
mensions. In this view, if the modern human being cannot explain a fact, he/she 
does not deny it or neglect its values; neither does he/she obey other authorities. 
Instead, rational reasons are sought, and if they cannot be found, he/she remains 
silent (ibid.: 277–278). In contrast to most reformists who are concerned about 
the fading of religion in the modern epoch, Malekian is more concerned for the 
human being and suffering in this world and says “I am not concerned with the 
tradition, nor the modernity, nor the civilization, nor any other abstract substance 
of this sort. My foremost concern is with the human beings who come into this 
world, suffer, and then leave it” (Malekian, cited in Sadeghi­Boroujerdi 2014: 
279). His main purpose in his project is the alleviation of suffering and the 
achievement of inner satisfaction for humankind. All human achievements in­
cluding science, religion, philosophy, art, and literature can be employed by hu­
man beings and are useful for the realization of this objective. Therefore, his 
project pursues more individual needs and rights rather than traditional demands 
of family, culture and religion (ibid.: 280). Yet, his project does not lead to mere 
individualism, but is rather aimed at releasing the individual from personal in­
ner conflict as well as social and political dysfunctional conflicts, in order to ex­
tend individual solicitude beyond the self to other people’s suffering and to bear 
them as if they were their own issues (Memarian 2013). Therefore, Malekian 
pursues a social relation based on humanity and says “I am very interested in 
the topic of love and it is something that has not been emphasized in Islamic 
theology. In Islam and Judaism the emphasis has been on justice. Law overcomes 
morality. Justice sometimes is compatible with violence but Love cannot be com­
patible with violence” (cited in Tavassoli 2011: 164).
Islamic law
According to Mojtahed Shabestari (1389/2010), Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
emerged after the death of the Prophet Muhammad and Islam’s expansion to 
provide solutions for new issues and experiences that were not directly addressed 
in the Quran and sunna. He argues that the beginning of the fiqh process was 
based on a definite agreement of how to understand the scripture after the Proph­
et’s death. Accordingly the foundation of this agreement was to find a command­
ment in the revelation, reflected in the Quran and sunna, for every issue in hu­
man life. Therefore there was not this specific form of fiqh at the time of the 
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Prophet, and hence it could have been based on another type of agreement; for 
instance the agreement on understanding the Quran as a book of morality and 
ethical references and instructions rather than as a book of law. 
Another remarkable point which should be noted is that according to Mojta­
hed Shabestari in the modern context there is no possibility to have direct inter­
action with the Prophet, and instead what is available today is only a historical 
heritage which is to be found in the form of historical text. Historical issues are 
not decisive and determined; instead they lead to conjectures and suppositions 
which ultimately provide an interpretation of the text and the conditions of the 
Prophet’s era. To understand such interpretations, hermeneutics as a scientific 
tool is required in order to discover the most historically relevant meanings 
among several possible meanings (Mojtahed Shabestari 1375/1996: 13). As a 
result, it is more logical to follow the strong solutions resulting from rationali­
ty and human reason in the current era rather than following conjectures and as­
sumptions from history.  
Mojtahed Shabestari (Interview January 2011) explains how at one point in 
his life he believed in two kinds of Islamic fiqh – unchangeable or essential pre­
cepts and changeable or subsidiary precepts – but now he does not distinguish 
between Islamic precepts and believes no precept is constant. In other words, he 
does not recognize any precept as a rule but sees them simply as moral recom­
mendations which could be applied by human beings in their unitary journey.
The reformist approach to religion, which divides religious precepts into es­
sential or unchangeable laws, and subsidiary or alterable precepts, is criticized 
by Malekian (Interview January 2011) as well. He mentions that such binary 
metaphors are not confirmed in the scriptures. In the scriptures, precepts are only 
and wholly unchangeable and essential laws. For instance, the Quran says: In-
deed, those who disbelieve in Allah and His messengers and wish to discrimi-
nate between Allah and His messengers and say, ‘We believe in some and dis-
believe in others,’ and wish to adopt a way in between. Those are the 
disbelievers, truly. And We have prepared for the disbelievers a humiliating pun-
ishment (Quran: 4:150–151). 
He argues that a ‘believer’ is not allowed to believe in just a part of the Qu­
ran and ignore other parts related to religious precepts or fiqh, noting that such 
precepts contain only about 500 verses, which is only one twelfth of the entire 
Quran. Ignoring or providing special interpretations of this part of the Quran is 
not an acceptable practice of the religion, Malekian (Interview January 2011) 
argues. He therefore rejects the division of precepts in the Quran into the essen­
tial and the subsidiary, and recognizes such practices to be a falsification, and 
unarguable for even by hermeneutics. Doing so is likely to replace some of the 
Quran’s content with our own theories and perspectives, which in fact contra­
dicts or disregards the trust conveyed by the Prophet when he delivered his mes­
sage to his believers. 
In Malekian’s opinion, being religious requires submission forevermore with­
out challenging or questioning. In his point of view, every historical and insti­
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tutional religion requires submission, and hence is against rationality. Maleki­
an thinks that reformist efforts to reconcile such submission with rationality are 
engaged in a defeated struggle, unacceptable to believers from either the mod­
ern or secular perspectives (Interview January 2011). 
Instead of such reformist efforts, Malekian explains a kind of spirituality 
which gives believers a philosophy that allows them to search for truth, one that 
is completely different from having the truth imposed upon them – which has 
been claimed by the prevailing understanding of religion. The search for truth 
implies a critical belief, not a blind submission. Such spirituality leads to ‘au­
tonomy’ or ‘self­authority,’ rather than accepting other­authority (heteronomy). 
In historical religion, the believer is obedient to God or a religious lawgiver, 
while in spirituality, the believer obtains a deep understanding of religion that 
what one does and thinks is similar to what is expected in a religion (Interview 
January 2011). Such spirituality leads to rationalism. He believes in the mutual 
relationship between spirituality and rationality, which implies that commitment 
to one results in a commitment to the other. 
He also argues that if human reason can prove a religious assertion, this be­
comes rational; concurrently, if human reason rejects such an assertion, it is ir­
rational. But in the case that human reason cannot prove or reject an assertion, 
it is a kind of ‘mystery’. Malekian emphasizes that in such cases it would be bet­
ter to be silent and let the matter remain neither proven nor refuted, rather than 
resorting to religion and accepting the religious argument about the mystery (In­
terview January 2011).61
Approach to the Quran
In the secular view, the Quran is considered as a historical human text which is 
required to be understood through the usual methods for understanding other 
human historical texts, such as criticism and hermeneutics.
Mojtahed Shabestari (Interview January 2011) argues that, according to a 
philological approach, a text can only be understood if it is a production of hu­
man writing or speaking, since text only has meaning in human language. Now 
the question becomes: who said and wrote the text of the Quran? If the Quran 
is a set of words that God sent to a prophet through his angel Gabriel, and in 
turn the Prophet sent them to the people, the words are independent from the 
Prophet. This makes understanding the text impossible, since the text is in hu­
man language but is not a human production. The important point in Mojtahed 
Shabestari’s discussion (1392/2013) is that a text is formed only by assuming 
the existence of two minds: the speaker and the listener; the mind­possessor is 
61  This is comparable with what Wittgenstein posits at the end of his Tractatus: “What we cannot 
speak about we must consign to silence”. Wittgenestein, Ludwig. 1990. Tractatus logico-phil-
osophicus. London: Routledge, §7.
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also a phenomenon formed on and in a particular social­historical background. 
Mojtahed Shabestari posits that the Quran’s text is the prophetical speech of the 
Prophet, which was inspired by God (revelation) and meant to be shared with 
the people, and its main content is a monotheistic explication and interpretation 
of the world. In this regard, the Quran is not revelation itself but a product of it. 
Therefore, interpreting the Quran as the Prophet’s speech is entirely different 
from interpreting the Quran as the speech and revelation of God himself (ibid.).
Mojtahed Shabestari posits that all phenomena in human language have hu-
manity. This means they manifest human features, characteristcs, experiences, 
perceptions, and desires. Language implies a human lifeworld, and therefore it 
shows humanity. Even if it speaks of divinity, it is not able to show the divine 
world; it reflects the human experience of divinity, not the world of divinity it­
self. Therefore, since the word of the Quran is a linguistic phenomenon, it fol­
lows a certain world­view, and defines a lifeworld and experiences that are man­
ifest in a human world and not a divine one. Therefore, the Quran is above all a 
human word. Hence, understanding the Quran requires the usual methods for 
understanding other human texts and since the Quran is a historical text, it needs 
a historical critique (Mojtahed Shabestari, Interview January 2011). Interpret­
ing the Quran as the speech of the Prophet is analyzing a historical text produced 
in a specific historical, cultural and social context, in mutual relation and inter­
action with its surrounding environment. One can draw out different interpreta­
tions of such a text and discuss the truth or falsity of it with others through in­
tellectual debate. On the other hand, if the Quran is interpreted as the speech of 
God himself, discounting the presence of a located speaker, the dialectical rela­
tion of that speech with historical­cultural and social facts, on which a rational 
understanding is based, cannot be perceived (Mojtahed Shabestari 1392/2013). 
In this way, the understanding and interpretation of the Quran leads to an exclu­
sive interpretation by a definite group which must be obeyed by other believers, 
and hence there are no criteria for discerning the falsity or truth of it. As such, 
only an exclusive group can be responsible and dominant in understanding and 
interpreting the Quran, and others should have no option but to obey this group’s 
perception and interpretation (ibid.). 
Mojtahed Shabestari believes that interpreting the Quran as the Prophet’s 
speech eliminates obstacles of pre­supposed dogmatic beliefs, and makes pos­
sible a dialogue between the text and reader in every era. Finally, this kind of 
analysis facilitates the evolution and completion of the Quran’s understanding 
and interpretation (ibid.). He also emphasizes that every claim that the Quran is 
a miracle which denies its human features of language, is unacceptable. He also 
explains revelation as a prophet’s reading (interpreting) of the world’s phenom­
ena, including nature, history, humanity and society, as God’s ‘relics’ and ‘to­
kens’. The unitarian experience is that all phenomena are appearances of God, 
manifested in the revelation of the Prophet. Therefore, the Quran is the narra­
tive of the Prophet regarding what God does in the world and how God is man­
ifested in all phenomena in the world. However, not all verses in the Quran are 
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interpretations of phenomena as God’s appearances; some verses are instruc­
tions which the Prophet needed to govern over his society (Mojtahed Shabestari, 
Interview January 2011).
Similarly, Malekian (Interview January 2011) criticizes perspectives that con­
sider the Quran as a direct word from God and as a presentation of the Proph­
et’s experience, and questions how the revelation can be understood and dis­
cussed when there is no knowledge or human experience of what exactly 
happened between God and the Prophet. Moreover, he also questions the kind 
of methodology that can be applied in such a debate that makes it a scientific 
one. Nevertheless, he thinks that considering the Quran as a statement of the 
Prophet explaining his own experience is more arguable and more rational. He 
believes that when the Quran is interpreted as God’s word, it implies he has a 
human body that can talk, and this view is unacceptable.
8 2 Individual Agency in a Rational Reading of Islam
Human reason 
The secular view acknowledges an essential role for human reason in modern 
society and in the relationship between human beings and God. Mojtahed Shabe­
stari (Interview January 2011) states that throughout history, religion and hu­
man reason have complimented each other, though in certain periods one over­
comes the other. In the modern epoch, the role of human reason is emphasized 
more. Human reason is of great importance and is a determining variable in the 
practice of religion in the modern era. Human beings have had a special need 
for a relationship with God which has been manifested in the form of tradition­
al religion, especially in some cultures or in the past. However, today, human 
needs have changed and therefore traditional religion might not be able to sat­
isfy those needs in a modern era.
According to Malekian (Interview January 2011), human reason has no ex­
clusive role in the relationship between God and society, or between God and 
the individual. He recognizes that there are other factors that influence these re­
lationships, such as the need for religion, and human emotions such as feelings 
of excitement and even love. He sees humans as having three dimensions: first, 
the cognitive dimension, or the sphere of rationality which deals with human 
knowledge; second, the sphere of emotions and feeling, or the emotive dimen­
sion; and third, the sphere of will and wishes, or the conative dimension. Hu­
man life is governed by these three dimensions, and manifested in human words 
and deeds. He also highlights the role of reason and says conducting human life 
through any other resource, such as revelation, is also a decision made by rea­
son.
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Changeaility of rights
Since human needs change throughout history, human rights change as well, 
though some arguments on how to define rights might remain stable. Mojtahed 
Shabestari (Interview January 2011) affirms that rights are non­constant and 
changeable, since they are based on human needs, which are also changeable. 
There are some ethical bases of rights that are constant which, in the course of 
time, can take different forms. For example, justice as a basis for rights has had 
different definitions throughout history.
Similarly, Malekian (Interview January 2011) mentions two reasons for the 
changing nature of human rights in history. Firstly, human beings change in the 
course of evolution – for example a modern human being differs hugely from a 
Neanderthal. Secondly, human knowledge has also been continuously changing. 
Changes in the human sciences alter human affairs and therefore also their rights. 
Some rights and duties become irrelevant, while new ones emerge. Therefore, 
there is no revealed origin for rights. Accordingly, religion and local rights are 
not proper variables that require changing or determining human rights (Male­
kian, Interview January 2011).
Equality of man and woman in religious doctrine
Similar to other currents of Islamic thought, secularists recognize humanity and 
humaneness as the most important characteristic of human beings, in which men 
and women are similar. As they moving further from reformists on the spectrum, 
secularists do not recognize the prevalent definition of a personal God, but rath­
er consider the entire universe as a unitarian entity composed of God, human 
beings and other creatures, in which all elements have an important place in re­
lation to each other. In such a view, gender differences do not play any role. 
In Mojtahed Shabestari’s opinion (Interview January 2011), since humanity 
is most important to God, man and woman are equal to God. They are created 
similarly in their humanity. He explains that men and women are different bio­
logically, but the question is to what extent the psychical and biological struc­
tures of man and woman play in determining different gender features. Howev­
er, he emphasizes such differences do not distort gender equality.
Malekian (Interview January 2011), referring to Abrahamic and some other 
Eastern religions, explains that such religions believe in a conception of God in 
which God is defined as a personal creator with human characteristics and emo­
tions such as wrath, satisfaction, pride, etc. Malekian sets himself apart from 
such believers. While he does believe in God, he recognizes the entire universe 
as God; therefore all human beings are also God. In other words, he does not 
acknowledge God as beyond the universe, or as a supernatural creator who sim­
ply created other creatures and is independent from them. In this view, there re­
ally are no fundamental differences between human beings – neither between 
men and women nor between people of different races. Malekian (Interview Jan­
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uary 2011) emphasizes that there is no doubt that men and women have physi­
cal and psychological differences; however these differences do not justify any 
difference in rights.
8 3 Global Norms of Justice and Human Dignity in the Secular Perspective
UDHR in the secular perspective
The UDHR is recognized in the secular view as protecting all individual human 
rights, regardless of their religion, which must be a foundation of the constitu­
tions of Islamic countries and other non­Islamic countries. In this regard, under­
standing human rights as the ‘rights of the individual’ implies that there is a cur­
rent lack of individual freedom (Mojtahed Shabestari 1384/2006: 224–225).
In Mojtahed Shabestari’s view, the UDHR is used to create judicial insurance 
for humans and a social framework in support of their freedoms. In this view, 
the UDHR is the only framework which makes it possible to invite all the peo­
ple of the world from various cultures and religions (including atheists) to fight 
and struggle against cruelty, discrimination and aggression. In fact, the UDHR 
is a means in the modern era to regulate humane relations and to establish order 
in society (ibid.: 229).
The essence of the UDHR lies in the experiences of the two World Wars and 
the failure of many democratic systems. This led to the sentiment that human­
kind must never go through the same experiences again, solidifying the idea that 
the principles of respect, and the acknowledgement of the grace of human be­
ings should be guarded throughout political, economic and social life, using 
some distinctive rules and rudiments which can be institutionalized (ibid.: 231).
To cast more light upon this subject, Mojtahed Shabestari refers to the opin­
ion of some Muslim scholars who refute the concept of contemporary human 
rights and propound an Islamic and metaphysical understanding of rights, in­
stead. They believe that ‘Human Rights’ should be derived from humanity’s gen­
eral essence which only God completely knows and is described in the Book and 
embodied in the practices given by the Prophet. This concept of rights has prin­
cipal differences with contemporary understanding. Those scholars believe that 
only God himself has established rules and laws as human rights and that human 
beings are not able to create them through conventions. Defining human rights 
needs a common source which can establish tradition and norms (ibid.: 235–236).
Mojtahed Shabestari raises two points to counter this argument. The first is 
that many of the world’s people today are reluctant to think and act according 
to metaphysical rules, for they do not believe in a metaphysical source and mean­
ing for ethics and rights. Public culture in many societies is non­religious and 
metaphysically­based human rights are unimaginable. Secondly, the fundamen­
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talists’ belief in the idea that only God can define human rights is based on ide­
al realities and natural essences that prove the origin of human rights in religious 
texts. Here a very important question comes to mind about how the various read­
ings of religious texts should be regarded as the basis for the creation of crite­
ria for human rights (Mojtahed Shabestari 1383/2004). 
According to Mojtahed Shabestari, human rights are regarded as being with­
out religious limitations, and should be accepted by Muslims on the whole. In 
such interpretations, especially if analyzed from philosophical and legal per­
spectives on the early eras of Islam, modern notions such as political and reli­
gious freedom as well as other concepts found in the UDHR did not exist. Hence 
it is impossible to deduct such modern concepts from religious texts. These laws 
are new forms of respecting human dignity in the modern era, resulting from the 
historical­social transition of humans from traditional into modern life (ibid.: 
184), and which according to Mojtahed Shabestari are not contrary to Islam but 
are necessary to being Muslim in the modern epoch (ibid.: 74).
Mojtahed Shabestari (Interview January 2011) believes that Muslims should 
build their political and social life based on the UDHR because society is also 
composed of non­Muslims who have the right to participate in their own polit­
ical and social affairs. Furthermore, it is not rational to build a social life based 
on certain religious precepts because, as history has taught us, it leads to autoc­
racy. Instead, freedom and justice must be the basis for a human consensus, both 
of which are found in the UDHR. Therefore, in his point of view, the UDHR 
should be recognized in the constitutions of Islamic countries. Although of 
course, he points out, different countries can restrict the UDHR according to 
their ethical values, as long as these are rationally defendable and not contrary 
to other articles of the UDHR – for example, to prevent sexual freedom to the 
extent that it is understood in the West (Interview January 2011). Malekian (In­
terview January 2011) also admits that the UDHR is practical and necessary for 
safeguarding human rights, though he believes that it requires some revision 
based on the current knowledge of human beings. For example, the attachment 
of reservations to the declaration should be changed; since reservations could 
justify many inequalities exercised by participating states. The second point 
Malekian suggests is changing ‘freedom of speech’ to ‘freedom of reasoned 
speech’. This means a person who makes a public speech must have an argu­
ment based in reason; thereby the audience members would be respected and it 
would also prevent dictatorship (Interview January 2011).
CEDAW in the secular perspective 
The secular perspective considers CEDAW as an international effort and set of 
criteria for the fulfillment of gender equality, which should be accepted by all 
states. However, secularists believe that as a convention, it requires further im­
provement.
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Mojtahed Shabestari (Interview January 2011) considers CEDAW as an ac­
ceptable and valuable international effort for promoting equality, though he can­
not agree with some of its articles. For example, he criticizes Article 10 of CE­
DAW regarding education, which calls for “the elimination of any stereotyped 
concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of educa­
tion by encouraging coeducation and other types of education which will help 
to achieve this aim.” He says if the sciences can prove that coeducation helps 
both genders learn to observe ethical values such as respecting the family, not 
committing adultery, and also preparing the girl for motherhood, he would ac­
cept coeducation as well. He emphasizes the importance of maternal responsi­
bility, which he argues is ignored today because of the influence of industrial 
capitalism, although he rejects bringing up girls to only undertake the role of 
housewife, to take care of the household and take sole responsibility for the chil­
dren, which hinders their participation in social and political life of society. 
Therefore, he believes in different forms of upbringing for boys and girls.
Malekian (Interview January 2011) finds conventions like CEDAW positive 
and necessary, although he believes that such conventions must not be consid­
ered as ultimate solutions to specific issues. Therefore, while CEDAW is con­
sidered to be a basis for international standards for gender equality, it should be 
open for criticism and improvement. However, he notes that some Islamic coun­
tries whose religious culture is not compatible with CEDAW have theoretically 
accepted CEDAW, but do not exercise its principles. He says that only in Islam­
ic countries where a reformist interpretation of Islam – and not a fundamental­
ist or traditionalist one – dominates, can CEDAW be practically and theoretical­
ly implemented (Interview January 2011). 
8 4 Women’s Rights in a Rational Reading of Islam
Seculars are particularly critical of the fundamentalist view on women’s rights. 
For instance, Malakian (1387/2008) explains that fundamentalists are only con­
cerned about the ritualistic aspects of Islam and cannot see the spirit and the core 
message of the religion. He also regards this reading of Islam as superficially 
juridical and that it posits this as the only way to be a ‘real’ Muslim. They de­
fine the whole religion by the juridical aspect of Islam, namely the fiqh. Male­
kian sees this reading of Islam as patriarchal, with three main characteristics: 
the inferiority of women to men, lawful and juristic privileges for men, and the 
right to establish parentage for men in the family (Malekian 1387/2008: 323).
Similarly, Mojtahed Shabestari (1384/2006) criticizes the fundamentalist per­
spective as recognizing jurisprudence (fiqh) as the correct basis of being Mus­
lim, and explains that such a view defines women’s rights according to a natu­
ral order. Mojtahed Shabestari also distinguishes two schools of Islamic thought 
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regarding natural order, and describes the relevance of human organizations such 
as family, political systems and economic systems in each of them. He criticiz­
es the first group and explains that they try to percieve a natural order for these 
systems; it means they try to relate them with the order of creation. From this 
group’s view, family has a natural order in which the division of labor inside and 
outside corresponds to the divine order. The rights women are (or are not) enti­
tled to are likewise defined by this order. Accordingly, family and society have 
a natural structure which should be obeyed. Although there are various systems 
throughout history, only this natural system is legitimate and thus the only one 
upon which society should be formed. Furthemore, it is only in this case that the 
family system is in harmony with other approved structures in the universe. Thus, 
this view considers other systems defining relations between men and women 
as deviations from the natural system (ibid.).
By contrast, the other school of thought believes that seeking a natural hu­
man order in social life, including the family system which is based on physi­
cal differences between man and woman, is of no use. It is not possible to de­
clare fixed orders in the field of politics and economics or for the family. This 
school acknowledges a historical view of family order and the relations between 
men and women, in the way that any era has its forms of social life and family 
order. The most applicable and just kinds of contracts and division of labor for 
common life in every era must be found (ibid.: 502–504).
The historical view does not ignore the physical and psychological differenc­
es between man and woman, and unlike the natural view, addresses how exist­
ing differences are created in the course of history; thus they are not natural or 
necessarily acceptable. Historically created differences mean that they have not 
been formed by a prior program; the first view is that the existing differences of 
man and woman were decided and definite from the beginning. The historical 
view, in constrast, explains that men and women have obtained their differenc­
es over the course of history. While this has created a certain structure, it can be 
altered and other forms of structures – for example, other forms of family life 
with different kinds of labor division and judicial systems – can be put forth. It 
is possible to reduce existing differences on behalf of justice and equality (ibid.).
According to Mojtahed Shabestari, the fundamentalist view is based on the 
concept of a natural order in which the family system is defined. In this system, 
as a primary duty the woman had to breed children to guarantee the survival of 
the human race. Women had the duty to nurture the family, to provide proper 
care and to maintain a home for men in order to prepare them for their respon­
sibilities in society. Men were responsible for managing society, creating and 
maintaining civilizations. In this regard, the woman is not considered as a life 
partner for man and her only task was to lessen the stress and suffering in life 
for the man. The fundamentalist approach insists on maintaining this view of 
the family, claiming that providing equal laws for men and women in the fami­
ly goes against the natural order created by God, and therefore would be con­
trary to God’s will. In this notion, the duty of the individual was to recognize 
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the natural order and to act accordingly. Thus it was necessary for women to be 
obedient to men because this obligation is defined by the natural order of cre­
ation (Mojtahed Shabestari 1383/2004: 65). Accordingly, the fundamentalists 
regard the precepts mentioned in the scripture and tradition as an expression and 
explanation for the natural order of the family. Consequently, the laws made at 
the beginnings of Islam are unchangeable and fixed (Mojtahed Shabestari 
1384/2006: 502–507). Mojtahed Shabestari emphasizes that this concept should 
be altered since it is not in accordance with the modern era and modern Mus­
lims’ consciences (Mojtahed Shabestari 1383/2004: 66).
Both Mojtahed Shabestari (1384/2006) and Malekian (1387/2008) argue that 
to understand women’s rights in the Quran and in tradition, it is necessary to 
comprehend the essence and reason for the Prophet’s actions. Such arguments 
based on natural order do not help to gain a reasonable interpretation of the 
Prophet’s deeds. According to both Mojtahed Shabestari and Malekian, there is 
no doubt that the Prophet of Islam caused some changes to women’s rights, but 
it is important to find out why this took place. The Prophet altered some cruel 
and unjust regulations and laws about women in his time. For example, he for­
mally recognized the ability of ownership for women, limited the right to pre­
viously unconfined polygamy; balanced the inheritance regulations in some 
ways; and changed the severe unjust and unfair approach of society in his era to 
make it more affliliated with the perception of justice, directing it toward the un­
derstanding of justice in that time.
The general message of the Prophet is that what needs to be balanced or changed 
in existing regulations needs to be understood, such that it accords with justice 
(Mojtahed Shabestari 1384/2006: 509–510; Malekian 1387/2008: 334–335).
Accordingly, moving along the path of justice is the cause and source of 
changes in the field of women’s rights. Justice should be defined in every peri­
od because we do not have a fixed interpretation for it in any field of politics, 
economics or family. The intellectuals in each period have the duty to recognize 
inequalities and to promote new notions and analyses of justice, as well as to 
suggest proper ways to eliminate inequalities, rather than to justify them by re­
ferring to the natural order (Mojtahed Shabestari, 1384/2006: 510).
Mojtahed Shabestari (ibid.) refers to Muhammad Baqer Sadr, one of the con­
temporary Shiite scholars, who states: 
The period in which women had unequal rights compared to men, was a pe-
riod that the responsibilities of life, and managing family affairs were on the 
shoulders of men. Social structure required this inequality and according to that 
structure men had some rights which women were deprived of. If today’s wom-
an is to be man’s ‘life partner’ and not only the manager of his internal affairs, 
jurisprudential laws should be changed according to this role-change. If the bur-
den of family is to be divided between man and woman, man no longer can be 
the head of family and generally if women are playing roles in the stable devel-
opment of society shoulder to shoulder with men, they should enjoy rights ap-
propriate with this role (ibid.: 508).
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Approach to the legal instructions related to women’s rights
Unequal legal instructions related to women’s rights must be redefined based on 
current definitions of justice, regardless of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).
Mojtahed Shabestari (Interview January 2011) believes that all precepts re­
lated to women require revision based on a concept of justice. He refers to pa­
triarchy, which existed in the Prophet’s society and was not challenged by the 
Prophet. He emphasizes the necessity of substituting patriarchal perspectives 
with a justice perspective for gender, one that is defined by representatives in 
parliament and agreed upon after expert discussions regardless of religious defi­
nitions and precepts.
Similarly, Malekian (Interview January 2011) rejects all discriminatory laws 
against women and says such laws are not compatible with human reason, nor 
to moral conscience. In his point of view, differentiation in body and mind must 
not lead to disparity in rights and privileges, although he posits that if it were 
possible for individuals to choose their gender before birth, based on knowledge 
of the positive and negative points of both genders, then unequal rights between 
men and women would be acceptable. As this is not the case, discrimination 
against women in terms of their rights, for example, in divorce, polygamy, in­
heritance, and so on. is unacceptable. 
Conclusion
Similar to previous chapters which dealt with fundamentalists and reformists, 
the secular perspective in this section is discussed by applying the four aspects 
resulting from the theoretical framework.
Dialectical relationship between structure and individual (religion and human reason)
The secular view, criticizing the text­based interpretation of religion, defines 
religion as a transcendental experience and different from issues of daily life. 
It is a unitary experience of the world. In this experience, the individual has an 
important determining role, for he or she determines that unitary experience 
and the sources for his or her experience of transcendence. Also in this view, 
the individual chooses their own demeanor, lifestyle and thoughts, applying 
reason and rationality rather than imitating institutionalized and habituated tra­
ditions. Each person has their own experience and interpretation of the revela­
tion. Therefore, efforts to impose and dictate a definite interpretation of reli­
gion only prevent the individual from experiencing religion. This turning away 
from life as lived according to external expectations, to a life lived according 
to the individuals’ own inner experience is similar to what Heelas and Wood­
head (2005) call ‘subjectivization’, which refers to a shift from external author­
ity offered by institutionalized traditional religions to the authority “rooted in 
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individual experience and subjective validations” (cited in Granholm and As­
prem 2014: 28).
Accordingly, human reason and rationality are of great importance in provid­
ing the human being with the source of religious experience that is contrary to 
institutionalized religion, which can prevent religious and unitary experience. 
Therefore, according to the secular perspective, religion and revelation should 
evoke this kind of experience in the recipient. This view considers the human 
being not just as a thinking machine but as one that is capable of confirming and 
accepting his/her emotive and conative dimensions, and claims that humans need 
transcendental experiences and spirituality for life. To obtain this objective, hu­
man beings are able to borrow from different sources of knowledge, traditions 
and means, including various religions, “because of a widespread sense that all 
religious traditions are built upon common insights” (Vincett and Woodhead 
2009: 326).
The secular view discussed here is divided into two perspectives. The first 
view, represented by Mojtahed Shabestari, acknowledges the unitary experience 
of transcendence as a definition of religion and recognizes the Prophet as the 
initiator of such experience, who invites other people to such divine experience 
as well. Accordingly, the revelation and prophecy is an invitation to access teach­
ings and experiences rather than a presentation of a set of creeds that is beyond 
human perception, and the fulfillment of these as the only way to salvation. 
Therefore, this view bases the definition of being Muslim on a unitary experi­
ence rather than following text­based definitions. The reluctance to call such a 
unitary experience ‘spirituality’ and an emphasis on considering this under the 
shadow of Islam can be discussed from two intertwined viewpoints. 
From the first standpoint, this emphasis posits that such a definition of being 
Muslim and such rational interpretation of Islam gradually finds its place in prev­
alent interpretations of Islam in the modern era. Since this interpretation argues 
the necessity of modern concepts such as human rights and gender equality for 
Muslim societies from completely different points of view from the current prev­
alent text­based interpretations of Islam, it can broaden interpretations of Islam 
for compatibility with current rationality and reason. 
On another note, the emphasis on an Islamic framework for this faith and re­
ligious experience raises the question of whether this emphasis originates from 
a kind of fear of losing a religious tradition and cultural background. 
Such views bring to the surface new and critical questions and suggest vari­
ations on what has been inherited, and are different from traditional forms of in­
stitutional religion (see: Webb 2009). In their search, spiritual seekers still re­
quire a framework in order to express their perspectives through a reflective 
process of naming and sharing their experiences with the help of definite reli­
gious symbolic systems (see Noble 2011: 30). Of course, the tradition and cul­
ture in which one is born can be a source for growth and regeneration and pro­
vide a platform for expressing such experiences. Yet belonging to a particular 
tradition constrains a person to the practices of that community, even when the 
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person claims to adopt or adhere to some aspects of other traditions that are 
thought to enrich the spiritual experience. This means for example, that despite 
adopting teachings from other traditions, one recognizes that one remains a part 
of the community. This in turn means recognizing distinctions among different 
religious traditions throughout history, which is problematic because seculars 
criticize the historical definition of religion. They recognize the superiority of 
human structure over God as the origin of all religions. 
In the second secularist perspective, Malekian argues that the project of ra­
tionality and spirituality is aimed at extending the borders of definite cultures 
and religious traditions. This view is similar to contemporary religious currents 
of thought in the West on spirituality and esotericism, which are rooted in East­
ern religious traditions, mainly Hindu and Buddhist, as well as Islamic mysti­
cism,62 which have been adapted to the cultural framework and local circum­
stances (Granholm 2007: 61). Spirituality is understood “as a movement which 
(arose) in the nineteenth century in conscious reaction against existing forms of 
traditional religion, particularly the more conservative Christian churches” 
(Vincett and Woodhead 2009: 320). The movement challenges the “supersti­
tious, dogmatic religious imperative of old” (ibid.) as well as the power of in­
stitutionalized religions. Such views do not believe in the disappearance or death 
of religion in the modern era, but rather they acknowledge the need of human 
beings for new forms of religiosity to provide inner satisfaction for a human life. 
These new forms of religiosity comply with the new ideals and concepts derived 
from rationality and are in accordance to human needs in the modern era (Gra­
nholm 2007: 52). Therefore, it pays special attention to modern concepts and 
the domination of reason and rationality, contrary to traditional religions which 
rely on the ‘supra rational’ or ‘irrational’. This kind of definition has its own 
features such as “the decline of the belief in pre­given or natural orders of things” 
(Granholm and Asprem 2014). In this process, non­reasoning thought and ac­
tion are replaced by ‘instrumental causality’, which seeks “reasons for events in 
the world in terms of material causation” (Granholm: 2007: 62–3). Another dis­
tinctive point is the non­belief in a personal God and the lack of emphasis on 
life in the hereafter, and instead a belief in some form of contact with the divine 
Spirit in the here and now (Noble 2011: 23). 
The other remarkable point is the emphasis of the secular stream of thought 
on the subjectivization of the experience of religion, which is different from ‘in­
dividualization’. “Whilst it is true that the subjective turn sees individuals em­
62  “Islamic mysticism is called tasawwuf (literally, “to dress in wool”) in Arabic, but it has been 
called Sufism in Western languages since the early 19th century.” It refers to “belief and prac­
tice in which Muslims seek to find the truth of divine love and knowledge through direct per­
sonal experience of God. It consists of a variety of mystical paths that are designed to ascer­
tain the nature of humanity and of God and to facilitate the experience of the presence of divine 
love and wisdom in the world” [Schimmel, Annemarie. Sufism, Islam. Encyclopaedia Britan­
nica; Britannica’s Public Website.Available at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/top­
ic/571823/Sufism (accessed 21 May 2015)].
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phasizing their personal experience as their source of meaning, significance and 
authority, this need not imply that they will be atomistic, discrete or selfish” 
(Heelas and Woodhead 2005: 11).
The seculars aimed at attaining an inner satisfaction for human beings and to 
release the individual from personal, inner conflict as well as social and politi­
cal dysfunctional conflicts, and to extend individual solicitude beyond the self 
to altruism. The individual bears other people’s suffering as if it was their own 
issue. Ultimately, it leads to social relations based on humanity and love that are 
beyond justice. Therefore, this perspective is not restricted to individual human 
beings but also has a social influence. It seems that the sociopolitical and his­
torical context from which this view arises has influenced the current emphasis 
on individual aspects of religion. This context has been dominated by a text­
based fundamental interpretation of Islam that contains instructions and creeds 
for all aspects of individual and social human life. In this context, the Islamic 
government aims to fulfill all Islamic laws in society to attain salvation in this 
world and the afterworld. Consequently, it seems logical that secular perspec­
tives emphasize the individual aspects of faith and experiences of religion, and 
also “a neutral stand for governments, even where they remained bound up with 
the religion prevailing in the country“ (Habermas 2008)63, although this can be 
at the expense of dealing with some of the current discussions in the West, af­
ter the failure of theories of secularization such as the debate on the social role 
of religion as a moral source in generating solidarity among citizens in a secu­
lar society, as discussed by Habermas (see: Reder 2011).
In conclusion, in the secular perspective, human reason and rationality are 
emphasized as being independent from revelation. Human beings are not only 
recognized as possessing pure rationality, but also other emotive and conative 
dimensions, and there is a dialectical relationship between religion and human 
reason – or in other words, between structure and individual agent. 
Crisis of meaning 
The seculars do not restrict the sources of human cognition to the dominant re­
ligion in a particular society; instead they acknowledge other human knowledge 
and sciences as sources of cognition. Therefore, subjective meaning is based on 
various resources of knowledge. On another note, secularists regard the objec­
tified meaning offered by religion is based on rationality. This view does not rec­
ognize the Quran and sunna as the book and source of law, but rather desacral­
izes them, defining them as historical human texts which need certain 
methodologies, such as phenomenology and hermeneutics, in order to be stud­
ied and understood. Of course such an understanding is not intended to provide 
precepts to build the basis of human life upon, though they can provide the hu­
63  Notes on a post­secular society. Availale at http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html 
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man being with substance for human faith and religious experiences like other 
resources can. Accordingly, the objectified meaning offered by religion overlaps 
with the subjective meaning, and hence the crisis of meaning decreases in the 
secular perspective. In fact, this kind of religiosity or spirituality can be seen as 
the most appropriate form of religion to fulfil human needs in the modern era. 
Justice as participatory parity for men and women in political, cultural, and economic dimensions 
and in the family
The emphasis on a rational interpretation of Islam leads to the non­recognition 
of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in defining and determining women’s and human 
rights. Similar to other currents of Islamic thought, in the secular view, defining 
rights must be based on justice, though justice is completely independent from 
religion and every religious definition. In seculars’ opinion, determining wom­
en’s rights requires expert discussion, but the remarkable point in this view is 
that Islamic jurisprudence is not allowed to interfere in this subject. This point 
separates secularists from reformists. Accordingly, the secular interpretation ac­
knowledges participatory parity for men and women in political, cultural and 
economic dimensions as well as in the family and confirms this as a requisite 
for justice in society. This view also regards a society in which justice is based 
on participatory parity for all human beings as a prerequisite for human free­
dom and important in the realization of faith and being Muslim. 
Accordingly, the UDHR and CEDAW are recognized as international stan­
dards for the protection of human dignity and human rights which must be guar­
anteed by all states. 
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9  Changing Gender Norms in the Dialectical Relationship 
Between Revelation and Human Reason
Today, incorporating gender equality into law is regarded as a requirement for 
fulfilling social justice. Accordingly, there are many international agreements 
that seek to achieve gender equality. Fulfillment of gender equality requires na­
tion states to adopt legislation and programs to provide women and men with 
equal opportunities, rights, and access to resources in all spheres of life, includ­
ing economic, political and cultural. Gender equality also entails modifying and 
changing existing customs, and social and cultural practices that prejudice and 
perpetuate the superiority of masculine traits, and the inferiority of everything 
coded as feminine (CEDAW).
Despite the mechanisms that are in place, gender equality remains unfulfilled 
in different places around the world. In many countries, women remain margin­
alized in the economic, political and cultural spheres. This can be found most 
notably in many Islamic countries. 
This study is aimed at investigating the perspectives of the main streams of 
Islamic thought on women’s rights and gender equality in modern times, em­
ploying a sociological theoretical model based on the theory of structuration by 
Anthony Giddens, the sociology of Religion by Peter Berger and Thomas Luck­
mann, theories of justice and recognition by Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, 
and the theory of cosmopolitan norms of justice by Seyla Benhabib. In my con­
clusion, I will first reconsider the theoretical model and then reflect on those 
streams of Islamic thought which I analysed. I will then discuss the consequenc­
es for the concepts of justice, especially justice based on individual self­deter­
mination as mentioned in recognition theories versus desert­based justice. 
9 1  The Model for the Dialectical Relationship Between Religion,  
Revelation, Reason and Individual Agency
It can be concluded from the theories by Giddens, Berger and Luckmann, that 
there is a dialectical relationship between individual agents, structure and soci­
ety. Religion, as a factor of structure, defines a framework for the interaction of 
individual agents by providing rules and resources from its moral and practical 
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interpretations of what personal and social life should entail, as well as obliga­
tions and sanctions. Religion also offers a value and meaning system for the 
non­material needs of human beings. On the other hand, human beings have an 
important role in the production and reproduction of rules and sources. Individ­
ual agency examines the patterns of interaction through ‘reflexive monitoring,’ 
employing human reason and rational explanation, hence the human being does 
not passively accept all patterns of interaction, but rather questions and rejects 
them whenever he or she finds them irrational. Therefore, individual agents and 
structure, as well as religion as an element of structure, have a dialectical rela­
tionship. Accordingly, when this dialectical relationship is disrupted, or the val­
ue and meaning system presented by religion does not satisfy the human needs 
of value, meaning and spirituality, a crisis of meaning emerges. 
The dialectical relationship between the individual agent and structure – and 
the relationship between human reason and revelation – has existed throughout 
history; from pre­modern society to modern society. However, in pre­modern 
society, because of the undifferentiated and overlapping areas of politics, eco­
nomics, and culture, religion was recognized as the only legitimate authority to 
organize and conduct all issues of human life, on both the personal and social 
levels. In fact, religion provided a rational and meaningful framework for the 
unstructured and irrational aspects of human life and issues. Therefore, in the 
dialectical relationship between religion and individual agent, or between reve­
lation and human reason, religion was regarded as the rational offering of a prop­
er value and meaning system to suit human needs, as well as solutions to vari­
ous and overlapping political, economic, cultural and social issues in pre­modern 
society. Hence, in pre­modern times, there was no crisis of meaning.
Major changes in the political, social, economic and cultural realities brought 
about by modernization, development and globalization raised the question of 
whether religion was still able to offer rational solutions for human needs and 
issues in modern societies. These issues are characterized by distinct econom­
ic, political, and cultural practices, based on their own autonomy, values and 
norms that are different from religious norms and values. The rational function 
of religion is to recognize the subsystems’ autonomy, and their norms and val­
ues as independent from religious norms, while continuing to provide meaning 
and a value system. Furthermore, it should be noted that both the value and mean­
ing system presented by religion is able to satisfy human needs for meaning, or 
it is simply imposing its authority on human beings. If religion neglects human 
needs, the gap, between the subjective meaning made by human beings and the 
objectified meaning presented by religion leads to an emergence of a crisis of 
meaning. 
As an outcome of modernity, pluralism grants human beings the opportuni­
ty to make choices between alternative worldviews, including religious perspec­
tives. Therefore, the functioning dialectical relationship between individual and 
religion is possible, if religion not only recognizes the agency of and the free­
dom of choice for the individual, but also provides opportunities in which hu­
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man beings can attain self­realization and self­determination. Accordingly, jus­
tice in this model means providing equal access to rules and resources of 
structure and also of religion; in other words, equal access to political, econom­
ic and cultural resources and recognition of gender equality in these dimensions 
as well as in the family. On this matter, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women provide practical criteria for the protection of human/women’s 
rights, and helps ensure equal access to rules and resources of structure as well 
as the fulfillment of gender equality. This leads to individual self­determination 
for every person in society and ultimately provides life circumstances proper to 
human dignity. 
9 2 Main Currents of Islamic Thought
Insisting that religion is the only legitimate source for defining norms and au­
tonomy for all subsystems leads to a situation that is unacceptable by human 
reason, which means disruption in the dialectical relationship between revela­
tion and reason. Among the various streams of Islamic thought discussed in this 
study, the fundamentalist view aims to impose norms, values and authority on 
all subsystems through the fulfillment of Islamic law without any alteration, 
which can lead to unacceptable discriminatory laws. This view neglects the 
self­determination and agency of individuals and enforces pre­determined roles 
and identities on human beings, which leads to a crisis of meaning. 
Fundamentalists aim to put all Islamic law into practice regardless of the mod­
ern circumstances of society. In their view, Islamic laws are consistent and eter­
nal, and cannot be interpreted. Any interpretation of the Quran and sunna results 
in modification and changes in Islamic law, which is regarded as innovation in 
religion and hence is unacceptable. Islamic laws are regarded as just and fair 
and shall remain just and fair forever because they were revealed by God and 
adopted by the Prophet. Since God’s will is ipso facto just, obedience of his com­
mands as embodied in Islamic law, by all his creatures, leads to the fulfillment 
of perfect justice. Accordingly, fundamentalists emphasize that Islamic laws are 
a set of the ultimate and complete teachings and instructions for human life in 
all aspects, and thus provide human beings with the path to salvation in this 
world and in the afterlife. Therefore, while modern concepts such as human and 
women’s rights are not explicitly mentioned in Islamic teachings and law, they 
are concepts that are deeply embedded in Islamic tradition. As such, fundamen­
talists point out that complete enforcement of Islamic laws in society would en­
sure the protection of human and women’s rights. They argue that all outcomes 
of human reason would be within the scope of Islam, and hence are reflected in 
the Islamic laws. All outcomes of human reason and experience that contradicts 
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Islamic laws are not an outcome of rationality and human reason, but rather il­
lusionary reasoning. Consequently, fundamentalists believe that reason is need­
ed to confirm and understand the revelation’s contents, but reason that is inde­
pendent from revelation is inconceivable; instead human reason is a subset and 
subsidiary of divine revelation. 
In contrast to fundamentalists, Muslim secularists reject the text­based defi­
nition of being Muslim and emphasize the role of faith, spirituality and religious 
experience. On this matter, human beings are regarded as subjective agents who 
recognize and affirm their identities as Muslims, while also consciously choos­
ing important aspects of religion that they think will enhance their spiritual ex­
perience. Secularists challenge the notion of religion as a closed system, defined 
solely by text­based interpretations. In this way, the Muslim is not a passive be­
liever that simply accepts a historical definition of being Muslim. This means 
that everything in history that has been understood as Islam and all historical 
events which have occurred in the name of Islam provide and determine a defi­
nition of being Muslim, in the way that being Muslim means a commitment to 
following the definite set of rituals and precepts provided in the course of his­
tory. This perspective regards reason as independent from revelation and ac­
knowledges the autonomy and authority of human reason as a criterion for dis­
tinguishing good from evil. Hence, reason is the foundation for defining and 
determining the rights and laws in modern society, rather than the revelation as 
manifested in the Quran, sunna and Islamic laws. In order to attain religious and 
unitary experience a healthy society is required where social and political ar­
rangements provide human beings with individual freedom and self­determina­
tion. Regarding this, various conventions on human and women’s rights and gen­
der equality have become more important, for they respect and protect 
individual rights in society and promote self­determination and freedom for ev­
ery person in society. Therefore, such conventions are required for an Islamic 
society. 
Between the secular and fundamentalist perspectives stands the reformist 
view. The reformists aim to present an interpretation of Islam in which Islamic 
laws are compatible with modern concepts, such as human and women’s rights, 
though their efforts involve a text­based interpretation of Islam and being Mus­
lim. Accordingly in their interpretation, conventions on human and women’s 
rights are not contrary to Islamic teachings, but must be emphasized in accor­
dance with the essence and message of Islam. This perspective attaches partic­
ular importance to human reason and its independence from revelation, though 
it does not believe in ‘the self­sufficiency of reason.’ They still acknowledge the 
need for reason to be guided by revelation. Reason and revelation both connect 
God with human beings and both are required to live a better life; hence they 
cannot be in conflict with each other. All three streams of Islamic thought rec­
ognize the attainment of justice in society as the aim of religion and prophecy. 
However, they have different definitions and recommendations for the fulfill­
ment of justice. 
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9 3 Desert-Based Notion of Justice
Fundamentalists acknowledge a ‘desert­based’ notion of justice. This means that 
justice is making sure everything in its place and everyone is given their proper 
rights. Persons of equal status must be treated equally and are entitled to equal 
rights, but persons of unequal status must be treated based on their desert. Based 
on this definition of justice, fundamentalists consider gender equality as a vio­
lation of justice and hence unacceptable. Since a desert­based notion of justice 
is justified by the state of nature, women and men are naturally, in the funda­
mentalist view, distinguished from and even opposed to each other, regardless 
of the lack of scientific evidence for such categorization. Fundamentalists em­
ploy a ‘character dichotomy’, and define a set of biological, physical, and men­
tal traits of women that are completely different from men. Consequently, jus­
tice requires various and unequal rights for men and women, and the legal 
system is based on this ‘character dichotomy’ between men and women rather 
than gender equality. Therefore, different duties and roles are defined for men 
and women, which in some cases are endorsed by the legal system, such as de­
fining the head of the family as a role, only men are entitled to. Similarly, oth­
er patriarchal norms and role­specific tasks based on the concept of the superi­
ority and inferiority of the sexes in both private and public spheres are recognized 
in the fundamentalist view. As a result, women have unequal rights and are forced 
to accept defined roles and duties by a patriarchal system in the name of reli­
gion. They do not have any opportunity to define their own identity and to at­
tain individual self­determination. 
Equal participation in political and economic life will only be possible along­
side legal and cultural recognition, so that these factors are intertwined. How­
ever, according to the fundamentalist view, defining rights and laws based on 
the character dichotomy of men and women naturally restricts access for wom­
en to resources in various political, economic, and cultural dimensions, as well 
as in the realm of family. Accordingly, the desert­based justice in this view de­
prives women of their human rights and the opportunity to self­realization and 
a life proper to human dignity.  
9 4  Justice Based on Individual Self-Determination Versus  
Desert-Based Justice
In contrast to the desert­based notion of justice, there is an egalitarian notion of 
justice which aims to provide opportunities for self­determination for every per­
son, in order that they may achieve life circumstances appropriate to human dig­
nity. In such a society, the individual has the freedom to choose their own faith 
and is able to attain self­realization and self­determination. This enables and 
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supports the agency and the subjectivity of the individual in having a unitarian 
experience and to choose religious content. This notion of justice provides hu­
man beings with the feeling of ‘dignity’ or integrity through patterns of recog­
nition. Accordingly, patriarchal norms, role­specific tasks and authority in the 
family transfer into equality, cooperation and partnership. Furthermore, the view 
on marriage as an economic contract between man and woman, so that the man 
gains household services and sexual ownership over his wife through the ex­
change of a dowry and maintenance as sale price, would be replaced with a view 
of marriage as a social relationship based on love which provides emotional sup­
port and encouragement in order to attain self­confidence for both husband and 
wife. Instead of a hierarchical power relationship between a man and a woman, 
both are able to interact as persons with equal rights, within the family and in 
society. This kind of relationship leads to self­respect. Ultimately, recognition 
of differences among individuals that are not based on a ‘character dichotomy’ 
helps individuals to develop self­esteem and fosters solidarity. In this way, it 
provides circumstances in which all human beings can attain self­realization and 
the feeling of dignity. 
Reformists, despite rejecting the desert­based notion of justice and believing 
in egalitarian justice, differ from secular view in the recognition of individual 
self­determination. Since the reformist view does not recognize the self­suffi­
ciency of reason but rather posit human reason’s need for revelation, reformists 
cannot recognize the complete independence of reason from revelation. The lack 
of complete independence disturbs the dialectical relationship between reason 
and revelation. Accordingly, this view cannot recognize individual self­determi­
nation in all aspects and dimensions of life. Reformists do not acknowledge the 
agency and subjectivity of Muslims in defining the content of religion, but rath­
er regard some essential laws in Islam as unchangeable. They also emphasize 
how the individual, as a Muslim, should accept and believe in such laws as the 
essential laws of Islam. Therefore, this view has not been yet totally successful 
in justifying and accepting all human rights and gender equality in detail, for it 
has not yet been able to recognize individual self­determination, particularly for 
women. Nonetheless, reformists have been successful to open a space for debat­
ing and accepting human and women’s rights in society through their efforts to 
offer an interpretation of Islam based on an egalitarian notion of justice, which 
is not only compatible with human and women’s rights in general, but also rec­
ognizes that human and women’s rights are necessary for Muslim society. There­
fore, this view has changed some discriminatory Islamic laws in favor of wom­
en’s rights; though it was not completely successful in changing patronizing 
perspectives on women. It seems that such perspectives need more debate and 
should be challenged in the public sphere in order to attain a better understand­
ing of human rights, justice, and gender equality. 
A remarkable point is that it does not suffice when a definite interpretation 
of Islam claims to acknowledge dignity for both men and women. Recognition 
of human dignity is of crucial importance in the value and meaning system of­
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fered by that interpretation. It is important to understand that if an Islamic view 
that claims to respect human dignity for both men and women still expects the 
human being to deny self­determination and to passively accept the roles and 
identity that are predetermined by society and culture, including religion, then 
it must acknowledge individual freedom and self­determination for the Muslim 
individual. Therefore, acknowledging human dignity requires the recognizing 
of the subjectivity and self­determination of individuals.
Gender equality is not conceivable in the fundamentalist interpretation of Is­
lam. Nonetheless, this perspective and its followers and representatives should 
be challenged in the public sphere in order to show how such insights are unsa­
cred and originate from patriarchal interpretation of Islam. The reformist view 
has played an important role in Iran after the 1979 revolution in bringing the is­
sues of women’s rights and CEDAW into the public sphere, and thereby to en­
hance the public consciousness on gender equality through endeavors to reform 
and change discriminatory laws against women. 
Thinkers from different streams of Islamic thought, particularly reformists, 
do not have a permanent and stable position on the spectrum and there has been 
a slow move towards secular thought, so that reformists gradually tend to give 
more space to human reason and recognize more autonomy for human reason 
independent from revelation. Accordingly, the issue of women’s rights and gen­
der equality receive deeper debate in the secular view; so that such debate on 
women’s rights have changed from mere reform of some Islamic laws on wom­
en’s rights to a new view on individual agency and individual rights. 
The notable point is that the secular view has surfaced from reformers in their 
later phases of intellectual life, and they have gradually presented a new inter­
pretation of Islam that emphasizes individual agency and human reason in un­
derstanding Islamic teachings. They believe in the independence of human rea­
son from revelation. However, this new view does not mean the reduction of the 
impact of religion and faith on human life, but rather leads to conscious religi­
osity and being Muslim in accordance with the human needs of modern times. 
Therefore, gender equality in this view is not only compatible with Islam, but 
also necessary in an Islamic society. In the secular interpretation of Islam, one 
can be recognized as Muslim and enjoy individual self­determination, whether 
man or woman. It seems necessary that this interpretation of Islam should be 
discussed more in the public sphere; thereby it gradually finds its place among 
various interpretation of Islam. Finally, the reformist view should be further chal­
lenged and debated in the public sphere to attain pluralistic interpretations of Is­
lam that are compatible with human rights and gender equality. 
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